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People who (in relation to their personal taxation) defraud the Inland 
Revenue and people who (in relation to their supplementary benefit 
payments) defraud the Department of Health and Social Security are 
similarly engaged in economic crimes which result in loss to the public 
purse. These crimes provoke differential political, official, judicial and 
public responses. Differential response to tax and suplementary benefit 
fraud can neither be explained by reference to qualitative differences in 
the commission of the illegal acts involved, nor by the crude suggestion 
that differential regulation of tax and benefit fraud is nothing more than 
a conspiracy of the rich against the poor. Rather, such differential 
response derives from the different combinations of legal, economic, social 
and ideological histories of these two forms of fraud. In this thesis, 
analysis of these differential and combinatory histories centres on the 
material conditions and ideological discourses within which differential 
response is made possible. In addition the vocabularies of motive offered 
for both the commission and regulation of tax and supplementary benefit 
fraud are analysed. These analyses together reveal that differential and 
shifting material and ideological conditions create different opportunities 
and justifications for both tax and supplementary benefit fraud. At the 
same time they also enable policy makers continually to change the modes 
of regulation of both types of crime. The bulk of the thesis is aimed at 
demonstrating how and why knowledges about taxation and welfare are not 
immutable but are forever open to deconstruction and challenge. 
(ix) 
The slogan that there is 'one law for the rich and another for the 
poor' is often used to describe, in commonsense terms, the differential 
response to those who 'fiddle' taxes and those who 'fiddle' welfare 
benefits. But such assertions are not explanations. The analysis that 
follows therefore aims to go beyond assertion - to describe how and 
explain why tax and supplementary benefit fraud receive such totally 
different social responses. 
Initially, the first objective of the research was to confirm the 
existence of differential response to tax and supplementary benefit fraud 
at an empirical level. This was to be done by an investigation of the 
following: 
(i) the circumstances under which fraudsters operate in order to gain 
financial advantage illegally from the state; 
(ii) the processes involved in the policing of fraudsters by regulatory 
agencies; 
(iii) the management of fraudsters' punishments, and the ways in which 
their offences are interpreted by others. 
Once this had been done the second objective was to explain the 
differential responses to tax and benefit fraud by attempting to theorize 
the economic and political conditions and the social ideologies that have 
made such a differential response possible. In this way the research had 
1 
the overall objective of generating a new set of problems and a new agenda 
for discussion. 
Phase 2- Deciding what to do. 
The knowledge gained in the initial phase of the research generated a set 
of more specific research aims. These can be summarised as follows: 
1) The examination in detail of: 
(a) the techniques used by tax and supplementary benefit fraudsters to 
defraud the state. 
(b) the rationales they employ to justify their actions. 
2) The examination in detail of: 
(a) the techniques used by investigators regulating tax and 
supplementary benefit fraud. 
(b) the rationales offered by the two enforcing departments for both 
their anti-fraud policies in general and their effective investigatory 
practice in particular. 
3) The elucidation of common themes in the representation of taxpayers and 
benefit claimants in political, departmental and judicial discourses. 
The first examination was carried out by means of in-depth interviews 
with tax and benefit fraudsters, (together with an analysis of 
complementary secondary source material). The second was based upon 
interviews with Revenue and D. H. S. S. spokesmen and unofficial 
conversations with departmental staff. Other sources were used to confirm 
and augment comments by departmental staff. (For instance, Public Accounts 
Committee reports an both Revenue and D. H. S. S. investigation policy, and 
ministerial pronouncements were examined). 
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In directing research towards these specific issues the initial 
problem of diffe]ential response to tax and benefit fraud was 
deconstructed in terms of its constituent parts: subsequent analysis 
therefore focussed on (1) the fraudsters, the investigators, and the 
enforcing departments and (2) the political, economic and ideological 
preconditions which framed their actions and policies. 
Phase 3- Deciding on the theoretical analysis to be undertaken. 
In order to deconstruct 'the problem' and to identify the conditions 
which have enabled differential response to tax and benefit fraud to 
develop, the research had to 
(1)Examine in detail both the social processes and discourses giving rise 
to differential response in practice and the broader social, political and 
ideological conditions under which these processes were made possible. 
(2)Engage in a variety of methodological procedures in order to analyse 
the modes through which differential response became apparent: for 
instance, its manifestation through social interaction in communities, 
departmental policy, political and judicial discourse, and ideological 
construction (for example in commonsense and media discourses). 
As a focus for investigation I posed the following questions: 
(1) How do otherwise law-abiding pimple come to commit economic crime by 
means of tax and supplementary benefit fraud? 
Such law-breaking is often a learned activity: for instance, in the case 
of tax fraud, workmates or business colleagues can offer positive 
definitions of tax crime as either shrewd business practice, or simply as 
a chance to beat the taxman (Sutherland, 1940). Similarly it can be argued 
that amongst many supplementary benefit claimants fraud is not perceived 
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as 'criminal' because of the dominance of definitions of fraud as an 
understandable response to the problems of poverty. In this way 
Sutherland's theory of differential association illuminates some of the 
analyses by focussing on the way in which criminal behaviour is learned 
in association with those who define such behaviour favourably and in 
isolation from those who would define it unfavourably (Sutherland, 1960). 
However, it is essential to analyse in more depth precisely how these 
fraudsters justify their crimes, (both to themselves and to others), in 
attempts to avoid unfavourable (criminal) definitions of their actions. 
The justifications which fraudsters offer therefore had to be analysed 
in order to explain what specific vocabularies are successfully (and 
unsuccessfully) invoked to excuse their illegal actions. As David Xatza 
(1964) argued, criminal actions do not indicate a commitment to 'deviant' 
values: rather, law-breaking is made possible through the use of excuses 
and rationalizations which he terms 'techniques of neutralization' by which 
individuals retain their committment to the norms of mainstream society. 
These techniques may involve denial of responsibility for the act: for 
instance a benefit claimant may displace direct responsibility by arguing 
that poverty and deprivation are responsible for fraud. Denial of harm or 
injury is another technique of neutralization. This technique, for instance, 
was used by a benefit fraudster who said that he had not, after all, 'hurt' 
anyone (see Chapter 5 (3)). A further technique involves shifting 
responsibility for the act away from the individual by condemning those 
who enforce the rules: for example tax fraudsters frequently blame the 
Revenue for its allegedly complex and harsh regulations (see Chapter 
4(1b)). Similarly benefit fraudsters often blame the D. H. S. S. bureaucracy 
for creating a situation in which fraud represents a rational response to 
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the vagaries of the benefit system (see 'swings and roundabouts', Chapter 
4 (2b)). Particularly interesting is the way in which one set of 
mainstream values (for instance the tax fraudster's committment to the 
accumulation of wealth and entrepeneurialism), may be used to justify 
breaking. the law. The work of Matza has therefore been useful in 
exploring the justificatory rhetoric of fraudsters, though it does not go 
so far as to explain why, tax fraudsters can invoke certain justifications 
successfully whereas benefit fraudsters engaged in similar activities 
cannot. 
In addition to techniques of neutralization, fraudsters' justifications 
also involve complex rhetorics of self-adjustment (Taylor, 1979). Such 
rhetorics may be purposive, serving to protect the individual's conscience 
before the commission of the illegal act: for instance, a benefit fraudster 
may justify fiddling 'for shoes for the kids' or to pay a fuel debt to 
avoid the disconnection of the fuel supply. Of course, this 'justification' 
may be seen as a justifiable explanation for fraud. However, in calculating 
culpability courts of law tend to conflate one with the other but use only 
the language of justification. Explanations which are not justifications in 
the law's terms have to be suppressed (Carlen, 1976). 
Alternatively, rhetorics of self-reconciliation may be invoked after 
the act has taken place: for example, the justification of the arbitrary 
'swings and roundabouts' of the benefit system (already mentioned) may be 
used by a benefit fraudster who fails to inform the D. H. S. S. of an 
advantageous change in, financial circumstances because this would have 
delayed his/her benefit payments. But, as Dittan (1977) argues, there may 
not be any particular relevance in whether motivational rhetorics were 
invoked before or after the act: what is significant is that the individual 
feels that s/he has acted in a justifiable way, with an apparent cause. For 
instance, in the case of tax fraud it may be possible for an evader 
initially to justify fraud on the grounds of an intrusive, stifling and 
over-taxing state. Yet after the event s/he may justify not declaring 
income to the Revenue by arguing that the Revenue did not ask for the 
information to be furnished (see Chapter 4). The issue of which 
justification came first, (whether 'excessive taxation' or 'you didn't ask 
me'), makes little difference to the individual who is able to offer a 
complex rhetoric of motivation. 
(2) How do departmental personnel justify their implementation of official 
tam as er? 
In addition, therefore, to analysing the language of motive impelling the 
two departments, it was essential to specify which explanations and 
justifications were absent from their accounts. The absence of certain 
motivations and explanations from official discourse serves to present the 
issues of tax and benefit fraud in very specific ways. The nature of 
official discourse surrounding personal taxation and welfare provision was 
therefore explored so that the theoretical foreclosures which prevented 
alternative discourses from emerging could be examined (Burton and Carlen, 
1977). For example, both the Revenue and the D. H. S. S. prefer to be seen as 
motivated by objective, technical, efficiency-based, even bureaucratic 
factors. But in avowing such official discourse the two departments 
systematically preclude alternative interpretations of their rationales, 
alternatives which would destroy the 'pre-givens' of the discourse itself 
(ibid). In the case of the D. H. S. S. discourses relating to supplementary 
benefit payments stress the goals of administrative efficiency and the 
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accurate targetting of benefits according to demonstrable 'need'. 
Alternative discourses could focus upon the goals of social justice, the 
elimination of poverty and payment of benefits as of 'right'. In the case 
of the Inland Revenue official discourse stresses administrative efficiency 
whici is interpreted as collecting tax while sparing the taxpayers' 
feelings (Chapter 5). Alternative discourse would indicate the 
contradictory effects of these ostensibly pragmatic goals and focus 
instead on the efficient collection of taxes through such means as 
increasing Revenue manpower, issuing returns to taxpayers at regular 
intervals of not less than three years), and publishing the names of 
defaulters as a deterrent to evasion. As all these alternative discourses 
have been articulated in recent years (see Keith Committee Report, Cmnd 
8822,1983), the prime theoretical task of this research was to identify 
the conditions, material and ideological, under which official discourses 
on taxation and welfare triumph while alternatives to them fail. 
(Definitional note - at this point it is apposite to define my usage of 
the terms 'ideological' and 'material'. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
term 'ideological conditions' will be used to refer to particular sets of 
ideas and already-known constructs which people use to apprehend, 
understand and present their social world. Ideological conditions have 
material effects in that they shape how people deal with and respond to 
the social world. 'Material' conditions refer to circumstances which exist 
independantly of ideological presentations, which are beyond the control 
of governments but which demand responses. For example, the material 
conditions of famine, scarcity, war and international economic 
circumstances). 
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The task, (of examining the material and ideological preconditions for 
official and alternative discourses), involved an analysis of political, 
economic and social discourses about taxation and welfare policies. It is 
within these discourses that explanations of both official and alternative 
responses to claimant and taxpayer can be located. They have effects 
according to the ways in which they are realised in organizational and 
political contexts. Therefore, once the investigative part of the project 
was completed I decided to analyse the empirical material in an attempt to 
theorise: 
(a) the nature of the contradictions between the stated goals and 
effective practice of social policy relating to personal taxation and to 
welfare provision in modern Britain. 
(b) the context and form of the interactions between Revenue/D. H. S. S. 
staff and claimant /taxpayer through which these contradictions were 
realised. 
In general the mode of analysis used in the research centred upon an 
examination of the vocabularies of motive utilized by those involved in 
the commission, regulation and punishment of tax and supplementary benefit 
fraud. These vocabularies are differentially distributed within society and 
the justificatory rationales of certain groups are more readily accepted 
than the (negotiated) reasons which other groups offer for essentially 
similar actions (Taylor, 1979). The irony of the overlap of motives for 
tax and benefit fraud is a central focus of this thesis. Whilst similar 
motives can be offered for tax and for benefit fraud, (for example the 
justification that 'everyone is doing it'), these motives are not attributed 
always the same meanings in either official or popular discourses. It may 
be argued, for example, that tax evasion is a logical response to 
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diminishing economic incentives to effort, yet the incentives argument is 
turned on its head when applied to supplementary, benefit claimants who 
may effectively suffer 100% 'tax' on legitimate marginal earnings (see 
Chapter 4). Similarly, the entrepeneurial spirit evident in the 'thriving' 
black economy may be welcomed when it is d: monstrated by some citizens, 
but not if they are in receipt of welfare benefits (Chapter 4). 
Phase 4- The Empirical Vork 
Both tax and supplementary benefit fraud are partly hidden activities 
and this gives rise to obvious difficulties in re. iearching the, area. In 
order to analyse the techniques and justificatory rationales of the 
fraudsters, I first had to seek out individual fraudsters, (whose illegal 
fiddles may or may not have been detected by regulatory agents), and 
obtain their confidence and co-operation. At the same time it was 
necessary to get a picture of what those regulatory agents were doing to 
detect fraud and police taxpayers and claimants. But, as their 
investigatory work depends for its success on the concealment of their 
techniques from the individuals they police, there was understandable 
reticence on the part of the enforcing departments to discuss their 'modus 
operandi'. The problem of secrecy was thus experienced from two vantage 
points: first from the perspective of the fraudsters who, if undetected, 
were anxious to retain both anonymity and secrecy regarding their 
sometimes distinctive fiddles. Second, from the perspective of the 
investigators, whose departmental bosses were often preoccupied with 
'official secrets' to an absurd extent, (particularly as some of the 
'secrets' of investigation work were in reality well known, as will be seen 
below). 
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The immediate problem facing me was therefore one of entry into a 
hidden area of social activity and into a hidden area of social regulation. 
I attempted to overcome some of these problems by seeking official co- 
operation from both the Inland Revenue and the D. H. S. S. by writing to the 
managers of four local offices outlining my research and requesting an 
interview. The two Tax District Offices responded in similar terms (see 
copy of reply in Appendix), referring me to departmental headquarters. But 
in the case of the D. H. S. S. the responses were varied and ultimately 
contradictory. Following my initial written request for local co-operation 
I telephoned managerial officials in the two offices. They both offered me 
(verbally) interviews with fraud staff, and in one case a period of 
observation C'two or three days') alongside local office staff. However, the 
situation changed rapidly following a second phone call to one office in 
which I mentioned that I had previously worked for the D. H. S. S., (this 
admission being made to emphasise my appreciation of the need for 
confidentiality both for the protection of both claimants and to retain 
certain confidential office procedures). This manager then consulted his 
regional and, apparently, national superiors which resulted in a firm 
warning to me that if I still wished to continue with the research, the 
results would have to be submitted to 'Personnel Section for clearance' 
(copy of letter in Appendix). This letter effectively precluded any 
possibility of office observation or close co-operation (officially) with 
D. H. S. S. staff. Consequently, I adopted an alternative strategy which in 
part relied on the official information provided by the headquarters 
contact, to whom I was advised to address future queries. 
To overcome this setback I approached representatives of the two civil 
service trades unions which represented most of the D. H. S. S. staff - the 
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Civil and Public Services Association (C. P. S. A. ) and the Society of Civil 
and Public Servants (S. C. P. S. ). Both organizations were, from the early 
1980's, campaigning vigorously against D. H. S. S. anti-fraud policy and they 
provided a variety of useful documentary material, for instance, describing 
the operational excesses of S. C. C. U. 's and the dubious nature of the 
resulting estimates of 'benefit savings'. In addition I sought to cement 
existing informal contacts with one or two D. H. S. S. officals I had met, 
although the information they provided to me had to remain strictly 
confidential to protect these officers from possible disciplinary action 
under the Official Secrets Act. The same strategy was adopted in the case 
of the Revenue: the Inland Revenue Staff Federation (I. R. S. F. ) provided a 
useful source of information and comment, and existing personal contacts 
amongst Revenue staff were utilised, giving due care to ensuring the 
anonymity of officers involved. But, it should be stressed that the staff 
in both departments who gave informal help did act in any way jeopardise 
the confidentiality to which all claimants and taxpayers have a right: all 
our discussions centred on the techniques of fiddling and of investigating 
fraud, but no specific cases were discussed as this would have amounted to 
an unacceptable breach of trust. Equally, these officers did not, I feel, 
breach the spirit of departmental rules on confidentiality as they were 
acutely aware of their professional responsibilities to the public and to 
the departments they served. 
In the case of the D. H. S. S. my former employment as an executive 
officer had proved to be a disavantage in obtaining formal access for 
research. However, at an informal level this experience proved to be an 
invaluable background for my research and also useful in cementing 
alternative contacts. As far as the Inland Revenue was concerned, my 
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former employment as a Tax Officer did not appear to be a significant 
factor in my being referred to headquarters for information. But in both 
cases my own work experience proved an advantage: I knew the framework of 
Revenue and D. H. S. S. organization and what questions to ask of bath 
departmental officials and taxpayers/claimants. Crucially, I knew w4at it 
felt like to be a member of staff in two very different departments whose 
job was in part characterised by different perceptions of the 'customer' an 
the other side of the office counter, or at the other end of the telephone. 
Having been referred by local Tax and D. H. S. S. offices to key (named) 
departmental staff at national headquarters, I contacted both individuals 
and arranged either to interview them, or to submit written lists of 
questions to them which I followed up with discussions over the telephone 
when clarification or additional questions were necessary. In this way a 
channel was kept open for 'official' comment, albeit from one or two key 
personnel rather than a larger sample of departmental staff. (However, the 
staff concerned held responsibility for the implementation and monitoring 
of departmental anti-fraud initiatives and therefore provided an excellent 
source of official comment). This strategy of utilizing 'key informers' 
arose in response to problems of access to the two departments at local 
level, but it proved to be a productive research technique: once 
established, these contacts generated 'off the cuff' comments as well as 
'official' information and so often provided a good testing ground for my 
own ideas and hunches during the process of research. Given the 
difficulties (discussed above) in obtaining access to such sensitive areas 
of state regulation, research initially proceeded on the basis of empirical 
information generated by 
a) Key (official) personnel 
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b) Unofficial departmental staff contacts 
c) Representatives of the main D. H. S. S. and Revenue trades unions 
d) A variety of secondary source material from campaigning groups, (such 
as the C. P. A. G. ) 
e) Material generated by official government publications, (such as the 
Public Accounts Committee and the Keith Committee). 
Gaining access to the accounts of the fraudsters proved almost as 
difficult. Early approaches made to the Probation Service and Iiagistrates' 
Court, with a view to discussing supplementary benefit fraud proceedings, 
proved fruitless (my telephone calls were not returned and my letters 
received no replies). Citizens Advice Bureaux staff were unable to arrange 
for me to attend interviews with claimants involved in fraud proceedings 
because of the need for client confidentiality. But advisers were able to 
discuss their knowledge of some (unnamed) cases of supplementary benefit 
fraud. These discussions provided useful verification (in general terms) of 
investigation procedures which were later described to me by some 
supplementary benefit claimants in their accounts of the experience of 
D. H. S. S. regulation. First hand accounts of life on supplementary benefit 
were obtained from local contacts. Fifteen claimants were interviewed: a 
few had personal knowledge of D. H. S. S. investigations and two had been 
convicted of fraud. Conversations with claimants were useful in providing 
an insight into the nature of relations between claimants and departmental 
staff and, importantly, focussed my attention an the material conditions 
under which some claimants are driven to commit fraud. 
A key problem in eliciting information from all interviewees was that 
of developing trust. Several strategies were used to secure trust: first, 
the minimizing of social distance between the interviewee and myself. This 
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was particularly important in the case of benefit claimants who would have 
been both suspicious and hostile had the researcher's manner and tone 
resembled 'authority' in general or the D. H. S. S. staff manner in particular. 
Interviews were therefore as informal as possible, taking place wherever 
the claimant felt most comfortable, usually in his/her own home. Rote- 
taking only proceeded with the claimant's permission and was kept to a 
bare minimum. I always took care to reassure interviewees of the 
confidentiality of my research and that if their comments were to be 
quoted, they would be attributed to fictitious names. Other factors 
entering into the 'building of trust' were subjective: simply to do with 
smiling and/or joking a little to put people at their ease, not pushing 
claimants to divulge information they did not want to, and at all times 
having respect for the individuals concerned. Significantly, halfway 
through one interview a female claimant said 'I didn't intend to tell you 
this, but... ' and she went on to tell me that she was currently cohabiting 
with her boyfriend. I took this to mean that trust had indeed been 
established as she had no fear that I would directly or indirectly inform 
the D. H. S. S. of this admission. 
The problem of trust manifested itself in a different form where 
interviewing departmental officials was concerned. With 'elite' 
interviewees, the emphasis was upon reassuring them of the integrity and 
the a-priori knowledge of the researcher before the interview began. In 
this way officials would feel that I was in the know' anyway, and so 
their comments could be rationalised as only confirmatory. In addition, I 
hoped s/he would feel that I could be entrusted with additional knowledge, 
being appreciative of issues such as confidentiality and the departmental 
organizational constraints acting upon such officials. In this way the 
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interviews could proceed as conversations between two equals, although at 
the same time the strategy that Johnson called 'identity spoilage' came, 
unwittingly, into play (Johnson, 1971). For instance, this may have 
involved divulging a little personalised information at times during the 
conversation in order to assure the interviewee of the researcher's 
'humility', or as an aside to prompt exploration of a key issue in more 
depth. Rather than being a conscious 'strategy', this attempt to put 
another at ease and to establish a personal rapport developed 
unconsciously. 
Throughout all interviews, whether with taxpayers, claimants, 
fraudsters, senior official spokesmen or departmental staff, one conscious 
strategy was that of 'playing it safe'. This mainly involved employing 
open questions, (and limiting the number of specific questions), as open- 
ended questions allowed for a more free and full response. These responses 
often helped to raise new issues which had not been previously anticipated 
(and so would have not surfaced in the context of a tightly structured 
interview). It was particularly necessary to play it safe and adapt to the 
needs of the interviewee in the case of departmental staff: they were often 
defensive, either in relation to their department's anti- fraud initatives, 
or (more usually) in relation to their own vulnerable position in revealing 
aspects of their work to an 'outsider'. Although the pressure: of secrecy 
exerted upon civil servants is considerable, I was less of an 'outsider' in 
view of my own experience in both the Revenue and the D. H. S. S. and this 
factor helped me to assess when staff were becoming anxious, and so when 
to play it safe by changing the direction of the interview, or by 
reassuring the interviewee. 
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Interviews formed the central core of the research, but in relation to 
some of the research aims they were inappropriate. For instance, in aim 
(3) attempts to analyse the modes of representation of tax and benefit 
fraudsters in judicial discourses would ideally have involved access to 
those judicial comments and observati, rn of the court proceedings in which 
they take place. But within the timespan of this research it was not 
possible to pre-plan the observation of prosecution proceedings for tax 
and supplementary benefit fraud. The first problem was simply that of 
notification of when such cases were due in court. My efforts to use local 
journalists to alert me to when D. H. S. S. prosecutions were 'on' failed 
because the journalists often did not know themselves and so simply turned 
up at court to record the day's proceedings. In the absence of any co- 
operation from the magistrates' court, I first attempted to find out when 
cases of benefit fraud were coming to court by scouring the local press 
for indicators of impending cases. Luckily this enabled me to identify 
several cases which were due to be heard on the same day, and I was able 
to attend court on that day and introduce myself to the magistrates' clerk. 
Subsequently, the clerk of the court offered me a great deal of support 
and co-operation, and I made contact with solicitors and probation 
officers who gave me an invaluable insight into problems concerning the 
represention and sentencing ofsupplementary benefit offenders. Following 
up on the contacts made at court proved to be extremely fruitful as I was 
able to obtain official data on over 208 cases of supplementary benefit 
fraud which had been heard in that court in the preceeding six years. 
Although (as Appendix 4 details) much of this information was a matter of 
public record, it was extremely useful to have information on offenders' 
gender, offence, verdict, sentence, legal representation, and the award of 
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compensation and costs for so large a number of cases. Clearly 
this 
information would have been impossible for me to collect through 
observation of court proceedings given the constraints of time already 
discussed. In addition, it was thereafter possible to get advance notice of 
other D. H. S. S. cases coming to court: this enabled first hand observations 
of court proceedings, claimants' official and effective rationales, and 
judicial discourse which supplemented the hard data obtained on the 206 
earlier cases. 
The data on 206 supplementary benefit prosecutions (heard in one 
magistrates court in the Midlands) was analysed according 
to 
1) Gender 
2) Guilty/not guilty pleas 
3) Guilty/not guilty verdicts 
4) Whether the claimant was represented in court/not represented 
5) Sentence passed 
6) Whether a social enquiry report was requested 
7) Whether a compensation order was made 
8) Whether costs were awarded to the D. H. S. S. 
(See Appendix 4 for full analysis) 
Official D. H. S, S. statistics on prosecutions offer no gender breakdown, and 
so this alternative source of data enabled an analysis of the kinds of 
offences female benefit claimants commit and the sentences they are likely 
to receive. Also, some tentative comments could be made on shifts of 
practice in sentencing the poor (in an area of already high unemployment), 
as the recession of the 1980's deepened (N. A. C. R. O. 1987). 
Prosecutions for tax evasion are extremely rare and are seldom heard 
in magistrates' courts. There was therefore no opportunity to parallel my 
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observation of D. H. S. S. proceedings in court with direct observation of 
Revenue proceedings. Nonetheless, many taxpayers are subject to Revenue 
investigation at local level and this can result in financial settlements 
and sometimes penalties. To overcome the difficulty posed by the 
comparative nature of the research, two strategies were adopted. First, I 
made contact with as many taxpayers as I could who had been involved in 
Revenue investigations. These contacts were made through 'friends of 
friends' and individuals I knew personally. Given the assurance of 
confidentiality, they demonstrated no anxiety in discussing their tax 
affairs, perhaps because of the opportunity that our conversations offered 
(for many of them) to moan about the taxman! But their descriptions of 
Revenue staff/taxpayer interactions provided an invaluable contrast with 
comparable accounts of D. H. S. S. staff/claimant interactions. 
A second strategy was adopted to gain an insight into judicial 
discourses on tax. fraud. Attempts were made to identify secondary source 
material on Revenue prosecutions which would offer an alternative to the 
impossible task of observing such a small number of potential court cases 
over the whole of the U. K.. I discovered that a semi-official commentary on 
Revenue prosecutions was reproduced in a quarterly bulletin to tax 
inspectors. This bulletin gives details of prosecution and defence 
submissions, verdict, judicial comment and sentence. Although 
'confidential' in nature and circulated only to Tax Inspectors, the 
commentaries on proceedings which appear in the bulletin are, (as in the 
case of the data on supplementary benefit proceedings mentioned above), a 
matter of public record. Nevertheless they were a significant discovery: 
an important alternative source of information on judicial discourse and 
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essential to enable me to undertake a comparative analysis of benefit 
fraud cases. 
Despite the constraints which secrecy (in respe;: t of both fraudsters 
and investigators) imposed on this research, it was possible to build up a 
picture of this essentially hidden area of social interaction and 
regulation through a combination of official and unofficial interviews and 
complementary use of secondary source material. As already discussed, the 
'ideal' research methods were frequently rendered impossible because of the 
constraints imposed by official secrecy, time and difficulties of 
identifying individuals who are (often) undetected criminals. Alternatives 
were therefore found as the research proceeded. 
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STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
Chapter 1 reviews literature relating to the issues of personal taxation 
and welfare benefits and examines themes emeging from relevant economic, 
legal, official, social policy, sociological and campaigning literature. 
Chapter 2 analyses the differential historical, administrative, legal, 
economic, organizational and ideological preconditions for the commission 
of tax and supplementary benefit fraud. 
Chapter 3 is an analytic exposition of everyday knowledge about tax and 
supplementary benefit fraud, (evidenced in 'official' information, the 
rhetoric of particular interest groups and in products of the mass media). 
This exposition forms the basis for the identification of vocabularies 
which are used to variously construct 'the problem' of tax and 
supplementary benefit fraud. 
Chapter 4 is an examination of the techniques which tax and supplementary 
benefit fraudsters employ to defraud the Inland Revenue and D. H. S. S. 
respectively, and an analysis of the vocabularies of motive which the 
fraudsters use to justify their economic crimes. 
Chapter 5 is an exposition of the stated (and latent) goals of Inland 
Revenue and D. H. S. S. enforcement policy and an analysis of the practical 
outcomes of these policies in terms of regulatory techniques and 
prosecution policy. 
Chapter 6 summarises the main analytic themes which have been identified 
as both enabling and justifying differential responses to tax and benefit 
fraud, and briefly demonstrates the utility of these themes by analysing 
the contrasting discourses justifying the 1988 Budget and Social Security 
Reforms. 
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1) People who (in relation to their personal taxation) defraud the Inland 
Revenue and people who (in relation to their supplementary benefit 
payments) defraud the Department of Health and Social Security are 
engaged in economic crimes with similar result - loss to the public purse. 
2) These crimes provoke differential responses from 
a)Politicians who decide Inland Revenue and D, H. S. S. enforcement policy 
b)Departmental officials who implement these policies 
c)Judicial personnel who administer justice to those accused of tax 
and supplementary benefit fraud 
d)The public, who informally adjudge the relative seriousness of both 
forms of fraud on the basis of the official and popular discourses 
available to them. 
3) Differential response to tax and supplementary benefit fraud is 
therefore apparent in 
a)The stated objectives of Revenue and D. H. S. S. enforcement policies, 
and the operative rationales (of compliance and control respectively) 
which they give rise to. 
b)The characteristics of relations between departmental staff and the 
taxpayers and claimants under investigation. 
c)The differential use of 'private' systems of justice, and differential 
prosecution and sentencing of tax and supplementary benefit fraud cases. 
d)Popular responses which differentially attribute meanings and 
motivations for these forms of fraud. 
4) Yet the existence of such differential response cannot be explained by 
the crude invocation of a theory suggesting that legal regulation of tax 
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and supplementary benefit fraud is nothing more than a conspiracy of the 
rich against the poor. 
5) Historically, personal taxation and welfare provision have generated a 
traditional hatred of taxation as an 'intolerable inquisition', and a 
simultaneous grudging acceptance of the £; tate's role in the alleviation of 
poverty, financed by 'the taxpayer'. These historical preconditions have 
also enabled the ideological construction of taxpayers as 'givers' to the 
state, and welfare recipients as 'takers'. 
6) Tax fraudsters justify their actions by denying the redistributive goal 
of social justice ideology, invoking instead the values of free market 
individualism: thus fraud is represented as a product of entrepreneurial 
wealth accumulation and resistance to excessive state regulation through 
the Inland Revenue 'inquisition'. A complex set of self-justifications are 
used which enable tax fraudsters to rationalise their actions as rational, 
moral and non-criminal. 
7) Supplementary benefit fraudsters'deny the ideology of a free market 
within which they cannot effectively compete. They invoke the principles 
of social justice to justify fraud as a rational response to economic 
deprivation, and the personal sense of injustice and degradation engendered 
by the claiming process. 
8) Both tax and supplementary benefit fraud are motivated by economic 
imperatives, but these economic motives are attributed differing meanings 
in both official and popular discourse, as well as in the rationales of 
those who enforce and those who break the laws. 
9) Discourses which emphasise the functional utility of differential 
financial rewards create the ideological space within which the 
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lawbreaking activities of the most 'valuable' citizens and those of the 
least valuable citizens can be differentially criminalized. 
10) Tax and supplementary benefit fraud are differentially - sometimes 
separately and sometimes concomitantly - shaped by ever-changing 
opportunity structures. These structures are both ideological and material. 
11) Differential responses to tax and supplementary benefit fraud are not 
rooted in qualitative differences in the commission of the illegal acts of 
tax and supplementary benefit fraud. Rather, they derive from 
contradictions in the legal, economic, social and ideological construction 
of these two forms of fraud. 
12) Analysis of the processes through which differential response is 
effected, and the vocabularies of motive which are offered for both the 
commission and regulation of tax and supplementary benefit fraud, reveals 
that differential historical preconditions, the limitations and scope of 
changing opportunity structures, changing economic conditions and changing 
ideological conditions, combine to create 
a) Different opportunities for taxpayers and benefit claimants to 
break the law and to justify such lawbreaking 
b) Opportunities for policy makers to change modes of regulating 
fraud, and to justify these changes. 
c) Discourses within which constructs such as freedom, morality, 
social justice, fairness, responsibility, dependency, needs and rights can 
be aligned and realigned to justify completely contradictory, and 
sometimes complementary, policies and practices of both regulators and 
fraudsters. 
13) The major constructs which surface and change in academic, official, 
popular and judicial discourses about taxation and welfare are the 
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principles of 'freedom' and social justice. The invocation of the competing 
social and economic goals of 'freedom' and of 'social justice' underlies and 
informs the ideological construction of taxation and welfare policies. 
Differential invocation of these principles give rise to a variety of 
official, judicial and popular discourses on the regulation of tax and 
benefit fraud, and ultimately to the paradoxes of differential response. 
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IATRODUCTIOH. 
Literature relating to the issues of personal taxation and welfare is 
extremely wide-ranging. This diversity raises problems in adequately 
reviewing literature which ranges across many discrete disciplines from 
economics to sociology. For this literature, though ample in breadth, 
lacks in-depth examination of the two forms of economic crime being 
considered in this thesis - tax and supplementary benefit fraud. For 
example, the black economy is a topic of interest for economists, 
criminologists and those interested in the legal and social policy issues 
it raises, but rarely are the precise activities which constitute the 'black 
economy', (and the forms of regulation used to police it) analysed in 
depth. When tax and benefit fraud are both examined as part of this black 
economy, the analyses often centre upon an economic measurement of these 
activities rather than upon any serious comparative analysis of responses 
to them as forms of economic crime (Smith, 1986). 
The use of terms such as the 'black economy' also raises two sets of 
problems: first, it involves the use of a blanket definition to describe a 
wide variety of activities. This problem has been explored with a view to 
creating a framework within which incresingly complex economic 
transactions can be analysed (Gershuny and Pahl, 19$0; Smith. 1986). But 
the new terminology such work has generated is not helpful in analysing 
differential response to tax and benefit fraud: for instance the 
distinctions made between formal, informal and household economies or the 
overall term 'shadow economy' fail to distinguish the principle feature of 
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tax and benefit fraud - that this activity is illegal (ibid). Nevertheless, 
the tendency to avoid issues of criminality when considering illegal 
activites within the 'informal' economy is in itself important. It 
indicates a particular ideological stance which serves to distance tax 
crime, for instance, from 'real' crime. As such, literature on the black 
economy is central to an analysis of how economic crime (by means of tax 
and benefit fraud) may be represented in academic and popular discourse. 
Second, ideological problems arise from the use of the word 'black' in this 
context, which may be offensive to some people. For the purposes of this 
thesis the phrase 'black economy' is used because this is the terminology 
employed by much economics and campaigning literature to describe the 
area of economic activity which is unknown to the Inland Revenue and other 
regulatory departments. No connotations of skin colour are implied by the 
use of this term, though the issue of racism as a possible influence on 
the targetting of benefit claimants and taxpayers for investigation will 
be discussed (see Chapter 5 below). 
Further definitional problems arise when utilising what is loosely 
termed 'white-collar crime' literature. Several sociological studies (Mars, 
1983; Henry, 1978; Ditton, 1977) have given useful insights into 
occupational crime and 'fiddles' assocated with jobs ranging from bread 
roundsman to supranational brokers. However, they pay more attention to 
the nature of work-based interactions and to factors promoting fiddling 
than to the way in which such activities are perceived by others and 
regulated by formal agencies. Although such studies are valuable in their 
analysis of how such occupational fiddles are learned, they cannot explain 
the various forms which tax and benefit frauds take, many of which do not 
fall within the definition of 'occupational crime' at all (see Chapter 4). 
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Nonetheless, their stress an the importance of opportunity structures 
which facilitate particular forms of fiddle is one which can usefully be 
applied to tax and benefit fraud (see Chapter 2(c)). In another area of 
'white-collar crime', studies of corporate crime provide a valuable 
analysis of the economic, political and ideological factors which underpin 
differential response to the powerful and the powerless when they engage 
in lawbreaking (Pearce, 1976; Braithwaite, 1984). 
To summarise, the review of literature which follows must attempt 
first to disentangle arguments used in studies which centre on larger and 
generalised concepts such as 'black economy' and 'white collar crime'. 
Second, these arguments must then be related to tax fraud and benefit 
fraud both specifically and comparatively. 
A further difficulty in reviewing literature relating to taxation and 
welfare is its diffuse nature, ranging from macro-economic analysis to 
ministerial statements of D. H. S. S. and Inland Revenue policy; from official 
prosecution statistics and legal discourses to sociological critiques. 
Clearly each source has a different perspective, focusing either on tax 
evasion or benefit fraud, and dependant upon the conceptual orientation of 
the author(s). For example there are detailed descriptions of the law in 
relation to tax fraud (Pritchard and Jones, 1976; Lewis, 1977; Leigh, 1982) 
and supplementary benefit fraud (C. P. A. G., 1985; Ward, 1982; Lynes, 1985). 
But in the case of the former much literature is provided for and by tax 
lawyers, business advisers and those with vested interests in minimizing 
tax liabiity, or guiding clients through investigation procedures 
(Pritchard and Jones, 1976). In the case of the latter, welfare agencies 
such as the Child Poverty Action Group (C. P. A. G. ) and Rational Association 
of Citizen Advice Bureaux (N. A. C. A. B. ) see their primary goal as offering 
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the best advice to their clients so as to secure the rights and 
entitlements of claimants (Stockwell and Clapham Law Centre, 1983). For 
the purposes of this thesis both sets of literature need to be analysed 
and their differing concerns taken into account. 
There is an absence of any systematic comparative analysis of tax and 
benefit fraud and it is this gap in the literature which the thesis seeks 
to fill. In view of the problems posed by the diverse and fragmentary 
nature of the relevant literature it will be broken down and analysed 
along the lines of academic disciplines and key sources of information. 
The starting point will be official departmental sources as the lii: itations 
of this literature provide an important guide to what precisely is and is 
not included in official discourse on tax and supplementary benefit fraud. 
Thereafter the order of this review will prioritize certain disciplines 
which are most closely concerned with differential response to these two 
forms of fraud: 
(1) Official Departmental and Xinisterial statements and 
publications 
(2) Economics Literature 
(3) Social Policy Issues 
(4) Legal Issues 
(5) Sociological Literature 
(6) Campaigning Literature and other relevant sources. 
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(1 )OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS. 
Fraud and the measures used to combat it are covert activities. 
Secrecy therefora surrounds the issues of Inland Revenue and D. H. S. S. 
anti-fraud practices: in order to deter fraud the two departments need to 
retain a cegree of confidentiality concerning their techniques of fraud 
prevention and regulation. But the subject of this thesis demands a 
knowledge of both fraudsters' techniques and the methods used to regulate 
fraud. For this reason official publications form an important source of 
information in three respects: 
(1) The comprehensiveness (or otherwise) of departmental information made 
available to the public indicates the extent of openness (or otherwise) of 
a relatively secretive area of departmental activity. (In turn this may 
indicate the degree to which that department is seen as accountable to the 
public it serves, and efficient in terms of its duty to safeguard public 
funds (see Chapter 5)). 
(2) The analysis of official Revenue and D. H. S. S. publications is important 
not only for the information which is. provided in them, but for an 
analysis of what is not provided. The absence of certain types of data is, 
therefore, highly significant, as is the form and rhetoric of the official 
discourse itself: its omissions and emphases indicate the theoretical 
foreclosures which are created by the dominance of official discourse 
(Burton and Carlen, 1979). 
(3) Official publications are clearly crucial in providing information 
which may be unavailable from any other source: for instance on the number 
of staff devoted to anti-fraud work, and the yield (in cost terms) of 
particular types of investigation (Inland Revenue, 1987). 
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Nonetheless, official information must be carefully and critically 
analysed: for instance, the means by which the Revenue and the D. H. S. S. 
calculate the financial 'savings' of anti-fraud work differ considerably 
(see Chapter 5(a)). The Inland Revenue calculates the yield from 
investigation work on the- basis of tax found to be due as a result of 
their enquires. The D. H. S. S., however, calculate the figure of benefit saved 
as a result of their investigations on the basis of several assumptions: 
for instance, the weekly benefit payment is multiplied by an estimate of 
the number of weeks the claimant would have been likely to have illegally 
claimed benefit. When first implemented, this system of calculating 
investigation 'savings' resulted in the weekly benefit saving of a detected 
fraudster being multiplied by up to 52 weeks, although clearly this was 
far in excess of the actual amount recouped by the department. This 
example serves to indicate that official publications do need to be 
subjected to critical interpretation and analysis: departmental constraints 
to prove cost effectiveness and efficiency may thus influence official 
pronouncements/publications on the effectiveness of their anti-fraud 
policy. In this respect, alternative sources (for example Trade Unions 
representing D. H. S. S. staff), proved a useful counterbalance in assessing 
the validity of official statements concerning the success of anti-fraud 
measures. 
What follows will be an indication of what official information is 
available concerning the enforcement role of the DHSS and Inland Revenue. 
Relevant sources of information will be outlined under the following 
headings. 
(a) Tax 
(b) Supplementary Benefits 
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(a) Tag 
For the purposes of this research the most important document 
published, by the Board of Inland Revenue is the Board's Aunt al Report, 
(originally commissioned in 1856), which is an invaluable source of 
information on all aspects of the work of H. M. Inspector of Taxes: for 
example it details the administration of the Collection of Taxes, overall 
departmental staffing levels and costs, manpower targets, the progress of 
the scheme aimed at computerising the work of the Revenue, details of 
compliance initiatives, investigation yields, criminal proceedings 
undertaken and a statement of the objectives of each sect-'on of the 
Inland Revenue department (Inland Revenue 129th Annual Report, 1987). In 
recent years this has become a far more comprehensive and weighty 
document, perhaps reflecting the radical changes which have taken place in 
Revenue organization and management. For example, it is significant that 
the Annual Report now includes formal statements of the Board's objectives, 
the most notable echoing the words of the Taxpayers' Charter (Inland 
Revenue, 1986) in the requirements to display efficiency and courtesy in 
relations with the public (Inland Revenue 129th Annual Repor-, 1987). The 
fact that the Board is able to specify such objectives in a public 
document is in marked contrast with the absence of any comparable 
statement on the part of the D. H. S. S. , as will be seen below. 
Changes in the form of the Annual Report can therefore indicate other 
shifts in departmental priorities: for instance, such changes can reflect 
attempts to improve the image of the Revenue in the eyes of the public <as 
through the Taxpayers' Charter), or in the eyes of its own staff. The 
format of the 1987 Report is glossier, larger, written in relatively 
jargon-free language, includes many diagrams and graphs offering a 
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diagrammatic representation of complex matters (ranging from staff 
resignations to the kind of parliamantary questions raised on Revenue 
. ssues), and 
is now circulated to all staff: it is no longer merely a dry 
document for the attention of managerial staff only. The Report makes 
reassuring comments on the success achieved in meeting work-related 
targets: whether this does improve the morale of the hard-pressed (and 
much-reduced) Revenue staff remains to be seen. But nonetheless, the 
document's form and tone is geared to creating the image of an efficient, 
open and accountable department in the eyes of the staff and public alike. 
Significantly, an entire section is now devoted to 'Compliance' - the 
overall term given to the Revenue's attempts to regulate tax evasion and 
avoidance, thus ensuring the compliance of the taxpayer in paying the tax 
required by law (ibid). The information given here on the organization of 
compliance work provides a framework within which to examine regulatory 
practice (see Chapter 5(D) and provides the basis for a comparison with 
D. H. S. S. regulation. 
A more detailed account of the Revenue's investigation powers, policy 
and methods is given in the Keith Committee Report on the Enforcement 
Powers of the Inland Revenue (Cmd 8822,1983). The Keith Report provides 
much detailed information on investigatory methods, previously not 
'officially' available. It also includes the comments of interested parties 
who gave evidence to the Committee. The contributions of Tax Inspectors. 
Solicitors, Employer's groups, Law Society and Revenue Trades Unions 
(I. R. S. F. and A. I. T. ) are all valuable in illuminating the following issues: 
(a) The official rationales used to justify the Revenue's compliance policy: 
for instance, the emphasis on financial settlement rather than criminal 
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proceedings in most cases of tax evasion as the pragmatic and 
mostsensible way of recouping tax lost. 
(b) The alternative rationales which are implicit both in the nature of the 
relations between Revenue and taxpayer, and in the form and application of 
compliance policy: for instance the latent desire to 'spare the taxpayers 
feelings' in deciding on proceedings or financial penalties (see Chapters). 
The Public Accounts Committee (P. A. C. ) also provides a forum for 
discussion of the Revenue's investigation work. P. A. C. Reports have 
provided useful information on the scale and nature of evasion as well as 
the cost/yield ratios of different types of investigation personnel. In 
addition, P. A. C. minutes of evidence give the opportunity to examine the 
rationale behind anti-evasion policy from the perspective of those members 
of the Board of Inland Revenue charged with implementing that policy 
(Control of Investigation Work : Board of Inland Revenue HC Paper 123, 
1984/5). 
General information on tax rates, thresholds and the (historical) 
shifts in the burden of taxation are available not only in The Board of 
Inland Revenue's Annual Report, but in other annual H. M. S. O. publications 
such as the Inland Revenue statistics and Social Trends. Nonetheless, 
detailed and specific information on estimates of the scale of tax evasion, 
the Revenue's counter-evasion efforts and measurements of the 
effectiveness of investigation work is more difficult to unearth. In 
addition to Hansard (where specifically relevant parliamentary questions 
and Ministerial statements may be examined), the P. A. C., Keith Committee 
and Board's Annual Reports provide the most in-depth information 
officially available on tax evasion and Revenue investigations. 
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(b) Si=le ntary Benefits 
A major disadvantage in obtaining comprehensive official information 
on supplementary benefits in general (and fraud policy in particular), is 
the lack of an annual report. The Supplementary Benefits Commission did 
publish annual reports but since its dissolution in 1980, no comparably 
document has been available. The responsibility for social security now 
rests with the Secretary of State, who is directly accountable to 
parliament and not to an independant body, as was the case prior to 1980 
(R. A. C. R. O, 1986). Ministers are thus responsible for providing information 
on social security matters and their statements are available through 
official press releases or Hansard. Details of anti-fraud efforts, 
prosecution policy and departmental manpower are usually made available in 
this way. For example, Hugh Rossi's statement to the House on 7th 
February 1983 in the aftermath of the Oxford benefit fraud swoop 
(Operation Major) outlines the rationales behind departmental prosecution 
and non-prosecution policy. 
As in the case of the Inland Revenue, Public Accounts Committee 
reports provide a useful source of official data and comment on fraud 
policy. In addition they may indicate important shifts in perceptions of 
the seriousness of benefit fraud: for instance, the tone of questions 
addressed to D. H. S. S. witnesses in 1983 indicated at worst a measure of 
'scroungerphobia', at best a serious over-estimation of the likely extent 
and costs of benefit fraud: 
'What view do you take of the estimates that working whilst claiming 
benefit costs the Exchequeur about L500 million? ' (Cmnd 102,1983/4) 
The senior D. H. S. S. official replied that this figure was not an estimate 
but, rather 
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'just a statement that if 10% of those receiving benefit were not 
entitled to it, that would cost about f. 500 million.... these are all 
hypotheses and assumptions. ' (ibid: 1780) 
The report criticised the D. H. S. S. for having 'no enthusiasm for attempting 
to guess how much they were allowing to Set away' in undetected fraud 
(ibid: 24). The vocabulary in use here is significant: it derived from the 
image of a department that was 'allowing' fraud and not attempting to 
'guess' at unquantifiable losses to the Exchequeur, and it was from this 
perspective that the report justified the suggestion of random checks on 
benefit claimants (ibid). Despite the reservaticis expressed by senior 
D. H. S. S. officials, subsequent media coverage of the P. A. C. proceedings 
centred on the 1500 million estimate and the possibility of making random 
checks on claimants: in this way official discourse was constructed 
politically rather than emanating from the department itself. The absence 
of any independant body responsible for social security increasingly leads 
to direct political control of the D. H. S. S. and what is regarded as its 
'official' discourse. Changes in the form and content of such 'discourses 
can be traced through an analysis of 'official' publications and 
Ministerial statements. 
Alternative estimates of the scale of benefit fraud and alternative 
discourses on the rationales behind anti-fraud policy are evident in 
comments from representatives of D. H. S. S. employ . (C. P. S. A, 1984; C. P. S, A., 
1986; S. C. P. S., 1984) . Publications from 'officials' such as these need to 
be analysed alongside the official ministerial and departmental 
pronouncements described above. 
Official H. M. S. O. statistics provide information on numbers of persons 
claiming social security benefits according to type of benefit, regions of 
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Britain, average amounts paid and estimates of unclaimed benefits (Social 
Security Statistics, 1986; Social Trends No 16,1986). But data relating 
specifically to fraud and its investigation is not so freely available : 
numbers of D. H. S. S. prosecutions, percentage of those prosecuted found 
guilty, figures showing numbers and designation of staff involved in 
investigation work and similar in-depth information is not regularly and 
comprehensively published by the D. H. S. S.. However, as indicated above, all 
this information is available in respect of the Inland Revenue in the form 
of the Board's Annual Report. 
For the purposes of this thesis much official information had to be 
sought directly from D. H. S. S. Headquarters and, despite early problems of 
access (discussed in the Introduction above), most information requested 
was made available. Nonetheless, the absence of an annual report and 
consequent lack of comprehensive, regular, official information on the 
enforcement of social security regulations enables an increasingly unitary 
political dominance over official discourse. This marks an important shift 
both in terms of the accountability and the political autonomy of the 
D. H. S. S.. 
Alternative sources of semi-official information are available which 
may be used to challenge current social security policy in key areas. For 
instance, the National Audit Office (198? ) provides information on 
incorrect benefit payments and official errors, the Chief Adjudication 
Officer (C. A. O. ) publishes an annual report which gives details of the 
standards of adjudication on benefit claims in local offices (C. A. O., 1987). 
In 1985/6 the C. A. O. concluded that 40% of supplementary benefit claims 
had been adjudicated either wrongly or on the basis of insufficient 
evidence (ibid). The Social Security Advisory Committee Report (1986) was 
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critical of many aspects of the governments social security reforms. But 
alternative sources such as these fail to challenge the dominance of 
official discourse on issues concerning the welfare state in general, and 
supplementary benefit fraud in particular. This thesis will examine the 
social, economic and ideological preconditions which enable the triumph of 
these official discourses and the parallel failure of alternative 
perspectives to influence public perceptions of tax and welfare benefit 
fraud. 
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(2) ECONOMICS LITERATURE. 
The interest of the economist in both tax and benefit fraud is related 
to a number of discrete concerns which can be summarised as follows: 
(a) A concern to measure the magnitude of tax evasion and, to a lesser 
extent, benefit fraud. in order to estimate the size of the black economy. 
(b) A concern 'to establish the disincentive to increased effort caused 
by high taxation and the parallel incentive to idleness of welfare benefits 
payments which allegedly contributes towards tax evasion and to social 
security 'scrounging' respectively. 
(c) A concern to assess what redistribution, in terms of income in 
particular, has taken place over the last 40 years. 
(d) A concern to establish the circumstances under which economic 
growth does or does not take place, and economists' perceptions of the 
role of welfare benefits and personal taxation in this regard. 
Although some of these issues are inter-related and many share the 
same ideological premises, the economists' literature will be reviewed in 
relation to these concerns, so as to render a broad ranging and complex 
body of literature more manageable. 
(a) Xea uri ng the black ecnnon_y 
In essence 'the black economy' is a blanket term incorporating frauds 
by both taxpayers and benefit claimants. Definitions of the term vary: 
according to the Keith Committee Report the black economy is seen as 
comprising 'the sum total of all the various methods of tax evasion' 
(Cmnd. 8822,1983; Note 41). In addition to tax evasion in the formal 
economy, it may be seen to include other areas of activity including 
'household, social, informal, communal, grey, black, hidden, subterranean 
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and underground' areas of the economy (Gershunny and Pahl, 1980). Clearly 
the distinctions in tone between the 'black' and the 'white' economy 
reflect the degrees of legitimacy accorded to such activities. None the 
less, it is generally accepted that all involve tax evasion. defined in 
1955 by the Royal Commission on Taxation as 'all those activities which 
are responsible for a person not paying the tax that the existing law 
charges on his income' (O'Higgins, 1981). But by its very nature tax 
evasion is a covert activity and, as O'Higgins argues, this leads 
to 
problems in assessing its true extent: 
'[it] is essentially a hidden activity and even trying to locate 
its accidental footsteps, or the finger prints it leaves, is still 
more a matter of art than science. ' (O'Higgins, 1981: 378) 
However, the 'science' of both macro and micro measurement has been 
attempted by a number of economists (Feige,. 1979; McAffee, 1980; 
O'Higgins, 1981; Smith, 1986). The principles underlying such literature 
are that the black economy may be measured in two ways: first, by macro- 
measurement which uses aggregate data in economic activity, in which case 
the discreprancy between known economic activity and Gross Domestic 
Product (G. D. P. ) forms the black economy, and so is often expressed as a 
percentage of G. D. P. Secondly, by micro analyses of specific areas of the 
economy in detail, attempting either to measure the 'gap' betwen the income 
and . expenditure levels of certain groups, particulaly the self-employed 
(O'Higgins, 1981), or by surveys of target groups such as this. But 
surveys pose the problem of reliability: because tax evasion is usually a 
continuing crime, it is an issue unlikely to illicit a truthful response 
from offenders (Lewis, 1982). 
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Although criticisms of a methodological nature could be raised in 
economists' attempts to measure the extent of the black economy, this 
would only be a digression. The principal point initially arising from this 
literature is that attempts to quantify the precise size of the black 
economy cannot give definitive answers, but may give broad indications of 
the scale of the problem. It may be useful, for the purpose of this 
thesis, to consider the estimate given by Sir William Pile (the then 
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue), to the House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee in 1980. He suggested a figure of 7Ya% of GDP was a 
plausible estimate of the scale of the black economy. Currently this 
would mean a loss of Income Tax revenue of approximately £4 billion p. a. 
Indeed as Michael O'Higgins argues, 
'all the data taken together makes it difficult to believe in a 
figure of less than 5%, so that Sir William Pile's 7% is indeed 
"not implausible". ' (O'Higgins, 1981: 378) 
Not only does relevant data provide a problem for economists 
interested in the black economy, but disagreements between differing 
schools of thought mean that some economists fail to agree that it 
constitutes a 'problem' at all. For example some economists from the 
Institute of Economic Affairs (I. E. A. ) have argued that it represents a 
dynamic and innovatory sector of the economy which can only be assessed 
in terms of its contributions to national wealth. Conversly The Inland 
Revenue Staff Federation (I. R. S, F. ) argues, that 
'On the contrary, the black economy is actually an obstacle to the 
creation of wealth through individual enterprise. The honest 
trader who pays his fair share of tax finds himself undercut by 
unfair competition - forced to join the dishonest sector or go % 
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under. ' (I. R. S. F. Taxte April 1981). 
But, the view expressed by economist Bracewell-Milnes (1979) is that 
the problem of the moral and legal distinctions surrounding tax avoidance 
and evasion can be removed by 'Positive (value free) economics'. This 
'value-free economics' is, however, based upon the simple calculation of 
when tax avoidance and evasion 'benefits the fisc' and when the fisc loses. 
Far from being value free, an analysis of this kind assumes that the black 
economy is acceptable so long as the economy benefits financially. In 
assuming that profit is an ideologically neutral motivation and failing to 
recognise issues of social justice, such arguments merely support the logic 
and ideology of capitalism. But, they nonetheless form an important source 
from which tax fraudsters draw on to justify their actions (see Chapter 4 
(ib)). 
Such arguments are defeated, even in their own terms, according to the 
I. R. S. F. who argue that 'the black economy may be growing - but it is only 
at the expense of the rest of us' (Taxes, April 1981). 
In addition to damaging legitimate businesses, the unfair competition of 
the black economy also hits the consumer who has no safeguards or 
guarantees from a 'cowboy' contractor. Paradoxically. this argument is also 
important because it is used by bona-fide contactors who do 'jobs on the 
side'. They may justify their fiddles in terms of giving a better service 
than the cowboys and at competitive prices, which are only possible 
through fiddling tax and V. A. T.! 
The debates briefly illustrated here highlight many of the problems 
raised by the economists' literature: estimates of the scale of the black 
economy vary a great deal and none are empirically verifiable. But 
equally important is the contradictory nature of much debate on the nature 
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of the black economy, whether it represents a drain of up to i4 billion 
p. a. on the nations' resources, or a dynamic sector of the economy as a 
whole. These ideologies will be discussed further in sections (d) and (e) 
below (see also Chapters 3 and 6). 
Another problem surrounding this concern within the economists' 
literature is that it fails to distinguish between tax evasion and other 
activities comprising the 'black economy', which includes the evasion of 
National Insurance contributions and Value Added Tax. It is equally 
impossible to distinguish what proportion of black earnings are earned by 
those who operate in the 'white' economy too, (Gershunny and Pahl, 1980) 
and what proportion of the black economy is attributable to persons 
falsely claiming state benefits. Although many commentators indicate a 
likeklihood that those already in work have greater access to channels of 
additional 'black' earnings (Trades Union Congress, 1983; Supplementary 
Benefits Commission, 1981; Inland Revenue Staff Federation, 1981), popular 
belief still upholds and reinforces the 'scrounger' mythology (Golding and 
Middleton, 1982). The problems involved in separating tax and benefit 
fraud as distinct activities within the black economy are not, and 
probably could never be, resolved by economic analysis. Suffice it to say 
that both forms of fraud are incorporated within it and, (as Chapter 3 
will argue), tax fraud forms the greater proportion in terms of its costs, 
scale and frequency. 
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(b) The Incentives Argument 
The debate over 'incentives' relates to this thesis in two important 
respects: first, the belief that high rates of taxation prove a 
disincentive to work in the 'white' economy and at the same time an 
incentive to work in the 'black' area is a crucial factor in explaining 
justifications for tax fraud. Second, the belief that high rates of welfare 
benefits operate both as a disincentive to take up formal paid work and as 
an incentive to remain dependant on state benefits, is important in 
explaining negative social reaction to benefit 'scroungers'. 
(i) lax. 
To deal with the literature regarding tax disincentives first, such 
arguments are based upon the notion that, 'individuals would react to 
changes in taxation of their efforts as measured by tax on their final 
marginal hour, week or month' (Seldon, 1979: 8). Some economists (and many 
journalists and politicians), therefore assume that 'high' taxation 
dissuades individuals from legally working longer hours, and from working 
harder. Such ideas, often put forward by the Institute for Economic 
Affairs, are reminiscent of the response of early nineteenth century 
industrialists to pressure from the 'Ten Hours' movement to reduce the 
length of the working day. They rest upon similar ideological rather than 
empirical foundations concerning the source of business profits and the 
economic rationality of men. But it was never the case that a firm's 
profits were made in the final hour of the working day, (Hobsbawm, 1968) 
and the assumed marginal effect of taxation upon effort remains similarly 
unsubstantiated. Research in the U. S. A. indicated that, contrary to this 
popular assumption, 
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'higher income taxes may virtually force the income earner to work 
harder in order to make ends meet. On theoretical grounds alone, 
therefore, it can no more be proven that taxation necessarily has a 
disincentive effect than it has an incentive one. ' (Break 1957: 529) 
Break's study found that disincentives were certainly absent in 
respondents with high fixed committments in relation to their incomes. 
High taxation may actually spur these individuals to work harder in order 
to maintain their living standards. But it is important to note that the 
rhetoric of the incentives debate may be more important than its logic or 
substance: 
'The chorus of complaints, vehement and eloquent, against "penal" 
taxation, echoed by the great majority of respondents interviewed 
was surprisingly infrequently translated into action. ' (ibid) 
And so the disincentive theory remained powerful in people's minds despite 
its shaky empirical foundations. 
As will be discussed in forthcoming chapters, the two sides of the 
incentives arguement when applied to tax fraud and supplementary benefit 
fraud may well help to explain their differential treatment. The former 
may be seen as a response to 'penal' taxation the latter to the 
disincentives to effort of a 'cossetting' welfare state (see Chapters 4 and 
5). Furthermore, the I. E. A. arguement articulated by Myddleton (1979) that 
'raising the tax rates an honest earnings automatically increases the 
relative benefits of untaxed crime' remains simplistic and unconvincing. 
It ignores the complexity of motivations of human action, the variety of 
individuals' personal (financial) circumstances and the evidence of Break's 
study. The incentives argument reduces the actions of men and women to 
those of rational economic man, and does not fit a complex social reality. 
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Former Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, Sir Norman Price rejects 
the simple link which incentives theorists pose between high rates of 
taxation and the avoidance and evasion of tax: 
'I think avoidance is growing and it my view has become a national 
habit. Even if rates of tax were reduced quite considerably, it 
would still go on. ' (Seldon, 1979: 6) 
This would seem to be confirmed by recent reductions in personal tax 
under the Thatcher government which have nom, been accompanied by 
reductions in evasion: 1979/1980 was the last tax year for which the 
highest rate of 83% was chargeable. In 1987/8 the highest rate of income 
tax is 60%, and this only on chargeable income in excess of t41,200 per 
annum. But there is no evidence that such reductions in the highest rates 
of tax, nor the recent reduction in the basic rate of tax from 30% to 27%, 
have led to a parallel reduction in the black economy! (see Chapter 3). 
A final criticism of the incentives arguement relating to taxation was 
made by the Low Pay Unit who argued that the degree of disincentive (even 
if it should exist), is much exaggerated. Chris Pond (1980) argues that the 
top 1% of income recipients in 1978/9 were effectively taxed at a rate of 
less than 50% overall, despite marginal rates of 83% at that time. As 
mentioned above, such rates were cut to 60% in 1979 therefore the number 
of taxpayers affected and the alleged extent of tax disincentives is much 
overrated (ibid). Nonetheless, the incentives argument, as Break indicated, 
is still a persuasive one in the public mind. As such it may provide a 
commonsense rationale for tax evasion. (This, together with other possible 
justifications for evasion, will be further discussed in Chapter 4). 
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(ii)Suplementaty benefit. 
The incentives debate (in a different form) lies at the heart of the 
economics of social security provision. Supplementary benefit levels in 
particular are directly related to the standard of living of those in work. 
Berthoud (1976) notes that one of the historical criteria for setting 
supplementary benefit at such a low level was the need to maintain work 
incentives. The legacy of the principles underlying the 1834 Poor Law are 
evident here: the principle of 'less eligibility' involved rendering the lot 
of the pauper less beneficial than that of the lowest-paid worker. This, 
coupled with the deterrent of the workhouse, sought to act as a 
disincentive to idleness and incentive to productive labour, however low 
the wages for that labour might be (Fraser, 1984; Rusche and Kirchheimer, 
1939). But even in the 1980's there are those whose views on taxation and 
welfare are still underpinned by these principles, despite the material 
reality of mass unemployment: 
'There can be no doubt whatever that at the margin there are people, 
even in present circumstances, who take the rational decision that 
it is not worth their while taking a job at the sort of pay at which 
jobs may be on offer. ' (Nigel Lawson, The Times 4.7.83) 
The present Chancellor of the Exchequeur therefore invokes arguments of 
the 'incentive' variety to justify further reductions in welfare benefits 
whilst encouraging the problem of low pay, and, moreover, not setting low 
pay as a problem at all on the political agenda. 
Economics literature which supports and legitimises such propositions 
derives mainly from the neo-classical school of economics, the most 
popular form of which is currently Monetarism (see also section 3- Social 
Policy Issues). An extreme exponent, Professor Patrick Minford, claims that 
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13-15% of the workforce are better off unemployed because of what he sees 
as the problems of high benefit levels and disincentives to effort 
(Minford, 1983), but the weight of statistical evidence suggests this 
assertion is grossly misleading (see Roll, 1983). Hermione Parker in 
effect abandons statistical evidence in favour of a 'snapshot' estimate of 
those who are (in her view), being discouraged from 'helping themselves' 
(Parker, 1982). But her figure of 5% million people without the incentive 
to help themselves is, argues Roll, simply the number of adults living 
below 140% of supplementary benefit level, this being an often used 
measurement of the poverty line (Townsend, 1979). Economists working 
within the political economy of the New Right therefore consider that any 
individual who is poor is at risk of being discouraged from working, (or 
from working harder), as a result of the discincentives that allegedly 
'high' benefit levels provide. They rarely indicate the other side of the 
arguement, namely the problem of low pay which is the largest single cause 
of poverty in Britain in the 1980's (C. P. A. G., 1987). 
It is also significant that the trap in which the low-paid are caught- 
up has now been redefined: what was known in the 1970's as the 'poverty 
trap' has more recently been termed 'the 'anti-effort trap' (as, for 
instance, in a 1984 B. B. C. Panorama programme 'The Welfare State'). This 
marks an important shift in the boundaries of popular discourse relating 
to welfare: vocabularies stressing the themes of effort and incentive are 
evidence of (and serve to justify) the New Right ideologies which invoke 
them. This is of crucial importance to the mode of analysis of this thesis 
as it is from the differential attribution of such vocabularies that the 
contradictions enabling differential treatment of tax and benefit fraudster 
emerge. As will be argued in this thesis (Chapters 4 and 6), when tax 
47 
fraudsters defraud the state they may successfully invoke vocabularies of 
effort and incentive which often imply that the regulation of their 
financial activities by the state (through the Inland Revenue) is a greater 
evil than the illegal act of evasion which they have committed. Put the 
other side of this argument is the failure of other groups (namely 
supplementary benefit fraudsters) to invoke similar vocabularies to justify 
their actions. For instance, claimants who clean windows or do household 
repairs 'on the side' cannot successfully invoke the rhetoric of incentives 
and effort as the tax fraudster can: they are constrained by their very 
relationship to the state (claiming from it) and cannot represent their 
fiddles as entrepeneurial and innovative. It is from their different 
connection to the state, through which the taxpayer is seen as a giver and 
benefit claimant as a taker, that differential response to their frauds 
derives. 
To return to the incentives issue, it is worth emphasising that the 
association between the payment of 'high' welfare benefits and the 
persistence of unemployment is the subject of controversy amongst 
economists. For instance, Minford maintains that there is a positive 
correlation and argues that a 10% cut in benefit levels would therefore 
reduce unemployment by 25 - 40% (Minford, 1983). However Atkinson (1981) 
insists that no such link is proven or measurable. Nonetheless, the 
incentives debate has in recent years entered a new phase (see analysis of 
the Ideology of the New Right in (3) below). It is now popularly argued 
that unemployment is a result' of excessive wage levels (and consequent 
uncompetetiveness) and therfore workers must 'price themselves into jobs'. 
Sir Alfred Sherman (Director of the Centre for Policy Studies) was 
therefore able to assert that 'There is a level of wages at which there 
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would be no labour shortages and no unemployment' (Sunday Times 10.7.83). 
The practical implications of this view when applied in policy terms to 
the unemployed, (and to supplementary benefit claimants generally), are 
clear: wages levels must come down so that workers can price themselves 
into jobs, therefore welfare benefits must be reduced to encourage the 
unemployed to accept these lower wages. Literature from the Institute of 
Economic Affairs and Institute of Directors demonstrates further 
implications of such assumptions. For instance, a spokesman for the latter 
argued in 1984 that benefits for young people should be reduced because 
such payments were a 'disincentive to further education and training' and 
to their seeking 'a low paid job, but one with prospects' (Graham Mather, 
B. B. C. Panorama: 'The Welfare State'). Despite serious flaws in Mather's 
argument, policy changes relating to benefit payments for young people 
reflect the same assumptions (Social Security Consortium, 1986). 
These incentives arguments are neither theoretically nor empirically 
sound. For instance, Roll (1983) demonstrates the less than perfect 
relationship between the individual worker, his/her wage levels and levels 
of welfare benefits. Moreover, being based upon neo-classical economics, 
arguments which emphasise workers 'pricing themselves into jobs... confuse 
what happens at the level of the individual firm with the economy as a 
whole' (Roll, 1983: 12). But, as will be seen from an analysis of New Right 
literature (see (3) below), the economics of the shopping basket and the 
good housekeeper is persuasive in its very simplicity. Although firms, 
government departments and nation states do not behave in the same way as 
individual household units, this analogy (implicit in Monetarism in 
particular), serves to reinforce the ideology of individualism and focuses 
responsibility on the individual not the state (see Chapter 3). Thus 
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incentives arguments reflected in the vocabularies of 'pricing into of 
jobs' and 'better off on the dole' gain an immediacy and power. They form 
easily understandable, shorthand explanations for complex phenomena such 
as mass unemployment and the role and effects of the welfare state. 
Although the kernel of the incentives argument, that voluntary 
unemployment exists as a result of the relatively high level of state 
benefits, seems absurd in the context both of effective reductions in 
benefit levels (CPAG, 1984) and mass unemployment at unprecedented levels, 
it cannot be easily dismissed. 
One example of the implementation of the incentives view in practice 
was the abolition of earnings related supplements (B. R. S. ) in 1982. This 
supplement had been payable on top of basic levels of contributory 
benefits (such as sickness and unemployment benefit), for a period of up 
to thirteen weeks. The level of supplement was determined by the level of 
the claimant's previous earnings and was designed to act as a cushion 
against the hardship which could result from a wage-earner's sickness or 
unemployment. According to the incentives argument, the abolition of E. R. S. 
reduced incentives to remain sick or unemployed. But even before its 
abolition, several studies refuted the idea that benefit payments acted as 
an incentive to idleness and dependancy (see Roll, 1983). 
Nevertheless, some economists have not only assumed, but have 
attempted to measure, the extent of the disincentive effect. One way of 
arriving at such a measurement is by calculating 'replacement ratios'. 
People whose incomes when out of work are adjudged 'high' in relation to 
their incomes when working are said to have high replacement ratios. These 
are the individuals who allegedly have the least incentive to work. But 
as Roll (1983) and Shawler and Sinfield (1981) indicate, economists' 
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definitions of what constitutes a 'high' ratio vary from 70-90% depending 
on their attitudes towards work and welfare. A mass of evidence from 
relevant surveys, (DHSS Cohort Study of Unemployed Men, 1982; House of 
Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Third Report, 1983) 
indicates that the minority of men who have high replacement ratios are 
most likely to be family men whose needs when means-tested are high, but 
whose wages may be very low. This appears to falsify the view of 
economists who argue that the young suffer most from the disincentive of 
receiving benefits. Equally, these studies do not support the mythology of 
large families procreating in order to maximise benefits. Rather, they 
demonstrate that when a 'family man' has a low earning capability, then 
the replacement ratio will appear high, but, according to Roll, this may be 
as a result of (a) low pay and (b) underclaiming additional means-tested 
benefits such as F. I. S and free school meals etc. to which the family may 
be entitled (Roll, 1983). It is important to note that what the 
individualist school of thought considers as a problem of incentives, the 
social justice school of thought considers a problem of low-pay and 
poverty. 
Minford (1983) and other economists adhering to the politics of the 
New Right may argue that benefit levels are too high and therefore that 
claimants' will to work, and to work harder, is diminished. But a survey 
of the long term unemployed by the Manpower Services Commission seems to 
refute this argument: 
'Most people questioned wanted work ... In real terms few of the 
unemployed expected an increase in their net pay .... By contrast 
probably at least one half were willing to accept a drop in their 
real pay. ' (M. S. C., 1980) 
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Similarly, data from the Family Expenditure Survey casts doubt on the 
association between the payment of benefits and a disincentive to gain 
work which would result in voluntary unemployment: 
'The average weekly income of an employee out of a job in 1983 was 
only 59% of employees' incomes. The ratio between income in and out 
of work for the long-term unemployed over one year is even less 
favourable since they can on average expect only 39% of the income 
they would have if they worked. ' (The Guardian 3.1.85). 
For the purposes of this thesis the incentives debate is a vital one 
not because of the merits of the economic analyses in themselves, but 
because of the importance of such arguments in producing and reproducing 
certain vocabularies which are differentially invoked in the cases of tax 
and supplementary benefit fraud. In particular the ideology of economic 
individualism supports the entrepeneurial drive of the shrewd individuals 
who accumulate wealth, (even if they do fiddle their taxes ), yet 
castigates benefit claimants who fiddle, no matter how ingenious and 
entrepeneurial they may be. Benefit fraudsters are perceived as doubly 
reprehensible because they are seen as takers from, the state who also 
cheat! The 'scrounger' mythology, so evident in the 1970's (Golding and 
Middleton, 1982), coupled with the resurgence of economic individualism 
may also effectively contribute towards the dismantling of what has been 
termed the welfare state consensus (Loney et. al, eds, 1983; Golding and 
Middleton, 1982; Hall et. al, 1978). The social and political consequences 
of this ideological shift will be explored below (see Chapter 1 (3) and 
Chapter 6). 
Finally, an alternative version of the incentive arguement must be 
mentioned: many critics of the economic analyses discussed so far would 
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deny that the welfare state is cossetting and provides a disincentive to 
work. Rather, they argue, benefit levels are set too low to enable 
civilized social life, and as such may even encourage fraud as the only 
available means of financial survival (Field, 1979; Harrison, 1983). A 
former high-ranking Civil Servant Geoffrey Beltram notes that 'mitigating 
circumstances - poverty and sometimes desperation' exist in many 
supplementary benefit fraud cases (Beltram, 1985). The link between low 
levels of benefit paid and incentive to defraud was explored in evidence 
to the Public Accounts Committee investigating Social Security fraud and 
abuse (Cmnd 102,1983/84). An important point was raised in relation to 
claimants' permissable earnings: currently (in 1987) unemployed 
supplementary benefit claimants may only have L4 per week of their (or 
their spouses') earnings disregarded, thereafter effectively suffering 100% 
'tax' on earnings. It was suggested that a more realistic disregard of 110 
or t12 would effectively reduce fraud (ibid). This formal suggestion 
demonstrates that the greatest financial disincentives are suffered by the 
poor not the rich (see Chapter 6). It also involves a tacit admission that 
there is a link between the inadequacy of benefit levels and instances of 
fraud. Paradoxically the D. H. S. S. themselves acknowledge this in that their 
prosecution policy involves taking account of 'mitigating circumstances' 
such as 'severe financial difficulties' (Stockwell and Clapham Law Centre, 
1983). But, if as advocates of greater social justice argue, supplementary 
benefit levels are wholly inadequate (Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983; Piachaud, 
1987), then being a claimant in itself constitutes mitigation, and even a 
justification for fraud. As will be argued below, the principle 
justification which benefit fraudsters offer is poverty - they need to 
'fiddle for necessities' (Chapter 4 (2b)). 
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(c) The Redistribution of Income : Tay and Benefits. 
Economists have also been concerned to examine the effects of using 
taxation and the payment of welfare benefits as twin agents of social and 
economic policy. It is often asserted that in the twentieth century the 
tax and welfare systems have brought about a redistribution in the income 
of Britons, evident for instance in the introduction of graduated taxes in 
1911 and the implementation of the Beveridge Report in 1948. The 
principles of equity and efficiency preoccupied legislators although 
neither has been achieved through their efforts: Sabine (1966) argues 
that apparent egalitarianism is a facade behind which inequalities of 
condition blatantly remain. Kincaid (1975) goes further and claims that 
social justice has always been subordinated to the goals of economic 
growth in modern British politics (whether Labour or Conservative). He 
argues that redistribution is a myth and that the issues of poverty and 
social justice are inseperable (ibid). His evidence, coupled with more 
recent statistics (Social Trends No 16,1986; Byrne, 1987) indicate a slow 
f. 11 in the incomes of the lowest half of income earners since 1949, a 
trend which is now accelerating. For example, the share of household 
income of the lowest fifth of income-earners dropped by 9% between 1976 
and 1985. Over the same period the share of the top fifth of income- 
earners rose by 6% (Byrne, 1987). 
Evidence to support the notion of redistribution of wealth is equally 
illusory. The Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth 
(1979) found that personal wealth (physical and financial assets as 
opposed to 'fluid' incomes), has very limited distribution amongst the 
population of Britain: over 40% of marketable wealth is owned by the 
richest 5% of adults (Reid, 1981; Social Trends go. 16,1986). Atkinson 
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(1978) and Kincaid (1975) therefore see little evidence to support the 
notion of a redistributive society or any process of equalization in 
incomes (or wealth! ) in recent decades. Moreover. recent privatisation 
share sell-offs in the mid 1980's have done nothing to alter gross 
material inequalities between rich and poor which, despite the rhetoric of 
'popular capitalism', are increasing (Piachaud, 1987; Walker, 1987). 
Nonetheless, the myth of redistribution dies hard, and some economists 
fail to recognise the existance of poverty : 
'I have always felt that far too much fuss is made of the poverty 
trap. ' (Nigel Lawson, 1977: 29) 
'Successive governments, obsessed with naive notions of social 
justice, have taxed to the point where the relation between effort 
and income has all but disappeared. ' (Ivor Pearce, 1977: 105) 
Greater social justice through redistribution is not an ideal shared by 
all: 
'It is as well if the Conservatives realise the limitations of 
social policies - good housing and food may make people happier, 
they won't make them more equal' 
(Rhodes Boyson, The Spectator 15.12.73) 
'Government spending is too high and the progression of direct 
taxation is too steep - and the combined result is that we have 
in Britain long passed the point where redistribution helps the 
poor - or anyone else except the increasing number of officials 
employed in increasingly complex tax and benefit systems....... 
And yet the talk is still of still more redistribution. There is 
scarcely anythying left to redistribute. ' 
(Sir Keith Joseph, Observer 22.8.75) 
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But empirical evidence offered by the Low Pay Unit and from Inland Revenue 
statistics suggests that there is a great deal of wealth left to 
redistribute. For example, Chris Pond argued in 1982 that if total 
marketable wealth recorded by the Revenue was equally shared amongst the 
adult population, every member would have owned 413,000 in 1980 after 
paying all debts including mortgages (New Society 9.9.82). 
Economists' estimates of the extent of redistribution of both income 
and wealth therefore vary enormously. The Institute of Economic Affairs is 
the source of much negative comment on the redistribution of income 
through what they see as excessively high marginal rates of taxation 
(I. E. A., 1979). However, the alternative commentators discussed here 
(Kincaid, Atkinson, Pond, Piachaud, Byrne), cast serious doubts upon the 
claims that substantial redistribution has taken place. They further argue 
that the concept of the redistributive state is more important at the 
level of popular mythology rather than at the level of empirical economic 
analysis. 
This debate provides a crucial foundation for any analysis of 
differential response to tax and benefit fraud: if as Mrs Thatcher has 
suggested 'the rich are getting poorer and the poor are getting richer' 
(Thatcher, 1975), then tax fraud may be perceived as more justifiable than 
benefit fraud, and the latter seen as evidence of greed and 'scrounging'. 
Alternatively, if (as the C. P. A. G., Low Pay Unit and other critics argue), 
the poor are becoming poorer, then differential response to tax and 
benefit fraud represents a negation of the ideal of social justice and a 
means by which the 'rich' who fiddle may become richer still. 
56 
(d) Ec cnonic arguments on Growth and Social Justice. 
Many of the justifications which are offered for the unequal response 
to tax and benefit fraud have their origin in crude economic analyses. 
These analyses can be broadly summarised as emanating from two schools of 
thought which will be referred to here as (1) Advocates of Economic 
Growth and (2) Advocates of Social Justice. Those economists who argue 
that economic growth should have priority over social justice believe that 
growth offers 'greater absolute benefits for all' (Seldon, 1979). They 
argue that a society based upon egalitarian principles would hamper the 
creation of wealth and so reduce economic benefits for all (Myddleton, 
1979). Such a view may lead to tax evasion and avoidance (conflated in 
the term 'avoision'), being represented as not only justifiable but 
positively creative: 
'Tax avoision may represent the power to preserve or create' 
(Myddleton, 1979: 57) 
'avoidance inspired by the motive of self-enrichment may yield 
gains, not losses, to the fisc and to the taxpayers fellows..... 
.. tax avoidance may serve the public weal by reducing public 
expenditure or increasing the yeild of tax. Tax avoidance and even 
evasion may be a form of public, service in consequence if not in 
motive. ' (Bracewell-Milnes, 1977: 82-3) 
No evidence is provided for such assertions, which are refuted by the 
Inland Revenue Staff Federation (I. R. S. F., 1981) and Sandford, Pond and 
Walker who argue that avoidance and evasion bring about 
'a redistribution of income in a way never intended by government: 
evasion is likely to mean a transfer from the unsophisticated to the 
sophisticated' (Sandford, 1980: 6). 
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This would indicate that even if economic growth were to be accepted as 
the guiding principle of taxation policy (economic growth which may even 
be predicated on the evasion and aviodance of taxes), 'benefits for all' 
would not automatically result. Financial gain would clearly be limited to 
the (already richer) few (ibid). 
To use Myddleton's analogy (1979), the debate may be summarised as 
one between proponents of 'Growthland' and proponents of 'Egalitaria'. 
Both views are seen as mutually exclusive, although in the era of 
Butskellite concensus it seemed that economic growth could be coupled with 
the development of welfare Capitalism and the achievement of greater 
social equality : 
'Overall, the blend of affluence and welfare appeared as a 
triumphant vindication of the western social system. And social 
welfare looked like an eminently successful way of tempering freedom 
with security, enterprise with stability, economic growth with a 
measure of social concern. ' (Mishra, 1984: 6) 
The welfare state had therefore appeared to provide the primary vehicle 
for the creation of a social consensus and for uniting economists' 
concerns for both growth and social justice. However, the challenge posed 
from the reassertion of the ideology of individualism, neo-classical 
economics and (most recently) the political 'New Right' have all but 
destroyed the welfare consensus (Mishra, 1984; Laney et. al, eds, 1983; 
Golding and Middleton, 1982). The issue of 'social justice' becomes 
redundant if the 'social' is replaced by atomistic individualism. Mishra 
argues that in rhetoric dominated by the latter, society consists merely 
of individuals 'playing the game' of the market according to the current 
rules and taking their chances in the market place, 'for better or worse', 
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and as a result social justice simply 'disappears' (Mishra, 1984: 62). Not 
suprisingly, countries which symbolized the aspirations and achievements 
of the post-war welfare state are most open to criticism from economics 
literature in the neo-classical vein: according to Mishra, Friedman 
therefore 
'blames the Velfare State, by implication, for Britain's economic 
ills - poor growth, inflation, unemployment and the like. ' 
(Mishra, 1984: 56). 
As a result the polarization of the economic schools (and ideologies) of 
growth and social justice seems complete. But this polarization has 
itself been constructed and is in no way 'natural' or self-evident. The 
development of political ideologies which enables the goals of 'Growth' and 
'Welfare' to be constructed as opposing ideals will be discussed below 
(section (3) and Chapter 3), as will the circumstances under which one 
triumphs and the other fails in the public rhetoric (Chapter 6). This 
thesis will argue that the contradictions between the politics and 
ideologies of indivdualism and social justice have generated contradictions 
in social policies relating to tax and welfare. Failure to resolve these 
contradictions has led to inconsistency in the responses to those who are, 
in economic terms, seen as successful and those who are regarded as 
failures. 
Tax evaders and supplementary benefit fraudsters may be located at 
either end of the polarization between the ideologies of 'Growth' and'Social 
Justice. As indicated above, many economists see taxpayers as those who 
generate wealth and benefit claimants as a financial burden upon those 
wealth creators. The paradox lies in the fact that moonlighters and 
'ghosts' and others generating 'wealth' by avoiding and evading tax may in 
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essence perform the same illegal acts as the majority of supplementary 
benefit fraudsters (as most who fiddle do so by working 'an the side'). 
But the latter are not regarded as entrepreneurial or wealth creating by 
economists operating neo-classical principles. The problem of selective 
application of their own economic principles is not an uncommon one 
within this school of thought: Mishra cites several examples of the highly 
selective nature of what he terms 'neo-conservative' literature (Mishra, 
1984: 56-61). 
This thesis aims to illuminate and explain the differences In 
vocabularies available to justify tax and benefit fraud. Many of these 
vocabularies invoke economic explanations for differential responses to 
tax and supplementary benefit fraud. Whatever the empirical validity of 
these explanations, they do inform official and popular discourse and so 
form an important source of both 'knowledge' and rhetoric on the topic. 
The concerns of economists summarised here therefore have a direct 
bearing on the aim of the thesis - to analyse the conditions (political, 
social and economic) under which the ideological discrepancies which give 
rise to differential response can arise. 
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(3) SOCIAL POLICY ISSUES. 
Personal taxation and the payment of social security benefits may be 
regarded as twin tools of social policy in modern Britain. Taxation 
finances the activities of the modern state, and the welfare state provides 
a channel through which much state revenue is directed towards individuals 
who demonstrate entitlement or need. The degree to which either (or both) 
are emphasized in political discourse can indicate the social policy goals 
of a particular government or political pressure group. For example, the 
payment of welfare benefits to the elderly, sick. unemployed and single 
parent families may, on one hand, be seen as a means of enabling these 
groups to 'participate in the life of the Community' (Donnison, 1982). On 
the other hand, welfare benefit payments may be perceived as weakening the 
'moral fibre of our people' making them like 'broiler hens' (Boyson, 1971). 
In the eyes of the British public taxation is indeed seen as the 
principal means of financing government expenditure, including the 
activities of the Social Services and the Welfare State (Furnham, 1985). 
Whether attitudes towards taxation and towards welfare are positive or 
negative, in public imagery they are perceived as evidence of the 'Robin 
Hood' activities of the state: taking from the rich and giving to the poor. 
But there is much evidence that this simplistic view is misleading: 
personal taxation has not only been imposed on the rich: 
'the contributory principles plus very heavy indirect taxation have 
together meant that much of the expenditure upon the social services 
has become a transfer by taxation within the working class itself. ' 
(Saville, 1983: 17) 
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that the burden of personal taxation 
is falling increasingly on those with incomes below average male earnings 
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(Byrne, 1987). The extent to which the rich subsidise the poor is therefore 
in serious doubt, yet the Robin Hood type of mythology is still influential 
amongst political and economic commentators (see discussion of the 
redistributive myth in (2) above), and in the public rhetoric (Furnham, 
1985). 
Regardless of the political perspective adopted, the perceived 
relationship between taxation and welfare benefits constitutes an 
important focus of social policy making. For this reason, a review of all 
relevant literature would be virtually endless. It is therefore necessary 
to limit the scope of such a review to the elucidation of three themes 
which are particularly useful in explaining differential responses to those 
who fiddle the state through evasion of taxes and those who fiddle through 
welfare benefit payments: 
1) The Historical development of the "Welfare State: this theme concerns 
the social, political and economic preconditions enabling the development 
of what is termed 'the welfare state' up to 1948. It is important here to 
illuminate the contradictory views about poverty and personal pathology 
upon which the modern welfare state is based: an appreciation of these 
contradictions will help to explain (a) how differential responses to 
welfare benefit fraudsters is made possible and (b) in what terms it may 
be justified. 
2) Theories of P. n alityy: this theme concerns the inculcation of the work 
ethic and the social side-effects of this process. For instance, social 
groups who were either unwilling or unable to adopt the discipline and 
values of capitalism (for example the 'idle', the sick or elderly) became 
marginalized. Consequently, when certain marginalised groups engage in 
rule-breaking, official sanction can more readily be applied to them 
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because they are already perceived as deviant by virtue of their lack of 
productive economic status, particularly the unemployed (Garland, 1985). 
3) The ideology of the 'New Fight': this theme is important in bringing up 
to date many of the debates emanating from a discussion of themes (1) and 
(2) which converge on the issues of taxation and welfare. These include: 
(a) the role of the state in the provision of welfare benefits and 
services in a modern society 
(b) the ideology behind the New Right articulation of the incentives 
argument: personal taxation as disincentive to effort and welfare benefit 
payments as incentive to indleness 
(c) the desirability of the 'go-getting society' and the social market. 
This review of social policy literature will therefore adopt the following 
framework: 
1) The historical development of the Welfare State'. 
2) Theories of Penality 
'3) The ideology of the 'Hew Right'. 
1) The historical development of the Velfa_*e State 
Many texts which describe and explain the development of the Welfare 
State adopt a historical perspective which, as Titmuss notes, assumes a 
'broad, ascending road of social betterment provided for the working 
classes since the nineteenth century and achieving its goal in our 
time. This interpretation of change as a process of unilinear 
progression in collective benevolence for these classes led to the 
belief that in the year 1948 "The Welfare State" was established. ' 
(Titmuss, 1963: 34) 
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Such an approach may be profoundly misleading, not least because it leads 
to a re-interpretation of history in terms of contemporary issues of 
'poverty', 'welfare' or the role of 'the state'. Karel Williams (1981) 
argues that historians have therefore attempted to establish causal 
connections along the road to 'social betterment' and in doing so have 
produced a historiography which is 'the prisoner of confused and 
incoherent received ideas' (ibid: 2). One difficulty in reviewing literature 
relating to poverty and its relief during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries is therefore the problem of 'modernity'. An example of this is 
evident in historians' reappraisal of the pre-1834 Poor Law as a 
relatively harmless practical response to rural poverty, and their 
simultaneous condemnation of the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act because of 
its emphasis on wilful pauperism. Williams argues that in such instances 
historians may be evaluating early social investigations and historical 
resources in accordance with the degree of harmony that they exhibit with 
contemporary discourses on poverty (Williams, 1981: 5). 
Nonetheless it is necessary to review orthodox accounts of the 
development of the Welfare State bearing in mind both the problem of 
modernity and the weakness of any simplistic historical interpretation 
which sees The Welfare State as coming into being in 1948, the product of 
a unilinear social progression (Titmuss, 1963). Many critics of post war 
British social policy argue that 1948 did not mark a revolution in policy 
towards the poor so much as a pragmatic response to the need for both 
post-war social and economic reconstruction and for political compromise 
(Mishra, 1977; Loney et. al. eds, 1983; Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983). 
No attempt will be made here to reconstruct the history of the Poor 
Laws (see Chapter 2 for an outline of differential histories underlying 
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taxation and welfare). Instead, certain important shifts in the 
assumptions underpinning social policy will be noted: for instance changes 
in definitions of who constitutes 'the poor', or in the ideologies of 
poverty and individual culpability. Such issues are important because they 
illuminate attitudes towards those perceived as 'living off the state' (or 
parish) or as 'workshy' (in former times, idle). Although the words used to 
denote attitudes to the poor may have changed, the meanings and'attributes 
associated with state/parish, workshy scrounger/idle pauper are essentially 
the same. Similarly, the literature in this area demonstrates a remarkable 
consistency in negative attitudes towards the poor, despite the lapse in 
years, from 1834 through to the 1980's. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century poor relief was 'selective, 
discontinuous and supplementary' and so offered a very different form of 
assistance from both later nineteenth century poor relief and late 
twentieth century social security (Williams, 1981). Payment for relief of 
poverty was based upon the Elizabethan Poor Law which was modified in 
order to supplement the incomes of the 'able-bodied', usually unemployed or 
lowly-paid men with families. This was known as 'outdoor relief' and such 
payments existed in tandem with indoor relief to the very young, old or 
sick housed in institutions (Fraser, 1973; Williams, 1981). Payments were 
financed at Parish level by the poor rates: the increased rates 
neccessitated by increasing expenditure to support the poor is frequently 
cited as a principle reason for the setting up of the Royal Commission 
which reported on the poor law in 1834. Commissioners Chadwick and 
Senior believed the key problem was that granting outdoor relief to the 
able bodied both interfered with market forces which (they argued) 
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determined wage levels, and stifled ambition and effort. Such ideas had 
been pronounced forcibly by Reverend Joseph Townsend in 1786: 
'What encouragement have the poor to be industrious and frugal 
when they know for certain that should they increase their store 
it will be devoured by the drones, or what cause have they to fear 
when they are assured, that if their indolence and extravagance, by 
their drunkenness and vices, they should be reduced to want, they 
shall be abundantly supplied ?' (Fraser, 1973: 35) 
The legacy of such ideas is clear in the pronouncements of contemporary 
politicians who use similar imagery of 'the idle, feckless and failures' 
in order to mobilize resentment against the poor: 'broiler hens' merely 
replace 'drones' in this rhetoric which assumes poverty is a problem of 
culpable, feckless individuals (Boyson, 1971). 
The twin pillars of the 'New Poor Law' of 1834 were the principles of 
less eligibility and the Workhouse Test (see Chapter 2). As Fraser (1973) 
noted, 
'A harsh alternative to self-help and independence was to be offered 
to the prospective pauper which he would accept only when truly 
destitute. It was not intended to reduce poverty but to deter 
pauperisum. ' (ibid: 43). 
In this context Fraser uses the term 'poverty' to denote a structural 
social problem and 'pauperisum' to denote individual destitution: the latter 
term was the one employed in the nineteenth century and in usage implied 
individual culpability. Therefore the principles of the 1834 Poor Law were 
aimed at deterring poor individuals from claiming poor relief by making 
its acceptance conditional upon the workhouse test. A contemporary 
economist summarised the role of the workhouse in the following terms: 
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'The able-bodied tenant- of a workhouse should be made to feel that 
his situation is decidedly less comfortable than that of the 
industrious labourer who supports himself. ' 
(McCullock . quoted in Fraser, 1973: 43). 
Also implicit in such ideas is a version of the incentives arguiment 
(outlined above). The assumption that it is the allegedly high levels of 
poor relief (or benefits) which are responsible for idleness lies at the 
root of attempts to reduce the attractiveness of the conditions under 
which such relief is paid, and the amounts paid. In this way it is 
possible to see parallels between contemporary calls for an end to the 
'anti-effort trap' (discussed in section (1) above) and between concerns to 
deter pauperism and reduce the costs of poor relief in the nineteenth 
century, and current attempts to reduce expenditure on welfare benefits . 
The poor law after 1870, according to Williams, presents a complex 
picture demonstrating the different strategies being adopted to deal with 
poverty. The 'crusade against outdoor relief' after 1870 attempted to 
educate the poor but 'degenerated into more repression of pauperism' 
(Williams, 1981: 92). At the same time indoor relief was subject to new 
classification and treatment which involved institutions more specialised 
than the general mixed workhouse: built on the pavillion system, these new 
institutions operated 'a battery of treatment techniques' (Williams, 
1981: 144). 
The separation of the able-bodied unemployed male from other groups 
claiming relief is highly significant: 'a line of exclusion was drawn 
against able-bodied men after 1850' (Williams, 1981: 59) which according to 
Bill Jordan remained an important feature over a century later. Jordan 
argues that the creation of a pauper class 
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'appears to be dealing with poverty, but separates those who may 
demand radical change from workers who may have a stake in higher 
profits and expanding economy. ' (Jordan, 1973: 11) 
This separation between workers and the unemployed thus created the 
possibility of antagonism between two clearly defined groups - workers 
and claimants. Such a division is firmly rooted in the operation of the 
poor laws and the mechanics of exclusion. As Jordan indicates, the re- 
establishment centres run by the D. H. S. S. function to control the alleged 
'voluntary unemployment' of the long-term unemployed (ibid). These 
residential centres offer places for 'persons who are in need of re- 
establishment through lack of regular occupation' - to the long term 
unemployed males (none are available for females) 'who show no signs of 
finding work' (Lynes, 1985: 231). Despite current levels of unemployment, 
the able-bodied male may be ordered to attend such a centre under threat 
of withdrawal of supplementary benefit if he refuses (ibid). This element 
of compulsion, together with the separation from wife and family, appears 
firmly rooted in the nineteenth century tradition of dealing with the male 
able-bodied pauper. The ideology of the workhouse thus remains an 
important element in the policy and practices of regulating the 
unemployed. 
Significant shifts in policy towards the poor are evident in the 
liberal reforms of 1909-1914 (following a Royal Commission on the Poor 
Laws set up by Conservative Prime Minister Balfour in 1905). Some social 
policy commentators fail to make distinctions between these reforms and 
the Beveridge proposals 35 years later seeing instead a 'causal sequence 
of events and policies which culminated in the welfare state of the second 
half of the twentieth century' (Saville, 1983: 11). 
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But such a view ignores the precise historical preconditions which give 
rise to social policy at any given point in time and conflate many 
discrete influencing factors into a simplistic chain of causation. By 
contrast Saville lists 'three interrelated strands' of causation as, 
(1) The political calculations of ruling groups; 
(2) The economic and social needs of a complex industrial society; 
(3) Pressures arising from the mass of the population insisting 
upon social change (ibid). 
Clearly all these factors have a part to play, but Fraser (1973) also 
stresses that the growing awareness of poverty (through pioneering social 
surveys, charity organizations and popular literature) heightened popular 
demand for change at the start of the twentieth century . Crucially, he 
distinguishes these humantitarian factors which promoted the liberal 
reforms from those which were to later underline more fundamantal shifts 
in attitudes towards the poor between 1918 and 1945. During this period 
the experience of war exerted a profound effect on social policy. But the 
motivations of the politicians who advocated such change varied: for 
instance, in 1919 Addison argued that the First World War had shown 
'hundreds of thousands of men who were physically unfit and could not 
pass the very moderate standard of physical fitness which the army 
required' (Marwick, 1965: 242). Good performance in warfare began to be seen 
as contingent upon better conditions of welfare in peacetime. To this 
extent the promotion of health care, homes fit for heroes and financial 
protection against unemployment or sickness can be viewed as the logical 
and functional responses of the state to the need for a fit workforce and 
war force. 
Selectivity remained the theme dominating state provision for the poor 
in the 1930's. Benefits were targeted to meet the needs of those who could 
demonstrate such needs through means testing, and were not paid as of 
right, (that is, 'rights' that were accorded to all those individuals within 
a specific category or group) (Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983). Public attitudes 
towards the poor were, however, changing: poverty was less likely to be 
attributed to personal failings and there was a far greater appreciation 
of the misery it caused (ibid). But such misery was not equally 
distributed throughout the nation: for instance, in the early thirties the 
unemployment rates in Jarrow were up to 67% whereas High Wycombe 
experienced 3% (Fraser, 1973: 180). Similarly, inequalities are evident in 
the national distribution of unemployment in the 1980's. 
But the Second World War had a profoundly levelling effect in terms of 
human experiences across the boundaries of social class. This was partly 
because of the 'total' nature of the war itself and partly because of the 
social integration that evacuation, air-raid shelters and the like brought 
about Cibid). Titmuss also noted that the 'fair shares' slogan was an 
inevitable consequence of the unity of the 'Dunkirk spirit'. Universalism 
thus replaced selectivity as the desired theme of social policy because, as 
Fraser succinctly noted, 'a people's war had to produce a people's peace' 
(Fraser, 1973: 194). But, the war-time goal of universal social provision 
was soon dissipated in the face of the problems of financing post war 
social policy. Moreover, these principles (which ostensibly underpinned 
the Beveridge proposals in 'Social Insurance') never materialized: 
'It is a misconception to describe these measures as protecting the 
individual citizen or family "from the cradle to the grave", for the 
deficiencies in provision soon became apparent although for nearly 
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two decades they were masked, or partially masked, by the fact of 
near-full employment. ' (Saville, 1983: 15) 
Not suprisingly, many alternative criticisms of the Beveridge Report 
stressed that welfare benefits would undermine the work incentive and that 
a universal benefits system would prove too costly for the taxpayer. 
These concerns mirror many raised in relation to early nineteenth century 
poor relief - the encouragement of idleness and (unduly) high costs for 
the ratepayers. In turn, these ideas are still present in the 1980's, 
particularly in New Right critiques of the welfare state (see Chapter 1 
section 3 below). 
Although the development of what is now termed the Welfare State 
cannot be seen in simplistic or causal terms, certain historical points of 
departure, for example in terms of changes in attitudes towards the poor, 
ideologies of poverty and strategies for dealing with poverty, are 
indicated by this (brief) review of relevant literature. Despite the 
vagaries of war, social upheaval, economic boom and recession, certain 
consistencies remain in the rhetoric used by policymakers relating to 
state provision of welfare. These consistencies may be summarised in the 
form of five themes which can be seen as emerging from this discussion of 
the-historical development of welfare: 
(1) The concern to maintain work incentives: this resulted in the 
principles of less eligibility in 1834, by the imposition of the 'Wage- 
Stop' in the 1960's and early 1970's, and the abolition of Wages Councils 
in 1985. Also, the 1980's have marked an effective reduction in benefits, 
particularly for the young and the unemployed (Walker and Walker, eds., 
1987). 
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(2) The separation of the able-bodied unemployed as a distinct 
classification amongst the poor: this is evident in the 1834 Poor Law and 
in the further separation of the male unemployed from other groups in the 
1850's. This distinction still operates in that the registered unemployed 
are the only category of supplementary benefit claimant not entitled to 
the increased long-term scale rate of benefits (see chapter 6 for 
discussion of future proposals). 
(3) The implicit distinction which is made (theoretically and practically) 
between the 'deserving' and the 'undeserving' poor: the elderly and the sick 
are not regarded as 'undeserving' in popular rhetoric to the same extent 
as are the male unemployed (Furnham, 1985). Once again, this ideological 
distinction demonstrates the potency of the attitudes dating back to the 
1834 Poor Law. 
(4) The social cleavage created by ideologies of poverty and pauper sm: 
in distingushing worker from claimant, (and, in the past, the worker from 
the idle pauper), antagonism is produced within what may be termed the 
'working ' class (Jordan, 1973; Hall et. al., 1978; Golding and Middleton, 
1982). The extent to which this feature is a conscious attempt by the 
powerful to 'divide and rule' (Jordan, 1973) or the logical product of a 
competitive capitalist society is open to debate (Golding and Middleton, 
1982). Nonetheless, the effect of such divisions is to open up the 
ideological space within which some groups who constitute 'the poor' may 
be both isolated and negatively stereotyped. This marginalization 
effectively enables differential responses to such groups, justified in 
terms of their status as undeserving 'scroungers' taking from the state: 
this response is amplified when such claimants engage in fraud. 
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(5) The contradictions between the principles of universalism and 
selectivity in welfare provision: universalism was embraced following the 
second world war as an expression of the desire for social cohesion and 
social justice. But selectivity through means testing never disappeared - 
the tension between the concepts of rights (universally available to all) 
and need (established through selective testing) is an important feature 
of twentieth century social policy. As will be argued in Chapter 3, this 
tension affects political and popular responses both to the taxpayer (who 
is seen to 'pay' for welfare) and to the the claimant (who is seen as a 
non-productive recipient). 
These issues, arising from a review of literature on the history of 
the 'welfare state', will inform this thesis in important respects: for 
instance, the development of social policy in relation to the poor, policy 
in relation to the taxation of the 'non-poor', historical perceptions of the 
poor and the genesis of explanations for poverty itself are all crucial 
elements in forming a historical framework within which to locate the 
problem of differential response. 
2) Theories of Penality 
Any thesis which deals with issues of law-breaking needs to examine 
the consequences of such actions in terms of punishment. Both 
supplemetary benefit fraud and tax fraud are illegal acts involving 
official sanction, although the nature of such sanctions and frequency of 
their use does vary (as will be seen in Chapter 5). Possible reasons for 
such variations in penal sanctions include the argument that public 
resentment (and therefore official punishment), is more readily mobilized 
against persons who can be perceived as workshy or idle. Therefore it may 
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be argued that popular resentment may be more readily mobilized against 
benefit 'scroungers' than tax evaders (Sutherland, 1949). Furthermore, 
benef it claimants may be seen to perform a function for the state in 
times of economic slump as 'whipping boys of the recession' (Golding and 
Middleton, 1982). By virtue of their 'workless' status the unemployed poor 
may be represented as implicitly workshy, and as a result become 
marginalized as a social group (Marsden, 1982). This marginalization 
renders them more prone to the negative stereotyping and ultimately to the 
scapegoating process indicated by Golding and Middleton. 
Marxist commentators may explain such marginalization as a technique 
of unofficial punishment, both for the claimants' failure to exhibit the 
virtues of the work discipline, and for their failure to compete 
effectively within the capitalist system. In this respect it is necessary 
to explore literature which links the ultimate official sanction, 
imprisonment, with the operation of the labour market under capitalism 
(Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1939). Alternative texts stress the role of non- 
penal modes of control (which may include education, medicine and social 
work), which exist alongside penal regulation in a series of linked 
institutions, or 'carceral archipelago' (Donzelot, 1979; Foucault, 1977). A 
variety of explanations needs to be examined in order to cast light upon 
differing modes of regulation (used both in contemporary British society 
and in past centuries), in order to understand the context and forms of 
regulation used to deal with the poor (i. e. supplementary benefit 
claimants) and the non-poor (i. e. taxpayers). 
Rusche and Kirchheimer postulate a direct relationship between 
economic change and penal developments: 
'Punishment as such does not exist; only concrete systems of 
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punishment and specific criminal practices exist ... Every system 
of production tends to discover punishments which correspond to its 
productive relationships. ' (quoted in Zdenkowski and Brown, 1982: 3) 
In particular they link the operation of the labour market and the 
sanction of imprisonment through the principle of 'less eligibility' : 
'This principle posits that the standard of living within prisons 
(as well as for those dependent upon the welfare apparatus) must 
be lower than that of the lowest stratum of the working class, so 
that given the alternative, people will opt to work under these 
conditions, and so that punishment will act as a deterrent. ' 
(ibid:? ) 
It is argued that wage and poor law legislation had forced long hours and 
factory discipline upon the dispossed landless labourer. The principle of 
less eligibility which underpinned nineteenth century poor relief may 
therefore be seen as a tool for the regulation of the landless labourer, 
both in the form of the workhouse and the penitentiary (Zdenkowski and 
Brown, 1982; Ignatieff, 1978). Ignatieff traces similarities in the 
architectural structures of, and disciplinary emphasis within, a variety of 
institutions that were built to house the sick, the mad, the pauper and the 
criminal: 
'Since they made up a complementary and interdependent structure of 
control, it was essential that their diets and deprivations be 
calibrated on an ascending scale, school-workhouse-asylum-prison, 
with the pain of the last serving to undergird the pain of the 
first. ' (Ignatieff, 1978: 215) 
Furthermore, Ignatieff argues that the model for all such institutions was 
the factory: demonstrating the links between prison reformers and the new 
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industrial employers (economically, ideologically and socially), he 
contends that 'penal and industrial discipline developed along the same 
trajectory of severity' (ibid). 
Critics of this view (and of Rusche and Kirchheimer), may argue that 
such analyses assume a crude economic determinism which effectively 
reduces very complex relationships to a crude functionalist account of the 
operation of capitalist economies. It may be argued that this determinism 
fails to take account of differences in the development of specific types 
of institutions: asylums, schools and prisons are thus lumped together in 
a generalizing (rather than specific) analysis (Williams, 1981; Zdenkowski 
and Brown, 1982; National Deviancy Conference, 1979). However Melossi 
argues that although 'economism' cannot entirely account for the 
development of the prison and its structure, the concept of the labour 
market is a valuable one in understanding the history of such institutions 
(Melossi and Pavarini, 1981). 
Such arguments are applicable to modern penal politics: for example 
Quinney argues that prisons perform the function of controlling marginal 
groups in society, particularly when capitalism is in a situation of crisis 
(Quinney, 1977). On the other hand Scull argues that decarceration is 
functional for monopoly capitalism because it limits the states' 
expenditure on imprisonment whilst favouring more subtle forms of social 
control within the community, namely psychiatry and social work (Scull, 
1977). Both arguments can be synthesized if one accepts that 
imprisonment increases in times of economic crises and decarceration takes 
place once the crisis is past (Box, 1987). However, both assume a 
'reading-off' of a punishment and regulation directly from economic 
factors, whether the explanation centres on labour market or economic 
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crises (Zdenkowski and Brown, 1982: N. D. C., 1979). This determinism can be 
challenged from a variety of perspectives, but the work of Steven Box will 
be emphasised here as it demonstratesf a theoretical position closest to 
that adopted in this thesis. Box (1987) argues, on the basis of a weight 
of research evidence, that there is indeed a positive relationship between 
economic recession and criminal activity _and 
the use of official 
punishment, whether imprisonment or repressive control within the 
community. But this link does not derive solely from the structural 
relationships between the capitalist state and penal politics: 
'The key term in analysing the behaviour of judges, probation 
officers and police is not "materialism" but "meaning". ' (ibid: 197) 
Box utilizes the notions of both materialism and meaning in order to 
elucidate the links between crime and recession in a way which seeks to 
illuminate contradictions as well as consistencies in the workings of a 
capitalist state: 
'government policy is as much a reaction to events as a creator of 
them; as much a recipient of the consequences of others' decisions 
as a dictator of them. ' (ibid: 199) 
It therefore becomes necessary to locate the actions of regulatory agents 
within a material, ideological and historical context in order to 
understand the logic in use in a particular situation at a particular time. 
To understand why tax and supplementary benefit fraudsters are treated 
unequally by regulatory agents, and why judicial and popular responses to 
them are so different, it is necessary to examine the meanings attributed 
to tax and benefit fraud by the fraudsters, the regulators and the public. 
These meanings are, as Box argued, not fixed and immutable, but change 
according to historical and material circumstances. The principal focus of 
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this thesis is to analyse the conditions under which differential meanings 
are constructed, and hence differential responses are justified. 
The work of Foucault also offers a critique of Marxist theories of 
penality. In seeking to explain the birth of the prison Foucault stresses 
the importance of disciplinary power rather than mode of production 
itself. Imprisonment under early capitalism therefore represented a desire 
'not to punish less but to punish better', to use disciplinary power more 
effectively in order to 'insert the power to punish more deeply into the 
social body' (Foucault, 1977: 82). In turn Foucault links coercive, corporal 
and secretive punishments with the development of a capitalist economy 
which enabled such a 'political anatomy'. He therefore attributes the 
development of disciplinary power within the prison to a more generalised 
'discipline' which could be operated in a variety of institutions forming 
the carceral network (ibid). 
Critics argue that Foucault fails to identify the precise origin of 
disciplinary power and that he also ignores the social and class context 
of such power relationships (Melossi, 1979; Lea, 1979). This debate has 
implications for this thesis in that differential treatment of tax and 
benefit fraud cases may on the one hand be seen to be 'read-off' as the 
product of class relations under capitalism (one law for the rich, another 
for the poor), or alternatively as an area of relative autonomy and 
struggle. The latter perspective does indeed allow for attempts by groups 
such as advice agencies, the D. H. S. S. Trade Unions and pressure groups 
(such as the C. P. A. G), to ensure the legal rights of benefit claimants 
accused of fraud, and also attempts to challenge current anti-fraud policy 
being operated by the D. H. S. S.. Similarly, such a perspective enables 
political space to allow explanations of current struggles against tax 
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evaders (and to some extent avoiders), and recent 'compliance' initiatives 
being mounted by the Inland Revenue. 
Although the work of Foucault and other authors writing in the area of 
penology may initially seem removed from a topic of study in which 'the 
prison' does not necessarily play a part (as very few tax fraudsters, for 
example, are gaoled), the value of such literature lies in its broader 
applications. In challenging empiricist histories of penal regulation, 
many of the authors discussed above have provided the basis for an 
understanding of punishment in terms of penal politics and struggle. 
Moreover they opened up possibilities for a greater understanding of how 
change takes place and in what ways such changes (in penal relations) are 
articulated with 'wider social forces'. (Zdenkowski and Brown, 1982; Box, 
1987). 
There are two other issues concerning power and penality which are 
of relevance to this thesis: first, the issue of formal equality before the 
law, and secondly the issue of the 'rule of law' as a means of ruling class 
ideological reproduction. As regards the first, Marx argued that 'The 
right of equality conveyed by the legal form is in fact a right of 
inequality, in its content, like every other right' (Zdenkowski and Brown, 
1982: 30). Second, the 'rule of law' may be seen to serve an ideological 
function in buttressing and legitimating ruling class domination. The 
application of the law in relation to those who fiddle welfare benefits 
and taxes does not appear to reflect genuine equality (as Chapter 5 will 
demonstrate). But the left idealist position that 'sees bourgeois rights 
as a sham' will be rejected because, as Jock Young (1979) argues, such a 
position regards any debates concerning the form and application of the 
law as legitimating the ideology of 'the rule of law' which so 
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successfully sustains the capitalist system. This thesis will take the 
view that the area of legal rights and penal regulation is an area of 
substantive struggle (ibid). The contradictory nature of the rule of law 
(both as upholder of ruling class interests, yet potential instrument 
against those interests), creates both a potential and a theoretical space 
within which struggles can take place. This thesis aims to engage in one 
such struggle in analysing and explaining differential judicial (and 
social) responses to tax and benefit fraud. 
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3) The Ideology of the New Right. 
The term 'New Right' is one which is readily understood (and used) at a 
commonsense level, but which is extremely difficult to define precisely. Some 
authors use the term to denote a philosophy of neo-liberal economism whi: h 
incorporates the ideas of a variety of authors including Adam Smith, Hayek, 
Friedman and Sir Kieth Joseph (Bosanquet, 1983). Others use the term to 
refer both to this neo-liberalism and to an accompanying form of 
authoritarian conservativism which has gained prominence in recent years 
(Hall and Jacques, eds., 1983; Levitas, 1986). Authors writing from the 
perspective of what they term the 'New Right' tend to stress that it marks a 
distinct break from conservatism: conservatism is seen to focus upon 
authority, allegiance and tradition which implies the need for fundamental 
continuity in the nature of the social order (Green, 1987). By contrast, the 
New Right is seen to challenge that social order, principally in its 
interpretation of the relative roles of the state and the market in modern 
industrial societies (ibid). In order to relate the ideology of the New Right 
to the issues of taxation and welfare it is first necessary to examine the 
differing perspectives on what precisely constitutes the New Right. (For the 
purposes of this examination I shall rely largely on New Right commentators 
rather than upon the original works of authors such as Hayek and Friedman, as 
the thesis is sociological, and not oriented purely to economics). 
New Right authors frequently present their arguments in a highly partial 
manner. Their analyses are not noted for intellectual sophistication: for 
instance, Irving Kristol (1978) (under the heading 'Infantile Liberalism- A 
Democratic Disorder? ') argues against the motives and policies of social 
reformers: 
'One usually concedes the sincerity of their moral passion while 
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questioning the efficacy of their proposals... But when their moral 
passion becomes intellectually petrified into a specific ideology, then 
sincerity can become transformed into a peculiar form of fanaticism. ' 
(ibid: 216) 
Kristol goes on to claim that reformers are in the business of justifying 
their own existence rather than helping the poor. Anyone who advocates 
greater social and economic equality is dismissed in unequivocal terms: 
'To that species of infantile communism which calls for permanent 
revolution, many of our liberals today respond with a kind of infantile 
liberalism which calls for permanent reform. ' (ibid) 
Hayek articulates criticisms of egalitarian social reform in a similarly 
polemical fashion: 
'The phrase social justice is not, as most people probably feel, an 
innocent expression of goodwill towards the less fortunate. .. it has 
become a dishonest insinuation that one ought to agree to a demand of 
some special interest which can give no real reason for it. ' 
(Hayek quoted in Green, 1987: 127) 
These examples serve to illustrate an important theme in New Right literature 
which Bosanquet (1983) calls 'antithesis'. The New Right is probably less 
identifiable because of what it is 'for' and more identifiable for what it is 
against. The thesis and antitheses of the New Right will be examined below, 
but it is important to stress that New Right discourse is notable both for 
its antagonism and for its implicit conviction that critics are opponents, 
and opponents are fools. Furthermore, their own arguments are presented as 
value-free, and free from the 'fanaticism' of social reformers: 
'The I. E. A. has firmly established itse if as a non-partisan research 
Institute with a reputation for scholarly independence. ' (Green, 1987: 153) 
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Yet, as Loney (1986) notes, friends of the Institute of Economic Affairs 
featured prominently among the life peerages announced in 1982 as, under Mrs 
Thatcher, the Institute moved to the centre of 'intellectual' life. 
The thesis and antitheses of the New Right will now be examined using 
the framework put forward by Bosanquet (1983) which is based upon economic 
theory. But, as already argued, the New Right can also be seen to include 
repressive elements of authoritarian conservativism (Levitas, 1986) and so 
the broadly 'economic' framework will be extended to include these elements. 
THESIS 
1. Society inherently tends towards 
order and justice. 
2. Inequality- inevitable result of 
social freedom, personal initiative. 
UT ITHES IS 
1. Politicization- search for equality 
democratic pluralism, tripartism. 
has intensified class conflict. 
2. Fallacy of the idea of 'social cost' 
3. Capitalism will ensure economic 3. Shortcomings of the Galbraith 
growth and improved living standards thesis on corporate power in the 
in the long run 'New Industrial State'. 
4. The entrepreneur is the key figure 4. Critique of rising public 
in ensuring all the gains that are to expenditure. 
be had from economic growth. 
5. Economic growth will first reduce, 15. Critique of industrial subsidies 
then eliminate (absolute) poverty. 
6. Failure of the welfare state. 
7. Pressure from bureaucracy. 
8. Critique of Trades Unions. 
The first principle of the New Right thesis is that society has 
'natural' tendencies towards order and justice. The central force which 
accomplishes such integration within societies is economic growth 
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(ibid). But, the role of other institutions should not be overlooked: for 
instance many commentators point to the role of the institution of the 
nuclear family in achieving the regulation of individuals, both in personal 
terms (the channeling of sexual drives), and in economic terms (through the 
division of labour within the household unit) (Fitzgerald, 1983; Wilson, 1983; 
David, 1987). At the same time the family may serve as a training ground 
where the values of the free market can be transmitted. Edgar (1986) 
illustrates this point by referring to a recommendation by the government's 
'Family Policy Group' that such values may be taught by 'training children to 
manage their pocket money' (Edgar, 1986: 75). 
The second principle is that inequality is the inevitable and tolerable 
result of social freedom and personal initiative (Bosanquet, 1983). Equality in 
reward is seen as undesirable because the uncertainty and risk surrounding 
personal reward is crucial in providing incentives to effort and risk-taking. 
Therefore 'there is no conflict between freedom and equality of opportunity, 
but much between freedom and the search for equality of outcome' (ibid: 11). 
'Freedom' is a word which figures prominently in New Right discourse, but 
which has profoundly contradictory applications: for instance, Levitas (1986) 
argues that Thatcher disliked the freedom from social bonds implied in the 
individualism of the 1960's and, rather, sought 'a mode of freedom that is 
compatible with virtue' (ibid: 92). This inconsistency in the use of the 
concept of freedom serves to valorise freedom in economic terms, but not in 
personal terms. However, inconsistencies such as these can be regarded as 
strengths (not weaknesses) of a brand of New Right ideology (Thatcherism) 
which incorporates economic liberalism with the moral concerns of 
conservative authoritarianism (Levitas, 1986; Hall and Jacques, eds, 1983). The 
consequence of the New Right's highly selective emphasis on 'freedom' is that 
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it becomes possible to justify social and economic inequality in the name of 
individual 'freedom', whilst at the same time denying many individual 
liberties to those who are not regarded as 'virtuous' (for instance, trades 
unionists, women who 'fail' in respect of their assigned role in the nuclear 
family, and homosexuals) (Levitas, 1986; David, 1986; Edgar, 1986). As Gamble 
summarises, 
'The "individualism" of the New Right is not a creed of universal 
opportunity for all individuals whatever their sex, age or race. 
It is primarily a creed of opportunity for male heads of families 
who receive the rewards of enterprise and in return are made responsible 
for their dependants - women, children and old people. Maintaining the 
social cohesion of families by non-market means is seen as an essential 
prop for a free market economy. ' (Gamble, 1986: 47) 
The freedom of the New Right is therefore restricted in two ways: first, it 
fails to apply to many socially (and economially) disadvantaged groups in 
society. Second, it is restricted in scope to economic freedom, and thus can 
be defined as freedom 'to get' and not freedom 'to be' (Gallie, 1976). This is 
the essential difference between liberal and socialist morality, and between 
free market and social justice ideologies (see Chapter 3). 
The third, fourth and fifth principles of the New Right thesis are to a 
large extent inter-dependant. It is argued that capitalism will, in the long 
run, ensure economic growth and improved living standards for all. According 
to Bosanquet (1983) Friedman argues that the combination 'of economic and 
political freedom produced a golden age in both Great Britain and the United 
States in the nineteenth century' (ibid: 12). However, what Friedman sees as a 
'golden age', others (according to Bosanquet, Schumpter) see as a period under 
which capitalism brought change through 'creative destruction' (ibid). 
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Nonetheless, the architects of change, and hence the key figures in ensuring 
all the gains to be had from economic growth, are the entrepeneurs. Schumpter 
sees them as 'driving the chariot of creative destruction', but most New Right 
commentators would see the role of the entrepeneur, (in taking the burden of 
'risk' and taking the initiative in discovering new businesses and consumer 
preferences), as vital for the creation of wealth (Vinson, 1980; Burton, 1985). 
Furthermore, it is argued that the creation of wealth is a prerequisite for 
reducing poverty: economic growth will eventually offer greater absolute 
benefits for all, and in so doing will eliminate absolute poverty (Bosanquet, 
1983; Myddleton, 1979). 
Bosanquet rightly emphasises that the thesis of the New Right is based 
upon qualitative assumptions rather than quantitative economic study, and so 
it invariably rests upon a faith in the value of (and the smooth operation 
of), the free market. By contrast its antithesis is based on a more 
quantitative critique of the alleged failure of the modern democratic state. 
The origin of the problems of the modern state lie precisely in its 
'democratic' nature. New Right theorists would therefore argue that democratic 
pluralism has led' to a short-term policy emphasis, geared to meeting the 
demands of a variety of interest groups who, under democratic principles, 
have an influential political voice. Therefore the root of the antithesis is 
this process of politicization (Bosanquet, 1983). 
Politicization can be seen from the New Right perspective as the process 
of political choice, motivated by envy and potentially leading to the 
despotism of the majority (ibid). Some authors , for instance Hayek, 
(Bosanquet, 1983; Green, 1987), advocate the taming of democracy through 
constitutional change, lest the nation be turned into a totalitarian slum. 
Politicization also involves the involvement of Trades Unions in the framing 
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again the New Right can be seen to conflate economic and social arguments 
into a powerful ideology which serves to legitimate and promote the interests 
of the economically successful few, whilst acting against the interests of 
both the 'failed' poor and of those who try to advocate social justice. 
The critique of state intervention is also bound up in the third and 
fourth principles relating to corporate power and to public expenditure. It is 
argued that, contrary to Galbraith's thesis, corporations in the new 
industrial state remain subject to market uncertainties and so are not over- 
powerful (Bosanquet, 1983). As a result, the New Right advocates non- 
intervention into corporate and business life: there is, allegedly, no 
concentration of power in the hands of a few because the free market can be 
trusted as an effective form of regulation. Similarly, intervention by means 
of industrial subsidies (often a consequence of the 'politicization' process), 
is regarded as an undesirable manipulation of market forces, and, moreover, it 
does not work (ibid). Public expenditure is increased by all such 
interventions, (whether into welfare, business regulation or subsidies). For 
instance, first there are the costs of the 'subsidy' itself and second, there 
are the costs of the bureaucracy which administers such interventionist 
policies (Gamble, 1986). The tendency towards rising public expenditure is 
perceived as cutting away at possibilities for wealth creation by wasting 
resources on the dead weight of bureaucracy, which in turn is financed by 
taxing the wealth creators themselves (Boyson, 1978). 
The thesis and antithesis briefly outlined here indicate the powerful 
intermeshing of economic liberalism and authoritarian conservatism which 
constitute New Right discourses. Clearly some authors emphasise some elements 
at the expense of others: for example, Bosanquet argues that Friedman 
stresses the economics of monetarism which involves tight control of money 
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supply and switches the economy 'to automatic pilot', leaving all regulation 
to the market (Bosanquet, 1983). By contrast, Hayek is seen to acknowledge 
the need for the state to ensure a minimum level of security and subsistence. 
He also saw the value of a third fcrce in the economy in the shape of the 
voluntary sector (Loney, 1986). Furthermore, Bosanquet sees Hayek's arguments 
as not deriving from economics alone, but from a wider political philosophy 
in which constitutional change was a necessity if modern democracies were to 
be restored to economic health (Bosanquet, 1983). At the same time many New 
Right commentators stress the moral rather than the economic aspects of the 
crusade in which they are engaged (Edgar, 1986). However, as mentioned 
earlier, such inconsistencies may be regarded as strengths when they are 
successfully packaged together in a composite ideology, as in the case of 
Thatcherism: 
'The alliance between the monetarists proclaiming freedom through the 
market and anti-libertarian traditionalists. . . provided the means of 
appealing to two distinct constituencies. It also afforded intellectual 
support for the authoritarian direction in which the Thatcher government 
moved. ' (Loney, 1986: 34) 
The mixture of the economic and the moral in the political discourse of 
the New Right is crucial in enabling the mobilization of both moral and 
economic arguments against the poor when they engage in rule-breaking, or 
even when do they not: benefit claimants are still regarded as potentially 
undeserving merely as a result of their lack of productive economic status 
(Boyson, 1978). At the same time, the ideology of the New Right valorises the 
role of the wealth creators and advocates minimum regulation in their 
economic sphere for two main reasons: first because intervention by the state 
is seen as in essence both immoral and ineffective (Green, 1987). Second, 
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because state regulation of the economy and (high) taxation are perceived as 
hampering wealth accumulation and stifling incentives (but see review of 
economic literature in (2) above for a clear rebuttal of this latter 
asumption). 
Literature concerning the New Right is therefore of central importance 
in examining the ideological preconditions which enable different political, 
social and judicial responses to the frauds of the rich and the poor. The 
historical and material circumstances under which the ideology of the New 
Right sustains dominance in the public rhetoric will be explored in Chapter 6. 
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(4) LEGAL ISSUES. 
The very nature of literature covering the legal aspects of tax evasion 
and supplementary benefit fraud in itself demonstrates differences in the 
way both forms of fraud are perceived: there is much more written about the 
legal issues concerning the former than the latter. As Tony Lynes noted, 
supplementary benefit remains 'a back-water of British Justice' (Fulbrook, 
1978). Despite Julian Fulbrook's view that legal scholars should be 
'digging into the details and realities' of the departments and tribunals 
involved in administering justice for the unemployed, this area remains 
relatively neglected when compared with the lawyer's interest in taxation 
(ibid). The legal complexities involved in tax evasion and tax avoidance 
(and problems in distinguishing these activities), are 'horrendous' (Leigh, 
1982). This is probably a reflection of the lucrative nature of such 
activities, both for the fraudsters who engage in them and for the tax 
lawyers they may employ. The scale of the sums which may be involved are 
evident in the case of the two founders of the Rossminster group, 
specialists in tax avoidance schemes. Following a four year investigation 
they were served with tax demands exceeding t30 million (Observer 19.2.84, 
8.4.84). By contrast, in cases of supplementary benefit fraud the amounts 
of money involved are small, legal representation is frequently non- 
existant (see Chapter 5(3)), and justice is administered swiftly and 
summarily (Uglow, 1984). 
Although some comparisons have been drawn between the law relating to 
tax fraud and that relating to supplementary benefit fraud (Uglow, 1984; 
N. A. C. R. O., 1986), generally the literature reflects a division between the 
lawyer's interests in two separate areas: 
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(a) Tax avoidance, evasion and the law 
(b) Legal issues relating to supplementary benefit fraud. 
The following review of relevant literature will therefore reflect this 
division. 
(a)Tax avoidance. tax evasion and the law 
Much literature relating to tax evasion and avoidance is geared to the 
needs of the taxpayer in seeking to minimise his/her tax liability (Wylie, 
1983), and therefore tends to adopt a negative stance towards personal 
taxation itself. This is clear, for example, in Monroe (1981), whose Hamlyn 
lecture on the laws of taxation was entitled 'An Intolerable Inquisition'. 
Unashamed hostility towards taxation underlies many commentaries by 
interest groups such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (Seldon, 1979; 
I. E. A., 1977). For instance, such authors admit that there is a legal 
distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance, yet fail to see a direct 
relationship between breaking the tax laws and the violation of moral 
codes: 
'I think also that we must dismiss from our minds the idea that 
there are any ethics in taxation. There are na ethics in taxation 
There is no moral law in taxation. And tax avoidance, in my view, 
is not a moral issue. Tax evasion is a different case - but only 
when it involves a breach of a normal code of human behaviour, when 
it is breaching the moral laws and not the tax laws. ' 
(Lord Houghton, 1977: 60). 
This argument seems to imply that breaking the tax laws may not give rise 
to a 'moral' wrong and that breaking the spirit of the law (though not the 
letter) by avoidance of tax is not a moral issue in any sense. Behind such 
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arguments are notions of the state and of morality which overlap with the 
ideology of the New Right . The activities of the state are seen as 
burdensome and intrusive, particularly evident in the collection of 
personal taxes. At the same time there is an expressed belief in a moral 
sense of right which is independent of the state, and ultimately 
independent of the operation of democracy itself (see analysis of the 
ideology of the New Right in section 3 above). By contrast, Sandford (1980) 
would argue, from the perspective of democratic pluralism, that both evasion 
and avoidance of tax run counter to the law and to the will of government. 
These activities violate the letter and the spirit of the law respectively, 
and also serve to distribute income and wealth in a way which is 
unintended by democratically elected government. 
The whole concept of the rule of law is once again turned on its head 
in arguments which see successful tax avoiders as positive contributors 
towards the maintenance of personal liberties, which governments (who try 
to act against tax avoidance schemes), allegedly threaten: 
'... anti-avoidance has become an instrument for the erosion of 
law and for the stimulation of totalitarian attitudes and practices 
... Hence, though it can be in some respects a vice, tax avoidance 
is now much more of a virtue. In our semi-totalitarian democracy 
the tax avoider renders us all two services. He upholds the Rule 
of Law, and he undermines policies of confiscation. Does he not 
deserve at least some modest applause? ' (Shenfield, 1968: 34-5). 
Such arguments serve to transform the dubious 'morals' of tax avoidance 
into a positive virtue when directed against the 'semi-totalitarian' 
democratic state. Within this rhetoric are echoes of early anarcho- 
libertarians who saw the liberty of the individual as paramount and so 
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regarded taxation as 'robbery' (Green, 1987). At the same time such 
arguments also reflect Hayek's concern with the drift to totalitarianism 
which he saw as resulting from the despotism of the majority - democracy 
(Bosanquet, 1983; Green, 1987). Furthermore, there is another important 
assumption which underlies (old and ) New Right discourses on the rights 
and wrongs of taxation and tax evasion - the assumption that tax crime is 
not 'criminal' at all. This, coupled with the Right's version of the 
incentives argument, is evident in the comments of another I. E. A. author: 
'It may seem rather harsh for citizens whose services are most 
valuable, and who can therefore earn most, to be treated like 
criminals when they prefer to keep more than 1/6 of their marginal 
earnings. ' (Myddleton, 1979: 47). 
The assumptions here are essentially in the functionalist tradition (Davis 
and Moore, 1945) in assuming that there is a positive relationship between 
the most functionally important skills and greatest financial rewards. 
Myddleton clearly feels that these most 'valuable' citizens cannot be real 
'criminals'. They are merely victims of high marginal rates of taxation. 
The crime of tax evasion is thus transformed by such discourses into a 
preference 'to keep' ones earnings. Legal issues are therefore effectively 
dispensed with and replaced by the rhetoric of liberty, which is itself 
'above' and distinct from the law and the state. The perceived relationship 
(or not) between morality, liberty, law, and state is therefore of crucial 
importance in explaining attitudes towards tax crime. 
Tax crime, (like other forms of crime), is also understood and 
represented in terms of the typical offender, who is likely to be 
successful in occupational and financial terms. The disjunction between the 
high status of the typical offender and the objective reality of law 
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breaking is rendered explicable by reference to broader stereotypes of the 
'real criminal'. Hence Myddleton goes on to explain that 'some tax evasion 
has always resulted from real criminals not declaring as taxable income the 
rewards arising from their "profession"' (Myddleton, 1979: 47). To 
demonstrate this point he cites the example of the criminal Al Capone who 
was jailed for tax evasion. It seems that if real criminals like Al Capone 
evade taxes then this is a criminal act, yet if other 'professions' engage 
in the same activity they are not perceived as criminal, but rather as 
valuable citizens excercising their 'right' to keep their marginal earnings. 
According to such rhetoric, criminality is seen as a product of the status 
and nature of the offender rather than the product of acts which violate 
the law (see also discussion of penality in section (3) above). This notion 
is important in the context of this thesis as it may help to explain why 
tax and benefit fraudsters are perceived and treated differently by 
departmental officials, judiciary, media and public. 
A more detached and circumspect view of British Tax law is provided by 
literature which aims to outline legislation and important cases upon which 
current tax law is based (Lewis, 197? ). Case law dates from 1874, but for 
the purposes of this thesis 1948 and the Case of the Duke of Westminster v. 
I. R. C. provides a watershed, as it helps to draw the line between legal 
avoidance and illegal evasion. In his judgement Lord Tomlin stated, 
'Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the 
tax attracting under the appropriate Act is less than it otherwise 
would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this 
result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue and his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot 
be compelled to pay an increased tax. ' (Lewis, 1977: 25). 
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But if liability is minimized by 'omissions from returns of income, mis- 
statements or.. fraud' then illegal evasion has taken place (ibid). The 
difficulty lies in establishing intent to evade tax: this is particularly so 
when attempting to decide, as in the Rossminster case, when an avoidance 
scheme is 'artificial' and hence constitutes illegal evasion of tax (Leigh, 
1982). 
As Steve Uglow notes, 'All the offences which the Board can call on 
involve proof of dishonesty in one form or another' (Uglow, 1984: 135). 
Therefore the provisions of the Theft Acts, Finance Acts and Taxes 
Management Act (T. M. A. ) 1970 under. which proceedings can be brought all 
involve an element of 'mens rea' which is difficult to prove. It is also 
important to note that provisions of T. M. A. 1970 do not create criminal 
offences but civil proceedings: this seems to justify Uglow's observation 
that 'the-Revenue do not consider the criminal law to be an effective tool 
for dealing with fraud' (Uglow, 1984: 36). This point seems substantiated by 
the infrequency of the Board's prosecutions (see Chapter 5(3)). 
The literature concerning tax law indicates the complexity of the laws 
involved. Even when cases are brought to court (that is, when the Revenue 
is satisfied there is a case to answer), the legal issues appear yet more 
complicated. Evidence to the Keith Committee Report (on the enforcement 
powers of the Revenue departments) illustrates this point: former Attorney 
General, Lord Shawcross stated that 
'it is often very difficult for a jury to understand what fraud 
cases are about. Often the judges do not understand it themselves. 
Or they are not strict enough and allow defence counsel to confuse 
everyone and drag out the trial for a ridiculous length of time'. 
(Keith Committee Report. Cmnd 88 . -, 1983: 8.1.3. ) 
qIi 
The Report also quotes Levi's research which found that in 1978/9 the 
average length of trial in a contested case of conspiracy to defraud was 
found to be 5 working weeks at costs up to £10,000 per day (ibid). This 
illustrates the complex and protracted nature of tax fraud cases and the 
enormous costs involved in bringing a prosecution. (As will be argued 
below, supplementary benefit fraud cases rarely present such problems for 
the enforcing department). 
The Keith Report summarises many of the difficulties involved in 
regulating tax evasion by comparing the investigation of tax fraud with 
'ordinary police work': 
'The question for [tax] investigators is not "who has done it? " but 
"has anything been done? ", and to establish whether the 
circumstances amount to fraud requires an initial investigation 
in circumstances where all or nearly all the evidence is likely to 
be in the hands of the suspect. ' (Cmnd 8822,1983: 8.1.5). 
Levi (1982) argues that the lack of observability of tax offences renders 
investigation extremely difficult and, as a result, more investigatory 
powers are needed. But when the Revenue's powers are exercised, albeit 
rarely. the legal issues which arise are more likely to reflect the 
interests of the taxpayer than the tax-gathering duty of the Revenue. For 
instance in the wake of the 'raids' (legal searches) on Rossminster 
directors, debate inside and outside parliament focussed on the alleged 
invasion of individuals' privacy, the allegedly 'draconian' powers of the 
Revenue and the threat which was being posed, according to Lord Denning, to 
the 'elemental right' of property (Daily Telegraph 17.8.79). The issues 
surrounding the avoidance or evasion of substantial amounts of tax due 
become lost in a swell of indignation at the Revenue searching business 
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mens homes (with appropriate warrants), for evidence. Once again the type 
of alleged offender and 'non-criminal' perception of the alleged acts 
combined to turn the tables upon the Revenue investigators themselves. It 
is difficult to see how this process could operate in relation to other 
forms of crime, notably benefit fraud (B. B. C. Grapevine The Oxfraud Incident, 
1983). 
Finally an additional source of literature needs to be mentioned 
although its usefulness for the purposes of this thesis is limited: 
specialist tax lawyers and accountants have produced what amounts to 
'guides' to Revenue investigation procedures (Pritchard and Jones, 1976). 
Literature of this kind seeks to guide the authors' typical clientelle by 
giving information on departmental procedures, sample cases and likely 
outcomes of investigations. Although useful in providing the tax 
specialists' perspective on Revenue investigatory practice, the procedures 
they outline are subject to frequent change in response to shifts in policy 
and manpower. As a result such works can become quickly out-dated and so 
official departmental sources, (such as the Board's Annual Report, Keith 
Committee Report and Public Accounts Committee evidence), give a more 
accurate picture of counter-evasion policy and practice. 
The lawyers' interest in tax avoidance and evasion is likely to reflect 
the values and vested interests of the particular author involved, and 
consequently literature varies from the polemical (I. E. A., 1979) to the 
critical (Uglow, 1984) and also includes the 'consumers' interest (Wylie, 
1983; Pritchard and Jones, 1976) in the form of specialist guides to 
handling Revenue enquiries and low-level avoidance strategies. 
For the purposes of this thesis the most valuable literature within the 
'legal' category involves a comparative analysis of the differential rules 
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and sanctions used in the regulation of tax and supplementary benefit fraud 
(Uglow, 1984; N. A. C. R. O., 1986). Differential sanctions are in part the 
product of D. H. S. S. and Revenue policy, but departmental policy is not 
created in a legal vacuum. Uglow (1984) argues that departmental practice 
also mirrors 'the availability and development of the substantive charges 
used against the different types of offender'. Therefore it is significant 
that the offences available to the Inland Revenue require proof of 'wens 
real in the form of an intent to defraud, whereas the D. H. S. S. only has to 
show that a false statement has been knowingly made, and no wider 
'dishonesty' needs to be proved (ibid). The key question that Uglow poses 
is therefore crucial to this thesis: 
'are the polices stressing the criminal aspect encouraged by the 
relatively easier task of prosecuting strict liability offences? ' 
(Uglow, 1984: 130) 
The Revenue's non-prosecution policy may appear to be justified as a 
pragmatic response to the difficulties involved in bringing prosecutions 
and also as a pragmatic response to the department's primary duty - to 
collect taxes due. However, it is the precise nature of the law itself 
which creates problems (discussed above) in mounting successful criminal 
proceedings against tax evaders. Ultimately therefore the law is responsible 
for the relatively lenient approach to the tax evader and for justifications 
of this leniency on the grounds of 'pragmatism'. In seeking to explain why 
tax evaders and benefit fraudsters attract differential legal regulation and 
sanction it is necessary to consider wider issues concerning a variety of 
economic, political and social relationships: these relationships can be 
summarised as follows: 
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1) the taxpayer and the state 
2) the benefit claimant and the state 
3) the Law and State . 
Tax and benefit fraud are crimes: the law defines the boundaries of legal 
conduct in relation to the citizen's duty in paying to and in claiming from 
the public purse. But the law is framed within 'a specific set of material 
and ideological conditions which enable differential responses to taxpayers 
(givers to. the state) and claimants (takers from the state) when they 
defraud the public purse (see Chapter 3). 
(b) Supplementary Benefit fraud and the Law. 
As already indicated, literature relating to supplementary benefit and 
the law is limited and falls into two principle areas: 
1) works best described as 'guides' to welfare law, aimed either at the 
consumers themselves or at professionals working with claimants (Mesher, 
1983; Lynes, 1985; HMSO, 1981; C. H. A. R., 1986; Alcock and Harris, 1982). 
2) literature which gives a critical perspective on social security law, 
either in general terms (Fulbrook, 1978; N. A. C. R. O., 1986) or in relation to 
specific issues: for instance critiques of the treatment of claimants caught 
up in the Operation Major anti-fraud 'swoop' in Oxford (Franey, 1983) or the 
treatment of women under social security law (Luckhaus, 1987; Ungerson ed, 
1985; Atkins and Haggett, 1984; Brophy and Smart, eds, 1985; Wilson, 1977). 
In the case of the former, such literature is useful in specifying what 
precisely constitutes supplementary benefit fraud - to 'knowingly make a 
false statement' for the purposes of obtaining benefit being the essence of 
the offence. In addition, such 'guides' seek to inform claimants of their 
rights during investigations, court proceedings or at appeal tribunals. As 
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argued in many critical texts, ignorance of such rights or of the nature of 
fraud proceedings may well affect the treatment the claimant receives 
(Franey, 1983). In turn, differential access to specialist advice, legal 
counsel and to knowledge of departmental procedures may amplify existing 
inequalities in the form of the law (Uglow, 1984) leading to an 
accentuation of the problem of differential response. Franey's examination 
(1983) of the treatment of allegedly homeless benefit claimants in Oxford 
during Operation Major illustrates the denial of basic civil liberties to 
those with least knowledge of their rights and least power to demand them . 
Critical analyses of social security law offer useful insights into the 
assumptions which underlie current welfare provision. For instance, Fulbrook 
(1978) points to the legacy of distinctions between deserving and 
undeserving poor which undermined the concept of legal rights to 
supplementary benefit. Although the Ministry of Social Security Act (1966) 
had aimed to reduce the stigma attatched to claiming 'National Assistance', 
the ideas of the old National Assistance Board (and relatively punitive 
attitudes towards claimants) were deeply entrenched. Beneath these attitudes 
lay the 'poor law' mentality whereby the elderly, disabled, children and 
sick were seen as 'deserving', but other individuals in poverty were not. 
Fulbrook therefore argues that the present Welfare State and administrative 
structures for dealing with the unemployed reflect fundamental dichotomies: 
between altruism and self-interest, between compassion and indifference, and 
between the belief that the poor are hapless victims and the notion that 
they are responsible for their own plight (Fulbrook, 1978). 
These dichotomies are manifest in contradictions between the apparent 
legal rights to supplementary benefit and the effective administrative 
regulations which govern how the rules laid down by parliament are to be 
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interpreted. These regulations were collected in the 'A Code' which 
Fulbrook saw as 'quasi-law' but which, contrary to the spirit of rights, was 
not accessible to members of the public and so remained essentially 'secret' 
in nature (Fulbrook, 1978). The A Code is now known as the 'S Manual' and 
is, theoretically, available for inspection at local social security offices 
(Lynes, 1985). But Fulbrook's argument, that apparent legal rights may be 
effectively denied through the application of complex administrative rules, 
remains a valid one. (In addition, the notion of 'rights' for -supplementry 
benefit claimants has been greatly eroded since this book was written in 
1978: for instance, see Chapter 6 for a discussion of work-tests). 
The contradictions which Fulbrook outlines are bound up with the 
fundamental differences between the ideologies of social justice (advocating 
social equality through a redistributive state and claimants' rights, and 
liberalism (advocating minimalist state intervention and emphasising 
individual responsibility) (see Chapter 3). These contradictions must be 
considered when analysing the form and content of the law relating to 
taxpayer and benefit claimant. The law appears to give 'the benefit of the 
doubt' to the taxpayer in cases of suspected fraud by requiring that 'mens 
real or interest must be proved (Cmnd 8822,1983; Uglow, 1984). But no 
such proof of intent is required in cases of supplementary benefit fraud: 
such strict liability offences thus make for far easier prosecution (Uglow, 
1984; N. A. C. R. O., 1986). The specific nature of the laws involved in 
regulating tax and benefit fraud therefore lies at the heart of differential 
response to tax and benefit fraud. In turn the law itself arises from 
political and economic relationships within a society at particular times. 
In order to understand such relationships it is necessary to examine 
sociological literature. 
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(5)SOCIOLOGICAI, LITERATURE. 
The discipline of sociology contributes an important and wide-ranging 
body of literature which is relevant to this thesis. In the sense that 
sociology is concerned with both the study of social structure and social 
action it offers differing perspectives on the topic of tax and social 
security fraud. First it deals with issues of social structure: economic 
and social inequality, power and authority, the nature and effects of 
social institutions (such as the mass media), and the role of 
organizations and bureaucracy in complex industrial societies. Second it 
deals with human interactions and meanings at the level of groups and 
sub-cultures in addition to probing how individuals perceive and 
understand and constitute their social world. Neither of these two major 
foci are mutually exclusive as modern sociology is increasingly attempting 
to reconcile the macro and micro approaches to the understanding of social 
phenomena, and nowhere is this more evident than in the sociology of crime 
and deviance (Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973; Hall et. al, 1978; Box, 1987). 
Relevant sociological literature is broad ranging and impinges on the 
issue of economic crime in general, and tax and benefit fraud in 
particular, from a variety of angles. The review of sociological literature 
which follows will reflect these differing perspectives, but will also 
entail some degree of overlap, particularly as modern criminology draws on 
theoretical and empirical work from other areas of sociological concern 
(for instance, organizational and media sociology). Bearing in mind the 
problems posed by a significant ovelapping of key themes, the following 
broad headings will be used in order to simplify the task of reviewing 
such an extensive body of relevant literature: - 
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(a) Social and economic inequality. 
(b) Issues raised by organizational sociology. 
(c) Criminological literature. 
(d) The sociology of the mass media. 
(e) Social psychology. 
(a)Social and economic inequality 
Sociologists differ greatly in their assessment of the extent and 
importance of social inequality in Britain. In the decade following the 
onset of the post-war economic boom, some sociologists optimistically 
heralded the beginning of a classless society (Marshall, 1950), or 'the end 
of ideology' (Bell, 1960). However, the persistence of class-based 
inequalities was demonstrated by sociologists who, following the 're- 
discovery of poverty' in the 1960's (Mishra, 1984), claimed that Britain 
was far from a classless society and remained as divided as ever (Abel- 
Smith and Townsend, 1965; Atkinson, 1975; Wedderburn, 1974; Westergaard 
and Resler, 1975). 
This debate has a long history. In 1830 John-Stuart Mill had expressed 
the optimistic view that 
'Eight centuries ago society was divided into barons and serfs... 
At every successive epoch, this inequality of condition is found to 
have somewhat abated; every century has done something considerable 
towards lowering the powerful and raising the low. ' 
(Beteille ed., 1969: 45) 
Over a century later Marshall (1950) argued that inequality was declining 
significantly, due largely to the enfranchisement and rights of 
'citizenship' which had been accorded to the masses following two wars. 
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He declared that class and citizenship were 'at war' and that citizenship 
was winning (Marshall, 1950). This concept was taken-up by other 
sociologists who similarly believed that democratic pluralism would end 
inequlality and class conflict: 
'democracy is not only or even primarily a means through which 
different groups can attain their ends and seek good society; it 
is the good society itself in operation. ' (Lipset, 1960: 403) 
Runciman argued that inequality existed only to the extent the individual 
perceived him/herself as deprived and so 'relative deprivation' could be 
seen as a means by which the full, extent of social and economic 
inequalities are not fully experienced by individuals, and a means by 
which social integration (despite class inequality) is achieved (Runciman, 
1966). 
The Weberian concept of status was also employed to explain the 
relative diminution of class inequality and conflict in twentieth century 
Britain. Halsey (1981) argued that differences in status between social 
groups effectively blurred class-based economic differences. Halsey 
combines the concept of citizenship, status and relative deprivation in 
his explanation of the accommodation of change with fundamental 
continuity, in British post war society. However, critical sociologists 
would point to the ideological role which status differences and the 
concepts of citizenship and relative deprivation perform in reducing the 
individual's awareness of the true extent of social inequality (Westergaard 
and Resler, 1975; Parkin, 1971; Miliband, 1969). At the same time the 
ideology of equal citizenship (like that of equality before the law) serves 
to legitimize the existing economic and social order as just and fair. 
Whilst perhaps agreeing that class and citizenship are indeed 'at war' 
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many marxists would see the battle as an ideological one in which 
citizenship is little more than an aspect of false conscionsness: 
therefore, in direct contrast to Lipset, Sweezy does not see democratic 
pluralism as an answer to the problems of disadvantaged groups, a means 
of ending inequality, and an end in itself: 
'Far from being anathema to the ruling class, democracy came to be 
regarded as the best and least expensive method of governing. ' 
(Sweezy, 1980: 27) 
Sociologists' assessments of the extent of political, economic and 
social inequality are directly related to their particular values and 
beliefs: if society is seen as basically stable, consensual and 'open', then 
inequality is seen as declining, as a relative concept and even positively 
functional in a meritiocratic society (Davis and Moore, 1945). By 
contrast, if society is seen as based upon conflict between economically 
based classes, unequal and 'closed', then inequality is both endemic and 
destructive (Giddens, 1973). Both perspectives are directly relevant in 
understanding differential response to tax and benefit fraud: both sets of 
arguments are still invoked in discourses which justifying relatively 
lenient treatment of tax evaders and in discourses which criticise harsh 
responses towards benefit fraudsters For example, the functional 
perpective underlies the views of an architect of New Right social policy 
in the U. S. A. whose work has been influential during the 1980's in Britain: 
George Gilder, author of 'Wealth and Poverty' argues that 'in order to 
succeed the poor need most of all the spur of their own poverty' (quoted 
in Loney, 1983). Taking the argument still further, Sir Keith Joseph had 
argued that 'people want more... But equality is the enemy of more... The 
pursuit of equality will turn this country into a totalitarian slum' 
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(Observer, 22.8.75). But it is precisely this use of populist imagery (or 
ideology) that radical sociologists point to as being the source of 
negative images of the Welfare State and its claimants. Stuart Hall 
therefore comments on the other side of the ideological debate 
'... What the people want! Thus "the people" also come to be 
represented as consenting to the erosion of their own hard-won 
and barely-secured "rights", in a society where massive inequalities 
of power, property and wealth continue to be secured. This is how 
the consensus against social rights is ideologically constructed. ' 
(Hall, 1980: 7). 
One important aim of this thesis is to examine precisely how the 
consensus against welfare 'scroungers' (and attitudes favourable to tax 
fraudsters) have been constructed and maintained. In the case of tax fraud, 
the functionalist assumption (Davis and Moore, 1945) that social inequality 
is an 'unconsciously evolved device' by which the most able and talented 
few are rewarded, (in accordance with the functional importance of their 
contribution to society), clearly underpins the view of many old and New 
Right commentators who justify the crimes of high status tax evaders in 
terms of the need to maintain high rewards and incentives for these 
'talented few'. 
Sociological debates concerning the desirability or undesirablity, 
reduction or persistence, limits or extent of economic, social and 
political inequality are therefore essential to this thesis for two main 
reasons: 
1) They provide a theoretical framework within which one particular form 
of inequality (differential response to tax and supplementary benefit 
fraud) can be analysed. 
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2) They also provide an insight into the rhetoric used (by fraudsters, by 
regulatory agents and in popular discourse) to justify the commission of 
these frauds and the varied responses to them. 
(b)Organizational Sociology 
Tax and benefit fraud often involve activities, (such as moonlighting), 
which are learned by the individual in the process of adapting to the 
goals andculture of the work group or larger employing organization. In 
addition, tax fraud, in particular, may be associated with organizational 
goals and structures which pre-dispose workers to commiting certain types 
of fraud. Examples of the influence of such occupational factors are 
Gerald Mars' study of pilferage by dock workers (Mars, 1974) and Ditton's 
study of the work of breadroundsmen, where 'fiddles' were institutionalized 
and so became part of 'learning the ropes' for new employees (Ditton, 
1977). In discussing the fiddles of higher status workers, Michael Clarke 
outlines the deviant activities of elites in organizations ranging from 
Pergamon and Poulson to British Leyland and the Crown Agents (Clarke, 
1981). It is in this context that Edward Heath's (often mis-quoted) 
comment is located : 
'The activities of the firm of Lohnro are not so much the unpleasant 
and unacceptable face of capitalism as the inherent logic of 
Capitalism. ' (ibid) 
In this respect the link between an organization's search for profit and 
shady business transactions, or even fraud, becomes clear: economic crime 
is compatible with the inherent logic of capitalism. Furthermore, it can be 
seen not as the criminal acts of certain deviant individuals, but rather as 
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the product of the 'slippery slope' of dubious organizational and business 
practice (Chambliss, 1978; Levi, 1967). 
The rules which apply to elites within organizations may also 
contribute to the commission of fraud by providing ready opportunities for 
illegal activity to take place. But these opportunities are to some extent 
taken-for-granted as providing 'perks' for certain higher status 
individuals: for instance, in discussing the business activities of some 
M. P. s (including Reginald Maudling ), Clarke notes the sympathy which some 
journalists expressed for men such as Maudling, who was seen to have 'a 
right as a member of his class to earn some money in a hurry after that 
length of ill-paid public service' (Clarke, 1981). 
Admittedly opportunities for fraud or 'fiddles' exist in most 
occupations (Ditton, 1977; Henry, 1978; Mars, 1982), but what differs is 
the societal reaction to those fiddles. As Gerald Mars notes 
'fiddles on the Khashoggi/Lockheed scale and the massive tax 
evasions that these inevitably invlove invite an awed admiration: 
social security fiddles, however igenious, do not. ' 
(Mars, 1982: 225). 
Mars argues that such reactions do not only result from class and 
privilege, but also from the different occupational structures which 
produce them. If the offender is 'demonstrably in a different league' then 
the observer feels he is no personal threat. By contrast, Mars argues, 
small-scale social welfare fiddles involve offenders who are despised 
'whether [they] fiddle or not' (ibid: 226). However, although providing a 
useful description of differing opportunities for and attitiudes towards 
tax and benefit fraud, Mars fails to explain the genesis of such 
differential response. Ultimately the (structural) differences in 'class and 
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privilege' remain undeveloped here, and so does any analysis of the 
formation of those ideologies which 'despise' the poor and 'admire' the 
rich. 
Much literature in the area of organizational sociology seems to exist 
in a social and political vacuum, without reference to the social world 
beyond the organization or to the economic base underpinning it. Therefore, 
whether one adopts a systems approach, (Etzioni, 1960), structural- 
functional approach (Merton, 1949), or psychological viewpoint (Maslow, 
1954), a common problem with much organizational theory is that it lacks 
a critical edge. Many authors are concerned to describe hQi organizations 
operate rather than wliX they operate in the way that they do, (other than 
for the purpose of attaining the 'goals' of the organization itself or 
fulfilling its 'needs': a largely tautological argument). This is perhaps a 
reflection of the goals of much research in the field of management and 
organizations - to make the organization function more efficiently. 
Bearing these problems in mind, the most useful literature in this field 
concerns organizational deviance. 
Definitions of organizational crime and deviance vary: Reiss (1978) 
states that organizational deviance can best be analysed through 
'the study of social organization - the organizational matrix 
that encompasses the deviant behaviour of persons and. 
organizations. ' (Reiss, 1978: 35-6) 
Organizational crime is, according to this view, distinct from other forms 
of individual crime. As organizations can be defined as groups which co- 
ordinate efforts towards the attainment of collective goals (Clinard, 
1983), then explanations for such crime must go beyond individualistic 
notions of crime and punishment. Thus it can be argued that theories of 
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organizational deviance contrast with the emphasis of much 'traditional' 
criminology on individual pathology. 
The definitive feature of formal organizations, then, is that they are 
established 'for the purpose of achieving certain goals' (Silverman, 1970). 
Deviance may result because certain internal processes produce tension 
for organizations to obtain goals unlawfully (Clinard, 1983). In his 
study of retired middle management executives, Clinard (1983) found that 
the 'oppressed middle' management suffered excessive pressures whilst 
having least decision making power. Top management was seen as 
responsible for setting the 'ethical tone' and so unethical conduct 
(organizational deviance), was most likely if top management was pressing 
too aggressively for profits. Such deviance was less linked to external 
economic (or competitive) factors than to internal 'cultural' ones. In this 
respect Clinard's findings point to the importance of an 'unethical 
subculture' in producing deviance, and in this respect they support the 
studies by Ditton, Henry and Mars in relation to occupational crime. 
Occupational rules can therefore be seen as providing the opportunity 
structure for crime, as well as the justifications for the offences 
themselves: for profits (Braithwaite, 1984; Clinard, 1983) or as 'perks' of 
the job (Henry, 1978), part of the wage for the job (Mars, 1978), or part 
and parcel of doing the job itself (bitten, 1977). All of these 
justifications are important in the implications they hold for enabling 
and justifying tax evasion and supplementary benefit fraud (where the 
latter involves working while claiming). They are subjected to further 
scrutiny in the criminological literature. 
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(c) Criminological Literature. 
The most important contribution made by criminology to the topic of 
differential response to tax and supplementary benefit fraud is the 
literature relating to white-collar crime. Indeed, it could be argued that 
the contribution which white-collar crime made to criminology is far more 
significant than the contribution that criminology made to the study of 
white-collar crime. The very concept of white-collar crime called into 
question orthodox criminology in three key respects: first, it indicated 
the inadequacy of theories of crime which rested on notions of social, 
economic or cultural deprivation. Second, it raised important questions 
about the nature of official knowledge about crime (dependant on official 
statistics), in which the crimes of the middle-classes were largely 
invisible. Third, it drew attention to the social process of 
criminalization which was selectively applied (and rarely so in the case 
of white-collar criminals). This literature is therefore important in 
analysing differential response to the economic crimes of the rich (tax 
fraud) and the poor (benefit fraud) as it comes to terms with the problems 
of differential criminalization and societal response. 
The review of relevant criminological literature will therefore focus 
on three themes: 
1) White-collar crime 
2) The processes of criminalization and the formation of societal 
responses to deviance 
3) New Criminology and attempts to develop marxist explanations of crime. 
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1)White-Collar crime 
Sutherland (1960) revealed the partiality of all theories of crime 
which saw law breaking as a response to deprivation (whether social, 
cultural or economic). In the 1940's he argued that white-collar crime 
(committed by persons of upper socio-economic status, in the course of 
their occupations), is both costly and damaging to social ralations based 
on trust. It differs from 'ordinary' crime not because it constitutes a 
different form of criminal behaviour, but because of the different societal 
reaction it induces. He identified the use of civil rather than criminal 
regulation and the lack of organized public resentment as important 
factors in explaining why white collar crime attracts little social stigma 
or punishment (ibid). Clearly there is a parallel here with the 
contemporary treatment of U. K. tax evaders (chapter 5). Also, in focusing 
upon the differential application of the criminal law (according to the 
social status of the offender), Sutherland indicates a possible reason for 
differential response to welfare benefit fraudsters who do not share 
'cultural homogenity' with businessmen and the powerful, and against whom 
public resentment is therefore more readily organized (Sutherland, 196Q) 
(see also the Sociology of the Mass Media in (d) below). 
Sutherland's work provided the starting point for a variety of studies 
of white collar and occupational crime. His theory of differential 
association led many criminologists to examine in more depth the 
interactions within workplace and workgroup which offered opportunity for, 
or buttressed sub-cultures of, 'fiddling' (Ditton, 1977: Henry, 1978; Mars, 
1982). Other criminologists shifted attention from lower class deviance 
to the study of the deviance of the business classes (Chambliss, 1978; 
Pearce, 1978; Levi, 1981; Leigh, 1982; Braithwaite, 1984; Levi, 1987). 
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Levi's work on long firm fraud demonstrates the extent to which the 
dividing line between what may be regarded as shrewd business practice 
and actual lawbreaking is blurred (Levi, 1981). More recently he has 
pointed out the practical difficulties in detecting and regulating 
extremely complex forms of contemporary business fraud (Levi, 1987). Leigh 
indicates that many of the problems invloved in investigating and 
prosecuting cases of tax evasion at a practical level emanate from the 
views of those in political power that tax fraud Ls 'at most only quasi- 
criminal' (Leigh, 1982: 24). 
A synthesis between the approaches of workplace-oriented studies of 
'fiddling' and those directing attention to issues of power and politics is 
evident in the work of Braithwaite (1984). In his analysis of corporate 
crime in the pharmaceutical industry Braithwaite examines the 
psychological, workgroup-based and structural factors which enable 
corporate crime to take place. He demonstrates that a complex set of 
practices and motivational rhetoric combine together in the commission, 
concealement and justification of crimes by individuals working within 
pharmaceuatical companies. In the context of this thesis his work is 
important in three key respects. 
First, it shows the close links between big business and politics in 
determining the regulation of illegal activities. For instance, an official 
of a large British pharmaceutical manufacturing company told Braithwaite 
that 'many British government regulations were written in their offices' 
(ibid: 299). Although the formation of Inland Revenue counter-evasion policy 
may not be so directly influenced by particular business interests, 
undoubtedly the general interests of the business community are borne in 
mind when shaping investigation and prosecution policy (see Chapter 5). 
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Second, Braithwaite points to the failure of the criminal law 
(designed to combat specific harms), to deal with the routinely harmful 
patterns of conduct of large firms. (This argument can be related to the 
problem of regulating tax evasion which can be regarded as endemic, and 
more readily understood as a 'harmful pattern of conduct' than a one-off 
form of economic crime). 
Third, he emphasises the role of 'negotiation' as opposed to 
enforcement of the law in relation to the activities of pharmaceutical 
companies. Although the small businessmen and individual taxpayers who 
form the basis of comparative study in this thesis do not have the 
bargaining power of the corporations studied by Braithwaite, their 
relations with the Revenue are far more likely to be characterised by 
negotiation than by strict enforcement of law. This situation contrasts 
sharply with the (strict) enforcement of social security law: ultimately 
Braithwaite's analysis points to the importance of economic power in 
determining modes of regulation, and whether the full force of the 
(criminal) law is likely to be invoked. 
The pervasiveness of deviance in the business world is not in doubt: 
as Ralph Nader observed, 'scratch the image of any industry and unsavoury 
practices become visible' (ibid: 12). At a lower level Henry (1978) argues 
that white collar crime forms part of a 'hidden economy' which pervades 
all areas of social life and so renders distinctions between 'honest' and 
'dishonest' transactions quite meaningless. But although Henry 
demonstrates the reciprocal and social characteristics of many activities 
within the hidden economy and succeeds in showing that it does indeed 
form 'an everyday feature of ordinary peoples' lives', he fails to account 
for the fact that some hidden activities are stigmatized and not others. 
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For instance, a benefit claimant who cleans windows or serves in a bar 'on 
the side' is not treated in the same way as a self-employed businessman or 
moonlighting employee who does the same thing. The use of private justice 
(Henry, 1983) to deal with some forms of fiddling in the hidden economy 
is an important feature of contemporary regulation and is of particular 
relevance to the policy of controlling tax evasion through 'compliance' and 
negotiation . This contrasts with the intensely 'public' justice meted out 
to benefit claimants who similarly defraud the state. The focus of 'white- 
collar crime' literature, though valuable, needs to be supplemented by 
criminological literature which illustrates how justice is differentially 
negotiated for the powerful and for the powerless. 
2)The processes of criminalization and formation of societal response to 
Becker (1963) argued that deviance was not a quality of a particular 
act a person commits, but was rather a consequence of the application by 
others of rules and sanctions to the offender. According to this view 
deviance is created through the processes of interaction by which the act 
becomes so-labelled. This view of deviance as a relative concept lies at 
the heart of explanations of differential 'labelling' and societal response 
to tax and supplementary benefit fraud. Cicourel (1976) shows the way in 
which definitions of juvenile delinquency are constructed through the young 
person's interactions with police and juvenile officers. Officials' picture 
of the 'typical delinquent' can influence the administration of justice at 
all stages of the process, depending on whether the young person's 
behaviour, demeanour and social background are seen to 'fit' the delinquent 
stereotype. As a result a close correlation between (lower) social class 
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and delinquency was found. By contrast, middle class juveniles' family 
background, appearance and motivations were seen to correspond with 
definitions of inadvertent waywardness or illness rather than with 
perceptions of committed criminal activity. These findings have a general 
application to the problem of differential responses to tax and benefit 
fraud: tax fraudsters are less likely to conform to stereotypes of 
'criminals', (in terms of social, moral and economic deprivation) and so it 
is likely that alternative justifications for their offences will be 
accepted. By contrast benefit fraudsters, whose social characteristics do 
conform to the 'criminal' typification, are more likely to be investigated, 
prosecuted and punished as straightforwardly 'criminal'. 
The processes whereby justice is negotiated are also evident in the 
courts (Bottoms and McLean, 1976; Baldwin and McConville, 1977; Carlen, 
1976; McBarnett, 1981). Negotiations not only surround the question of 
whether a case should go to court at all (see chapter 5), but also 
surround decisions on court venue, plea and representation. For instance, 
if the police persuade a defendant that there is a good prosecution case 
(or if they have obtained an admission of guilt during questioning), then 
defendants are likely to plead guilty, hoping for a 'discount' in sentence 
(Baldwin and McConville, 1977), or in the belief that the police case is 
too strong and so to 'get it over with' (Bottoms and McLean, 1976). Most 
defendants who plead guilty are young and of low socio-economic class, and 
the vast majority of all defendants in magistrates' courts plead guilty and 
are not represented by legal advisers (ibid). Studies of courts therefore 
illuminate the problem of negotiated justice within a context of vulnerable 
(often unrepresented) defendants and powerful regulatory agents: such 
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findings are important when analysing judicial responses to supplementary 
benefit fraudsters (Chapter 5(2)). 
Ethnographic studies of the court process provide useful insights into 
the context in which differential judicial response is located. Carlen 
(1976) points to the complex use of abstract and situational rules by 
court 'performers' in order to get their own jobs done and to ensure that 
the 'game' of the court process continues. This analysis of rule-usage is 
important in illuminating the way in which individuals justify their 
actions to themselves and to others (and in retrospect), often in entirely 
different terms. This thesis will consider the justificatory rationales of 
fraudsters and of regulatory agents and so an understanding of the 
paradoxes of rule-usage by individuals is vital. 
Of particular relevance to my own observations of benefit fraud cases 
in a magistrates' court is Carlen's analysis of the modes of control and 
coercion which are exhibited through judicial language, formal 
presentations and court rituals and through the surpression of alternative 
'performances'. Chapter 5(3) will argue that many defendants accused of 
supplementary benefit fraud are confused, perplexed, invariably plead 
guilty and yet 'play the game' of the court by offering acceptable 
mitigations: for instance, ill-health of the defendant or relatives, 
previous good work record and character are often offered as mitigating 
factors with some success. However, the justification of 'poverty' is rarely 
offered 'for fraud and, when it is put forward, attracts magistrates' 
disapproval not sympathy (see Chapter 5(3)). 
The other side of this argument is that those defendants who have the 
cultural skills to manipulate legal and extra-legal rules and so play the 
game effectively are likely to fare best in the theatre of the court. 
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Certainly, these skills are evident in the analyses of tax fraud 
prosecutions in chapter 5(3) below. But it is important to bear in mind 
the material and ideological conditions which create and reproduce these 
inequalities of knowledge and power. 
3)New Criminology and marxist explanations for crime 
For the purposes of this review of some relevant literature, there is 
insufficient space to allow for full analysis of attempts to arrive at a 
marxist theory of crime. Instead, the broad areas of debate which affect 
this thesis will be outlined. Hirst, (1975) argued that crime and deviance 
are no more a 'scientific field for Marxism than education, the family or 
sport', but 'new' criminologists have been concerned to establish a 'fully 
social theory of deviance' committed to radical social transformation 
(Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973; Taylor Walton and Young, 1975). Current 
debates in this field derive from differing interpretations of Marxism and 
from differing views as to what is the best means of effecting social 
change: broadly the debate has been summarised as being between realists 
and idealists (National Deviancy Conference, 1979; Young and Lea, 1984). 
The idealist position sees a direct relationship between the form and 
operation of law and the furtherance of ruling class interests. But, as Box 
(1987) argues, 'doggedly' structural accounts, (for instance of the 
relationships between economic recession and penal policies), 'would 
inevitably have been sucked into the quicksand of functionalism and 
conspiracy theory' (ibid: 197). Idealism can be seen as both naive and 
deterministic in presuming that individual social actors (for instance, 
police chiefs), merely reproduce the behaviour which capitalism requires of 
them (Young, 1986). At the same time realism can be seen as offering a 
'flag of convenience' under which the causes of crime can once again be 
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explored, without, Box argues, due consideration to material circumstances. 
Box advocates a theoretical integration - 'something old, something new, 
something borrowed ... ' - whereby economic conditions are considered to be 
important, but so are the actions of and meanings held by individuals, and 
the social processes of labelling and control (ibid). As indicated in the 
earlier discussion of penality, the approach of Box comes closest to that 
adopted in this thesis. 
Although left idealism is regarded as flawed, many useful insights 
into the 'crimes of the powerful' have been gained through 
straightforwardly structural analyses: these have been based upon the view 
that the amplification of crimes of the poor serve to conceal the (far 
more serious) crimes of the rich, and that the crimes of the rich merely 
celebrate the goals of caplitalist accumulation (Pearce, 1976; Quinney, 
1977; Chambliss, 1978). Although open to criticisms of economism, such 
literature is both useful and significant for its focus on tax evasion and 
other crimes of the powerful. Those engaging in such illegal activities, 
according to Chambliss, are 
'Simply acting within both the logic and the values of America's 
political economy. They were operating to maximise profits, to 
protect their investments from competition, to expand markets, and 
to provide services and goods demanded by "the people". These are 
all the logical implications of a capitalist economy. ' 
(Chambliss 1978: 188). 
Whether or not this argument is regarded as theoretically convincing does 
not detract from its importance at an ideological level: the justification 
emanating from this argument, that tax fraud is merely the result of the 
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over-zealous pursuit of otherwise-normal business practice, is a powerful 
one in popular discourse (see Chapter 4 (lb)). 
(d) The sociology of the mass media 
The mass media constitute an important source of information and 
ideas for members of modern industrial societies (Wilkins, 1964). Although 
an individual's personal experience provides a useful check on the validity 
of media imagery and news, there is evidence that in the event of conflict 
between the two perceptions of 'reality', the media version holds greater 
sway (Golding and Middleton, 1982; Glasgow University Media Group, 1982). 
In order to understand media representation of the problems of tax and 
supplementary benefit fraud, therefore, it is necessary to understand the 
processes through which media images relating to welfare and taxation are 
selected and replicated. 
News values determine whether or not a crime or social problem is 
reported and what perspective the coverage will adopt. News must be 
simple, dramatic, personalised, culturally familiar, consonant with other 
forms of stereotypical knowledge or unexpected (Galtung and Ruge, 1973; 
Ericson et. al., 1987). It follows that much white-collar crime in general 
(and tax fraud in particular) will not score highly in terms of news 
values, unless the offender is well known or 'unexpected'. This accounts 
for both the non-reporting of complex fraud cases and for the occasional 
sensational reporting of notable offenders, such as Lester Piggott. At the 
same time, welfare scrounger stories tap into deeper cultural themes 
surrounding the 'deserving and undeserving' poor (Golding and Middleton, 
1982). Such themes are not merely mirrored in the media, but amplified and 
distorted (Cohen, 1971). This amplification of the problem of benefit 
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fraud, according to Golding and Middleton, may serve to undermine political 
consensus regarding the welfare state and ultimately help to 'dismantle' 
it. 
But it would be simplistic to see the production of 'scrounger' imagery 
deriving from either organizational or political conspiracies: journalists 
are constantly engaged in organizational and inter-personal negotiations 
which render the social production of news a complicated process and one 
which cannot be simply reduced to a product of organizational constraints, 
ownership and control, or commercial journalism (Cohen and Young, 1973; 
Glasgow University Media Group, 1982; Erikson et. al., 1987). Amplification 
spirals do not emerge from a social and ideological vacuum and do not go 
on forever: as one journalist I interviewed observed, there comes a time 
when media professionals know when to put the scrounger stories 'in the 
cupboard'. Although Golding and Middleton's (1982) argument that welfare 
scroungers perform the function of 'whipping boys of the recession' is a 
powerful one, it does assume a normative consensus throughout any period 
of recession which would be difficult to sustain either in theory or in 
practice. As will be argued in Chapter 6, coverage of the 'whipping boys' 
of the 1970's recession is now accompanied by coverage of the dubious 
activities of the rich 'naughty boys' of the city amidst the recession of 
the 1980's. 
(e)S ia] psychology 
Some literature in the field of social psychology is relevant to this 
thesis in illuminating attitudes towards taxation and benefits, and 
perceptions of those who defraud both systems. In addition, studies on 
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perceptions of crime seriousness also help to put into perspective public 
reaction to both types of fraudsters in relation to other 'criminals'. 
Levi argues that 'income tax evasion is regarded far less seriously 
than theft or burglary or the embezzelment of the same amount' (Levi, 
1982: 38). In a survey conducted in Sheffield, Walker (1978) found that 
small-scale tax evasion was felt to be the least serious of property 
offences. However, larger scale tax evasions are viewed much more 
seriously (ibid). This evidence is supported by a study conducted in 
Scotland where Dean et. al. (1980) found that 66% of respondents felt most 
taxpayers would exploit oppo;. rtunities so long as the amounts evaded were 
small. Respondents were morally 'neutral' regarding small-scale evasion, 
seeing it as neither good or bad, but moral disapproval was overwhelming 
in cases of very large evasions (ibid). 
Most studies of attitudes towards tax evasion appear to agree that the 
public's belief that rates of taxation are 'too high' is an important 
factor (Levi, 1982) together with a lack of faith in government to use 
revenue efficiently: 
'The predominant belief amongst our respondents (62%) that on the 
whole the Government does not spend taxpayers money wisely cannot 
help tax compliance. ' (Dean, 1980: 43) 
Significantly, of that 62%, almost 14% cited social security as an area of 
dissatisfaction and waste. It is extremely difficult to assess whether 
factors of class, age or sex affect such attitudes, although it may be 
tentatively argued that attitudes towards taxation in general become more 
negative with age (Dean, 1980) and that members of upper socio-economic 
groups are more tolerant of major tax-evasion than poorer people are 
(Levi, 1982). The latter supports the theory put forward in much crime 
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seriousness research that our views on the seriousness of a particular 
crime is closely related to our ability to identify with the typical 
offender. This in turn may throw light upon the relatively lenient 
political and judicial response to tax evasion (see Chapter 5(3)). 
In summarising research into attitudes towards taxation, Alan Lewis 
(1982) agrees that the notion of being overtaxed may contribute towards 
negative attitudes to tax and so be used. as a justification for evasion. 
However, he argues that when respondents were invited to consider the 
relationship between taxation and the provision of services, the majority 
agreed that tax was the best way of providing for essential services 
(ibid). The argument that individuals pay 'too much tax' is therefore 
available as a justification for evasion or avoidance, yet individuals 
often agree they are willing to pay taxes for the common good. Here the 
contradictions between the ideologies of social justice and the free market 
minimalist state are most apparent (see chapter 3). 
Lewis also indicates the importance of social and sub-cultural 
networks in affecting the likeli hood of evasion as 'there is a sub-culture 
of tax evasion governed partly by normative considerations', whereby 
colleagues all 'play the game' so long as it does not go too far (Lewis 
1982: 184). Furthermore the belief that you can 'get away with' tax evasion 
is most common amongst those who have friends who are self employed, 
amongst white collar employees, and those who are college educated. The 
less educated and blue collar workers fear the law more, and, according to 
Lewis, 'perhaps for good reason'. (ibid: 144). 
Where attitudes towards benefit claimants are concerned Furnham 
(1985) suggests that 
'the statements which people agreed with most concerned shame and 
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stigma ex.. perienced by people on social security, but... a large 
number of people also believed social security recipients are idle, 
dishonest and lack effort in trying to obtain work. ' 
(Furnham, 1985: 25) 
The inconsistencies evident in such attitudes derive from early 
distinctions between deserving and undeserving poor, as a legacy of the 
1834 Poor Law rhetoric (Higgins, 1981). For example, disabled people and 
pensioners are perceived as 'deserving ' but the able-bodied poor, (the 
unemployed and single parent families) are not (Golding and Middleton, 
1982). Such distinctions are evident in the following comments: 
'The people who should xt get help are those who can't be bothered 
to look for work, and all those who earn too much money and have 
council houses. ' (Age 46 male biologist) 
'The people who get help are the blackies and the wags and those 
who can do with out it. The old people who need it don't get it 
yet the blackies get all they can and more. ' 
(Age 70, female retired home help)' 
(Golding and Middleton, 1982: 170-171) 
In seeking to explain the determinants of such attitudes Furnham 
suggests several influential factors: age, sex, income, voting behaviour and 
personal explanations for poverty. But the single most important factor, 
according to Furnham, is an individual's adherence to the Protestant Work 
Ethic, a factor which correlates closely with both conservatism, voting 
behaviour and frames views on poverty itself. For the purposes of this 
thesis such findings are relevant: if poverty is seen as the product of 
culpable, idle, feckless or inadequate individuals and families, then 
broader structural issues of inequality and poverty are obfuscated. At the 
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same time punitive responses to welfare claimants are justified, whether or 
not there is any evidence of abuse: 
'Of all the myths of the Welfare State, stories of the work-shy and 
scroungers have been the least well-founded on evidence, yet they 
have proved the most persistant. ' (Marsden and Duff, 1975: 17) 
Social psychology may prove useful in exploring the nature and extent 
of such myths and in attempting to discover the determinants of attitudes 
towards taxation and welfare. But in pointing to the link between high 
Protestant Work Ethic (P. W. E. ) beliefs and negative attitudes towards 
claimants, Furnham and others point to a broader political question which 
lies beyond the scope of their discipline. Golding and Middleton go on to 
link P. W. E. to political, economic and ideological preconditions: 
'A society so firmly anchored in an ethic of competition and reward 
will only with difficulty dispose of scarce resources to those 
conspicuously unsuccessful in a system ostensibly offering equal 
opportunities for all. For success to glisten seductively to the 
winners, the failure of poverty must display its burden of guilt 
and shame. While blaming the victim remains the cornerstone of our 
conceptions of poverty, the grinding and enduring misery of the 
poor is unlikely to evoke other than contempt, malign distrust or 
corrosive pity. ' (Golding and Middleton, 1982: 244). 
Attitudes towards the rich and the poor, taxpayer and claimant, tax 
fiddler and benefit scrounger are created within a broader political, 
social, economic and ideological framework. This thesis will analyse the 
combination of ideological and material conditions which give rise to 
differential attitudes (and differential political and judicial responses) 
towards tax and benefit fraudsters. 
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(6)CA_uPAIGKIB'G LITERATURE 
Personal taxation and welfare provision form important constituents of 
social policy (see section (3) above) and therefore form the focus for a 
variety of interest groups who seek to influence policy. For the purposes 
of this brief review of relevant campaining literature, these interest 
groups will be distinguished, and their contributions discussed, along the 
following lines: 
(a)Trades Unions who represent the staff of the Inland Revenue and 
D. H. S. S. respectively and so articulate their members' concerns regarding 
the goals (and practice of collection) of personal taxation, and the 
operation of the welfare state. 
(b)The 'Anti-Poverty' lobby who campaign on issues of both taxation and 
welfare provision, seeking to promote greater social and economic equality. 
(c)The 'Anti-Taxation' lobby whose campaigns seek reductions in personal 
taxation, and whose attitude to both taxation and welfare rest on the 
incentives argument (discussed in section (2) above). 
(a)Trades Unions 
Trades Unions representing staff in both the Inland Revenue and 
D. H. S. S. have produced valuable information and comment upon their 
respective department's policy towards fraud and investigation work. The 
Inland Revenue Staff Federation (I. R. S. F. ) together with the Association of 
Inspectors of Taxes (A. I. T. ) submitted a report on the black economy to the 
Keith Committee (Taxes, April 1981; Cmnd. 8822,1983). Through the unions' 
newspaper Assessment and journal Taxes, attention is often drawn to issues 
such as staff cutbacks, (which adversely affect the Revenue's compliance 
efforts) and to the broader political issues which underpin the direction 
'f 
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of Revenue policy in general. Such sources thus provide a good index of 
staff 'morale' and of changes in staff attitudes towards, for instance, tax 
evaders. 
The Society of Civil and Public Servants (S. C. P. S. ) who represent 
employees in the 'executive' grades of the D. H. S. S., and the Civil and 
Public Services Association (C. P. S. A. ) who represent 'clerical' grade 
workers, have produced conference reports and press releases on issues of 
concern: for instance, the policing of welfare benefits and the activities 
of Specialist Claims Control Units have been topics of union conferences 
and publications (C. P. S. A., 1984; S. C. P. S., 1984). In the case of the unions' 
campaign against Special Claims Control Units, they were joined by other 
national organizations with interests impinging on the investigation of 
supplementary benefit claimants: for example, the National Council for 
Civil Liberties (N. C. C. L. ), Child Poverty Action Group (C. P. A. G. ), the 
Federation of Claimants Unions and the Disability Alliance. The C. P. S. A. 
also produces a newspaper Red Tape which indicates areas of staff concern 
and re flects their reactions to policy changes. 
There is a good deal of overlap between the campaigns of Revenue and 
D. H. S. S. staff. This joint concern often centres on the problem of 
differential response to tax evasion and benefit fraud, which is recognised 
by the unions involved. They therefore lead attempts to publicise and to 
combat the inequalities in departmental and political response to those 
who defraud the Revenue and those who defraud the D. H. S. S. (T. U. C., 1983; 
N. A. C. R. O., 1986). 
(b)The 'Anti-Poverty' lobby 
Interest groups such as the C. P. A. G. and the Low Pay Unit have 
published detailed analyses of the extent of poverty in contemporary 
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Britain, and have suggested policy changes which could alleviate the 
problem (Walker and Walker, eds., 1987; Ward ed., 1985; C. P. A. G. /Low Pay 
Unit, 1986; C. P. A. G., 1987). The levels of and delivery of welfare benefits 
are crucial concerns for these groups and led them to form a loose 
coalition between themselves and local authority, voluntary and trades 
union groups (therafter known as the Social Security Consortium), which 
was formed to lobby -parliamentary and public opinion during the passage 
of the Social Security Bill. The Consortium's publications offer a valuable 
source of critical comment on the 1986 Act and an alternative agenda for 
social security reform (Social Security Consortium, 1986; Lister, 1987). 
The 'Anti-Poverty' lobby also campaigns on specific issues, for 
instance, against the appalling treatment of the supplementary benefit 
claimants who were involved in 'Operation Major', (an anti-fraud swoop 
which took place in Oxford in September 1982). The subsequent analysis by 
Franey (1983) was jointly published by the &. C. C. L., Housing Campaign for 
Single People (C. H. A. R. ), the C. P. A. G., Claimants' Defence Committee and 
National Association of Probation Officers. Once again, this demonstrates 
the overlapping concerns of many groups concerned with social security 
provision in general, and with the D. H. S. S. 's anti-fraud policy in 
particular . 
Another issue which drew attention both from D. H. S. S. staff trades 
unions and the C. P. A. G. was the staffing crisis in Birmingham's social 
security offices in 1982, which led to strike action and the closure of 11 
D. H. S. S. offices in the city from September 1982 to May 1983 (Coetzee, 
1983; Ward, 1985; McKnight, 1985). Campaigning literature which focusses on 
the problems of staff cubacks in the D. H. S. S., the apparent policy emphasis 
on efficiency and yet 'overwhelming sense of crisis in D. H. S. S. offices (in 
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relation to the 'efficient' payment of supplementary benefit in particular), 
is of great value in illustrating some elements of the contemprary crisis 
of the welfare state: the crisis of management as well as of ideology. 
(c)The 'Anti-Taxation' lobby. 
An alternative agenda is presented by interest groups who conceive 
their primary goal as the pursuit of profit, rather than the abolition of 
poverty. Groups such as the Confederation of British Industry, the 
National Federation of the Self-Employed, the Institute of Directors and 
the Institute of Economic Affairs frequently campaign against what they 
see as 'high' rates of tax and 'high' rates of welfare benefits. The issues 
of both personal tax and welfare provision come together in the 
articulation of the incentives argument which is now seen as a key feature 
of New Right discourse (section (3) above). But ambivalence to state 
welfare provision (lest it prove an incentive to idleness), and 
simultaneous hostility to paying progressive personal taxes (lest it prove 
a disincentive to wealth creation), has long been a feature of the 'Old 
Right' rhetoric of these interest groups (I. E. A., 1968; I. E. A., 1977). 
The fallacy of the latter half of this argument is evident in recent 
academic work on the 'income effect' which may outweigh the 'incentives 
effect' for the higher income-earner. Christopher Huhne (Guardian, 24.2.88) 
argues, on the basis of research commissioned by the Treasury from 
Stirling University that tax cuts can create the 'income effect' whereby 
the beneficiary of the tax cut feels richer and 'lazier'. Hence tax cuts can 
act as a disincentive to effort! But, he argues, the 'incentives effect' 
created by a reduction in higher marginal rates of tax probably does 
encourage higher earnings to some extent. Huhne thus argues that most 
economic research suggests that these two effects 'just about cancel out' 
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each other. But, importantly, he uses the Stirling research to argue that 
'most people simply cannot increase their earnings. Their jobs are such 
that they are not paid extra for more work' (ibid). The pronouncements of 
the Anti-Tax lobby are thus premised on dubious assumptions concerning 
the effects of personal tax on the efforts of the taxpayer. Similarly, 
their assertions regarding the sapping effects of welfare an claimants' 
will to work are by no means proven (see section (2) above for a full 
discussion of the incentives debate). Nonetheless, their arguments are 
still powerful in popular and political ideology (see section (3.3) above). 
Groups such as the Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of 
Directors and National Federation of the Self-Employed are more likely to 
attract 'official' recognition than are the groups who represent the poor 
and the powerless. For example, the voices of the business community 
continue to dominate discourses about taxation and public expenditure, 
particularly on high-profile occasions, such as Budget Day. 
It is important, then, to remember that a review of campaigning 
'literature' must also take account of non-published sources of comment 
relating to tax and welfare. This thesis will therefore also analyse 
discourses on taxation and welfare which are generated and replicated by 
means other than published academic work. An analysis of the activities, 
speeches and writings of 'campaigners' is therefore a crucial element in 
explaining why some alternative discourses (for instance those of the 
Anti-Poverty lobby), fail to gain power and credence in the public 
rhetoric, whereas others (for instance the Anti-Tax lobby), do have a 
significant influence upon policy at particular times. Such an explanation 
will involve exploring the nature of official, political and popular 
discourse (see Chapter 6). 
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Tax and benefit fraud occur within the political and economic context 
of a state which demands personal taxation (direct and indirect) from all 
citiz: ns liable to pay, and which pays benefits (contributory and means 
tested) to those eligible to receive them. Ideologies relating to the work 
ethic, work incentives, the free market system, individualism and 
collectivism in welfare provision are all evident within literature on tax 
and welfare, though their relative influence depends upon specific 
historical, political and material preconditions. The foregoing review of 
literature has attempted to disentangle some of these issues and 
ideological positions by breaking down the topic into discrete disiplines 
and areas of academic and campaigning interest. 
Invariably many rigid disciplinary and thematic distinctions are 
misleading because complex 'knowledges' of tax and welfare have been 
compartmentalized in order to give a clearer understanding of the 
contributions made by economists, lawyers, sociologists and pressure 
groups. Nonetheless, these distinctions do represent divisions which have 
not only appeared in academic discourses on taxation and welfare, but have 
also had political effects. For instance, economists have constituted the 
'problem' of tax and benefit fraud in terms of key issues such as: 
(1) The technical and theoretical difficulties involved in measuring 
the scale and significance of the black economy <O'Higgins, 1981). 
(2) The problem of allegedly 'high' rates of taxation which are seen 
to be acting as a disincentive to effort, whilst allegedly 'high' rates of 
welfare payments are seen as an incentive to dependency and idleness 
(I. E. A., 1979; Minford, 1983). 
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(3) The alleged redistribution of income (and wealth) which has 
allegedly taken place as a result of the progressive personal taxation of 
the better off so financing generous welfare payments to the poor. (I. E. A., 
1979; Lawson, 1977). 
Clearly 'the problem' of tax and benefit fraud can be represented very 
differently from an alternative political perspective, for instance: 
(1) An alternative analysis of the black economy may focus an the 
hidden modes of exchange and reciprocal relationships within it, and on 
the differential meanings which can be attributed to some black economy 
transactions (Gershury and Pahl, 1980; Henry, 1978). 
(2)The incentives debate can itself be explored as an example of the 
way in which the values of competition and work are ideologically 
constructed and maintained: such ideologies necessarily favour the 
taxpayer whilst penalising the workless (Marsden, 1982; Roll, 1983). 
(3) The notion of a post-war redistribution of income and wealth, from 
the rich to the poor, can be challenged empirically (Byrne, 1987) and can, 
alternatively, be seen as a thinly veiled attempt to conceal persistent 
economic and social inequality in modern Britain (Kincaid, 1975; Quinney, 
1977). Progressive and penally 'high' rates of taxation are thus part of 
the mythology of redistribution, which once more envokes sympathy for the 
hard-pressed taxpayer and comtempt for the poor (who, despite this alleged 
redistribution, are still 'with us'). 
Finally, and to conclude this review of the relevant literature I will 
now summarise the common themes which have emerged, the clusters of ideas 
from within which dominant discourses emerge to triumph, and alternative 
discourses emerge to challenge them. These themes will inform the analyses 
of differential response to tax and supplementary benefit fraud in this 
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thesis. They are summarised, in relation to the areas of 
academic/campaining concern under which they were discussed, as follows: 
(1)OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
Ix: the Revenue's official rationale for seeking the 'compliance' of the 
taxpayer is pragmatism. The latent rationale, however, concerns the desire 
to 'spare the taxpayer's feelings'. This is rooted in the view of taxpayer 
as a 'giver' to the state. 
Supplementary benefit: the D. H. S. S. 's estimates of the scale of (and 
threat posed by) fraud are politically and ideologically constructed, but 
have important effects in shaping public perceptions of benefit 
'scroungers' in particular, and benefit claimants in general. Official 
D. H. S. S. discourse is currently dominant, despite evidence of Departmental 
inefficiency and massive under-claiming of welfare benefits. 
(2) ECOHOX ICS LITERATURE 
The black economy: economists are largely concerned to surmount the 
technicalities of measuring the black economy. Such analyses fail to 
regard tax evasion as a legal issue. They also ignore differential response 
to taxpayers and to supplementary benefit claimants who participate in 
such activities. 
The incentives debate: arguments alleging the disincentive effects of 
high rates of personal tax and of welfare benefit payments are 
ideologically constructed and maintained. In practice this serves to 
justify tax evasion and to buttress the 'scrounger' mythology. 
The post-war redistribution of income and wealth: the myth of 
redistribution through progressive tax presents the taxpayer as 'giver' to 
the state and benefit claimant as 'taker'. It thus serves an ideological 
purpose of justifying fiddles by the hard-pressed taxpayer, whilst 
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effectively discrediting the major justification for benefit fraud - 
poverty. 
Growth versus social Justice: economists present these policy goals as 
mutually exclusive. ' Tax evaders and benefit fraudsters thus appear 
polarized examples of the worst outcomes of these competing ideologies. 
This foreclosure in economic discourse fails to recognise the 
complexities and contradictions which emerge in a mixed economy and which 
render differential response to tax and benefit fraud possible. 
(3)SOCIAL POLICY ISSUES 
The development of the welfare state: the welfare state is based upon 
fundamental contradictions: between the ideologies of individualism and 
social justice, the principles of universalism and selectivity in welfare 
provision, the ideologies of pauperism and poverty, the post-war collective 
spirit of 'fair shares' and the social cleavage created by distinguishing 
worker from claimant, and the long-held distinctions between the 
'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor. 
Penality and welfare: the role of less eligibility, the 'wage-stop' and 
recent work tests in the maintainance of the work ethic, and the 
stigmatising of the workless and unproductive poor. 
The thesis and antithesis of the New Right: when translated into policy, 
the ideology of the New Right accentuates differential responses to tax 
and benefit fraud in its emphasis on individualsim, wealth creation, the 
minimal state and belief in market forces as the sole desired form of 
economic regulation. Discourses based on the New Right thesis are 
sucessfully invoked to justify (or at least excuse) tax evasion and to 
present the welfare state as creating individual and financial dependency. 
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(4) LEGAT. ISSUES 
Defrauding the public purse: economic crime by means of tax and 
supplementary fraud have the same 'victim' - the public purse. 
Crimes of 'omission' and 'commission': this distinction fails to take 
account of the essential similarities in offences arising from failure to 
declare income for tax purposes and failure to declare income for the 
assessment of benefit. 
'Strict Liability' or 'hens Rea': the Revenue have to prove intent to 
defraud in order to mount a fraud prosecution, but the D. H. S. S. merely have 
to show that a false statement has been knowingly made. The form of the 
law thus facilitates differential judicial response to these offences. 
'Justice' for the rich and the poor: the complexity of tax law ensures 
loopholes and delay, both of which can be expolited by legal advisers. By 
contrast the 'backwater' of welfare law enables less abiguity and swift 
'justice'. 
(5)SOCIOLOGICAL LITBRATDRE 
Ideologies of social inequality form an important basis for analysing 
both tax and benefit fraudsters' rhetorics of justification. They are also 
vital in understanding the broader problem of differential political, 
judicial and public response. 
Opportunity structures: the opportunities and means to fiddle are 
shaped by the material conditions of, and relationships within, the 
fraudsters' workplace /social milieu. But, these are, in turn, determined by 
structural factors - class, status and power. 
" Differentialcriminalization is a theme which will be evident throughout 
this thesis as it seeks to explain the differential responses of regulatory 
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agents, Judiciary and popular rhetoric to those who fiddle taxes and those 
who fiddle welfare benefits. 
Rhetorics of motivation: fraudsters and regulatory agents use a variety 
of (contradictory) justifications through which they seek to justify their 
actions, to themselves and to others. An analysis of the fraudsters' 
vocabularies of motive, and the differential meanings which are attributed 
to them, will be central to the analysis of differential response to the 
two types of fraud. 
The 'scrounger' mythology: underlying all responses to tax and benefit 
fraud are popular images of the deserving and the undeserving poor, and of 
the taxpayer as victim (of Revenue harassment). It is necessary to examine 
the material and ideological preconditions which enable the popular 
representations of benefit fraudsters as 'folk devils' and tax evaders as 
folk heroes. 
(6)CAXPAIGNING LITERATURE 
In addition to articulating many of the debates already discussed, 
campaigning literature raises the problem of the possibility of influencing 
policy change in relation to personal taxation and the welfare state. This 
involves analysing the vocabularies of discourses which are successful in 
policy terms, and those which fail to displace 'offical' discourses. 
I will utilize these overlapping themes (evident in a variety of 
academic and non-academic literature), to inform the an analysis of: 
(Chapter 2) 
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'Commonsense' definitions of the problem of differential r spane to 
tax and benefit fraud, and the theoretical approach adopted to analyse the 
problem (Chapter 3) 
of motive which are offered toJustify their actions (Chapter 4) 
The official and unofficial rationales of the Revenue and D. H. S. S. 
investigation policies and investigatory techniques which put them into 
practice. (Chapter 5) 
The outcome of investigation - policy and practice in deciding on 
penalties and prosecution (Chapter 5) 
(Chapters 3 and 6). 
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Analysis of the empirical data obtained during my investigation of the 
differential response to tax and supplementary benefit fraud aims to 
analyse and explain three key aspects of differential response. These are: 
C1)2he different experiences of taxpayers and claimants: this refers 
both to their knowledge (and techniques) of fiddling, and to their 
relations with regulatory agents. 
(2)The investigation policies officially pursued by the Inland Revenue 
and D. H. S. S. respectively, the practices used by the departmental staff who 
implement them, and vocabularies of motive invoked to 1ustify both policy 
and practice. 
(3)The different responses to the problems of tax and benefit fraud 
which are evident in popular and official discourses: for instance, in 
media imagery and judicial comments about tax and welfare fraud. 
These three areas will form the focus of the analyses in Chapters 4 
and 5 of the thesis. Before such an analysis can take place it is 
necessary to locate the problem of differential treatment within a specific 
historical, political, administrative and legal framework. In order to 
describe these frameworks, the chapter will be organised under the 
following headings: 
(a)Differential histories of tax and welfare. 
(b)Legal and administrative preconditions. 
(c)Differential opportunity structures. 
To conclude the chapter the differential opportunities which exist to 
engage in forms of tax and benefit fraud, and the consequent differences 
138 
in the likelihood of investigation, apprehension and punishment, will be 
summarised. 
(a) Differential histories 
(i) Taxation 
Direct taxation in Britain has a very spasmodic history. Until the 
eighteenth century taxation remained indirect because of the vast problems 
involved in implementing any system of direct taxation. But in 1799 Pitt 
imposed income tax to raise revenue to finance the costs of the French 
Wars. Although there was a reluctant acceptance of income tax in time of 
war, pressure to repeal the 1806 Income Tax Act succeeded once the war 
had ended. Nonetheless, a precedent had been set and income tax was 
raised again to finance the Crimean War (Sabine, 1966). 
Income tax continued under both Gladstone and Disraeli - even during 
the heyday of 'laissez-faire'- and so became an integral part of the fiscal 
system. By the 1880's a shift had begun towards using taxation as a 
social instrument: in 1885 Joseph Chamberlain's radical programme argued 
in favour of a form of state socialism which used taxation as a means of 
social reform. Importantly, it was argued that this should be on a 
graduated scale. Although Gladstone considered such graduation 'tended to 
communism' (ibid: 125), a movement towards some redistribution in income 
had commenced. But arguments still raged over the costs of administering 
a graduated income tax system as against its 'yield' in cash terms, and 
also over the dangers of capital 'emigrating' in the face of super-tax. 
These arguments are still evoked a century later, (despite the fact that 
the greatest emigration of capital in recent times was not a result of 
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increased taxation but as a consequence of the removal of exchange 
controls in 1979). 
Sabine usefully refers to the 'old' and 'new' conceptions of taxation 
which, at the beginning of the twentieth century, were represented in the 
Select Committee on Income Tax (the Dilke Committee) in 1906. The old 
conception of tax emphasised what was seen as a 
'harsh inquisitorial system eager to strengthen its powers by 
assuming the right to interrogate taxpayers, examine bank accounts 
and insist on returns of total income in all cases. ' 
This contrasted with 'the new idea of a tax designed to serve public 
welfare' (Sabine, 1966: 144). These differing views of 'progressive' taxation 
lie at the heart of the contradictions between the ideologies of liberalism 
and social justice (see Chapter 3). 
Lloyd Georges 'People's Budget' adopted the 'new' approach to the role 
of personal taxation, but in his budget speech he used irony to invoke an 
early justification for raising taxes - war: 
'This is a War Budget. It is for raising money to wage implacable 
warfare against poverty and squalidness. ' (Fraser, 1973) 
Measures adopted to this end included increasing indirect taxation and 
death duties and, importantly, levying income tax on a progressive scale. 
Super-tax was to be levied at sixpence extra for all income over L3,000, 
and Land Duty and Capital Gains Tax were also introduced (ibid). The 
latter measures in particular gave rise to the rejection of the budget by 
the House of Lords and, subsequently, to a constitutional crisis, 
In addtition to the introduction of progressive rates of tax, the 
People's Budget was also important for its incorporation of manual wage- 
earners into the orbit of taxation. This meant that taxation policy became 
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of personal relevance to all sections of society. Nonetheless, doubts 
had 
been expressed concerning the problems of implementing a redistributive 
tax system, particularly in view of the opportunities that existed for 
evasion. Sabine (1966) quotes Asquith, who was concerned that 
'facilities for fraud and concealment and illegitimate exchange 
of wealth as between man and man were so great, that an income 
tax which would operate fairly and justly between all classes of 
the community was an ideal which could never be fully attained. ' 
(ibid) 
But, according to Sabine, no real attempt was made to legislate against 
evasion prior to the First World War, as this was not perceived as either 
worthwhile or practical. However, after the war the Royal Commission on 
Income Tax (1920) took a firmer stance against evasion, although many of 
its recommendations were only hesitantly being implemented 30 years later, 
and some still remain shelved as too 'strict' (Sabine, 1966: 184). 
The problems of avoidance and evasion of taxes took a back seat in 
1939 when the most prominent concern became the efficient collection of 
taxes to finance the Second World War. To ease the practical burden of 
collection, the Pay-as-You-Earn (P. A. Y. E. ) system was suggested in 1943 and 
put into effect in 1945. The 1945 Income Tax Act thus laid the 
foundations of the current Inland Revenue organization and the P. A. Y. E. 
system by which employees still pay their taxes. Critics had argued that 
the new system would act as a disincentive to workers. In his defence of 
P. A. Y. E. in parliament Lyttleton epitomized the immediate post-war attitude 
to tax - that it came 'just a much from the tool room as the Boardroom' 
(ibid). The galvanizing effects of war on social policy are evident in such 
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arguments which stress that in peace, as in war, all citizens were 'in it 
together' (Fraser, 1973; Marwick, 1965). 
The era of post-war reconstruction was characterised by consensus 
between the major British political parties in relation to fiscal policy. 
This 'Butskellism' (Mishra, 1984) continued into the 1950's. But from 1955 
onwards the conservative government under MacMillan began to shift 
taxation policy in favour of the well-off: for instance, concessions were 
made to surtax payers in the 1957 budget, and the pre-election budget of 
1959 was a 'give away' package for the better-off (Sabine, 1966). In 
addition, economic growth and full employment enabled some to argue that 
poverty was all but eliminated, and that economic prosperity was ensured 
for the future (Mishra, 1984). Such prosperity clearly encouraged the 
pursuit of still greater wealth, sometimes by dubious means: it is notable 
then that this period also saw the need for unprecedented anti-avoidance 
measures against 'dividend stripping', 'bond washing' and other such 
loopholes for tax avoidance which the 1960 budget attempted to close up 
(British Tax Reveiw, July 1960). 
The next notable change in British taxation came under the Labour 
Government which in 1965 introduced Capital Gains Tax and Corporation 
Tax, returning briefly to the redistributive goals of the 1945 
administration. However, it is unlikely that such measures, or more recent 
ones (for example, Capital Transfer Tax), have succeeded in shifting 
either income or wealth from the rich to the poor. There has been no 
redistribution of income from the richer half of income-earners to the 
poorer half since 1949 (Social Trends No. 11,1981). Although wealth has 
been redistributed differently among the richer 50% of the population, 
there is no evidence of a redistribution of wealth tQ the poorer half 
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(Reid, 1981). Recent evidence suggests that the gap between rich and poor 
has widened since 1979 (Byrne, 1987). Yet the myth of redistribution (see 
Chapter 1 (3) above) remains ideologically powerful, and serves as an 
important justification for the allied myth of the over-taxed or 'harassed' 
taxpayer. This image, in turn, can be successfully used as a justification 
for fiddling taxes (see Chapter 4(ib)). 
It is significant that in terms of social policy it is the issue of 
taxation which has dominated the 'official' political agenda since the 
1970's. Recent attempts to revive the 'war against poverty', (for instance, 
during the 1987 general election campaign), signally failed (C. P. A. G., 1987). 
The ascendancy of New Right ideology has stimulated fundamental shifts 
in political emphasis which directly impinge upon how taxation (and 
poverty) is viewed. Such changes are evident in shifts from the notion of 
Collective to individual responsibility, from state to market regulation 
and from the goal of personal freedom 'to be' towards an alternative 
economic freedom 'to get'. Taken together, these elements in New Right 
politics have prioritized reductions in personal taxation, on the grounds 
of creating incentives, increasing personal economic freedom (freedom of 
choice in how to spend more disposable income), and thus undermining state 
regulation by the increase of market regulation. 
The results of such ideological principles when put into practice have 
been paradoxical: while officially espousing tax reductions and financial 
incentives, Thatcher governments have actually increased the burden of 
personal taxation for the lowest paid citizens (Esam et. al, 1985; Byrne, 
1987). Financial incentives for the better-off (allegedly promoted by tax 
cuts), have produced a credit-driven consumer boom rather than a sound 
economic recovery. There is thus evidence that for the well-off the 
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personal contentment of the 'income effect' may cancel out the alleged 
effort-inducing 'incentive effect' of reduced tax (see Chapter 1(2) above). 
At the same time ideologies of 'freedom' (economic and individual) have 
been accompanied by dramatic trends towards centralized government 
control, for example in the areas of education and local government policy. 
That such contradictions can, for the present, be contained within the 
framework of New Right ideology may be regarded as a strength and a 
factor contributing to its ideological dominance (Levitas, 1986). It is in 
the context of such contradictions that current attitudes towards taxation 
must be located, although elements deriving from the history of taxation 
(outlined above) can also be identified as important in framing views on 
the desirability and goals of personal tax. The most relevant historical 
themes can be summarised as follows: 
(1>The old maxim, that there are only two certainties in life - death 
and taxation, demonstrates the traditional British hatred of taxation. 
This attitude is influential in both forming vocabularies of motive for 
those who fiddle their taxes, and in ensuring that such justifications are 
popularly accepted (see Chapter 4(lb) on the 'Intolerable Inquisition' as a 
justification for tax fraud). 
(2)Debates concerning the ethics and the effectiveness of progressive 
taxation have long included arguments that such measures either 'tend to 
communism' or that progressive taxation is counter-productive in depriving 
the successful of financial incentives to create still more wealth. These 
arguments offer justifications for tax fraud on grounds of penally high 
rates of marginal tax, and the repressive nature (In practical terms), of 
any system of progressive tax. 
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(3)When taxation is levied for war or, (in popular rhetoric) for 
'defence', it may be regarded as disagreeable but (historically) is likely 
to be tolerated. The 'war' spirit has been invoked to justify progressive 
taxation to finance social reform (for instance, by Lloyd George and later 
by Beveridge). But such justifications are only successful so long as 'fair 
shares' are seen to be 'won'. The winning of consent for social reform 
through progressive taxation can be seen as a process of strugglla against 
deeply held traditional resistance to personal taxation, and also as a 
struggle against the (capital accumulative) logic of the British society 
within which the struggle takes place. The outcome of the struggle is 
determined by a combination of economic, political and ideological 
preconditions: in 1945 these conditions enabled tax and National Insurance 
financed social reforms to proceed (although in modified, compromised form 
- see (ii) below). But any 'consensus' on tax and welfare had dissipated 
by the 1970's, in the face of economic recession and ideological attack 
(from the left, and the 'New' right) (see Chapters 3(b) and 6). 
(ii) Eupnler mentary Benef its 
Supplementary benefit is only one form of cash benefit distributed 
through the Department of Health and Social Security . The department pays 
both contributory benefits (such as retirement pensions), which are paid 
out if sufficient National Insurance contributions have been paid in by the 
claimant, and non-contributory benefits (such as Family Income Supplement 
(F. LS) and supplementary benefit), which do not depend on contributions, 
but are means-tested. Despite these formal distinctions, most 
supplementary benefit claimants refer to themselves as being 'on social 
security'. In February 1987 there were over 5 million supplementary benefit 
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claimants and the total number dependant on that benefit was 8,350,000. In 
1948 one in thirty-three of the population was dependent on the earlier 
'safety net' of National Assistance (C. P. A. G., 1987). A historical analysis 
may illuminate possible reasons for the increasing number of people forced 
to depend on 'safety net' (poverty line) state support, and will also 
indicate how attitudes towards state welfare (and its recipients) have 
developed. In order to understand the experiences of supplementary benefit 
claimants it is therefore necessary to examine the history of attempts to 
alleviate poverty in Britain. 
The sixteenth century marked the beginning of a transition from a 
local to a national economy, which in turn involved the intervention of 
central government in economic affairs (Marsh, 1965). For the first time 
there was a recognition (for instance, in statutes of 1531 and 1563), that 
society had a responsibility to support those 'aged poor and impotent 
persons' who were unable to support themselves (ibid). The regulatory 
agents used to implement this policy locally were Justices of the Peace, 
and the focus of responsibility (in the absence of relatives to support 
the destitute), was the parish (Marsh, 1965; Fraser, 1973). These provisions 
were codified in the 1601 Poor Law Act which, importantly, established a 
nationwide system of poor relief for children, the destitute, infirm, 
unemployed and the 'workshy' (ibid). This emphasis upon the role of the 
parish as statutory provider for the destitute remained until 1948. 
The social upheaval brought about by the processes of 
industrialization and urbanization led to a dramatic increase in 
'pauperism' and by the end of the eighteenth century the Elizabethan 
system of poor-relief was over-stretched (Fraser, 1973). In 1795 
magistrates in Berkshire (meeting at Speenhamland), attempted to alleviate 
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poverty by supplementing the wages of low-paid workers to a level which 
was linked to both the price of bread and family size. The Speenhamland 
system thus aimed to help those who worked for low wages is addition to 
providing relief for the unemployed. Critics argued that the system was 
too costly for the ratepayer, encouraged dependancy amongst the poor and, 
according to economist Ricardo, was 'self-defeating' (Fraser, 1973). These 
criticisms were reinforced by the ideas of Thomas Malthus who argued (in 
his 'Essay on Principles of Population', 1798). that population growth 
would soon outstrip the means of subsistence: this theory contributed to a 
hardening of attitudes towards the poor in general, and towards large 
families in particular. 
The findings of the Royal Commission on the Poor Law, (set up in 1832 
as a consequence of such criticisms of poor relief), exemplifies this shift 
in attitudes. For instance, Checkland, one of the authors of the 
Commission's final report, observed that 
'One of the most encouraging of the results of our enquiry ... 
is the degree to which the existing pauperism arises from fraud, 
indolence or improvidence. ' (quoted in Fraser, 1973. ) 
The implicit distinction between the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor 
became clearer as the 'idle' able-bodied unemployed were distinguished in 
the provisions of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, a watershed in 
terms of attitudes towards poverty and unemployment. The 'New' Poor Law 
was based on the twin principles of less eligibility and the workhouse 
test (Marshall, 1970; Fraser, 1973; Donnison, 1982). According to this New 
Poor Law, 'every penny bestowed that tends to render the condition of the 
pauper more eligible than that of the independent worker, is a bounty on 
indolence and vice' (Fraser, 1973). 
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The assumptions underlying the principle of less eligibility are that 
the test. of the (inferior) conditions of workhouse incarceration would act 
as a deterrent to pauperism, and that pauperism is wilful and so could be 
deterrec.. The Assistant Commissioners had indicated how this deterrence 
should be effected: 
'Our intention is to make the workhouse as like a prison as 
possible. .. our objective is to establish a discipline therein 
so severe and repulsive as to make them a terror to the poor and 
prevent entering. ' (ibid) 
This di'acipline involved appalling physical conditions and diet, separation 
of the sexes, separation of families and total confinement within the 
workhouse walls. But the premis that pauperism was wilful and hence 
deterable by means of the workhouse test was proved false: the population 
of these 'bastilles' for the poor increased from 78,500 in 1838 to 197,180 
in 1843, evidence in itself of the scale and depth of the structural 
problem of poverty in Britain during this period <Fraser, 1973). 
One of the main aims of the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 was to 
instil the factory discipline demanded by an industrial economy (Rusche 
and Kirchheimer, 1939). This may explain why, between 1834 and the 
introduction of Family Income Supplement in 1970, the working poor were 
denied financial support from the state. But, according to Jordan (1974) 
this return in 1970 to a modern equivalent of Speenhamland was due to an 
economic rather than social imperative: 'some wages were simply not enough 
to allow those who received them to eat properly'(ibid: 45). But the effect 
of such state intervention, as in the past, can be seen as the creation of 
'a new class of subsidized paupers', rather than guarantee of a minimum 
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income for all: the problem of low pay was not tackled at its (economic) 
origin (Jordan, 1974). 
The 1834 Poor Law left an important legacy: for instance, in 
differing perceptions of the deserving and undeserving poor, the notion of 
individual culpability for pauperism (the result of 'failed' individuals), 
and the gearing of welfare benefits to the requirements of an industrial 
economy. Yet the failure of the 1834 Poor Law was demonstrated both in 
rising workhouse populations on the one hand, and a growing philanthropic 
concern for the poor on the other. Traditionally, the causes of pauperism 
had been seen in terms of individual personal failure, but by the mid 
nineteenth century it was becoming clear that not all members of society 
could make good under a laissez-faire economy. Charities sprang up to 
cater for the powerless - from stray dogs to fallen women and from 
orphans to drunks. But the ethos of the Charity Organization Society 
formed in 1869 derived from a combination of private charity and the 
inculcation of the positive value of self-help (Marshall, 1965; Fraser, 
1973). The pioneering social surveys conducted by Mayhew, Booth and 
Rowntree also served to demonstrate the nature and extent of poverty in 
Britain in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the need for 
state intervention to mitigate the worst effects of 'laissez-faire' 
political economy. 
Changes in attitudes towards poverty are thus, historically, linked with 
the political shift from laissez-faire to positive state intervention. The 
resulting emphasis on 'collective' social provision contributed to the 
gradual break-up of the Poor Law, as under the 'Liberal Reforms' categories 
of people were removed from dependence on poor relief: for example through 
the National Insurance Act (1911) which gave contributory benefits to the 
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sick and unemployed, and was to be financed by means of the redistributive 
taxation advocated in the 'People's Budget'. In addition, the 'moral element' 
involved in the payment of poor relief had been removed as, for the time 
being, no benefit could be witheld due to voluntary unemployment (Fraser, 
1973). This provides a glaring comparison with current policy of reducing 
or suspending benefits in cases of 'voluntary unemployment', 'misconduct' 
or refusal to take a job (Lynes, 1985). The moral concern to maintain 
work-incentives and combat idleness are not merely of historical interest 
as such concerns are increasingly evident in New Right social policy. The 
Thatcher government is currently considering the introduction of 
'workfare' (the workhouse test without incarceration), and compulsory 
'training' for adults who wish to continue to receive state support (Loney, 
1987). Such measures serve to further industrial discpline, keep wages 
low and claimants 'less eligible' than lowest-paid workers and to regulate 
(and punish) the poor (Garland, 1985). 
Despite the apparent progressive social goals of the Liberal Reforms, 
critics such as Kair Hardie argued that the Liberal government was really 
saying 'We shall not uproot the cause of poverty but will give you a 
porous plaster to cover the disease that poverty causes' (Fraser, 
1973: 152). Such criticisms are still articulated in relation to the failure 
of contemporary governments to tackle the structural problem of poverty 
(Low Pay Unit/C. P. A. G., 1986; C. P. A. G., 1987). 
The experience of 'total war' further shifted public perceptions of 
poverty: by the 1930's poverty was less likely to be seen as caused by 
personal failing and the public was acutely aware of the misery it caused 
(Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983). This gave added impetus to the movement 
towards the universal provision of social welfare benefits, and by the end 
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of the Second World War the 'Dunkirk spirit' and unity forced by the war 
led to the slogan 'fair shares' (Titmuss, 1950). As discussed above, 
attitudes towards personal tax had softened in order that the 'fair shares' 
could be distributed, in part through taxation and in part through the 
contribution principle. The Beveridge Report Social Insurance established 
the principle that the state should provide 'in return for contributions 
benefits up to subsistence level, as of right and without a means test' 
(Cmnd 6404,1942). The rhetoric of war was invoked against the enemies of 
Want, Disease, Ignorance, Idleness and Squalor at home (ibid). 
As in the history of taxation, changes in provision for the poor were 
only secured through struggle and through compromise. In the case of 
welfare provision (as in the case of personal tax), the rhetoric of the 
incentives argument was prominent in criticisms of the Beveridge Report. 
The consensus which emerged was arrived at partly because advocates of 
work-incentives for the poor were appeased: elements of the means test 
were retained in the form of National Assistance which was payable to 
those who did not satisfy contribution requirements. Furthermore, what is 
dubbed the 'Welfare State' can be seen as 'a judicious balance between the 
claims of various interests and resolving them in the name of One Nation' 
(Deakin, 1987: 61). The goals of Beveridge, according to Deakin, were linked 
to a sense of common purpose following the experience of war, but did not 
effect any fundamental shift in power between classes or between genders. 
The same rhetoric of crisis was invoked to justify both 
'redistributive' taxation and Beveridge's 'War' against the five 'enemies' he 
associated with poverty. In both cases the motivational rhetorics drew 
upon ideologies of social justice, yet failed to accomplish their stated 
goal of a fundamental redistribution of income (or wealth). Deakin (1987) 
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gives an illuminating summary of post-war attitudes towards the welfare 
state in which he substitutes the notion of 'consensus' for that of 
'grumbling acquiescence' (ibid: 61). The same can be said of attitudes 
towards personal taxation. Differential responses to taxpayers and benefit 
claimants must therefore be seen against this historical background, 
apparently characterized by the rhetoric of social justice, but effectively 
marked by resistance to putting such rhetoric into practice. What 
progressive measures that did emerge can be seen as the result of 'co- 
incidence rather than conjunction of views' and political interests (ibid). 
The basic contradictions between the ideologies of social justice and 
individualism were therefore incorporated within a welfare state which 
paid lip-service to the notion of a guaranteed social minimum (as of 
right) through national insurance, yet retained the deterrent of a less 
eligible benefit (National Assistance) which was paid by proving need in a 
means-test (see Chapter 3). 
These contradictions enable differential responses to different 
categories of claimants and so encourage distinctions between the 
deserving and undeserving poor. The 1966 Ministry of Social Security Act 
replaced 'National Assistance' with supplementary benefit. The change was 
in part a symbolic attempt to reduce the socail stigma attatched to 
claiming National Assistance. But the payment of benefit was still means- 
tested, and supplementary benefit levels were set in line with its 
perceived role as the 'safety net' for the welfare state (just as National 
Assistance had been). For the purposes of this thesis it is, therefore, 
essential to examine two dimensions of differential response: 
1) the differential responses to supplementary benefit claimants as a less 
eligible claiming group a the provisions of the welfare state. This 
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involves historical distinctions between the deserving and undeserving 
poor and the contradictions which have emerged as % result of the 
opposing principles of National Insurance and means-test. ng. 
2) the differential response to those who are seen to taxe from the state 
- ie. supplementary benefit claimants - and those who are seen to give to 
the state - ie. the taxpayers - and, in so doing, are seen to finance 
state welfare. 
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(b)LEGAL AID ADI(IBISTRATIVE PRECONDITIONS 
(i)Taxation 
British taxpayers usually pay their personal taxes in one to two 
ways: first, employees pay tax under Schedule E, through the P. A. Y. E. 
system. Second, the self-employed and small businesses pay tax under 
Schedule D, direct to the Collector of Taxes (Inland Revenue leaflet I. R. 
28,1982). The administrative regulations concerning the collection of 
personal tax were consolidated in the Taxes Management Act 1970 which, 
together with the current Finance Acts, constitute the statutory basis for 
tax collectiot. Case law dating back to 1874 (Lewis, 1977) also influences 
the drafting of tax statutes, but may lead to difficulties (and loopholes) 
in the administration of the Taxes Acts: for instance, under the Taxes 
Management Act 'profits or gains' from a 'trade' are chargable to tax under 
Case I of Schedule D, but nowhere is the term 'trade' adequately defined. 
As Lord Denning remarked, 
'Try as you will, the word "trade" is one of those common English 
words which do not lend themselves readily to definition but which 
all of us think we understand well enough. We can recognise a 
"trade" when we see it ... but we are hard pressed to define it. ' 
(Denning quoted in Lewis, 1977: 19). 
Furthermore, such difficulties may serve to complicate issues 
relating to the evasion of tax, giving rise to debates over technicalities 
and 'loopholes'. Therefore, as the Keith Committee Report noted, there are 
problems in establishing if anything illegal has taken place and, 
thereafter, in explaining such technicalities to judges and juries (Cmnd. 
8822,1983)(see Chapter 5 (2) and (3) below). 
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All taxpayers have statutory obligations to declare all income they 
receive, from whatever sources (S1. Taxes Management Act, 1970) and to 
submit periodic returns of income (S7. ). In the case of self-employed 
taxpayers and companies, returns must be completed annually, based upon 
the profits of trading during the previous year (Inland Revenue leaflet 
28,1982). Failure to submit accounts may result in financial penalties 
(see Chapter 5(3)). Although employees have to declare all the income 
they receive, tax returns are rarely issued to P. A. Y. B. taxpayers on an 
annual basis. The Keith Committee recommended that all taxpayers should 
complete tax returns at least once every 3 years, but this recommendation 
has not been implemented (Cmnd 8822,1983). It is therefore commonplace 
for P. A. Y. B. taxpayers to submit a return only once in 5 or 6 years. The 
obligation thus rests upon the taxpayer to inform the Revenue of any 
changes in circumstances. 
For both trading and non-trading taxpayers it is an offence to make 
an incorrect statement or submit incorrect accounts (S95(1), Taxes 
Management Act, 1970). But the Taxes Acts recognise 2 types of offences. 
' (1) Minor regulatory offences: failure to comply in due time, or 
instances of negligence. 
(2) Major offences: substantial failure to comply, or doing something 
negligent or fraudulent in the course of complying (Cmnd. 8822,1983: 17.1). 
But once again the language of tax law may lead to difficulties in 
defining, for instance, the term 'wilful default': 
Wilful default is understood as 'near fraud' in the sense of 
deliberate or reckless failure to give proper attention to the 
requirements of tax law ... intention not to comply. ' 
(Cmnd 8822,1983: 17.1). 
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The term 'evasion' does not itself appear in offences against tax law 
although to understate profits, submit incorrect account:;, complete 
incorrect tax returns or to omit or understate sources of incc-me will all 
lead to evasion of income tax. Tax offences are defined in relation to the 
taxpayers duty to declare all income to the Inland Revenue: 'evasion' 
therefore 'denotes all those activities which are responsible for a person 
not paying the tax that the existing law charges an his income' (Leigh, 
1982: 64). However, there is nothing illegal in avoiding tax through 
arranging financial affairs so as to pay less tax, for example, through 
covenants. Commenting on the case of the Duke of Vestminst=r v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners (1948), Lord Tomlin acknowledged that 
'If he succeeds in ordering this tax affairs] so as to secure this 
result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue and his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot 
be compelled to pay increased tax. ' (Lewis, 1977: 25). 
Avoidance of tax is, therefore, legal but tax evasion, which minimizes 
liability by omission, mis-statements or fraud, is illegal (see Chapter 1.4 
above). The blurring of the line separating avoidance and evasion of tax 
may lead to an ideological and practical 'space' within which tax fiddles 
can be committed and justified without the full weight of 'criminal' 
sanction being brought to bear upon the offender. This is accomplished in 
part because of the ambiguity surrounding the avoidance/evasion 
distinction (as in the Rossminster case, discussed in Chapter 5 below), 
and in the main because of the form of tax law itself: as Uglow (1984) 
noted, all the offences which the Revenue can call on in major cases of 
suspected fraud are offences requiring proof of dishonesty, an element of 
'mens real. As argued earlier, the very complexity of the language and form 
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of tax law serves to mystify and complicate the (already difficult) issue 
of intent. 
To summarise, the taxpayer's status as employee or employer will 
determine how s/he pays tax: if the former, tax is deducted by employers 
directly from an employee's weekly wages or monthly salary in accordance 
with the instructions received (in the form of a code number), from H. M. 
Inspector of Taxes (Inland Revenue leaflet P7,1983). The code number is 
determined by information the taxpayer supplies concerning his/her tax 
liability on a tax return farm. 
In the case of the latter, sole traders, partnerships or companies, 
annual accounts are submitted to the Revenue giving details of all income, 
profits, expenses and losses. The amount of tax calculated to be due is 
collected directly by the Collector of Taxes under Schedule D. As will be 
seen below, opportunities to engage in tax fiddles vary between Schedule E 
(P. A. Y. E. ) and Schedule D taxpayers: they also vary in accordance to the 
opportunity structures afforded by particular occupations "(see Chapter 
4(la) below). 
(ii) Supplementary benefits 
As the brief history (in (a) above) indicated, supplementary benefit 
is paid following a claimant's establishing his/her entitlement through a 
means-testing procedure. The decision as to whether an individual is 
entitled to supplementary benefit is taken by a Benefit Officer in the 
local D. H. S. S. office. The statutory framework within which Benefit Officers 
make their decisions is provided by the Supplementary Benefit Act 1976, 
extensively amended by the Social Security Acts of 1980 and 1986 
(N. A. C. R. O., 1986; Lynes, 1985). In addition, the Secretary of State for 
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Social Services is responsible for the detailed regulations which put the 
supplementary benefit scheme into operation. Increasingly, caselaw may 
also augment this legal and administrative framework (Lynes, 1985). 
Regulations currently still mean that 'every person in Great Britain 
who is aged 16 years or over is entitled to supplementary benefit if his 
resources are insufficient to meet his requirements. Except in certain 
, cases, 
he must be registered for and available for full-time employment' 
(Pearl and Gray, 1981: 82). Individuals over pension age, those responsible 
for the care of young children, the sick or disabled or those who are 
incapable of work for other reasons are not required to register for work 
and may still claim supplementary benefit. But, for others the scheme is 
based upon a work-test as well as a means -test, and these (unemployed) 
claimants must sign on as available for full-time work in order to claim 
benefit (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of current proposals for a 
widening of such work-tests). 
Another feature which characterises the supplementary benefits scheme 
is the presumption of nuclear family relationships when assessing 
entitlement to benefit. For instance, a lone mother who is 'cohabiting' 
with a man may not claim in her own right because she is assumed to be 
financially supported by the man she lives with (Chapter 4 will analyse 
the gender-specific forms of fraud which are generated by such 
assumptions). Supplementary benefit entitlement is calculated by adding 
up the requirements of the 'assessment unit' (whether family or 
individual), in accordance with fixed 'scale rates' of benefit which are 
laid down by parliament. Additions are then made for variables such as 
rent, rates and special additions for diet and heating where applicable 
(Lynes, 1985). Against this figure of 'total requirements' is set any 
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figure of income which the assessment unit receives, for example in child 
benefit, part-time earnings, private pensions and National Insurance 
benefits. Supplementary benefit therefore represents the shortfall between 
the claimant's statutory financial requirements and his/Ler income. 
The regulations governing the assessment of benefit are both complex 
and strict. The Social Security Act 1980 sought to reduce many areas of 
discretion within the operation of the supplementary benefit scheme, 
particularly in relation to exceptional needs payments. Although the 1980 
Act was officially motivated by the desire to prevent abuse and 
inconsistency and to save staff time, critics argue that in practical 
terms the Act led to rigid and excessively technical regulations (Rowell, 
1982). 
The 1980 reforms also involved the abolition of the independant 
administrative body, the Supplementary Benefits Commission. The 
responsibility for social security provision now rests with the Secretary 
of State, who is directly accountable to parliament. But commentators 
differ in their analyses of the motives and the results of the 1980 
reforms. The last chairman of the Supplementary Benefits Commission, David 
Donnison, offered (in 1982) a prophetic view of the changes which were 
being brought about: 
'The reform of supplementary benefits was not conceived simply 
as a way of bringing a sensitive sector of government under 
control. But that is how it could be interpreted. Simplification 
would then become a way of means-testing more and more unemployed 
people without commensurate increases in staff. The new decision- 
making system would be a way of transferring powers from the S. B. C. 
-a body which could at least be exposed to public pressure - to 
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the Chief Supplementary Benefit Officer who is safely insulated 
from the public. . Special case officers may only be used to 
process the more harrowing cases without too much scandal and 
protest. And th3 Social Security Advisory Committee may turn out to 
be a respectable front office for a service whose function is to 
divide the poor from the working population and keep them docile. ' 
(Donnison, 1982: 182-3) 
From this perspective, the 1980,1986 and 1988 reforms can all be seen 
as attempts to manage and police the poor more effectively as poverty and 
unemployment increased. This involves blunting any effective opposition to 
tighter regulation of the poor, whether from within the Social Security 
system (hence, the abolition of the S. B. C. ), or from outside the system 
(the official discourse on 'efficiency' and 'simplification' thus dominating 
popular rhetoric on the welfare state). (The political and ideological 
conditions under which this management is made possible are discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 6 below). 
The policing of the poor has long been accomplished, in part, by the 
very mechanisms of benefit payment: such payments are made by girocheque 
or order book, at a nominated post office, and with a 'payday' which is 
pre-determined by the department. Although such mechanisms may have been 
designed to safeguard against abuse, they also function to instil a 
discipline into the claimant. This is the discipline of the workforce, with 
a payday and either cash or (giro)cheque. Yet the claiming and payment 
system inserts the stigma of non-work, for instance through the ignominy 
of the benefit office and post office queues. These administrative 
preconditions foster feelings of degradation and mistrust between claimant 
and departmental staff, and between claimant and worker: the latter 
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categories are, after all, distinguishable within and divided through the 
post office queue and similar mechanisms which operationalise the welfare 
sanction. The nexus of mistrust and degradation provides both the 
conditions under which benefit fraud is committed, and justificatory 
rationales for its commission (see Chapter 4 (2)). 
Both administrative and legal preconditions facilitate the relatively 
easy investigation, apprehension and prosecution of supplementary benefit 
fraudsters (as compared with tax fraudsters). No proof of intent to 
defraud is needed: rather, it is sufficient to show that the claimant made 
a false statement 'knowingly' (Mesher, 1983; Uglow, 1984; NACRO, 1986). 
Although there are a variety of of fences available under social security 
law and under the general law, it can be argued that, 
'The D. H. S. S. prefers to use of fences under the Supplementary 
Benefit Act because it is easier to get a conviction on a summary 
offence before a magistrate than on indictment, say under the Theft 
Act, before a jury. ' (Stockwell and Clapham Law Centre, 1983). 
In summary, the law and the administrative framework of the supplementary 
benefits system facilitate a tight and effective regulation of claimants' 
lives. Modes of regulation are embodied in the processes of 'claiming' from 
the state. The forms of regulation are both changed (and include, for 
instance, surveillance) and intensified if a claimant is suspected of 
fraud. The same may be true if the claimant is merely within a category 
which is targetted as 'fraud-prone' (see Chapter 4(2b) and 5 (2)). 
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(c) DIFFERENTIAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES. 
The previous sections have argued that the histories of taxation and 
welfare produced different perceptions of taxpayer and benefit claimant 
underpinned by contradictory ideologies of individualism and social 
justice. These contradictions are also evident in the differential 
responses to taxpayer and supplementary benefit claimant in terms of the 
administrative and legal rules used to regulate them. This section will 
argue that both departmental rules and material opportunities lead to 
differential access to illegal channels of financial gain for tax and 
benefit fraudsters (techniques of fraud will be discussed in Chapter 4). 
As already argued, the letter and the spirit of the law both offer 
scope, and justifications, for the commission of tax fraud. The Revenue's 
'sparing' attitude towards tax evaders coupled with an emphasis (implicit 
in its administrative procedures), on the taxpayer's duty to declare any 
change in circumstances, allow the taxpayer much leeway: for instance, 
leeway within which (successfully) to commit and justify fraud, escape 
detection, exploit legal loopholes, avoid penalties or to, almost certainly, 
avoid prosecution (see Chapter 5(3)). But as taxpayers themselves are 
subject to different rules, so the opportunities to manipulate 
administrative rules will differ. For example, P. A. Y. E. taxpayers have less 
opportunity than their self-employed counterparts to evade tax. Employees 
have their taxes deducted at source, whereas the schedule D taxpayer, in 
submitting accounts to the Revenue, has greater opportunity to falsify 
information in annual accounts. But for the majority of taxpayers (who 
pay by P. A. Y. E. ), the main opportunity for evasion consists of 
'moonlighting' and concealing invested income. Although there is evidence 
that such forms of evasion are increasing , they remain relatively small 
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in scale when compared with the evasion by the trading (Schedule D) 
taxpayer (see Chapter 4 (a)). 
Large camp mies are therefore not alone in having access to lucrative 
opportunities for tax evasion. The self-employed, partnerships and small 
businesses may similarly defraud taxes by understating profits, over- 
stating losses and display a variety of 'fiddles' ranging from nominally 
employing wives on inflated salaries to exaggerating expenses against 
income (Mars, 1982; I. R. S. F., 1983). In addition to administrative 
opportunity, the self-employed and small businesses have greater 
opportunities successfully to justify their actions in terms of their 
adherence to the entrepeneurial values of competition, and accumulation. 
Vocabularies of motive are thus punctuated by references to incentives, 
repressive taxation and the desire, above all, to be profitable (see 
Chapter 4 (ib)). Such vocabularies are often expropriated by other 
categories of taxpayers (non-self-employed) who invoke similar 
justifications for fiddling their taxes. The degree to which such 
vocabularies of motive are adopted and accepted as justifications for tax 
fraud contrasts sharply with the rejection of justifications offered for 
benefit fraud. In both practical and ideological terms the opportunity 
structure for tax evasion is considerably more open and acceptable than 
for benefit fraud. 
As far as supplementary benefit fraud is concerned, the brief outline 
of legal and administrative rules above indicates that supplementary 
benefit claimants are not given the 'benefit of the doubt' in relations 
with, D. H. S. S. staff in general, and particularly where an overpayment of 
benefit has occured. For instance, the form All on which entitlement to 
benefit is based is not filled in by the claimant, but by a local DHSS 
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office clerk who reads back the claimant's statement of income and 
requirements. This form is then signed, as correct, by the claimant. This 
practice contrasts with taxpayers completing a tax return form in the 
privacy of their own home, infrequently and free from official gaze and 
scrutiny. The presence of a face to face contact while making a legally 
binding statement may reduce opportunity for benefit fraud whereas the 
anonymity and distance involved in preparing tax forms may increase both 
opportunity for omission and fraud and the excuse of 'mistake' (Beltram, 
1984). 
Although a simple example, this instance serves to demonstrate 
differential opportunity in practice. The conditions under which the false 
statement which constitutes 'fraud' is made are thus 'very different for 
taxpayers and for suplementary benefit claimants. These conditions reflect 
differences in power and credibilty: supplementary benefit claimants do 
not have the knowledge and power to even record their own histories and 
circumstances. Taxpayers are given the knowledge and opportunity to make 
such statements, and are believed when they make them. If later proven 
false, they often cite innocent error or confusion in justification. These 
excuses are far more likely to refer to the experience of benefit 
claimants, yet are usually rejected. 
For the supplementary benefit claimant, the principle opportunity for 
fraud is by working while claiming (Mars, 1982; D. H. S. S. Ip. c. ) 1985). But it 
should not be overlooked that work opportunities are most open to 
individuals with marketable skills and this favours those who are 
relatively successful in the formal economy (I. R. S. F., 1983; T. U. C., 1983). It 
could therefore be argued that the opportunity structure provided by the 
black economy favours taxpayers (who are thus already in work), to a 
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greater extent than benefit claimants. Moreover, work confers opportunities 
to learn particular fiddles in association with colleagues (Sutherland, 
196Q; Ditton, 1978) and higher staus occupations thus generate 
opportunities for higher staus fiddles (Mars, 1982; Braithwaite, 1984). 
Supplementary benefit claimants who work while claiming are usually 
located in marginalised, casualised and low-paid jobs (see Chapter 4(2a)). 
Their opportunities to fiddle are likely to be determined by material 
factors, such as unemployment and poverty. The material conditions of 
taxpayers thus offer a more favourable opportunity structure for fiddles 
in several ways: 
1)Scope and range: administrative and legal preconditions enable most 
taxpayers to fiddle with some degree of impunity (although greater scope 
is offered to schedule D taxpayers). 
2)Scale: taxpayers are likely to be working in more highly paid jobs 
than benefit claimants who work on the side as an easily disposable labour 
reserve. Moreover, taxpayers who submit accounts are dealing with far 
greater sums (and hence greater possible frauds) than are possible in 
working while claiming benefit. But, most importantly, benefit claimants' 
fiddles are limited in scale to the amounts of benefit they receive. Such 
limits invariably mean that the scale of tax evasion is far greater. 
3)Ski1ls: taxpayers are likely to have more marketable work-skills 
than the unemployed benefit claimant. At the same time, the taxpayer is 
likely to have social skills and knowledge which facilitate fiddling and 
also help the tax fraudster to manipulate rules, find loopholes and avoid 
punishment and criminalization (see Chapter 5). 
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APTRR 2: SUxx RY 
Supplementary benefit fraud and tax fraud are economic crimes which 
are committed . ender particular historical, administrative, legal and 
material conditi. 3ns. In order to provide a basis for an explanation of 
differentit. l response to tax and benefit fraud, this chapter has outlined 
these differential preconditions, and several important themes have 
emerged. 
The histories of taxation and welfare have given rise to contradictory 
ideological and political effects. On the one hand the taxpayer can be seen 
as suffering tho 'intolerable inquisition' of state taxation, yet on the 
other hand is valorised as provider of 'fair shares' for the poor. These 
two representations are not mutually exclusive: although the former view 
may be associated with nineteenth and early twentieth century social 
policy and the latter view with post-war reconstruction, the discussion 
above has demonstrated that the history of taxation is riven with such 
contradictions. The 'new' view of taxation as progressive and 
redistributive, did not simply replace the 'old' one: rather, both are 
invoked in differing ideological and material conditions. Broadly, the new 
view is invoked to justify levying progressive taxation in order to 
finance, amongst other things, welfare provision. The old view remains as 
a powerful reassertion both of the British resistance to taxation, and of 
the doubts held by many well-off commentators that such tendencies were 
'communist' in orientation. 
Although apparently contradictory, both views can be seen to underlie 
contemporary discourses on taxation. For instance, the current Thatcher 
government has to rely upon the 'new' view in order to successfully seek 
the compliance of most taxpayers. Good and compliant citizens are thus 
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essential if the state is to gain the taxation revenue it needs to function 
at all. But this government is at the same time committed to (New Right) 
ideological principles which seek to minimise state intervention and 
maximise market regulation in the economic and social spheres. According 
to such principles the taxpayer is over-burdened and his/her enterprise is 
stifled as a result of 'excessive' personal taxes. The current incorporation 
of both views in dominant political discourse thus gives rise to a 
significant ideological contradiction in relation to tax: paying taxes is a 
civic duty, but is (in economic terms) counter-productive. It is this 
contradiction which enables tax fraudsters to successfully justify their 
actions, both to themselves and to others (see Chapters 4(1), 5(1) and 
5(3)). In practice such contradictions have given rise to the ambiguities 
and complexities which characterise the law and administration of personal 
taxation. 
The history of state welfare provision is inextricably linked with 
issues of taxation and work-incentives. For instance, the 1834 Poor Law 
was conceived as a response to criticisms that poor relief was an 
excessive burden to ratepayers and was encouraging idleness and 
dependency amongst the poor. The legacy of the Poor Law is an important 
feature of the analysis in this thesis because contemporary discourses 
about supplementary benefit claimants are deeply imbued with notions of 
the 'undeserving' poor. For example, Patrick Minford currently advocates a 
system under which the 'safety net' of welfare provision would only be 
available to alleviate 'avoidable need': under such a system, 
'those elderly who saved conscientiously for their old age will be 
rewarded: they will be better off than those who merely put aside 
the minimum. That is both just and good for the economy. Under this 
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system, those who have illegitimate children will suffer; 
illegitimacy is therefore discouraged. Families which choose to 
have many children will have less income per head than those who 
have fewer. . . the system discourages avoidable need, which is of 
course a good thing. The inevitable penalty is the suffering 
incurred when people fail to avoid such need. ' (Minford, 1987: 81) 
This is clearly an articulation of nineteenth century arguments that 
poverty was culpable (or 'avoidable'), the result of individual failing, and 
so could be deterred. Deterrence could be effected through the principle of 
less eligibility, put into operation by work-tests and the 'suffering' 
resulting either from inadequate levels of benefit, or from no benefits at 
all. Such arguments are as important in analysing responses to the poor in 
the 1980's as they were in the 1830's. 
Beneath these historical contradictions, which inform the law and 
administration of tax and welfare, lie different conceptions of the role of 
the state in modern societies. This Chapter has indicated the importance 
of war, both as a justification for progressive social policies in terms 
of 'fair shares', and for the collection of personal taxes to finance social 
policy. But the twin justifications which 'war' offered failed to reconcile 
the problem of whether the modern caplitalist state in which the war was 
waged (whether war against poverty or against external enemies), was a 
state geared to the needs of capital accumulation or to the goal of 
securing consent and legitimation (George and Wilding, 1984). According to 
O'Connor (1973) welfare-capitalist states cannot raise sufficient taxes to 
provide adequate services (to secure their legitimation), and at the same 
time maintain the conditions under which private capital remains 
profitable (to secure accumulation). These two contradictory functions of 
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the modern state lie at the heart of differential responses to taxpayers 
and to benefit claimants (see Chapter 3(b)). The taxpayer is seen to 
pursue capital accumulation, whereas the benefit claimant is seen as the 
recipient of state welfare provision. 
But legitimation is not guaraL, teed simply through the existence of 
such provision. As argued above, the welfare state rested not so much on 
'consensus' as on 'grudging acquiescence'. In the last decade this already 
fragile base has been further eroded: critiques from the left (of poor 
delivery of services), and from the right (of cossetting welfare and the 
'scrounger'), have effectively undermined the legitimation function of the 
welfare state. At the same time the New Right politics of privatisation 
and de-regulation . have gained dominance and so, for the time being at 
least, the function of accumulation appears to dominate social policy. Yet 
the state cannot be sustained without popular consent: debates centred on 
the National Health Service, the 'Poll Tax' and the 1988 Social Security 
Reforms are evidence of political struggles involved in the winning of 
such consent. 
Struggles over taxation and welfare, both historical and contemporary, 
therefore reflect fundamental struggles over the nature and role of the 
state. One element in this struggle is the deconstruction of the problem of 
differential political, judicial and popular responses to tax and 
supplementary benefit fraud. 
In conclusion, the important themes raised in this Chapter and which 
will inform the analyses of the thesis are summarised as follows: 
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IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSES 
IAX, as intolerable inquisition v Means to ensure 'fair shares' 
as disincentive to effort (Myth of) redistribution of 
income and wealth 
WELFARE as incentive to idleness, v Safety-net provision for needy 
STATE and dependency. Too costly. 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES 
Scope, skills and opportunity v Limited opportunities for 
for successful tax frauds. successful benefit frauds 
LEGAL CONDITIONS 
'hens real to be proved v Strict liability for 
for tax fraud. supplementary benefit fraud. 
EC. OIOXIC COHDITIOIS AND DISCOURSES 
Emphasr is on: Market regulation v State regulation 
Freedom to get (economic) Freedom to be (individual) 
Entrepreneurialism, wealth creation Less eligibility, work-tests 
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INTRODUCTION 
Having in Chapter 2 examined the differential historical, legal and 
administrative preconditions and opportunity structures for tax and 
supplementary benefit fraud, it is now necessary to determine what, in 
commonsense terms, constitutes 'the problem' under investigation. This 
involves 
(a) An analytic exposition of everyday knowledge about tax and 
supplementary benefit fraud as evidenced by readily accessible sources 
of information and comment. By examining precisely how the agenda is 
set for public debate an the topics of tax and benefit fraud, a clearer 
understanding should emerge of how the problem is constructed by 
different interest groups. 
(b) Using the exposition in (a) to identify particular vocabularies and 
clusters of ideas which influence 'commonsense' constructions of the 
problem. An analysis of the inconsistencies and common themes within 
these public discourses will provide the conceptual framework which 
will inform the analyses in Capters 4 and 5. 
Thereafter, the problem of differential response will be 
deconstructed and analysed in terms of its political, material and 
ideological preconditions (see Chapter 6). But this Chapter will 
proceed, as described above, under the following headings: 
(a)DEFIHIHG THE PROBLEX: IH CONNOHSEISE. 
(b)DEFIRIIG THE PROBLEM: 11 THEORY. 
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(a)DEFIIIAG THE PROBLEM: IN COBXOHSEHSE. 
Tax evasion and s. pplementary benefit fraud may or may not be 
constituted as 'probleaa' within public discourse. As will be argued 
below, the former may be represented as a justifiable 'fiddle' or 
shrewd business practice, the latter as a despicable form of 
'scrounging' from the state. These two forms of economic crime share 
the same basic characteristic (defrauding the public purse), yet may 
not be recognised as comparable in popular rhetoric. In order to 
analyse differential responses to tax and benefit fraud it is first 
necessary to examine hoi knowledges about these two forms are created. 
But several problems emerge in attempting to disentangle everyday 
or 'commonsense' knowledge of tax and benefit fraud: for instance, upon 
what 'official' information are such knowledges based? Is the official 
information which the Inland Revenue and D. H. S. S. provide about fraud 
equally available, reliable and amenable to comparison? How is 
official discourse transformed (or reproduced) into the public idiom? 
In what ways do the mass media and interest groups respond differently 
to the 'problems' of tax and supplementary benefit fraud? These 
questions will be addressed in the following sections: 
<i)Official information - availability, reliability and comparability 
(ii)Competing perspectives on the problem - advocates of 'effort' and 
of 'social justice'. 
(iii)Xedia processes and products - scroungers and tax evaders: folk 
devils and folk -heroes? 
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(i)Official information 
As argued above (see Chapter 1(1)), official publications and 
pronouncements on tax and supplementary benefit fraud need to be seen 
in terms of what information is provided in, and what is omitted from, 
official Revenue and D. H. S. S. discourses. The Inland Revenue 
systematically collect and publish details on, for example, 
prosecutions mounted, the yields gained from investigation work, 
numbers of cases where interest and penalties were levied on tax found 
to be due (indicating the taxpayers culpability) and statements on 
Revenue policy objectives. All such information is regularly available 
in the Board's Annual Report (Inland Revenue 129th Report, 1987). By 
contrast, no similar systematic collection of information is published 
by the D. H. S. S.. Prior to its abolition in 1980, the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission produced an annual report, but no current D. H. S. S. 
publication gives comparable information. The present means for 
disseminating information on supplementary benefit fraud are 
Ministerial statements and press releases. The public's knowledge of 
the costs, scale and investigation of benefit fraud is therefore 
largely determined by the Ministers who are themselves responsible for 
framing, directing, administering and evaluating D. H. S. S. policies. 
Under these circumstances there must be doubts as to the objectivity 
of such information. 
The processes of collection and distribution of information have 
a direct effect on public knowledge about tax and supplementary 
benefit fraud. For example, the Revenues prosecution policy and details 
of numbers and types of offences prosecuted are available in the Annual 
Report. As argued above (Chapter 1(1)), this document is evidence of 
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the openness, clarity and professionalism in the Revenue's approach to 
informing both its staff and the public on issues such as counter- 
evasion measures. Such an approach is not adopted by the D. H. S. S.: for 
example, Mr Hugh Rossi outlined the D. H. S. S. 's prosecution policy in a 
a statment to the House of Commons on 7th February 1983 (in the wake of 
the 'Operation Major' anti-fraud swoop in Oxford): 
'In 1980-81,121,625 cases of fraud were investigated. They led to 
30,116 prosecutions. In 1981-2 there were 136,307 investigations 
into fraud resulting in 25,654 prosecutions. Convictions were 
secured in 97% of the cases prosecuted... those figures show that 
the number of prosecutions in relation to numbers of investigations 
has fallen from one in four to one in five during those two years. ' 
(Rossi, Hansard 7.2.83. col. 811) 
He indicated that the shift towards detection and recovery of benefit, 
rather than detection and prosecution through the courts, was far more 
'humane' (ibid). Not only did this assertion disregard the inhumane 
treatment of some claimants by investigators conducting coercive 'non- 
prosecution interviews' (see Chapter 5(2) below), but the numbers which 
were quoted may have given rise to misleading views on the scale of 
supplementary benefit frauds: Mr Rossi's statistics referred to &II 
D. H. S. S. investigations and prosecutions yet were offered in response 
to questions on the prosecutions for supplementary benefit frauds of 
the homeless in Oxford. Official pronouncements can thus conflate 
different categories of benefits and so create misleading impressions 
about particular types of fraud. Such confusion characterises everyday 
knowledge of supplementary benefit in general. Lack of adequate 
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information is often cited as one reason for the gross underclaiming of 
means-tested benefits (Alcock and Shepherd, 1987). 
The reliability of official information on supplementary benEfit 
fraud is also called into question when the processes of data 
collection are examined more closely. For example, figures cf benefit 
'saved' as a result of investigation efforts are calculated by 
multiplying the weekly amount of benefit received by the suspected 
claimant by a number which represents the likely duration (in weeks) 
of his/her claim (see Chapter 5(2) for a further discussion of 
'multipliers'). As a result of the use of these 'multipliers', an 
element of guesswork is introduced into figures which purport to 
represent the costs and scale of supplementary benefit fraud. 
Nonetheless, these figures were used to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of investigation work (of Special Claims Control Units in particular), 
despite the dubious assumptions upon which they were calculated. It is 
therefore difficult to establish the veracity of D. H. S. S. estimates of 
the scale of detected fraud as the amounts they refer to represent 
notional not actual losses. This contrasts with Inland Revenue figures 
of yields from investigation work which refer to actual amounts. 
Problems of reliability and availability of official information 
may directly affect commonsense public knowledge about fraud. Estimated 
'benefit savings' may be accepted as indicating the 'real' extent of 
fraud, and so fuel the scrounger mythology. But equally important is 
the fact that the more reliable information provided by the Revenue 
(and which indicates that tax fraud clearly dwarfs benefit fraud in 
costs and scale), remains largely absent in popular rhetoric. 
Difficulties are thus presented by the lack of systematic, clear and 
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comprehensive information from the D. H. S. S. which hinder analysis of 
benefi": fraud and adversely affect public knowledge. But these problems 
are ccmpounded when the information which ia available is used and 
interpreted selectively by particular interest groups (as will be seen 
-. n (iii) below). 
A further problem in defining the problem of differential response 
in commonsense terms is the issue of comparability. One senior civil 
servant observed to me that examining the differential responses to tax 
and benefit fraud was like 'comparing apples and pears'. Although the 
end pioduct of both forms of fraud remains the same (loss of state 
revenue), it may be argued that direct comparisons are not valid 
because of differences in the legal, administrative and social 
processes involved in evading taxes and in defrauding supplementary 
benefit. However, there are important justifications for a comparative 
approach. First, there are significant similarities and a high degree 
of overlap in the activities engaged in by both tax and benefit 
fraudsters: for instance, 'moonlighting' and other black economy 
activity often unites those who are evading taxes and those who are 
fiddling welfare benefits by working 'on the side'. Second, both forms 
of fraud involve false declarations of personal circumstances to 
government departments, motivated by the desire to maximise personal 
gain at the expense of the state: the criminal act is thus essentially 
the same, (though, as argued in Chapter 2(b) above, the standards of 
proof required differ). Third, a comparative approach is essential if 
the broader issues of (a) social justice in a mixed economy and (b) the 
differential criminalisation of fraudsters, according to their social 
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and economic status, are to be analysed. These issues are central 
concerns of this thesis. 
In order to make a reasoned comparison between tax and benefit 
fraud it is first necessary to delineate what forms of tax fraud are 
being alluded to. Tax fraud may range in scale and scope from 
concealment of income by P. A. Y. E. taxpayers to complex and massive 
corporate swindles. For the purposes of this thesis it is necessary to 
restrict the analysis to a level which is comparable to the experience 
of an individual supplementary benefit claimant. My analyses will 
therefore centre on tax frauds committed by individuals subject to 
P. A. Y. E., by the self-employed and by small businessmen. In this way a 
valid comparison with the commission of, and responses to, 
supplementary benefit fraud remains possible. Examples of large scale 
tax frauds, (for instance the Vestey and Rossminster cases) will be 
used as illustrations of fiddling at the upper extreme of the socio- 
economic hierarchy. Although such illustrations provide a useful 
counter-measure of responses to those at the lowest extreme - the poor 
- differential response is most effectively analysed by comparing, as 
far as possible, similar levels of fraud. 
Comparability is not only a methodological problem, it has wider 
implications for public conceptions of tax and benefit fraud. If 
comparisons between these two types of frauds are absent, then the 
injustice of differential response remains concealed. For instance, 
Franey (1983) notes a local case of tax evasion which came to court 
within a month of Oxford's Operation Major. The directors of The Bear 
Hotel, Voodstock, <'by appointment to his Grace the Duke of 
Marlborough'), were found guilty of tax frauds to the tune of £330,000. 
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However, national media coverage was minimal, being largely confined to 
the 'quality' press (Guardian 8.10.83. and 11.1.84). As will be seen 
below (in(iii)), public knowledge of tax and benefit fraud is 
constructed in a way which does not encourage such critical comparisons 
(Golding and Middleton, 1982; Franey, 1983). A central task of this 
thesis is to examine the political, material and ideological conditions 
under which (a) public knowledge about benefit fraud is constructed in 
a way which emphasises the social and economic threat it allegedly 
poses, yet (b) public knowledge about tax fraud is relatively 
underdeveloped, and fails to attract similar condemnation, and (c) the 
issues of tax and benefit fraud are rarely linked in the public 
rhetoric (except by certain campaigning groups), and thus the problem 
of differential response fails to surface in popular discourse as a 
problem at all . 
(ii)CCompetingpparspctives on the problem 
The 'problems' of tax and supplementary benefit fraud are 
constructed within an ideological context. This context is created by 
co-incidences of particular economic and political ideas which inform 
the way in which tax and benefit fraud are perceived. Although such 
clusters of ideas are often complex (and internally contradictory), 
they will be examined under two broad categories: 
1. Advocates o effort (and Revenue critics) 
2. Advocates of social justice (and D. H. S. S. critics) 
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1. Advocates of effort 
The effort school of thought is primarily coicerned with the 
maintenance of incentives to work, and disincentives ;o 'idleness'. In 
so doing it invokes both the virtue of the work ethic and the vice of 
financial dependency on the state. Both personfl taxation and welfare 
provision are therefore important elements in this school of thought. 
The alleged links between them are outlined by Hermione Parker (1982) 
in an article entitled 'The Moral Hazards of Social Benefits': 
'A consequence of the widespread dependence on means-tested 
benefits is that the young in particular feel no stigma when they 
claim benefit. We are breeding a race which will regard dependence 
on the taxpayer as a normal state of affairs. Already the young 
claim social security without hesitation as a matter of right. ' 
Clearly, Parker implies that stigma should be attatched to claiming 
benefits in order to deter 'dependence': such views are reminiscent of 
the Poor Law's objective - to deter pauperism. But benefit claimants 
are being presented as a 'race' apart from taxpayers, and as morally 
inferior. Rhodes Boyson makes a similar connection between the moral 
evil of dependency and the provision of welfare benefits by the state: 
'If... the state always picks up the bill, there will be no moral 
growth at all.. It has been well said that "the ultimate result of 
shielding men from the effects of folly is to fill the world with 
fools". A further effect of too much welfare support is not only 
that individuals lose their independent character but that they 
actually enjoy their servitude. ' (Boyson, 1978: 110) 
At the same time, the civil servants who administer the welfare system 
are seen as both inefficient and 'corrupting' the poor by increasing 
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dependency. The effort school prefers the poor to depend on private 
charity, which is humbling and stigmatising, but more efficient in 
targetting cash: 
'As much as Lady Bountiful might be scorned, she also could 
distinguish between the deserving and the undeserving poor. 
Not so the state professional worker with his rule book. ' 
(ibid: 110) 
Taken together, these views represent most welfare benefit 
claimants as wilfully idle, 'undeserving' and lacking in moral fibre. 
By contrast, taxpayers are represented as victims: victims of the idle 
poor (who are financed by the taxpayer) and victims of the state 
bureaucracy of taxation itself: 
'Taxation has no merit in itself. It is but a necessary evil and 
should be limited to the lowest level possible. ' (ibid; 135) 
Moreover, the use of taxation as a means of redistributing income is 
associated with 'envy' and not social justice. Those who manage to 
avoid paying their taxes are applauded by the effort school of thought; 
'Of course tax avoidance does thwart the efforts of egalitarians. 
It is perhaps the main defence of the rich against what some would 
call their right and proper taxation but what others would call 
their despoilation. ' (Shenfield, 1968: 25) 
Shenfield continues to argue that it can be seen as 'heartening' that 
the rich have managed to save their wealth from their 'rapacious fellow 
citizens' (ibid: 26). 
The traditional British hatred of taxation (see Chapter 2(a) 
above), is implicit in the 'effort' ideology, and co-incides with 
emphases on the positive virtues of entrepeneurialism, wealth creation 
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and 'freedom' through the operation of the market. This combination of 
ideas is a powerful one, tapping popular resentment to paying tax. 
Within such an ideological context it is not surprising that the Inland 
Revenue is subjected to intense criticism. For example, an accountant 
dealing mainly with small businesses argued 'For some time I have felt 
that the Inland Revenue is bashing the little man' (The Times, 22.6.85) 
Another accountant protested that 'people trying to make a go of things 
get hounded by the taxman'. He further complained at the Revenue's 
'assumption of guilt' and 'intrusion' into people's private lives 
(ibid). In a similar vein the National Federation for the Self-Employed 
complained that the Revenue 'continues to pursue the hapless trader' 
(Guardian, 12.4.85). It is significant that newspapers such as Ih?. 
Times refer to such views sympathetically, (in this example under the 
headline 'Tax Hounds'), yet call for more intrusion into the private 
lives of supplementary benefit claimants under headlines such as 'A 
life of luxury on the scrounge' (The Times, 21.1.85). Clearly the 
tabloid press are not alone in using grossly exaggerated 'scrounger' 
stereotypes (see (iii) below). 
For the purposes of this thesis it is important to recognise the 
important influence of the effort school of thought in constructing 
public knowledge about taxation and welfare. These views have a long 
pedigree: the legacy of the 1834 Poor Law is evident in the assumptions 
of commentators such as Boyson and Parker. The 'old' view of 
progressive taxation 'tending to communism' (see Chapter 2(a) above), is 
also evident in effort school commentators. Although New Right 
ideology (see Chapter 1 (3)) is based an similar assumptions about the 
value of what is now termed the 'enterprise culture' and the 'go- 
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getting society', the effort school incorporates a broader spectrum of 
opinion which has long been influential in shaping public discourses on 
tax and welfare. Golding and Middleton (1982) identify three key ideas 
which have, historically, formed the basis of popular conceptions of 
welfare: 
'These were efficiency, morality and pathology: efficiancy of the 
labour market and the economy; morality of the work ethic and self- 
sufficiency; and the pathology of individual inadequacy as the 
cause of poverty. ' (ibid: 48) 
Golding and Middleton argue that the 'fixing' of these ideas into 
prevailing discourses took place in the late nineteenth century, and 
that the twentieth century has seen the 'naturalising' of these images 
about welfare (ibid). Following on from this it can be argued that the 
political dominance of New Right ideology can be seen as won, in part, 
by the successful incorporation of 'commonsense' ('naturalised') 
critiques of the taxman and the scrounger which have emanated from 
the 'effort' perspective. 
To summarise, it can be argued that the effort school of thought 
constructs the abuse of supplementary benefit as a 'problem', but 
underplays the social and economic damage caused by fiddling taxes. 
Benefit 'scroungers' are thus evidence of a wider problem of the 
cossetting effects of state welfare, individual idleness and lack of 
'morality' among the undeserving poor. Tax fraudsters are seen as 
reacting to 'hounding' by the taxman, punitive rates of personal 
taxation and intrusive state regulation of individuals' affairs. The 
'problem' of differential response to tax and benefit fraud therefore 
does not arise within such discourses. 
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2. Advocates of social justice. 
Commentators adopting a sccial justice perspective locate the 
problems of tax and supplement:: ry benefit fraud within a structural 
economic and social framework. Benefit fraud is thus not linked with 
idleness and lack of work incentives, but with poverty and 
powerlessness (Field, 1979; Ward, 1985). The problem is thus addressed 
in a less hyperbolic manner: 
'There is nothing wrong... with a department responsible for the 
payment of some £6 billion in supplementary benefits each year 
being concerned that it goes only to those entitled. And, given the 
size of the undertaking, fraud and abuse are bound to occur - just 
as a degree of shoplifting is anticipated by any large 
department store. But the ways in which they are controlled needs 
examining. ' (Smith, 1985: 113) 
The righteous moral indignation and contempt for the culpable poor 
which characterise the effort school's comments about benefit claimants 
are absent here. The social justice perspective shifts attention from 
the 'undeserving' poor to the activities of those who regulate their 
behaviour. This shift also focusses attention on government policy 
which shapes investigatory practice, and in this way invokes critical 
comparisons with policies directed towards tax fraud: 
'Government policy towards the administration of the tax and 
social security systems is socially divisive. While it continues to 
give great emphasis to tackling alleged abuses of social security, 
the government consistently refuses to make extra resources 
available to tackle tax fraud. ' (T. U. C., 1983: 3) 
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To the social justice commentators differential response is a problem, 
and, according to I. R. S. F. General Secretary Tony Christopher, 
represents 'a duality of standards no civilised society could defend' 
(World in Action: Rich Law, Poor Law, 7.2.83). 
The trades union movement has consistently attempted to inform 
public discourses on tax and supplementary benefit fraud (I. R. S. F., 
1981; T. U. C., 1983; C. P. S. A., 1984). They have attempted to deconstruct 
the scrounger mythology and at the same time indicate the unequal 
responses to tax and benefit fraud in terms of social policy, 
departmental manpower and societal reaction. These aims have also been 
shared by other interest groups and by academic commentators (see for 
instance C. P. A. G., 1985; Franey, 1983; Scraton and South, 1984; Golding 
and Middleton, 1982; Levi, 1987). But this task has presented several 
problems. 
First, despite notable 'leaks' (such as the Fraud Investigators' 
Guide, F. I. G. 1983), information concerning the operational gudelines 
and methods of investigation used to regulate benefit fraud emanates 
from Ministerial statements. It could therefore be argued that the 
secrecy surrounding the policing of benefit fraud concentrates the 
power to define the fraud agenda in the hands of the D. H. S. S. primary 
definers (Hall et. al., 1978). This argument may help to explain why 
public knowledge on benefit fraud reflects the political priorities of 
'scapegoating' the scroungers (Golding and Middleton, 1982). However, 
it fails to explain the lack of similarly consistent organised public 
resentment against the similarly hidden activity of tax fraud. 
Second, when advocates of social justice broaden the issue of 
'scrounging' into a problem of structural social inequality, they 
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render the whole issue more complex. Public resentment largely depends 
on lack of ambiguity: tax frauds are complicated and not easily 
distinguished from 'shrewd business practice' in popular rhetoric. Tax 
offences are not easily translated into the public idiom (see (iii) 
below) whereas restricted opportunity structures (discussed in Chapter 
2(c)), mean that most benefit frauds are relatively crass and so may be 
presented unambiguously. However, media preferences for clarity cannot 
alone explain the relative neglect of the problems of tax fraud and 
differential response. 
Third, 'commonsense' knowledge is not unified and immutable. The 
problems of tax and benefit fraud can be represented from a variety of 
perspectives. But social justice commentators are faced with the 
problem of reconciling basic contradictions which have historically 
undermined British committment to the welfare state (Deakin, 1987), and 
which are evident in the contradictory goals of 'economic growth' and 
'social justice' (see Chapter 1(3)). 
Fourth, in drawing attention to differential responses to tax and 
benefit fraud the social justice school of thought is faced with the 
task of combatting powerful 'commonsense' notions of whose money is 
being fiddled. It is far easier to represent the tax evader as merely 
keeping his/her own money, than it is to represent them as taking money 
from the state (and fellow taxpayers). It is also a simple to represent 
those who are already seen as takers (benefit claimants) as taking 
money from the hard-pressed taxpayer. The differing relations between 
taxpayer and the state, and benefit claimant and the state are 
constructed within a particular material, historical and ideological 
context (see 3(b) below and Chapter 6). Once the nature of these 
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relationships has been 'naturalised' it becomes difficult (save in an 
emergency, such as war), to deconstruct the vocabularies of 'givers' 
and 'takers' which become incorporatod into public discourse as 
'commonsense'. But the thesis aims to begin the task of deconstruction 
of such commonsense knowledge so as to reconstitute the 'problem' of 
tax and supplementary benefit fraud. 
(iU Media processes and products. 
Public knowledge of tax and supplementary benefit fraud is, in the 
absence of direct personal experience, likely to be shaped by images 
and vocabularies supplied by the mass media (Wilkins, 1964). Although 
the national press is an infamous source of scroungermania (Golding and 
Middleton, 1982; Franey, 1983), television also reproduces similar 
imagery. Arguably, this is because 
'Information is controlled and routinely organized to fit within a 
set of assumptions about how the world works and how it ought to 
work. ' (Glasgow University Media Group, 1982: 143) 
Thus, according to the Glasgow University Media Group, press and 
television coverage reflect consensual ideas about 'how the world 
works' in relation to issues like unemployment, taxation, the welfare 
state and the institution of the family (ibid). But, as already 
indicated, vocabularies about work, idleness, tax, welfare, morality, 
thrift, dependency, inequality, 'fiddling' and 'scrounging' are 
differentially invoked, depending on particular material and 
ideological preconditions. For instance, the domestic ideologies about 
'woman's proper place' may be reversed when economic conditions (for 
instance, economic boom or wartime), require their services as a 
reserve army of labour (Braybon, 1982). In the same way the rhetoric 
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of ' incentives' may be suspended in favour of 'fair shares' following 
the leveling experiences of total war. 
It cannot therefore be assumed that the construction of a consensus 
about tax and welfare is a simple process. In addition to 'fitting' 
stc, ries into a picture of the world which is by no means constant, 
journalists also fit stories within a set of assumptions about how 
their Jab works (Ericson et. al., 1987). In practice the discourses 
which result may show remarkable congruence as, for instance, reporters 
from 'quality' national newspapers agree with the commonly held view 
that social security is a baring subject: 
'I mean, who can understand it for a start?... It's to do with 
money. It's not picturesque, unlike health - patients, wards, that 
sort of thing. Cuts in social security are complex and difficult to 
portray, there are no picturesque images. ' 
(Guardian journalist, quoted in Golding and Middleton, 1982: 127) 
This belief, that social security is not a 'sexy' subject, means 
that fascination or compulsion have to be introduced into stories, 
usually by the technique of personalisation. This technique can be used 
in a variety of ways: far instance, in a story entitled 'A Life of 
Luxury on the Scrounge' (The limes, 21.1.85), a reader bemoans that her 
21 year-old daughter (who lives with a middle-aged man), has 'never 
done a day's paid work in her life'. Personalisation is effected 
through assumed identification with the respectable mother who talks of 
her social embarassment and personal disappointment at her daughter's 
failure (or, 'lack of ambition'). Other elements are borrowed from the 
scrounger mythology, despite the fact that no fraud has been committed. 
The only crimes these 'scroungers' have committed are that they have 
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'chosen to live off government allowances' and that they are living 
happily: 
'A comfortable faintly bohemian lifestyle - wholesome food, home- 
made wine, the odd cigarette - these two are happliy content to 
rest among the statistics of the registered unemployed. ' (ibid) 
This story clearly indicates the powerful ideology of the work ethic: 
in rejecting this ethic, the couple are labelled 'scroungers' and 
should thus be subjected to state regulation and punishment. The mother 
also demonstrates her frustration that the principles of less eligibity 
do not apply rigorously enough to her daughter - the couple own a 
colour television, a car and a motorcycle! 
This story also includes another important element of 
personalisation - the claimant's failure to adhere to the ideal of the 
nuclear family style is in itself implicitly criticised. Media 
attention often reinforces the familial ideal through its castigation 
(or gross stereotyping) of alternatives. But the desire to maintain the 
ideal-type family is essentially political, and has assumed a renewed 
importance in New Right ideology (Levitas, 1986; Fitzgerald, 1983). 
Lone parent families are, in Minford's words, 'to be discouraged' 
(Minford, 1987). They are thus presented as culpably deviant 
scroungers: 
'Single parents have made their case so well that they have 
expanded their subsidies from the public purse from some L15 
million in 1960 to tl billion in 1983... Low paid members of 
normal families are taxed at standard rate to subsidise not only 
those forced to be one-parent families by misfortune, but also to 
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subsidise those who have specifically chosen to be one-parent 
families. ' (Boyson, Guardian, 10.10.86) 
These comments, made at the 1986 Conservative party conference, 
appeared under the heading 'Boyson condemns "evil" singlig parents'. 
However, the picture which appeared immediately above this story 
showed, ironically, Cecil Parkinson, (responsible for one such 'evil' 
family) and his wife at the conference. 
It is significant that the issues of taxation and welfare are 
linked through the notion of taxpayers subsidising deviant families. An 
alternative agenda may have drawn attention to poorer taxpayers 
subsidising those richer couples who live 'in sin' as a means of 
claiming double mortgage interest tax relief. The 1988 Budget which 
removed this subsidy merely referred to it as an 'anomaly', or a 'tax 
on marriage' (Guardian, 16.3.88). Such discourses fail to invoke 
against the rich the same vocabulary of 'subsidy' or of righteous moral 
indignation which is regularly invoked against the poor. Public 
knowledge is therefore created through differential use of discourses 
on both morality and economics. In relation to economic vocabularies, 
these financial transfers (described above), are represented as 
taxpayers 'subsidies' for the undeserving poor, but are represented as 
tax 'allowances' for the rich. 
Personalisation serves to render otherwise-boring social security 
stories 'sexy', this term being used to describe a high degree of 
fascination. Examples of this process are also found in local press 
coverage of benefit fraud, as evident in a story entitled 'Life on the 
Scrounge' which followed the court proceedings in which a couple were 
jailed for a £50,000 supplementary benefit fraud. Coverage relied not 
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upon the court proceedings (as both pleaded gulity), but an the 
comments of neighbours: 
'Neighbours spoke today of the spend, spend, spend life-style of a 
Wolverhampton couple who fiddled £50,000 in social security 
handouts. Kathleen Smyth and her husband Tom were always rolling 
in money... Kathleen Smyth known as the "tatooed lady" admitted 
12 charges... While they were enjoying the good life Smyth, a 
19 stone mother of six, drank much of the cash away in pubs and 
her husband bet heavily on horses. ' (Express and Star, 15.2.85) 
This coverage include:. all the necessary ingredients of a scrounger 
story: massive amounts of cash, local gossip and disapproval, a 
'sponging' lifestyle, heavy drinking, and gambling. The language is 
typical of similar stories which form an important source of local and 
national knowledge about benefit fraud. Here benefit payments are 
termed 'handouts' and the depravity of the fraudsters is evidenced in 
drinking, gambling and the recklessness associated with the 'spend, 
spend, spend' spree of pools winner Viv Nicholson. In addition there is 
an insidious sexualisation of this particular story whereby the woman's 
name appears foremost (and hence attracts unusual prominence). This 
paves the way for a circus-like titillating expose of her failure to 
conform to gender expectations concerning self-presentation, propriety 
and femininity. The woman's love for her six children is not doubted, 
but the moralising tone of the story suggests that good mothers (and 
nice women), do not get drunk, have tatoos or engage in economic crime. 
This story is a typical one in its focus on aspects which construct 
the offence or the offender as 'a-typical' (Cohen and Young, 1973). 
This technique makes the story 'sexy', but 'by scorning the commonplace 
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as dull and unnewsworthy, the routine of life's pattern is rendered 
invisible' (Golding and Middleton, 1982: 128). For supplementary benefit 
fraudsters life's pattern is characterised by poverty and degradation, 
but this is absent in popular discourses on the 'problem' of 
scrounging. Yet, as discussed below (Chapter 4 (2b). these 'invisible' 
material conditions form the most important self-justification which 
benefit fraudsters offer for their actions. 
Popular knowledge of tax and benefit fraud is constructed within 
ideological boundaries. Although shifts are possible (see Chapter 6), 
these boundaries encompass 'commonsense' ideas concerning the work 
ethic, hostility to taxation, economic success and failure. Politicians 
are important primary definers of such ideas; 
'I was unemployed with debts of £400,000. I know what unemployment 
is like - and alot of it is getting off your backside and finding 
yourself a job. ' (Jeffrey Archer, quoted in Guardian, 7.10.85) 
Archer goes on to describe the large group within the unemployed 'who 
find it convenient to collect every single benefit God can give' 
(ibid). The views expressed by Archer and by Norman Tebbit (telling 
the unemployed to 'get on their bikes'), support the imagery of the 
idle, undeserving poor (discussed above in Chapter 2(a)). Public 
knowledge is currently being shaped by official discourse stressing 
'genuine' availability for work, to be established by Restart 
interviews, Job Club attendance and other work-tests (see Chapter 6). 
The conflation of issues of 'availability' and 'scrounging' serves to 
cast unemployed people as by definition scroungers. 
In summary, it has been argued that the journalist's adherence to 
'news values' thus skews media attention towards the exceptional, but 
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the problem is that the skew is towards 'certain marginal areas (social 
security abuse), and not others (.. tax fiddles)' (Golding and 
Middleton, 1982: 129). Journalists justify this unequal emphasis on the 
grounds that 'Mr Average' feels social security fraud is more 
important, yet resarch on attitudes indicates that public perceptions 
of right and wrong in public life are not so simplistic: 
'if people break the law to help their children, we may judge 
matters more leniently... If prominent or socially distant persons 
and organizations are perceived as breaking rules, judgements may 
be relatively strict. ' (Jowell and Witherspoon, 1985: 137) 
The issue of social distance therefore becomes an important factor in 
explaining differential response by journalists (and judiciary) to tax 
and supplementary benefit fraud. This is particularly relevant if the 
tax fiddles of journalists themselves (see Chapter 4(a)) are also 
considered). It could therefore be argued that Mr Average is likely to 
feel that tax frauds committed by the better-off are more 
reprehensible than benefit frauds committed by the poor, but that s/he 
is less likely to be told about them. The problem is that media 
coverage, with skewed assumptions about clarity, importance and 
'sexiness', feeds Mr Average with the stories it thinks s/he wants. Tax 
fraud stories will only gain prominence if they have other compelling 
aspects, as in the case of 'housewife's choice' Jockey Lester Piggott. 
The public are thus routinely denied the knowledge upon which to 
adequately assess the problem of tax fraud. Therefore media stories, 
and the official discourses they often reproduce, effectively foreclose 
on alternative discourses, for instance about the problem of 
differential response to tax and supplementary benefit fraud. 
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(b)DEFINING THE PROBLEX: IN THEORY. 
Commonsense knowledge of the problem of different-. al treatment of tax 
and supplementary benefit fraud is grounded in a complex set of 
assumptions concerning the essential nature of taxation and welfare in 
modern society. Complexity arises because the differential histories of tax 
and welfare, (referred to above), have produced contradictory principles 
which underlie current welfare and taxation policy. These principles, 
although antagonistic, are by no means mutually exclusive: existing ideas 
and social philosophies are never simply replaced by new and alternative 
ones, but rather they are challenged, incorporated and have an effect upon 
subsequent discourses. In the case of ideas relating to the welfare state, 
for instance, principles emanating from the 1834 Poor Law are still 
evident in the emphasis upon the work-test and less eligibility in 
1980's welfare provision. 
The following discussion will therefore seek to identify those 
contradictory principles which inform our current understanding of the 
role of the state in two interlocking areas: first in the collection of 
revenue from its citizens in order to finance the various acivities of the 
modern state, and second in the provision of welfare services f= those 
citizens. Having identified these principles in theory, they will then be 
specifically related to the problem of differential response by empirical 
examples. The theoretical approach adopted will be to assume that 
responses to tax fraud cannot be reduced to a single explanation, (for 
instance, to the operation of free market ideology) any more than 
responses to welfare benefit fraud can be reduced to the determinism of 
purely economic relations. The examples given will demonstrate that 
similar justifications are often offered for both forms of fraud and that 
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investigators from both departments may use similar rationales for their 
regulatory activities. But although similar discourses are invoked, they 
are attributed different meanings and attract different kinds of judicial 
and societal reaction. Chapters 4 and 5 will indicate how this happens 
through analyses of the pract_ces of fraudsters and investigators. The 
analysis in effect involves examining the ideological conditions under 
which differential response to tax and supplementary benefit fraud takes 
place. 
At the same time it is also necessary to identify the political and 
economic preconditions for differential responses to tax and benefit fraud. 
These preconditions derive from the contradictory nature of political, 
economic and philosophical principles which form the basis of our 
understanding of personal taxation and the Welfare State. (These 
contradictory (and sometimes complementary) principles are summarised at 
the end of the Chapter in Table 3: 1). 
The State 
" At the heart of the problem of differential response lies a 
fundamental contradiction between Liberal and Democratic conceptions of 
the state. Philosophically the 'ethos of liberalism and ethos of democracy 
are antithetical'(George and Wilding, 1984: 238). Liberalism involves a 
minimalist state only intervening in the affairs of its citizens to 
preserve law, order and justice. By contrast the democratic state implies 
positive state intervention to reduce the social inequalities which may 
affect the citizens ability effectively to exercise his/her democratic 
rights. According to Marxist commentators such as O'Connor (1973) the 
contradiction between liberal and democratic conceptions of the state is 
itself an indication of fundamental contradictions within capitalism. 
iss 
Capitalism is inherently an unstable economic system, being characterised 
by periods of boom and slump. Throughout such periods the state must 
fulfil two contradictory functions of legitimation and accumulation. The 
former involves the maintenance of the consent of citizens who perceive 
the social and economic system as free and fair. The latter involves the 
creation of conditions under which private capital remains profitable. 
According to O'Connor, welfare capitalism cannot raise sufficient revenue 
in taxes to provide the services that will ensure its survival through 
popular consent, and at the same time cannot support private capital tm 
far without losing legitimacy (Mishra, 1984; George and Wilding, 1984). 
The tensions created by these two antagonistic functions of the 
modern welfare state are the tensions which enable entirely contradictory 
discourses on taxation and welfare to take place. For instance, free market 
ideology, based upon the principles of liberalism, enables the individual 
to justify evasion of tax on the grounds of a reaction against excessive 
state regulation in the free market, and the consequent stifling of 
enterprise. As will be argued in Chapter 4, these justifications of the 
'intolerable inquisition' which tax is seen to represent and the emphasis 
on entrepeneurial spirit and 'sporting' view of tax evasion all contribute 
to representations of tax evasion as socially acceptable and even quasi- 
legal. But the same representations do not result from similar 
entrepeneurial spirit when demonstrated by supplementary benefit claimants 
who 'work on the side', despite the fact that these fraudsters' economic 
motives are the same. Also, excessive state regulation is not perceived as 
an aspect of claimants' lives which would justify their fiddling, although 
it appears to excuse the fiddles of the small businessman. 
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Ideology 
Democratic ideology involves notions of social justice which serve to 
contradict liberal principles when applied to the role of state taxation. 
For instance, liberalism advocates minimal state intervention and 
implicitly minimal taxation. Yet even New Right governments espousing the 
virtues of liberalism (such as the Thatcher government), are forced to 
invoke democratic ideology when demanded by the needs of the economy: in 
the current economic recession this government is increasingly pursuing 
the tax evader and invoking notions of good citizenship in attempting to 
ensure compliance to the Taxes Acts. This is almost certainly the result 
of economic imperatives, yet demonstrates the complexity of discourses 
surrounding the inextricably linked issues of taxation and welfare. This 
example also serves to indicate that it is not possible to simply read-off 
explanations for differential response to tax and benefit fraud from a 
straightforward class analysis. Although it is tempting to concur that 
there is one law for the rich and another for the poor, this analysis is 
too simplistic. It fails to account for the complexity of the discourses 
surrounding tax and welfare, and fails to account for the fact that these 
discourses shift over time according to specific material conditions (see 
Chapters 2(a) and 6). 
It may be true, as Wolfe argues, that the problem of tension between 
free market and social justice ideologies is in essence the location of 
class struggle (George and Wilding, 1984). It is equally evident that in 
Britain in the 1980's this struggle is centred upon the issues of the 
welfare state consensus (or lack of it), and the aims of current taxation 
policy. Taxation may be perceived as distributive or as a means of 
maintaining incentives according to social justice and free market 
197 
ideologies respectively. In a similar vein, welfare benefits may be seen as 
a redistribution of income from rich to poor, or as a subsistence level 
provision to maintain work incentives and thrift. But these perspectives 
are by no means determined by either class position or adherence to a 
single set of political principles, nor are they mutually exclusive 
(Taylor-Gooby, 1985). For example, adherents to the democratic principle in 
relation to redistributive taxation may argue that they do not pay their 
taxes in order for benefit claimants to fiddle the system and so 
illegally maximise their rewards. Furthermore, many taxpayers I 
interviewed expressed concern at the lack of work incentives which they 
saw as emanating from a bureaucratic and 'soft' welfare state. Even those 
who appeared to pay their taxes willingly seemed to be imbued with 
nations of incentives which owed much to free market ideology. Their 
attitudes towards supplementary benefit claimants were also influenced by 
the individualism and free market ideology which together enabled them to 
perceive the poor as being (to some extent) culpable - for allegedly 
lacking in the personal qualities of enterprise and effort needed to 
succeed in work. 
Imagery 
At the same time the poor are frequently represented as bing at 
fault in their familial relationships. As will be seen in Chapter 4, lone 
parents and large families in particular are often regarded as to blame 
for a variety of social ills, ranging from promiscuity and divorce to 
crime and delinquency. This, coupled with political critiques of a 
'cosseting' welfare state, has led to negative stereotyping of benefit 
claimants and ultimately to the scrounger mythology, a mythology deeply 
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permeated by conceptions of the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor 
(Boyson, 1978; Golding and Middleton, 1982). 
Social policy 
At a less obvious level a shift has taken place in the emphasis of 
social policy towards the poor since the later 1970's. A long standing 
debate between advocates of universalism and of selectivity in welfare 
benefits has all but been won by the selectivists. Once more it will be 
argued in this thesis that economic recession is at the root of a trend 
towards increasing targetting of benefits according to a demonstrable 
'need', established through rigorous meaner testing. The universalist 
principle of 'rights' to benefits has dissipated in the face of economic 
imperatives and the political rediscovery of individualism in the 
economics of monetarism and the political philosophy of the New Right. 
Simultaneously an emphasis on the role of the entrepeneur in national 
wealth creation, and a desire to privatise the production of goods and 
services has had an impact on taxation policy. De-regulation, rolling back 
the frontiers of the state and encouraging enterprise are the antithesis 
of redistributive taxation and the notion of paying tax as a civic duty. 
It is at this point that the contradiction between liberal and 
democratic ideology surfaces as of vital importance in an understanding of 
attitudes to both tax and welfare. The welfare state consensus is 
undermined both by policies which seek to reduce the taxation which 
enables the financing of the welfare state and also by policies which 
advocate social market principles. As O'Connor indicated, the state's role 
in accumulation and legitimation are fundamentally at odds, and it is in 
the arena of welfare and taxation that this struggle is currently taking 
place. Differential responses to tax and supplementary benefit fraud are 
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therefore an important aspect of this struggle: through an understanding 
of the individual's motives for fraud, the investigation and punishment of 
fraudsters and the public representation of those who fiddle tax and 
benefits, it is possible to trace political, economic and ideological shifts 
which influence policy on welfare and tax generally, and fraud 
specifically. 
The first part of this Chapter examined how everyday 'commonsense' 
knowledge about tax and supplementary benefit fraud was constructed. In 
addition to official discourses on taxation and welfare, the examination 
also focussed an the different vocabularies used by interest groups, who 
approach the issues of tax and welfare (broadly) from the perspective of 
social justice or the promotion of 'effort'. Official discourse and the 
social justice and effort vocabularies have effects upon how popular 
knowledge is created by the mass media. Media personnel use these 
vocabularies selectively as they interpret and translate tax and welfare 
issues. 
Journalists and other media personnel are subject to a variety of 
organizational constraints and hold work-based values which also influence 
the construction of knowledge about tax and benefit fraudsters. For 
example, the perceived public 'demand' for unambiguous, simple and 
personalised stories allegedly renders benefit fraud stories more popular 
with writers and readers. But the media are not merely reproducers of 
'what the public want', rather they are producers of knowledge which the 
public does not 'already' have. The production of news and ideas is 
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therefore a complex process, involving both external (contextual) 
influencing factors and iiternal (organizational) processes: 
'Information does not lie around like pebbles on the sand, waiting 
to be picked up and turned into knowledge. Knowledge is 
interpretation in context, and all work of journalists involves 
interpretation in context as they transform the specialized and 
bureaucratic knowledge of sources into the common sense. What 
is required to do this is itself common sense, knowledge that 
seems natural, practical, simple, immethodical and accessible. The 
reporter seeks to ii uminate, not to search; to borrow not to 
burrow. His is the power of news transformation, constructing as 
part of the common sense what most people do not know otherwise. 
(Ericson et. al., 1987: 346) 
The thesis will examine how certain discourses about tax fraud and 
its regulation are accepted as 'natural, practical and acceptable', whereas 
alternative discourses are not. At the same time, it is necessary to 
examine why the vocabularies of motive successfully offered by tax 
fraudsters (for instance, the desire to create wealth, or the belief that 
'everyone is on the fiddle'), are not successful when invoked by benefit 
fraudsters. This examination thus involves analyses of why some discourses 
triumph and others fail, and why certain justificatory rhetorics are 
differentially attributed to tax and supplementary benefit fraud. 
The second part of this Chapter outlined ideological and political 
contradictions and inconsistencies which have enabled the paradox of 
differential response to tax and benefit fraud. The analysis of these 
contradictions provides the conceptual framework within which to analyse 
the empirical reality of differential response (Chapters 4 and 6). The 
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precise economic and political conditions which enable certain 
combinations of beliefs, (derived from both liberal and democratic 
ideologies), to dominate public rhetoric and social policy at certain 
historical points in time, will be discussed in Chapter 6. In this way the 
commonsense problem of differential treatment will be deconstructed and 
its constituents, in terms of social, economic, political and ideological 
preconditions, will be analysed. Thereafter it will be possible to 
reconstitute the problem in theoretical terms, allowing for the 
complexities and contradictions referred to above, and also allowing 
theoretical 'space' for the changes which have taken place - both in social 
policy and in attitudes in relation to tax and welfare. 
In conclusion, the important themes raised in this Chapter, and which 
will inform the analyses of the thesis are summarised in Table 3 below. 
CONCEPTIONS OF Liberal v Democratic 
THE STATE minimalist interventionist 
FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE Accumulation v Legitimation 
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY Individualism v Collectivism 
IDEOLOGY Free market v Social Justice 
WELFARE POLICY EMPHASIS Selectivism v Universalism 
means testing citizenship 
'needs' 'rights' 
IMAGERY, FOCUS ON Entrepreneurial v Social inequality 
wealth creators Poverty 
'scroungers' v 'deserving poor' 
'undeserving' poor 
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This chapter will examine in detail the techniques employed by both 
tax and supplementary benefit fraudsters to gain financial advantage 
illegally from the state. Their actions will then be analysed in terms of 
the fraudsters' own perceptions of their motives, and the justifications 
they themselves offer for defrauding the public purse. 
Initially it is necessary to describe the practices of the fraudsters 
in order to understand what precisely the commission of tax and benefit 
fraud involves. Thereafter it may be possible to summarise common themes 
within the overall categories of tax fraud and supplementary benefit fraud 
respectively. 
In the process of the research itself it became apparent that it was 
extremely difficult to separate the fraudsters' descriptions of their 
actions from the justifications which they offered for these actions. The 
practices of tax evasion and benefit fraud were thus inextricably linked 
with the material conditions under which the frauds took place and the 
perceptions and rationales of those committing the frauds. But some degree 
of separation is necessary in the analysis of the techniques employed and 
justifications offered, in order to disentangle and reconstitute the 
problem' of tax and benefit fraud. What follows, therefore, will separate 
these elements under the following headings for ease of presentation and 
understanding: - 
(1)TAX FRAUDSTERS: (a) Techniques. (b) Justifications. 
(2)SUPPLEXEKTARY BENEFIT FRAUDSTERS: (a) Techniques. (b) Justifications. 
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(1)TAX FRAUDSTERS 
(a)TECHNIQUES. 
The opportunity to evade tax is to some extent determined by an 
individual's employment status and consequent mode of paying personal tax. 
As argued above (Chapter 2 (c)), the Pay As You Earn (P. A. Y. E. ) taxpayer 
has his/her tax deducted prior to receiving wages or salary and this 
inevitably places limits upon their opportunities to fiddle. By contrast. 
the self-employed(Schedule D) taxpayer is required to complete accounts at 
the end of each financial year in which his/her profits are declared, 
together with a claim for allowances and expenses which are offset against 
declared profits to reach the appropriate figure of tax liability for that 
year. Clearly there is far greater scope for tax evasion as a Schedule D 
taxpayer than for the majority of P. A. Y. E. taxpayers whose tax is deducted 
at source. As will be seen below, the Schedule D taxpayer may fail to 
declare profits fully, may overclaim allowances or expenses or do jobs 'on 
the side' in the black economy if s/he has appropriate skills. 
The extent of such irregularities in the accounts of the trading 
taxpayer is evident in the Board of Inland Revenues Annual Report. In 
1985 it was stated that only 1.48% of traders accounts for that year were 
examined in depth, but that 90% of those examined had understated profits. 
Furthermore, in 37% of these cases financial penalties were imposed, 
implying the existence of 'wilful default' or negligence (see chapter 5(3)) 
(Inland Revenue, 1985). It could therefore be argued, on the basis of this 
examination of accounts, that the majority of trading taxpayers seem to 
be evading tax. However, it would be wrong to push the P. A. Y. E. /Schedule D 
distinction too far in alone explaining the extent and distribution of tax 
fraud. There is a good deal of overlap between the techniques of these 
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fraudsters when one considers their activities in the black economy in 
general. 
As mentioned above (Chapter 1 (2a)), the black economy is a term used 
to describe 'the sum total of all the various methods of tax evasion. '(rmnd 
8822,1983). From the Inland Revenue's standpoint the black economy 
consists primarily of 'ghosts' and 'moonlighters'. Ghosts are people who 
are working but remain unknown to the Revenue: moonlighters are known to 
the Revenue in one area of economic activity, but also engage in other 
business (unknown) in addition (Inland Revenue, 1985). Identifying such 
people is a difficult task involving a variety of investigative techniques 
(which will be discussed in Chapter 5 (1) below). But it is worth noting 
that moonlighters may include both P. A. Y. E. taxpayers who, for instance, do 
evening work in bars, and the self-employed builder who, for instance, 
builds an extension in his 'free time' at evenings and week-ends. The black 
economy therefore includes a wide variety of activities, skills and forms 
of enterprise, all of which are hidden for the purposes of tax and V. A. T. 
It is not easy to impose a structured analytical framework upon such 
diverse and varied activities as serving behind a bar, installing central 
heating, driving taxis and architects 'doing a foreigner' by drawing up 
plans (for a small fee and tax free), for their acquaintances. What follows 
will therefore look at techniques of fiddling tax within the boundaries of 
an individual's skill or occupational category, broadly summarised as 
follows: - 
(i)The building trade. 
(ii>The 'one man band' and sma11 commercial traders. 
(iii)Auction and street market traders. 
(iv)Highly paid employees, Directors and the Professionals. 
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(i)The Building Trade 
The building trade became a key focus of concern in the 1970's with 
much publicity, and subsequently investigative effort, centred upon its 
systems of payment, in particular the evasion of tax by sub-contractors 
known as 'the lump'. In an effort to combat what appeared to be widespraad 
abuse, tax deduction certificates, called "714's , were issued to sub- 
contractors who were registered with the Inland Revenue (under S29-31 of 
the Finance Act 1971). As a result, nowadays, if a sub-contractor does not 
produce a 714 certificate then a main contractor must deduct tax at the 
current rate (presently 27% for the year 1987/8) from his payment, and 
pass the tax on to the Inland Revenue. If the sub-contractor does have a 
714, he can be paid in full and the transaction is recorded on an official 
voucher. Despite attemptsýto combat continued abuse, (for instance by the 
requirement under S69-71 of the Finance Act No. 2 1975 for a photograph 
of the holder to appear on the 714 certificate), there remains a 'black 
market' both in the 714 'credit cards' and accompanying vouchers (Inland 
Revenue, 1986). According to the Revenue, 'The tax known to have been 
evaded on such cases completed during the-year ended 30th September 1985 
amounted to t35 million' (ibid: 5). But despite the massive amounts 
involved, most sub-contractor investigations 'are focussed on the "mean 
streets"of labourers' doss houses, or squalid hostels'(ibid). 
Once registered as a self-employed, 'bona fide' sub-contractor, many 
individuals nonetheless go on to engage in seemingly lesser fiddles within 
the black economy. One such self-employed builder I interviewed was Bill 
(see Appendix 1 for biographical details). He emphasised the distinction 
between those jobs which did, and those which did 'go through the IkQt 
books'. Jobs which dU go through the books included V. A. T. (where 
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applicable) in all the estimates he gave, and information concerning 
these jobs was passed on to his acc3untant for inclusion in the end of 
year accounts. Jobs which did n+, go through the books were usually done 
(during the evenings or at week-ends) for friends or as 'a favour' and did 
not include V. A. T. and were no"; reported to the accountant. Payment for 
this type of jab was invariably in cash, thus avoiding the payment of 
cheques into his bank account and the resulting attention of the 
accountant and tax inspector. 
Bill also stressed that his skills often enabled him to complete small 
jobs with very little outlay, in t(. rms of materials, and without the 
bureaucratic 'red tape' of recording procedures. For example, 
'Pointing up a wall or lowering a chimney only needs 
a bag of cement, a trowel, a ladder and a hammer. ' (Bill) 
But even when red tape, (in the form of building regulations or 
planning permission) was involved, Bill was prepared to do the jab 'on the 
side' so long as the customer realised it would take longer and involve 
evening and week-end work. In this way such jobs were seen to serve the 
interests of the customer who paid less, and the builder, who had a little 
'insurance' against problems (such as bad weather or monies owing), 
deriving from his 'through the books' work (such justifications for 
working in the black economy will be analysed in (b) below). 
For Bill such 'jobs on the side' do not form the lion's share of his 
income but, he argued, they ensure his financial survival by providing 
ready cash and a fairly constant stream of small jobs, (often with little 
financial outlay), in an uncertain trade. Bill does not consider his 
'foreigners' (jobs on the side) as in any way comparable to the activities 
of 'cowboys', whom he derided as both lacking in skill and accountability. 
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The stereotypical cowboy fiddle was well portrayed in Alan Bleasdale's 
play, 'Boys from the Blackstuff'. The cheap offers to tarmac a drive (using 
the ubiquitous lorry load 'left over' from a legitimate job), involve 
fiddling the main contractor in addition to the taxman. The difference 
between this sort of fiddle and those engaged in by Bill is essentially 
one of accountability. Bill's reputation as a good builder depended as much 
upon his week-end jobs as those officially accomplished 'through the 
books' in the official working week. The 'cowboys' who work primarily in 
the black economy are frequently only in a particular area fleetingly, have 
no reputation to maintain and are not therefore accountable to the 
consumer; they are virtually impossible to track down in the event of any 
complaint. Opportunities to fiddle are greatly increased by one-off 
transient transactions akin to a 'passing trade' (Mars, 1982: 138). 
The building trade offers an excellent entree into what has been 
referred to variously as the hidden, underground, informal or black 
economy (Henry, 1978; Gershury and Pahl, 1)80). The marketability of the 
skills involved and, frequently, the abscence of additional outlay for the 
fraudster (particularly if the customer buys his/her own materials for the 
job), enhance the advantages of the 'cash' economy. Henry argues that the 
hidden economy forms an 'everyday feature of ordinary people's lives' and, 
moreover, it is 
'the on-the-side illegal activity of "honest" people who have 
conventional jobs and would never admit to being dishonest. ' 
(Henry, 1978: 12) 
However, this view runs counter to the evidence provided to me by 
Bill. He is, (as are other participants in the black economy whom I have 
interviewed), acutely aware of the illegality and dishonesty of these 
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actions and yet rationalise them by utilising a complex set of 
justifications (see (b) below). 
(ii)Small Commercial Traders and the 'one man band' 
The activities of many sole traders in the black economy in many ways 
mirror those of the builder. For example, electricians, plumbers and 
carpenters who are registered as self-employed have similarly marketable 
skills which can literally be 'cashed in on' outside normal working hours. 
Often, though, such traders see their participation in the black economy in 
social rather than economic terms. One self-employed plumber, Fred, told 
me that such jobs were done 'as a favour' for acquaintances. The economic 
rationale is far more evident in the case of individuals who possess these 
skills and are employees. For instance, workers in the (so far) public 
service sectors of electricity and gas provision, regard 'jobs on the 
side' as a useful way of supplementing their earnings. As they are hardly 
in a position to 'advertise' their availability for such work, jobs are 
obtained through a grapevine of relatives and 'friends of friends'. A 
similar situation can be seen in respect of car mechanics. If they are 
self-employed, the social relationship appears to predominate, whereas if 
they are employees the cash nexus predominates in black economy relations. 
The techniques of evasion in areas of work discussed so far are 
similar: work is preformed on a cash basis and is not declared for tax 
purposes. Small commercial traders, though, may engage in other fiddles 
which ultimately serve to reduce their tax liabilty by dubious and illegal 
means. Gerry, for example, owned a small builder's merchants business from 
which he regularly pilfered materials for his own private use. Because he 
considered that the stock belonged to him, he undertook several expensive 
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considered that the stock belonged to him, he undertook several expensive 
conversions to home using materials -. hat were not paid for and were 
finally written off as 'losses' of the firm. In effect he had reduced the 
size of his firm's taxable profits through his pilferage and obtained 
goods free of V. A. T. He continued such actions perceiving them neither as 
theft nor as evasion of V. A. T., yet clearly 'crimes' had been committed. As 
Mars notes, 'theft is a "heavy" word' and the lighter, relatively neutral 
term 'fiddle' is probably closer to the fiddler's view of his own 
activities. Furthermore; 
'A businessman .... might describe his Expense allowance as a 
"perk". Viewed from the outside, it will, however, look like a 
"fiddle". And viewed from... - for example, the Inland Revenue - it 
will look more like tax evasion. ' (Mars, 1982: 166-7) 
These differences in terminology are crucial as they implicitly involve 
self-justifications for the fiddler/fraudster concerned. 
Another factor affecting the opportunity, (and possibly the desire) to 
fiddle tax is the scale of the business in question. One small-scale carpet 
retailer told me that he felt it was easier to fiddle when he was a 'one 
man band' operating from home. Once he had purchased retail premises, the 
high profile his business acquired led him to be more cautious. He argued 
that it would be stupid to understate profits when anyone could see that 
the shop was nearly always full of customers. To this extent he believed 
that visibility was a factor deterring tax fiddles of this kind. He added 
that if turnover was good there was 'no point' in fiddling anyway, clearly 
seeing tax evasion as motivated by financial hardship rather than greed. 
Although this is a debatable point, his belief that 'hidden' areas of trade 
and business are more fertile ground for potential fiddling does seem to 
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be borne out: for instance, Gerry's pilferage (and subsequently the firm's 
and the Inland Revenue's losses), was easier to enact in the covert area of 
a building supplier's yard. Similarly, a small sub-contractor like Bill could 
moonlight with relative impunity, but a larger contractor's busy premises 
or signs displayed upon his construction work would belie assertions that 
business was bad. This is not to say that all commercial traders are as 
content to pay their taxes, as the carpet retailer quoted above, but 
merely indicates that differential opportunities for fiddling depend not 
only upon the nature of the occupation but also on its scale and 
visibility. 
It could be argued that the nature of tax fiddles simply changes (as a 
result of the scale of the enterprise), from the crude to the 
sophisticated. Relatively straightforward moonlighting, (doing jobs 'on the 
side'), is replaced in larger firms by regularised milking of the firm's 
resources by its directors, or by systematic under-declaration of taxable 
profits (See (v) below for director's fiddles). 
(iii)Auction and street market traders 
So far this discussion has focussed on moonlighters, but another 
means of evading tax altogether is by ghosting. Ghosts, as the name 
implies, are shadowy individuals who are difficult to trace and are 
consequently invisible to the Revenue. Many day-to-day traders fit into 
this category: for example, individuals who set up market stalls on a one- 
off basis or who irregularly offer to fill the stalls of absent official 
traders. Although it may appear that the evasion of tax involved in such 
cases is small, vast sums may be at stake. An Inland Revenue senior 
official told me of one street trader whose earnings over the past seven 
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years had totalled £150,000 and whose tax bill, once this had been beccme 
known to the Revenue, was correspondingly substantial. 
The techniques involved in this form of fiddle centre on constan, ly 
moving, preserving anonymity, trading in cash with goods (enabling a quick 
turnover), and maintaining 'invisibilty' with regard to the Inland Revenue. 
These same techniques are applied to fiddles in the sphere of auctions. An 
individual may buy up household goods for auction in one area and then 
sell them at a profit in another. Similarly, household goods and furniture 
obtained through 'house clearances' may be sold at a profit. If the person 
concerned can pay in cash, then they can remain anonymous or 
alternativley, when buying at auction, they may use a false name. 
More recently, car auctions have provided a similar opportunity for 
ghost dealers to emerge. As invisibility is essential, such traders seek to 
avoid advertising cars or goods for sale in the classified columns of the 
local press in which, officially, they must include the word 'Trade' when 
placing adverts. Another trading situation proving lucrative for ghosts is 
the car boot sale, which fund-raisers often find an increasingly favoured 
alternative to auctions and jumble sales. For ghosts, the opportunity to 
buy in goods for resale at a profit, and to sell others, is attractive, 
cheap and offers the benefits of ease of mobility, cash trade and 
anonymity. As noted above, in relation to 'cowboy' builders, the existence 
of transient, cash-based commercial relationships particularly facilitate 
tax evasion. 
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(iv)The Hotel and Catering trade. 
'A recent survey by tax offices in one region found that hotel and 
catering staff in some larger well-known establishments received up 
to £7,500 a year in tips. The review yielded some £650,000 in tax 
and the lowest average agreed tips per full-time worker was £750 
per annum. ' (Lindsay Cook, Qi6irdlaa, 11.5.85). 
Ion-declaration of tips is the simplest and most common form of tax 
fiddle in the hotel and catering industry. By failing to declare tips, an 
employee is effectively receiving income without tax being deducted and is, 
therefore, guilty of evasion. However, this type of fiddling is rarely 
perceived by the recipients as being a criminal act - as in other fiddle- 
prone trades, the gains made are considered to be 'perks' or a means of 
making up for low 'official' wages (Mars, 1982: 152). In effect, fiddling 
taxes may serve to both facilitate and encourage low paying employers in 
an area of the economy which is highly vulnerable, casualised and 
relatively un-unionised; an area where, according to Mars, two-thirds of 
employees tend to be underpaid (ibid). 
Another form of fiddling which is prevalent in the hotel and catering 
industry is moonlighting. Employees working full or part-time elsewhere 
may top-up their official wages with tax-free earnings from working in 
bars, hotels, cafes and clubs. As one mechanic noted, moonlighting in the 
hotel trade has its advantages; 
'I'd get a tenner a night, and as many drinks as I wanted. By four 
in the morning I'd be paralytic and have some ready cash. ' 
(quoted in Rawnsley, Guardian, 27.12.85) 
Employers are not obliged to deduct tax unless an employee earns an 
amount in excess of the current single person's tax threshold, currently 
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L2,425 per annum (1987/8). However, they are required to satisfy 
themselves that the employee does imt have employment (or income from) 
elsewhere (Inland Revenue booklet P7,1983). If a part-time employee 
admits to having another job, a form P46 must be sent to the local tax 
office who will then note his/her tax records at the main employment and 
deduct P. A. Y. E. tax as appropriate (ibid). The employers guide to P. A. Y. E. 
clearly indicates that, 
'The employer should consult the tax office whenever he is in any 
doubt as to whether or not P. A. Y. E. should apply to a particular 
employee or group of employees. ' (ibid: 9 ) 
If an employer ignores this requirement, or simply does not 'ask any 
questions' regarding possible jobs elsewhere, he may be effectively 
colluding with moonlighting employees. Furthermore, some unscrupulous 
employers (often eager to capitalise on low wage rates and casualised 
labour), may suggest that an employee use a fictitious name so that, when 
entered on an end of year return of all employees, it is not traceable by 
the Revenue. 
Employers may therefore abrogate their responsibility to fully consult 
tax offices about employees with other jobs, and thereby fail to deduct 
P. A. Y. E. where mal earnings exceed the tax threshold for both. 
employments. This can also result form categorising an employment 'casual'. 
Casual employees do not have tax deducted unless their earnings exceed 
the tax threshold, and only a note of their name and address needs to be 
kept by the employer. As we have seen, these details may be falsified too. 
The employee, if moonlighting, will gain by this arrangement because tax 
is being evaded. The employer gains in two ways: first, he need not incur 
the administrative costs of operating P. A. Y. E. and second, he has the 
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advantage of having a cheap, disposable and vulnerable workforce. These 
fiddles are frequently evident in the hotel and catering industry which is 
characterised by unsocial hours, part-time and casual working and low wage 
levels. It must be remembered, however, that other market areas, (notably 
contract cleaners) may operate similar fiddles. 
The licensed trades are notable for 'triadic' fiddles, usually involving 
short-changing customers, over-charging or giving short measures 
(Mars, 1982); frequently the victim is, therefore, the customer. Some pubs 
may evade tax by, for instance, serving snacks or buffet meals as a 
'sideline' without declaring the resulting profits for tax or V. A. T.. One 
instance of this occured when I observed a landlady surreptitiously 
displaying a small cardboard sign to her regulars which read 'Don't ask 
for food today -VATMAN IN! '. However, scope for tax evasion is limited to 
some extent by the direct comparability of one pub with another either in 
proximity or scale. A tax inspector may therefore guage whether profits 
are being grossly under-estimated in relation to other similar licensed 
premises. Arguably, the notion of an acceptable fiddle is at work here both 
on the part of the evaders and the tax inspectors: as long as the 'crime' 
is not too large, too obvious or too 'cheeky', then it attracts little 
serious attention. A key technique in this type of fraud appears to be that 
of assessing the safe scope for fiddling tax; an equivalent technique for 
the moonlighter, as for the tip-receiving staff, is simply to collude 
happily with the employer, keep a low profile and take care not to get 
caught. 
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(v) Highly-paid employees. directors and the professionals. 
According to a confidential T. U. C. report on tax evasion and avoidance, 
'Higher income earners are generally better placed to take advantage of 
tax allowances, and therefore have more scope to avoid the payment of tax' 
(T. U. C., 1983). To assess this vie!, it is necessary to examine the 
'allowances' and expenses which may be paid to these employees, and the 
means by which they are declared to the Revenue. 
Employers are obliged to complete a form P. 1ID annually. This form 
gives details of 'all expenses, benefits and facilities' provided to highly- 
paid employees, directors and their families. These expenses, benefits and 
facilities currently include the following: cars available for private use, 
car fuel provided for private use, entertainment allowances, general 
expenses allowances, travelling and subsistence, subscriptions (to 
professional and learned societies, London and provincial clubs and leisure 
and sporting clubs), private medical and dental treatment (or cast of 
insurance against such treatment), educational assistance provided, goods 
and services provided free or below market value, work carried out at the 
employee's/director's home, personal or domestic staff, vouchers and credit 
cards, accommodation, cars, property or assetts given or transferred to 
the employee/director, telephone provision or 'any benefits or facilities of 
whatsoever nature not returned under any previous heading'! (Inland Revenue 
form P. 11D, 1985). In short, any assett or benefit-in-kind provided to an 
employee or director is taxable. Although penalties may be imposed on 
employers who delay completing these forms, or who make 'incorrect 
returns', considerable scope does exist for evasion as ultimately the 
Revenue trusts employers to declare fully all benefits paid out, and 
similarly trusts employees to declare fully all the benefits they receive. 
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Collusion between employer and employee can serve to conceal untaxed 
payments in a variety of forms. These may be considered 'perks' by the 
firms and employees concerned, but are in fact taxable sources of income. 
In the case of Gerry, he certainly received goods and services 'free or 
below market value', and furthermore a good deal of work was carried out 
by the firm's employees 'on the side'. Many highly paid employees make a 
habit of collecting restaurant receipts from their family and friends in 
order to obtain entertainment allowances from the firm. In addition to 
fiddling their employer (in one instance by using a receipt for a Saturday 
evening meal for ten friends as a 'business expense'), by claimin such 
entertainment allowances, these employees often fiddle their personal tax 
by not declaring these allowances on their tax returns. 
As the T. U. C. report (1983) indicated, there is indeed enormous scope 
for highly paid employees to fiddle their tax. This is a direct result of 
the higher social status their work is accorded and the consequently 
higher rewards and allowances that m. be provided to them by their 
employers. Employers who wish to retain and to 'motivate' their executive 
staff may well do so at the expense of the Inland Revenue. As Chapter 5 
will argue, the Revenue, in times of severe staffing cutbacks, has 
insufficient staff to examine forms P. 11D in any depth at all. As a result 
many abuses go unchecked, in every sense. 
In addition to the expenses and allowance fiddles already discussed, 
certain professions appear to be prone to specific fiddles which derive 
from the opportunity structures within the profession itself. For instance, 
a senior Revenue official told me of e recently publicised fiddle by 
Doctors who prepared appropriate certificates to enable cremations to take 
place. Doctors received a set fee for their signature on these 
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certificates, and frequently failed to declare these fees for tax. Known in 
the trade as 'ash cash' these payments are one example of the medical 
profession's contribution to the black economy. 
Other professions are equally fiddle-prone. Academics do not always 
declare fees for guest lectures, examination marking and occasional 
publications. However, the Revenue has begun to restrict such opportunities 
through regulations taxing such payments at source (as is the case for 
P. A. Y. E. generally). One architect I spoke to also engaged in professional 
moonlighting: he regularly drew up plans for extensions for friends, 
acquaintances and relatives. All payments for his services were in cash 
and were not declared for tax. Similarly Rawnsley refers to 
'local authority architects doing what they call "homers" for 
private clients whom the've met during the passage of planning 
applications. ' (Rawnsley, OjiardialL, 27.12.85) 
In this respect professionals, whether self-employed or not, may engage in 
moonlighting and 'jobs on the side' in exactly the same way as builders, 
plumbers, car mechanics, hairdressers, gardeners, electricians, caterers and 
bar staff. 
Alternatively the profession itself may offer insider knowledge which 
provides the basis for a fiddle. One such example concerns fiddles 
associated with deeds of covenant. This may at first appear only to 
involve avoidance of tax, but in a routinized and organized form may 
constitute evasion. The Boards Investigation Office has recently turned 
its attention to deed of covenant fraud amongst solicitors and accountants 
(see chapter 5(1)). This evasion technique exploits current regulations 
enabling individuals to arrange deeds of covenant, for a son, daughter, 
grandchild or close friend, through which they make an annual payment, 
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typically to a student entering higher education. As students are, 
typically, not liable to pay tax, the Revenue pays back to the student the 
tax which the covenanter is assumed to have deducted before payi"ig over 
the sum. So, for instance, if £1,000 p. a. is covenanted, the Revenue pays 
£270 (the basic rate of tax for 1987/8 being 27%), to the student who is 
assumed to have received £730 from his/her benefactor. In reality the deed 
of covenant offers a legitimate tax dodge for many parents of college 
students, who are able to supplement student grants with cash from the 
taxman. However, the system is open to abuse, as a Revenue investigator 
admitted: 
'Until recently this [deed of covenant fraud] has been largely 
disregarded but the scale of abuse, either through non-payment of 
the sums covenanted or through reciprocal arrangements in which 
families agree to covenant for each other's children and share the 
gain, has meant that it can no longer be ignored. ' 
(Board of Inland Revenue, Network, January 1986) 
As the result of an investigation into one such fraud, a senior partner in 
a large firm of accountants was successfully prosecuted <ibid). But clearly 
with Revenue staff already over-stretched, much of this type of fraud 
remains uninvestigated and undetected. Perhaps this accounts for reforms, 
announced in the 1988 Budget, which will effectively stop such fiddles by 
ending tax relief on all but charitable deeds of covenant (see Chapter 6 
for analysis of the 1988 Budget). 
Journalism is also an area of work with its own specific opportunity 
structure for fiddling expenses and tax. A journalist (working for a 
regional evening newspaper), explained to me that many fiddles centre on 
the freedom of many journalists, (particularly those working for the 
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national press>, to 'chase a story'. The chase can involve much travel: the 
journalist may find out the rail fare to a town 100 miles away, claim to 
have stayed overnight and so claim subsistence, add a few pounds for 
'entertainment' of the person being interviewed and tot up a sizeable 
expenses claim. In reality the journalist may never speak to the person 
involved tie. the story peters out), or may have already obtained 
sufficient information over the telephone. But, once more, there is a 
consensus regarding what level of fiddling is acceptable, and a good deal 
of silent collusion on the part of employers, as one Fleet Street 
journalist confirmed: 
'It is well known in journalism that "a good story deserves good 
expenses", and when I say it's well known, I mean well known by 
management as well as by staff. ' (Mars, 1982: 47) 
So long as fiddles remain in mutually acceptable bounds and part of a 
well-kept secret then they are 'safe' for all concerned. But the risks of 
exposure and detection increase if the perpetrators become too greedy or 
too cheeky. For instance, in 1979 the Revenue was unable to ignore 
moonlighting and ghosting Fleet Street workers being paid under the names 
of 'Mickey Mouse' and 'Donald Duck'. Yet, significantly, an 'amnesty' was 
offered by the Revenue to the fraudsters (Daily Telegraph 5.3.79): this was 
ostensibly to put an end to such fiddles, but showed a recognition on the 
part of the Revenue that they were unable to tackle the problem without 
seeking the compliance of the 'taxpayer'(see chapter 5(1)). 
Highly paid employees, directors and professionals have similar 
opportunities as other occupational groups to fiddle tax through 
moonlighting. But in addition they have further scope for tax evasion 
through fiddling allowances and benefits-in-kind, sometimes with either 
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the active connivance or quiet tolerance of their employers or, if self- 
employed, their accountants. 
A variety of techniques have been decribed whereby individuals can 
evade paying the full amount of tax chargeable on their income. As noted 
earlier, one factor which is crucial in determining the means of evasion 
is the mode of payment of that individual's tax: if tax is deducted through 
P. A. Y. E. then obviously the most appropriate techniques involve, for 
instance, moonlighting. If self-employed, then techniques involving the 
under-statement of profits and over-statement of allowances are 
additionally appropriate. 
In recent years the P. A. Y. E. taxpayer's opportunities to fiddle have 
been greatly restricted by changes in the adminstration of the Inland 
Revenue, changes which are collectively known as 'the Unification of 
P. A. Y. E. I. This term denotes a variety of procedural and legislative changes 
designed to simplify the assessment and collection of P. A. Y. E. by gradually 
removing 'allowances' which used to be off-set against a person's tax 
liability. This assessment was accomplished by a complex formula, 
eventually resulting in the computation of the appropriate tax 'code' 
number. This code was put into operation by employers who used it to 
calculate the correct amount of tax to be deducted from the person's 
wages/salary, in accordance with the tax code. But, as Unification of 
P. A. Y. E. has proceeded, many of the allowances which formed part of the 
calculation of a tax code have been abolished: for instance child 
allowances, life insurance relief and building society relief have all been 
abolished over the last decade. 
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As a result, P. A. Y. E. has been simplified by changes such as the direct 
payment of child benefit, life insurance premiums which incorporate tax 
relief and the M. I. R. A. S. scheme (Mortgage Interest Relief at Source). 
Similarly, in 1985 the 'Composite Rate Taxation Scheme' enabled banks and 
building societies to tax at source all interest they paid out (with the 
exception of certain low-interest accounts). Evasion of tax by individuals 
concealing the bank interest they received was effectively eliminated by 
this latest unification measure. Therefore several key variables involved 
in calculating an individual's tax liability have been eliminated and the 
personal taxation system considerably simplified. But, equally, this 
simplification has removed the P. A. Y. E. taxpayer's opportunities to fiddle 
through, for instance, false claims to child allowance and failing to 
declare bank interest. As one senior tax official noted, 
'If you look at Revenue prosecutions historically, the biggest 
proportion were for false claims to allowances. That was taken over 
for two reasons: firstly child allowances were abolished and 
secondly there were the lump prosecutions... ' (O. V. S., 1985) 
This comment signifies that although one door was closing for tax evasion, 
another was being opened. The abolition of child allowances clearly 
eliminated a prevalent form of fraud, but the expansion in the 
construction industry facilitated the sub-contractor (lump) fiddles which 
were so prevalent in the 1970's. 
It can therefore be argued, following the analysis above, that 
techniques used to defraud the Revenue are related to two sets of 
variables: 
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This part of the Chapter has also analysed the tax fiddles associated 
with particular occupational groups, whose techniques can be broadly 
summarised as follows; 
1) Moonlighting: concealed additional earnings. 
2) Ghosting; failure to pay any tax at all, being invisible to the Revenue. 
3) Sub-Contractor Fraud and fiddles aciated with the construction 
indIL-Ary-: the lump and 714 Certificate frauds. 
4) Fiddling Expenses. Allowances and Benefits-In-Kind: an employee's 
failure to declare payments received from their firm/employer. 
5) Fiddling the Accounts: a self-employed person/trader under-stating 
their profits and/or over-claiming their allowances and expenses. 
The first three categories of tax fiddle - moonlighting, ghosting and 
construction industry fraud - constitute a large proortion of what is 
termed 'the black economy'. By contrast the fiddles in 4) and 5) form part 
of an alternative opportunity structure, often associated with the highly 
paid and the self-employed. But no single category is mutually exclusive; 
for instance, professionals such as doctors and architects can engage in 
moonlighting; self-employed builders may moonlight and under-estimate 
profits too! 
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Tax evasion is by its very nature a secret activity and involves the 
fraudster in constant efforts to outwit the Revenue. Fraudsters thus 
become both reactive (reacting to procedural changes instituted by the 
Revenue), and proactive (seeking out new opportunities within the economy). 
The typology offered above is therefore a summary of the current 
techniques of evasion, but is by no means immutable. Nonetheless, the 
hidden agenda behind the operation of these techniques is a complex set of 
self-justifications by which fraudsters seek to define themselves in a way 
which distances them from 'real criminals'. These justificatory rationales 
will now be analysed. 
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(1)TAX FEAUDSTERS 
(b) JUSTIFICATIONS. 
The old saying that only two things are inevitable in life - death 
and taxation' exemplifies a traditional British hatred of personal tax. 
This view is largely the product of a political and economic culture 
which stresses the primacy of incividualism, and a belief in the market 
as sole regulating force within the economy (see Chapter 3). British 
reluctance to pay centrally collected, state determined taxes has 
distinctive political and ideological roots (see Chapter 2). Many of 
the justifications offered by tax evaders are built upon a bedrock of 
assumptions laid down centuries ago, yet still deeply held within the 
British culture. At the same time, pragmatic reasons are given for 
fiddling tax which, together with a variety of personalised moral 
justifications, enable the fraudster to constitute him/herself as 
1) Rational 
2) Morally 'right' 
3) Non-criminal, despite the illegality of the act committed, 
Justifications are often offered in a conglomerate of cultural, 
pragmatic and ideological rationales. In order to unravel the 
constituents of these justifications it is first necessary to examine 
the common themes which emerged when analysing the comments made by the 
tax evaders themselves. Certain arguments were identified as present 
(in one guise or another), in the justifications offered by all of the 
tax fraudsters studied in the course of this research. These themes 
will therefore provide the basis for analysis in this part of the 
Chapter: 
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1)'An Intolerable Inquisition' - taxation as anathema to British 
culture. 
2)Taxation as a stifling of incentives. 
3)'Everyone does it'- tax evasion as ubiquitous. 
1)_An Intolerable Inquisition' 
This justification for tax evasion centres upon the allegedly 
intrusive nature of personal taxation and the negative effects which 
tax is said to have upon the honest, thrifty taxpayer. It is a view 
which is associated with commentators from, amongst other 
organizations, the Adam Smith Institute (A. S. I. ) and the Institute of 
Economic Affairs (I. E. A. ). The I. E. A. argue that both avoidance and 
evasion of tax are inevitable, given what they perceive as penal high 
rates of taxation (I. E. A., 1979). Justifications for evasion are also 
evident in the I. E. A. 's comment that the Inland Revenue displays 
'impertinence' in some of its tax collection methods: for instance, in 
deducting tax at source! (Tullock, 1979). Such commentators are 
implicitly arguing that 'unjustifiable' taxation merits justifiable 
crime in the form of tax evasion. But the argument is presented in a 
form which emphasises the allegedly 'totalitarian' and draconian nature 
of the Inland Revenue, and which therefore deflects attention from the 
criminal nature of tax evasion. It is amusing that when one such I. E. A. 
commentator does acknowledge the criminal element in tax evasion he is 
referring to Al Capone (who was jailed for tax evasion)! (Myddleton, 
1979)" 
The 'intolerable inquisition' school of thought stresses that 
Revenue rules are oppressive in character, and so the nature of the 
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rules actually fosters rule-breaking. Furthermore, this school suggests 
that attention should instead be drawn to the unacceptably severe rules 
whose infraction constitutes evasion, rather than to the evading 
taxpayers themselves (Christie Davies, 1979). But, it is significant 
that these arguments are not applied to all offenders: as will be 
argued (in section (2) below), the intrusive and unacceptable features 
of D. H. S, S. rules are not successfully invoked as adequate rationales. cr 
excusing benefit fraud. 
On a grander scale, I. E. A. authors come close to, seeing Revenue 
attempts to counter evasion as pointless, menacing and un-British. For 
instance, in an article entitled 'The Futility of Taxation by Menaces', 
former secretary of the Inland Revenue Staff Federation, Lord Houghton, 
dismissed appeals for more Revenue staff to combat evasion as 'yearning 
for the impossible'. Although in the current political and ideological 
climate this may appear a sound observation, Lord Houghton was, rather, 
arguing that 
'The big stick will not resolve the dilemmas and discontents of 
people trying to find some grounds for confidence in the future for 
themselves and their children. ' (Houghton, 1979) 
This former Labour party minister had earlier put forward the view of 
essentially 'honest' British taxpayers seeking a better future for 
their children: on this occasion the argument was used to oppose 
increases in the powers of tax inspectors: 
'Are not the fiddles, the lump, the fringe benefits, the 
moonlighting, the articles and subterfuges of avoidance 
and evasion signs of the breakdown of the otherwise honest 
taxpayer caused by the weight of direct taxation upon extra 
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effort and successful enterprise? ' (Houghton, The Times 16.8.76) 
Assertions such as these are little more than a re-hash of reactionary 
ideological arguments emanating from at individualist perspective on 
both economics and social policy. As Fiready indicated (chapter 3), 
these arguments presuppose a positive relationship between wealth and 
enterprise and see taxation as a threat to both. Equally, the ideology 
of liberalism advocates minimal state intervention, as the individual 
is the primary source of economic and social responsibility. In this 
sense the tax-collecting activities of the state can be represented as 
both morally wrong and economically counter-productive (see Chapters 3 
and 6). 
Despite the weaknesses in these arguments and the deep 
contradictions to which they give rise in a caplitalist 'welfare' 
state, such views remain powerful and persuasive at the level of public 
ideology. For example, the notion of the intolerable burden of taxation 
is a popular one: a study conducted in Scotland found that 62% of those 
interviewed considered the level of income tax was 'much too high' and 
only 5.5% considered it 'about right' (Dean, Keenan and Kenney, 1980). 
Perhaps because of this impression that the British are over-taxed, 
'two-thirds of respondents thought that most people would hide 
a small amount of their income if they thought they could get 
away with it, and 44% thought that such conduct would not be 
"bad". ' (Dean, 1981: 47) 
What is important here is that there is a popular beleif that 
British citizens are over-taxed, and that this popular belief, (whether 
ill-founded or not), surfaces as a Justification for evading tax. 
Certainly, all the small businessmen I interviewed considered 
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themselves to be over-taxed, and this factor was often linked with 
otter 'intrusive' aspects of state regulation. For instance, Bill (a 
self-employed builder), linked what he perceived as heavy taxation with 
the 'red tape' involved in completing tax and V. A. T. records. He 
therefore justified his tax evasion as a logical response of a hard- 
pressed, hard-working, heavily-taxed citizen to the intolerable 
inquisition of state bureaucracy. Yet at the same time he argued that 
'if I do a job for you on the side, I'm doing you a favour by giving 
you a cheap estimate' (Bill). 
Although the formal logic used by Bill and others to justify tax 
evasion centres upon the burdensome complexities of state regulation, 
the effective rationales are self-interest and reciprocity. Thus the 
black economy is justified because both trader and customer gain 
financially at the expense of the state. But social scientists studying 
the formal and informal economies may conflate the formal and 
effective rationales: 
'Legal changes also push production from the formal to the informal 
economy. V. A. T. means that money payments in cash become illegal 
andunrecorded. Steep rates of personal taxation, obligations to pay 
high national insurance contributions and employment protection 
legislation: all these encourage both casual work 'for cash' and 
do-it-yourself. ' (Gershuny and Pahl, 1980: 7) 
These authors are in danger of uncritically accepting that, for 
example, V. A. T. automatically led to an explosion in fiddling. This 
view is excessively deterministic, as it would imply that' the state 
alone and directly creates evasion by creating rules: in this respect 
Gershuny and Pahl are arguing along the same lines as the I. E. A.. As 
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argued above, there is a far more complex relationship between 
administrative regulations and techniques of tax evasion. Any analysis 
needs to focus not only on state regulation and bureaucratic 
processes, but also on wider economic conditions and on the specific 
opportunity structures for fiddling. The introduction of V. A. T. is 
certainly an important variable, but it is not the only one needed to 
explain the extent and form of the black economy. 
Another problem arises from these authors' contention that steep 
rates of taxation, high national insurance contributions and employment 
protection legislation have encouraged casual work. Their observations 
relate to high income-earners and employers, and it is the perspective 
of these groups which is favoured by such justifications for tax 
evasion. Thus the introduction of employment protection legislation in 
itself did not effect a shift towards casual labour: workers did not 
decide to become 'casual' as a result of legislation! Rather, it is the 
response of employers to such legislation which is of significance. It 
seems that the rationales of employers and of the (relatively) rich are 
the ones which dominate public discourses an the justifications for tax 
fraud. It is therefore not surprising that these justifications, whilst 
dominant in legitimising tax evasion, are not successfully invoked to 
justify benefit frauds committed by the poor when they work in the 
black economy. 
The National Federation of the Self-Employed (N. F. S. E. ) is another 
organization which, like the I. E. A., espouses the 'intolerable 
inquisition' view of taxation (and was associated in Chapter 2(c) with 
the 'effort' school of thought). The N. F. S. E. also sets the tone of 
discussions concerning taxation essentially in negative terms and from 
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the perspective of employers. Using the imagery of the 'hapless trader' 
who is 'relentlessly pursued' by the Revenue, the N. F. S.? and its 
supporters represent the self-employed as overburdened with ; he duties 
of tax collection and administration imposed upon them by the state 
(Guardian, 12.4.85). The Institute of Directors also promoted this view 
when announcing the results of a survey in August 1986, which indicated 
that the Thatcher government's policy of de-regulation had failed to 
remove the heaviest burdens oppressing businessmen - two of these 
'burdens' were noted as the operation of P. A. Y. E. and V. A. T.! At the 
same time they represent the taxman as 'over-zealous' and accuse the 
Revenue of 'bullying' small businessmen 'into paying vast sums of 
money which are not lawfully due' (Guardian, 27.12.85). Once again the 
charge of illegality shifts attention from the likely evaders of tax 
onto the architypal folk-devil, the taxman. Although assertions of 
Revenue bully- tactics and illegal purges may seem highly dubious, (and 
I believe they are), such views are not readily dismissed. For example 
a recent series of Guardian articles, (written by an accountant and 
based on a handful of tax investigations) contended that 
'There is a new and unhealthy spirit of aggression within the 
department. Some of the people who make complaints of this sort 
to me are afraid to speak out publicly because they feel they are 
always vulnerable to reprisals from the department. 
(Joe Horner, Guardian 21.11.87) 
The notion of 'reprisals' is typically associated with, for instance, 
terrorist organizations and has an inflammatory effect when discussing 
the activities of the Inland Revenue! Such notions also grossly 
exaggerate the power of individual tax inspectors, but at the same time 
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they do make for good newspaper stories. The new 'spirit of aggression' 
perhaps signifies the gradual impact of compliance initiatives in local 
tax districts and simultaneous lessening of the Revenue staff's 
sympathy with those who evade tax (see Chapter 6 for analysis of recent 
shifts). But the language amplifies and distorts these newly- 
perceptible shifts. It constructs the image of taxman as an aggressive 
post-1984 'Big Brother' and thus reinforces the intolerable inquisition 
view of taxation. 
The small businessmen, directors, farmer and highly paid employees 
whom I interviewed all set the issue of tax evasion within the context 
of burdensome state demands, whether in the form of V. A. T. returns, 
P. 11D expenses returns or business accounts. For directors and highly 
paid employees, the Revenue's tightening up of regulations concerning 
the taxing of 'car fuel benefits' (Finance Act, 1982), had engendered 
much hostility. What had been regarded as a valuable 'perk' was being 
clawed back in tax and those individuals with company cars felt they 
were being over-taxed rather than being taxed legitimately on a benefit 
provided by their firm/employer. A logical consequence of this belief 
is to see fiddles in relation to expenses and benefits-in-kind as 
merely attempts to ensure the 'perks' that go with the job. This view 
was articulated by highly paid firm's representatives and a director, 
who, during conversations with me, seemed to subscribe to the sporting 
theory of tax evasion: at an informal level they appeared to be engaged 
in a battle to 'beat the taxman'. This is consistent with a negative 
view of personal tax as intrusive and burdensome. 
Where lower paid employees are concerned, many justifications 
offered for tax fiddles also emanate from the British tradition of 
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hatred for taxation. But, in these instances the justification which 
is uppermost involves a combination of being underpaid whilst overtaxed 
at the same time. Tax fiddles are therefore justified as a means of 
supplementing low wages, and thus become part of the job (Mars, 1982; 
Henry, 1978; Ditton, 1978). This is particularly relevant in the case 
of the hotel and catering trade and other low paid service sector 
employment. But tax fiddles in the form of moonlighting are popular 
amongst a variety of individuals in many occupations which they 
themselves define as underpaid. For instance, one junior school teacher 
(Tony) from the Midlands could only afford family holidays by 
supplementing his earnings through giving private tuition and selling 
houseplants (Guardian, 27.12.85). He justified his moonlighting by 
referring to being low paid and commented 'Illegal it may be, immoral 
it isn't'. Tony referred to the building up of a sense of 'community' 
through the exchange of favours in the black economy, a rationale which 
is used elsewhere (Gershuny and Pahl, 1980). Bill also referred to the 
favours done for his customers when he saved them money by doing jobs 
'on the side'. Nevertheless, the use of justifications involving 
'favours', community goodwill or 'morality' merely serves to conceal 
the essential illegality of tax evasion as well as its negative social 
and economic consequences. 
A further defence offered for tax fraud centres upon the crucial 
role of the entrepeneur in national wealth creation. It is argued that 
the regulation of would-be entrepeneurs by the state serves to stifle 
the potential for creating wealth, and moreover may lead to the 
channeling of creative capacities into the arena of the black economy. 
For instance one I. E. A commentator advocated an end to government 
2: x: 1 
controls relating to business premises, (which were seen as impeding 
the natural workings of the market), as this would enable people to 
'start businesses in their own garages and encourage enterprising 
wives to do dressmaking legitimately in their front parlours. It is 
in such humble ways that many businesses start. As is well said: 
"Inside every moonlighter there is a small businessman trying to 
get out". ' (Vinson, 1980: 67. ) 
But it has already been argued above that bona-fide traders are 
themselves prone to moonlighting. This disproves Vinson's assertion 
that moonlighting is only the perogative of those who are, as a result 
of government red tape, prevented from becoming legitimately self- 
employed. Also worthy of note is the blatant sexism underpinning the 
image of 'wives' busily 'dressmaking' in front parlours. Not only are 
their activities and status sexualized, but they are also firmly 
located within a middle-class frame of reference. Commentators from the 
I. E. A. overwhelmingly support the interests of the entrepeneurial 
middle class, but clearly distinguish between this group and the 'new 
class of administrators, bureaucrats and quango members' who are 
anathema to the ideals of the liberal minimalist state in which the 
entrepeneurial spirit thrives (Burton, 1985: 75). Burton sees society 
divided into the taxpaying and tax-consuming 'castes', entrepeneur 
businessmen belonging to the former caste, and the 'new class' 
belonging to the latter, (as all public sector employees are seen as a 
drain an national resources). His argument inevitably concludes in the 
justification of tax avoidance, evasion and the black economy as 'a 
form of "backdoor" tax revolt against tax-consumers'(ibid). The 
underlying theme remains that of the 'intolerable inquisition' which 
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personal taxation is seen to impose in a capitalist state, particularly 
in a 'Welfare State' in which taxpayers are seen to unwillingly 
subsidise yet more unproductive members of society - tax-consumers - in 
the form of the elderly, the sick, the handicapped, the unemployed and 
lone-parent families. 
A logical consequence of arguments which stress the intolerable 
burden which taxation and state regulation imposes is to see tax 
evasion as at worst non-criminal and at best quasi-legal (Leigh, 1982). 
It is relegated to the level of 'victimless crimes... if they can be 
regarded as crimes at all' in the same vein as 'tak: ng your clothes off 
on remote beaches'(Bracewell-Milnes, 1979: 112). As will be seen below, 
this tolerance does not extend to those who fiddle state welfare 
benefits. 
The 'intolerable inquisition' school of thought frequently sees the 
administration and collection of taxes not only as burdensome for the 
taxpayer, but also as an unwieldy system in itself. The cumbersome 
nature of the British taxation is therefore seen as partly reponsible 
for tax evasion on two grounds. First, by unwittingly creating 
opportunity structures for fiddling on the part of certain occupational 
groups (for instance highly paid employees and small traders whose 
fiddles have already been described), who manipulate Revenue rules 
which are seen as too broad-ranging or sloppy. This view is allied to 
the 'sporting' perspective, mentioned above, which aims to dicover 
loopholes in the tax system or to 'beat the taxman' by stealth. 
Second, the tax system is seen as encouraging evasion because 
governments unduly overburden the Revenues, (particularly in relation 
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to its scope and scale of operation), leading to inefficiency because 
staff and resources are spread too thinly. 
One interesting variation on this second approach was evident in 
the assertion of one Revenue official who argued that the net of 
taxation was being cast too widely. He believed that if the tax 
thresholds were raised in order to bring taxation back to its' original 
role - to tax the wealthy - then 'you could begin to make sense of it' 
(O. V. S., 1985). Also, he argued, some of the poorer members of society 
would have the financial imperative to engage in the black economy 
removed. This may seem an optimistic view, (and, in the light of the 
1988 budget, highly improbable), yet it is essentially a pragmatic one. 
Alternatively, this official privately believed, 'we may have to find a 
tax system which comes to terms with the black economy'. If this is the 
case then our present system of tax is, in his words, 'doomed'. 
Nevertheless, he argued that the complex and over-stretched nature of 
the Inland Revenue system is not in itself a justification for the 
evasion of tax, but rather is an enabling factor. In this respect he 
differs from Revenue critics who cite the very existence of the alleged 
'inquisition', (in the form of 'oppressive' state taxation), as 
sufficient justification for fiddling tax. Instead he offers the 
alternative perspective of a system of personal taxation which taxes 
rich and (relatively) poor alike, and in so doing has become so 
unwieldy that cracks appear. These cracks in the system are evident 
both in the tax loopholes which unwittingly emerge, ripe for 
exploitation by those 'in the know', and in the prevailing moral vacuum 
surrounding the issue of tax evasion. 
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An example which illustrates such 'cracks' concerns the issue of 
income tax returns, which form the legal basis an which an individual's 
tax is assessed as well as providing the information on which such 
assessments are based. In recent years the frequency with which tax 
returns are issued has been drastically curtailed in an effort to 
bring about cuts in revenue manpower and resources. This has resulted 
in many taxpayers not receiving tax returns to complete for some 5 
years or more. In such circumstances greater opportunity is offered to 
evade tax and the belief that one is not likely to get caught is 
strengthened. As one official noted, 
'If you never get a return, do six weeks work for an extra 2100 a 
week and nobody asks you anything, it's asking alot to expect you 
to go and knock on the door of your tax inspector and say "can you 
give me a bill? "'. 
Therefore the knowledge that the 'taxman' is unlikely to request 
declarations of income on a frequent or regular basis leaves the 
initiative with the taxpayer. Evasion can thus be represented as a 
crime of omission rather than commission by the perpetrator. 
Justifications in terms of 'They never asked me' are offered, thus 
denying the taxpayer's culpability and instead focusing on the 
Revenue's role as inquisitor, and the sporting challenge which this 
role offers to tax evaders. Effectively the legal and moral issues 
surrounding tax evasion are dodged in such rationales which assume that 
tax regulations are bureaucratic, intrusive, exist to be circumvented, 
and ' good luck' to those who can get away with paying less tax than 
should be officially charged on their income. But it is worth noting 
that the sporting approach to fraud does not extend to those who 
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defraud the D. H. S. S. for whom legal and moral considerations are 
uppermost in public discourse. As will be argued (in 2b) below, many of 
the justifications offered by benefit fraudsters themsalves mirror 
those of the tax evader and yet their actions are perceived. and treated 
very differently by regulatory agencies, and represented as 
qualitatively different acts in the public rhetoric. 
In a television interview in November 1985 Mrs Thatcher stated that 
the black economy was 'big, flourishing, thriving'. She welt an to link 
this with the notion of incentives, an essential ingredient of 
successful 'enterprise culture' economics: 
'What this means to me is this: that where people find a direct 
relationship between the money they get in their hands and the work 
they do, they not only do that work but they go out to find it and 
seek it. The enterprise is still there. ' 
(Thatcher, 'I. T. V. Veekend Verld', 17.11.85) 
The fact that this 'direct relationship' between work and cash-in- 
the-hand was achieved through evasion of income tax was not regarded as 
significant. The belief that 'the enterprise is still there' marked a 
triumphant assertion of the spirit of the 'go-getting society' which 
Thatcher sees as her aim. The costs at which such aims are realised, in 
terms of widening gulf between go-getters and 'failures', and the 
losses in tax and V. A. T., are not part of her economic calculations. 
Simplistic notions of what constitutes financial incentives, and how 
individuals react to them, underlie New Right discourses. For instance, 
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the supply-side economics of the Reagan administration rest on 
assumptions which are evident in Thatcherism too: 
'The basic case here was that the rich were not working and 
investing because they were receiving too little money and that the 
poor were not working because they were getting too much. The magic 
word was incentive - incentives for both the rich and the poor'. 
(Galbraith in 'New Statesman', 25.11.83) 
Social policy deriving from such theories has emphasised tax cuts 
for the rich and increasing stringency in welfare benefits for the poor 
(see Chapter 6 for an analysis of the 1988 budget in these terms). But 
there is no evidence that the concept of 'incentives' upon which such 
policies rest is a valid one. According to Break (1957), higher rates 
of taxation may in reality serve to force most income earners to work 
harder in order to maintain their living standards. When applied to the 
actions of individual earners the alleged disincentive effect of 
taxation is therefore impossible to prove. It may well be the case that 
high rates of tax act as a spur to effort rather than as a 
disincentive (Break, 1957). Alternatively. recent Treasury-sponsored 
research concluded that the 'income-effect', felt by higher income- 
earners when their taxes are reduced, may well produce feelings of 
financial satisfaction which cancel out any effort-inducing 
'incentives' effect (Guardian. 24.2.88). Nevertheless, the rhetoric of 
the incentives school of thought remains both popular and persuasive in 
spite of the internal weaknesses of their argument. The simplicity of 
this theory appears to some commentators to elevate its tenets to a 
'natural' law of sorts. For instance, a team from the Institute of 
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Fiscal Studies researching the effects of tax reform on incentives 
asserted that 
'What matters most in any tax system is the "marginal rate" - how 
much tax you pay on each additional pound of income - since it is 
this which governs the reward to extra effort.... The lower the 
marginal rate the greater the incentive. ' 
(Robinson, Smith and Stark, Guardian, 1.10.86) 
Despite the very real difficulties with empirically proving the 
disincentive effect of (allegedly) high rates of taxation, many 
justifications offered by tax fiddlers for their actions draw heavily 
upon the incentives argument. All of the small businessmen I 
interviewed believed that they were over-taxed, and amongst higher paid 
employees the perceived erosion of their 'perks' by the taxman had 
contributed to the mythology of penally high taxation and the stifling 
of incentives. Taken together such beliefs offer individuals excuses 
for their tax fiddles through a reassertion of 'enterprise', albeit 
illegally, through working in the black economy or through the routine 
fiddling of personal tax. 
A logical corollary of the incentives theory held that higher wages 
must be paid to those whose marginal rates of tax were high in order to 
maintain their incentives to effort and so retain highly paid (and, 
argably, highly important), employees. But this view was dismissed by 
the Inland Revenue Staff Federations, (I. R. S. F. ) General Secretary, 
Tony Christopher, who considers it a 'facile' approach. He argued that 
there was no evidence to suggest that since top rates of tax had been 
reduced to 60% there had been a corresponding reduction either in the 
salaries of higher rate taxpayers or in their untaxed benefits (O. V. S., 
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1985). If the incentives argument were accepted and if individuals 
responded logically, precisely and predictably to changes in rates of 
taxation, then a reduction in tax would have inevitably led to a 
reduction in remuneration neccessary to maintain incentives. But 
clearly the tax cuts (for richer employees), introduced by the Thatcher 
government have not given rise to a rational downward re-adjustment of 
upper wage levels - rather, the reverse has been the case. As 
Christopher argues, the incentives issue is invoked selectively to 
reassert certain political and economic values rather than to explain 
and adequately predict the workings of a strictly co-ordinated system 
of wages and tax rates. 
To summarise, the notion of incentives is a problematic one. 
Individuals cannot be reduced to the simplistic level of economically 
programmed units who respond accurately and surely to given stimuli in 
terms of their earned income and tax due. Break argues that rationality 
may involve responding to higher taxes by working harder and 
Christopher indicates that the incentives issue is not invoked where 
downward variations in tax are concerned, (although in the case of 
Supplementary benefit claimants, as will be seen below, incentives do 
take on this negative interpretation in requiring downward variations 
in benefit levels to maintain work incentives! ). 
Another consequence of accepting a New Right or supply-side logic 
on incentives is to see the black economy as a thriving sector of the 
economy and, moreover, a sector which potentially holds the key to an 
economic recovery in that it is based upon 'go-getting' 
entrepeneurship. In addition to Mrs Thatcher, other exponents of this 
view include th I. E. A. and some individuals from the business 
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community. For instance Michael Edwardes offered a novel interpretation 
of the black e,; onomy when he asserted that it was reducing 
unemployment: 
'there could be a couple of million who at the moment are in the 
unemployment statistics many of whom - not all perhaps - but many 
of whom are probably employed in one way or another. ' 
(Edwardes, Guardian, 31.10.85. ) 
It is difficult to see the logic of such arguments which on the one 
hand see the black economy positively as evidence of 'enterprise', yet 
on the other hazd see benefit claimants who fiddle as 'scroungers' 
whose enterprising efforts to maximise their rewards should be roundly 
condemned. It seems that 'effort' may be encouraged amongst the rich, 
even if tax fiddles are a consequence, yet similar efforts by the poor 
in their forays into the black economy are only acceptable if they are 
held to reduce the unemployment statistics. As Rawnsley (1985) argues, 
the realities of the black economy conflict with political demands to 
crackdown on social security scroungers and this leads to a 'benign 
neglect of those who have "got on their bikes" and joined the 
underground army'. 
One telling criticism of this simplistic view of incentives and 
taxation is that the explosion of wealth creation promised as a 
consequence of tax reductionscuts and the restoration of effort 
incentives has, in the mid to late 1980's, simply not materialised. 
Loney (1986) quotes a leading American economist, Lekachman, who poses 
this question: 
'Vhy, it might legitimately be asked, haven't these amply rewarded 
managers and investors already unleashed the investment boom needed 
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to renew economic growth and make America great again? ' 
(Loney, 1986: 21) 
In the case of the British economy a similar question can be raised as 
there is no evidence that tax cuts have promoted wealth creation, save 
for increasing the personal incomes and wealth of the rich themselves. 
Furthermore, if policy makers place a high priority on economic 
expansion, then it is difficult to stop short of welcoming the 
expansion of the black economy, which according to Thatcher and 
Edwardes, constitutes an area of 'enterprise'. In so doing, such 
advocates of incentives are condoning tax evasion and an increasingly 
skewed distribution of financial rewards in our society, which is not 
being determined by social policy so much as by the vagaries of the 
market, allegedly through the operation of effort-incentives and 
commensurate rewards. 
Critics argue that the black economy is 'ne;. ther the answer to the 
financial problems caused by unemployment nor an incentive to the 
creation of wealth through individual enterprise' (T. U. C., 1983). The 
T. U. C. support this view with Inland Revenue data which demonstrates 
the detrimental effects of the black economy on honest traders and 
taxpayers: their prices may be undercut by unfair competition, the 
honest taxpayer effectively subsidises the dishonest earnings of the 
fiddlers (T. U. C., 1983: 3), But such legal and moral issues are 
frequently obscured by straightforwardly 'market' solutions to problems 
of economic growth. For instance, the assertion that 'people prefer the 
lowest price for given quantities or qualities of goods' and references 
to the 'modern economics of public choice' deny the importance of 
social justice and focus instead on the inevitability of tax evasion 
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which results from consumer choice and the inner logic of the free 
market economy (Seldon, 1979: 15). 
The incentives debate is of central importance to this thesis ii. 
two respects: first it informs public discourse on the nature of oui 
tax system, which as a result is frequently perceived as stifling 
incentives through penal rates of taxation. Second it therefore 
provides individuals with ready justifications for illegal tax evasion, 
which can be translated into the logical response of long-suffering 
taxpayers who are, after all, only trying to create wealth for the 
nation and exercise the 'modern economics of public choice - the choicc 
to earn and not to pay tax! 
(, )'Everyone does it' 
Guesstimates of the size of the black economy seem to support the 
notion that tax evasion is indeed ubiquitous. It appears that although 
not exactly 'everyone' is resorting to tax evasion, a sizeable 
proportion of taxpayers are. According to Inland Revenue data 
(discussed in Chapter 1(3) above), the black economy may constitute 7i% 
of G. D. P.. Furthermore, it is estimated that one in four persons may 
have undeclared income of t500 p. a. (Levi, 1982). The willingness of 
individuals to evade tax was demonstrated by Deane et. al. (1981) whose 
survey on attitudes towards income tax (conducted in Fife, Scotland), 
found that almost 40% of respondents were morally 'neutral' where small 
scale tax evasion was concerned . Furthermore, 62% of the sample 
believed the level of income tax to be 'much too high'. and a quarter 
thought that all or most taxpayers have opportunities for small 'safe' 
evasions. More telling still, 66% felt that 'all or most taxpayers 
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would exploit such opportunities if they had the chance'. In this way 
tax evasion is seen as relatively safe, neither good nor bad', 
justifiable in terms of the high level of taxation and a logical course 
of action for the average taxpayer (ibid: 39) The message behind this 
and similar research is simply that 'tax evasion is a common activity 
in the U. K., and is widely regarded as uorally acceptable' (ibid: 57) 
However there is a lack of consistency in arguments which suggest 
that because tax is too high individuals will inevitably seek to evade 
it, and because everyone is therefore fiddling tax then such actions 
cannot be thought reprehensible, as millions of taxpayers cannot be 
'wrong'. The alleged popular approval of evasion is therefore 
underpinned by other excuses. Justifications which involve the plea 
that 'everyone is doing it' depend in turn upon other rationales 
offered for tax fiddles, namely the intrusive, burdensome and excessive 
demands of the Inland Revenue and the stifling of incentives described 
above. For instance, tax ghost 'Jim' is quoted by Rawnsley (1985) as 
being 'pissed off' with many aspects of British society - 'appalling pay 
and boring work', periodic unemployment and the knowledge that 
'everyone else is on the dodge anyway'. He added that the entire 
economy would collapse without the moonlighters and ghosts who undercut 
'legit' firms' prices and so save the punters money. Similarly Bill had 
argued that building jobs which did not 'go through the books' were 
doing the customer a favour, but working life without the black economy 
was inconceivable to him. The justification that 'everyone was on the 
fiddle' was implicit in the nature of his daily work. An alternative 
perspective was, however, offered by the direr-tor of a large building 
firm whom I spoke to: he argued that the 'cowboys' and fiddlers were 
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undermining the whole building industry because 'legit' firms were 
being squeezed hard in their efforts to compete with unrealistic work 
estimates which did not account for tax and V. A. T.. In the long term, 
he argued, unemployment and shoddy workmanship would result. 
Nevertheless the rationale that 'everybody is on the fiddle' (when 
coupled with other justifications described above), is a crucial means 
by which individuals can render their own illegal acts explicable and 
excusable to themselves and to others. With a shrug of the shoulders, 
most tax fiddlers I spoke to justified their actions in this simple and 
seemingly unambiguous manner. But considerable ambiguity is evident if 
their assertions are examined in more detail. 
First, this justification rests upon the belief that a certain 
level of tax evasion is both understandable and tolerable. However it 
remains unclear exactly how this 'acceptable' level is determined. In 
practice, the acceptable fiddle seems to be delimited by normative 
thresholds which mark the tolerable scale and frequency of evasion, but 
what level of tax fraud can be seen as both acceptable to others and 
justifiable to the fiddler? It can be argued that perceptions of the 
relative seriousness of tax evasion shifts according to the amount 
defrauded. For instance, both Deane (1980) and Walker (1978) note that 
whilst small-scale tax evasion may not be perceived in negative terms, 
evasion involving 'larger' amounts may well be. As Deane implies, this 
shift in what is considered acceptable probably has far more to do with 
'moral attitudes' than with any rational-economic calculations 
concerning increased risks of discovery and the subsequent penalties 
that may be imposed by the Revenue (Jowell and Witherspoon, 1985). The 
essential problem remains one of how boundaries are set upon the nature 
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and scale of tax evasion which 'everyone' is felt to be justified in 
committing. 
Second, it seems probable that a 'moral' element operates in 
setting boundaries on acceptable fiddles. According to Lewis (1982) 
this moral element may derive from group pressure, just as the impetus 
to evade tax in the first place may come from workmates. Lewis argues 
that individuals agree to 'play the game', (particularly if the rest of 
their workmates are doing so), but take care not to 'go too far': 
'It seems probable that there is a subculture of tax evasion 
governed partly by normative considerations. ' (Lewis, 1982: 184). 
And so pressures, both to evade tax and to justify it, may differ 
according to the opportunity structures offered by particular 
occupations. Tax evasion is not a homogeneous phenomenon. But the 
justification that 'everyone is doing it' simplifies the complex 
reality of evasion and overlooks significant differences that exist in 
the scope and scale of the opportunities individuals have to fiddle. It 
may well be the case that this excuse merely legitimizes tax fraud as 
ubiquitous in order to conceal the considerable gains made by certain 
occupational categories - highly paid employees and the self-employed 
being the most noteworthy - at the expense of the honest taxpayer. 
Another important thread running through such justifications as 
these is the belief that it is 'natural' to want to pay as little tax 
as possible and so to evade tax wherever practical. This is most 
clearly articulated in the work of the I. E. A. who lament that, in 
relation to avoidance and evasion of tax, 'the trouble is that it is 
impossible to change human nature' (Seldon, 1979: 40). In discussing the 
Revenue's anti-evasion efforts Lord Houghton similarly argues that 'it 
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is simply no good yearning for the impossible' (Houghton, 1979). 
Clearly tax fiddles are once again being represented as an immutable 
part of human nature. But it would seem thtt such commentators ignore 
the cultural, political and economic condi-. ions under which peoples 
'human nature' is created. The values and ideals of modern capitalism, 
(focussing on wealth accumulation and 'free enterprise'), which are 
utilized in justifications for tax evasion are by no means 'natural'. 
They are ideologically constructed through a variety of interlocking 
social institutions (see Chapters 3 and 6). But, significantly the same 
rationalizations, in terms of 'human nature', fail to dominate in 
discourses surrounding welfare benefit fraud. Whilst it is asserted 
that it is natural for taxpayers to maximise their financial gains, 
illegally, from the state through tax fraud, this justification is not 
invoked to explain supplementary benefit fraud, which is rather 
represented as motivated by greed and idle dependancy (see section 2(b) 
below and Chapters 3 and 6). 
Nonetheless, it is the very simplicity of these excuses for tax 
evasion, drawing upon notions of'human nature', which contributes to 
their potency. In this way, to argue that everyone fiddles their taxes 
is to do no more than to state the obvious and in so doing to rebuke 
critics, as if to say 'I fiddle my tax, so does everyone else. So, 
what? ' Justifications stressing the ubiquity of tax evasion and its 
roots in commonsense logic therefore serve to displace 'the problem' of 
tax evasion, (if indeed one exists), upon the allegedly few honest 
taxpayers and the agencies of regulation. Responsibility for the 
commission of an illegal act, the negative economic and social 
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consequences, as well as the divisive implications for social policy 
are all bypassed in this most common of all excuses. 
Research into workplace and white-collar crime has demonstrated the 
breadth and depth of tax fiddling (Henry, 1978; Mars, 1982; Chambliss, 
1978; Pearce, 1976; Leigh, 1982; Levi, 1982; Levi, 1987). Such evidence 
confirms the fears of the National Federation of Self-Employed and 
Small Businesses that tax evasion is a 'national disease' and Britain 
is riddled with it. Even as a critic of evasion it is, therefore, 
possible to unwittingly support the view that everyone is indeed on the 
fiddle. But acknowledgement of such observations does not inevitably 
lead to the conclusion that it must be sanctioned. Just because 
fiddling taxes, in the words of one official, 'goes back to the bible' 
it cannot automatically be legitimated. But the belief that everyone 
else is fiddling makes it far easier for tax fraudsters to justify 
their activities to themselves and also to those around them who share 
a similar commonsense idea that if evasion is the norm, then they are 
not deviants. 
jnriiary of the justifications offered for tag fraud 
As argued above, (see Chapter 3), responses to and justifications 
for tax evasion must be located within the context of the contradictory 
principles which underlie our understanding of taxation (and welfare). 
This part of the Chapter has analysed the common themes which emerged 
from an examination of the justificatory rationales offered for tax 
fraud. The rationales that taxation is in itself an intolerable 
inquisition and that tax stifles personal effort are both closely 
related. They both adopt a liberal conception of a minimalist state, a 
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state geared primarily to the goal of capital accumulation. Within such 
a context it becomes possible to rationalise tax evasion as no more 
than an excessive zeal in the pursuit of the accumulation of wealth, 
which is, in turn, seen as the basis for the prosperity of society as a 
whole (Bosanquet, 1983). Against this ideological background, the 
Inland Revenue may be perceived as stifling wealth creation and 
minimising personal (economic) 'freedom' by imposing personal taxation. 
Evasion of those taxes thus becomes transformed in such discourses as a 
form of individual rebellion against the power of the intrusive state. 
For example, I. E. A. commentators regarded those who avoid and evade 
taxes as crusaders against 'bad law' and against the allegedly 
totalitarian spectre of redistributive taxation (Shenfield, 1968; 
Seldon, 1979; Bracewell-Milnes, 1979). 
The social philosophy of individualism and ideology of the free 
market thus dominate justifications for tax fraud. At a personal 
level, rationales may be supplemented by ex-post facto justifications, 
such as 'everyone does it'. Although a powerful commonsense 
rationalisation, it is clear that everyone does nat evade their taxes, 
otherwise the modern capitalist state would be unable to function. But 
the contradictory demands of the principles of citizenship (to pay 
one's taxes), and free market individualism (to generate and accumulate 
wealth), remain unresolved (see Chapters 3 and 6). As a consequence, 
tax fraud can only be successfully justified if it remains within 
certain normative boundaries - these boundaries are often delineated by 
reference to the 'acceptable fiddle' and notions of what can 
acceptably constitute 'shrewd business practice'. 
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(2) SUPPLEÄEHTARY BENEFIT FRAUDSTERS. 
(a) TECABIQUES. 
Where supplementary benefit fraud is concerne3, it is difficult, as in 
the case of tax fraud to separate the techniques of the fraudsters from 
the justifications which they offer for these techniques. In the eyes of 
many benefit fraudsters their illegal actions are only understandable in 
terms of the material conditions of disadvantage, poverty and degradation 
in which they live out their lives. In making ends meet as best they can, 
some claimants may break D. H. S. S. regulations and, implicitly, the law. In 
order to examine precisely how such frauds are committed, it is necessary 
first to arrive at an analytical framework which will contribute to an 
understanding of what precisely is involved in the commission of 
supplementary benefit fraud. For this purpose, fraud techniques will be 
examined by categories which reflect the D. H. S. S. 's own analysis of 
detected fraud. 
The statistics in Table 4: 1 below represent the numbers and types of 
detected frauds considered for prosecution in the year ending 12.2.85 and 
demonstrates the relative prevalence of key types of offence. Although it 
should be remembered that such statistics can never give a full picture of 
the extent of benefit fraud (because obviously a great deal goes 
undetected), they nonetheless give a useful indication of what the most 
popular forms of (detected) fraud are. Clearly the most widespread form of 
fiddling is working while drawing benefit, which constitutes almost half 
of all cases considered for prosecution in 1984/5. The second most 
prevalent form of fraud, accounting for over 12% of cases considered for 
prosecution, also relates to earnings, but in these cases it is the income 
of a dependant, (usually the claimant's wife) which is not declared. 
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OFFENCE T OTAL OFFENCE S OFFENCES AS % OF TOTAL 
(1)Earnings, claimant. 24,513 49% 
(2) Earnings, dependant. 6,086 12.2% 
(3) Fictitious desertion and 
Living together cases. 3,680 7.4% 
(4) Itinerant fraud. 3,347 6.7% 
(5) Total of 'other' 
static fraud. 3,129 6.3% 
(6) Rent and other 
outgoings. 2,619 5.4% 
(7) Composition of house 
hold; child or adult not 
maintained or not legally 
dependant. 1,923 3.9% 
(8) Other recources 1,400 2.8% 
(9) Claimant or dependant in 
receipt of other benefit. 1,265 2.5% 
(10) Undeclared payments 
from Liable Relative. 963 1.9% 
(11) Forged or altered 
documents. 650 1.3% 
(12) False expenses claim 133 0.26% 
(13) Aid and abet. 121 0.24% 
(14) Collusive employer. 46 0.1% 
TOTAL 49,947 100% 
(Source: D. H, S. S., 1986 p. c. ) 
------------------------------------------------------ 
The third category is a particularly interesting one as it refers 
overwhelmingly to the frauds of female claimants who are lone mothers. 
Fictitious desertions (examined in depth below), occur when a woman 
falsely alleges that her husband (or cohabitee) has deserted her. In this 
way she may claim supplementary benefit, falsely, in her own right. 'Living 
together as husband and wife' cases, (abbreviated to L. T. H. W. in D. H. S. S. 
jargon), are a hotly disputed form of fraud because, as will be seen below, 
they assume that a financial relationship exists where a domestic and/or 
sexual one does. In this way a woman who fails to admit the existence of 
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such a domestic and/or sexual relationship and who continues to claim 
benefit in her own right may be guilty of fraud. Taken together, cases of 
fictitious desertion and L. T. H. V. amounted to 7.4% of cases considered for 
prosecution in 1984/5. But, as will be seen below, such statistics may 
conceal far greater numbers of women who have been informally deprived of 
their supplementary benefit by special fraud units, who focussed on these 
forms of fraud but adopted a 'non-prosecution policy'(See Chapter 5(2)). 
Fourth in the league table of offences is 'itinerant fraud'. This 
involves fraud by individuals who claim benefit because they have 'no 
fixed abode', but may visit different supplementary benefit offices in the 
same day making (false) claims at each. In recent years there has been an 
increase in this form of fraud which may be compounded, or even initiated, 
by unscrupulous landlords of cheap bed and breakfast accommodation to 
whom itinerants are often referred by Social Security offices (see the 
discussion of Operation Major below). 
The fifth category of 'other static fraud' encompasses a variety of 
fiddles ranging from multiple claims to falsely alleging a lost giro or 
purse on benefit payday. Some of these fiddles together with category 
eleven, (forged or altered documents), are subsumed under the conglomerate 
term 'instrument of payment fraud' where such frauds involve altering, 
forging or feigning the loss of benefit order books or girocheques. Other 
categories of fraud refer broadly to two kinds of fiddle: first, to 
specific omissions from a claimant's declaration of resources (such as 
payments of maintenance from a liable relative, or an occupational 
pension); and second, to specific false claims for allowances (whether for 
dependants, rent or expenses against part-time earnings). 
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The analysis of fraud techniques which follows will utilize the broad 
headings of fraud categories already discussed, although some of these 
have been amalgamated or simplified for ease of presentation: 
1)Working and claiming. 
2) Liable Relative fraud: fictitious desertion and living together cases. 
3)Itinerant fraud. 
4) Instrument of payment fraud. 
5)Other fiddles., 
1)Vorking and claiming. 
As explained in Chapter 2(b) above, people in full-time work cannot 
normally receive supplementary benefit (Lynes, 1985). Because it is means- 
tested, payment of supplementary benefit depends upon D. H. S. S. officials' 
calculating, in accordance with regulations laid down by parliament, what 
the total financial requirements of a claimant (and family if applicable) 
are. Then it is necessary to deduct from this figure of financial 
'requirements' any income the claimant (and family) receives from any 
source, (for instance from other state benefits, part-time earnings or 
occupational pension schemes). Consequently any alteration in the income 
of the 'assessment unit', (the claimant and his/her family), may affect the 
amount of benefit payable under the Social Security regulations. And so the 
claimant and his/her spouse can legitimately work part-time so long as 
their income is declared and then deducted, (after appropriate 'disregards' 
have been allowed) from their weekly benefit payments. The fiddle involved 
in 'working while claiming' is therefore largely self-explanatory, with 
the notable exception that some claimants believe they are fiddling merely 
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by working part-time, unaware that this in itself is not fraudulent. It 
becomes so when a claimant makes a false declaration - either by stating 
they do not work at all, or by under-declaring the amount earned. 
As the table above indicates, working while claiming is the most 
prevalent form of fraud amongst supplementary benefit claimants, and on 
the surface seems by its very nature to confirm the worst 'scrounger' 
stereotypes. It is argued that there is indeed plenty of work available to 
those who genuinely seek it: the numbers of claimants who da work 
allegedly indicates this. Furthermore, the greed of benefit fraudsters is 
played upon by those emphasising the extent of this type of fraud. After 
all, it is argued, they have the advantage of high levels of state benefits 
and wages to boot! (Golding and Middleton, 1982). But what needs to be 
examined are the specific types of work often involved in such frauds, and 
the techniques used by claimants trying to (successfully) fiddle by these 
means. 
'Low paid, insecure work and social security fraud fuel each other 
and feed off each other. ' (Harrison, 1983: 147. ) 
This statement refers to a description of life in Hackney where, the 
author argues, inadequate benefit levels and low pay fail to meet the 
social needs of individuals and families in the area. But this analysis is 
not only confined to the inner city areas so well described by Harrison. 
The strong link between casualised, low-paid and part-time work, (often in 
the black economy), and social security fraud is aknowledged as having 
more than local significance (Harrison, 1983; Mars, 1982; T. U. C., 1983). 
Nevertheless, the double-bind which working supplementary benefit 
claimants suffer must be emphasised. First, as a T. U. C. report noted, those 
who work in the black economy suffer inferior conditions and rewards: 
255 
'"Black" earnings are generally low as employers are often able to 
cut the price of labour without fear of repercussions from a 
vulnerable and unco-ordinated labour force. Training and safety 
requirements tend to be neglected and therefore workers are often 
unqualified and uninsured. ' (T. U. C., 1983: 3) 
Second, both the Inland Revenue and Supplementary Benefit Commission, 
(prior to its abolition in 1980), acknowledged that those who succeed in 
the black economy were likely to be those groups who succeed in the 
formal economy, (D. H. S. S., 1979; T. U. C., 1983; Donnison, 1982). In other words, 
benefit claimants without the facilities and contacts of a work 
environment find themselves pushed further down into dependence upon less 
than scrupulous employers who are well aware of their plight. 
For example, an analysis of local newspaper coverage of supplementary 
benefit frauds in the Telford (Shropshire) area indicates that employers 
from the service sector, such as contract cleaning firms, rely upon a 
casual, temporary workforce which is readily available from the ranks of 
the unemployed. Moreover, those unemployed individuals who seek such 
casualised and irregular work are unlikely to cease claiming benefit when 
starting work, because of the low level of wages that such work offers and 
the characteristic instability of the job itself. It is therefore apparent 
that some employers gain a great deal economically by using a willing 
reserve army of labour, drafted in and disposed of at will, and prepared 
to work for wages that are patently too low to provide a sole family 
income. At the same time, these employers provide D. H. S. S. investigators 
with an easy 'catch' of fiddling claimants, yet appear to receive no 
reprimand or sanction themselves for their collusion in social security 
fraud. This is despite the assertion made by several fraudsters prosecuted 
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by the D. H. S. S. that employers are well aware that they are hiring 
claimants. According to one fraudster, his employer even suggested that he 
use a false name in an attempt to avoid detection : see Chapter 5(2) 
below). 
There exists a link, then, between the black economy in general terms 
and the most popular form of supplementary benefit fraud - working while 
claiming benefit. Clearly those avenues which enable tax fraud, on the 
face of it, enable this kind of benefit fiddle too. But it must be 
remembered that, as in many other respects, benefit claimants are 
marginalized, socially and economically, and for the rost part fail to 
'cash in' on the black economy to the same extent as the employed 
moonlighters, ghosters and tax evaders do. As Donnison argues, 
'Since you need skills, confidence and contacts to make alot of 
money from concealed jobs, most of this fraud is committed by the 
working population, not the people on social, security payments. ' 
(Donnison, 1982: 70-71) 
At the same time the double-bind already described serves to render 
claimants who fiddle more vulnerable than moonlighting employees, because 
the claimant's economic position is weaker and involves greater dependence 
on collusive employers and, as will be argued below, greater likelihood of 
being investigated by regulatory agencies. 
Perhaps because of these harsher facts of life for claimants on the 
fiddle, strategies to minimise the chance of getting caught are uppermost 
in the minds of many fraudsters. For instance, most claimants I 
interviewed mentioned that it was certainly preferable to get work which 
did not involve national insurance 'cards', which would, they felt, increase 
their chances of getting caught. For this reason many female claimants 
; 
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resort to home-working, which is notoriously badly paid yet feels 'safe' 
from the claimants' perspective. Jobs involving sewing skirts and stuffing 
soft toys therefore keep women claimants in the home, engaging in 
monotonous yet domestically suitable tasks for very low wages. 
Marginalization, exclusion and exploitation all reinforce each other, and 
make comfortable profits for employers, arguably on the backs of both 
taxpayer and benefit claimants alike through the undercutting of 
legitimate firms and adequate wage levels. 
Other jobs which involve a minimum of record keeping on the part of 
employers are equally convenient for working claimants. Seasonal work, 
whether on farms or the holiday catering trade, offers opportunities for 
claimants to earn cash, albeit spasmodically, on a fairly anonymous basis. 
In reality they remain vulnerable because anonymity is illusory: as 
seasonal work is 'targetted' as a likely area of fraud, employers are often 
approached by investigators. Nevertheless, this type of work remains 
popular despite often appalling conditions. For example, in rural areas 
'spud bashing' (harvesting potatoes), and fruit-picking involves back- 
breaking labour for small reward. It seems a measure of the desperation 
of benefit claimants that such unrewarding labour is sought at all. 
Jobs such as 'spud-bashing' seem to be allocated on the basis of 
willingness and being 'in the know' as a result of a network of personal 
contacts. Although seasonal workers such as these now have to fill in more 
paperwork than previously, giving false names and information may simply 
circumvent attempts to keep track of casual employees. Employers provide 
transport to farms, collecting workers from certain pick-up points, and, 
according to fraudsters interviewed, rarely 'grass' on workers known to be 
fiddling social security. As will be seen below, (Chapter 5(2)), the 
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anonymous tip-off is the greatest enemy of these fiddlers. Once approached 
by investigators, employers are obliged to comply and give full accounts 
of dates worked by claimants and wages paid to them. 
In keeping with the theme of casualisation and minimum record keeping, 
the building and catering trades offer scope for supplementary benefit 
claimants to work on a part-time or irregular basis. As mentioned above, 
claimants appear to form a source of menial labour at the lower end of the 
occupational ladder. They are more likely to work as general site labourers 
than skilled plasterers, plumbers, bricklayers and carpenters. In the 
catering and licensed trades they are likely to work as part-time bar 
staff, waitresses and cleaners. For female claimants these jobs are more 
readily combined with the demands of bringing up infants and school-age 
children. A relatively recent development enabling additional commission- 
based employment for women is the 'party plan' selling scheme. One woman, 
'Terry', indicated to Harrison (1983) how such schemes worked: 
'I've always got to do casual jobs, with no cards. If I did a 
regular job with cards, I'd get caught. I started doing 
demonstrations for a pottery firm - you know, in people's houses. 
.... You had to use your own car and your own petrol. You didn't 
get any wage, just commission, 12%, on what you sold. If you 
damaged any of the pots, they took it out of your commission. ' 
(Harrison, 1983: 152) 
It is significant that Terry later worked as a barmaid and homeworker, 
with little financial success and much physical and emotional strain. One 
lone mother of three I interviewed emphasised the fear of getting caught: 
'Working is dodgy now, with more tracing through national insurance 
cards. There seemed more casual work in the past. ' 
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Speaking, (in 1986), in an area of high unemployment, she clearly 
believed that for her, the opportunities to work 'on the side' were limited. 
This is borne out in evidence which suggests that 
'.. the jobless blackspots of the North are the least fertile ground 
for the hidden economy. If it is a disease, it it more contageous 
in the still bouyant South than in the cash-starved North. ' 
(Rawnsley, 1985) 
At the same time there is evidence that, in national terms, casualised, 
part-time and low-paid work is increasing as the current economic 
recession deepens (Low Pay Unit, 1987). In addition tba growing trend 
towards payment by commission rather than wages or salary has eased 
the financial and administrative 'burden' on employers, who are no longer 
responsible for the deduction of tax and national insurance: persons 
receiving commission only are usually classed as self-employed rather than 
as employees. At the same time, commission-based jobs (whether selling 
pottery, underwear, double-glazing or collecting debt and hire-purchase 
payments), appear to offer a casualised form of 'self-employment' for 
claimants looking for work on the side. It seems to be popular because of 
flexibility in hours worked and minimal official record keeping. But once 
more it can be argued that this form of work serves the interests of the 
firms and agencies involved at the expense, literally, of individuals who 
would surely rather seek secure, protected, legal, full-time employment. 
If it is the case that economic recession is creating casualised, 
vulnerable and part-time jobs, then it seems that supplementary benefit 
claimants who seek to add to their income (illegally) by working on the 
side will be increasingly forced into these lowest paid, least secure and 
least desirable jobs available in both the formal and informal economies, 
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This situation serves to exploit and further marginalise benefit claimants 
who fiddle, and gives rise to the added fear of financial and possibly 
custodial punishment should thF. -y get caught. 
It is apparent from the discussion so far that the vast majority of 
cases of benefit fraud b, 'working while claiming' are both unsophisticated 
and risky, involving less 'technique' on the part of the fraudster than 
many of the- tax frauds discussed above. But one fraudster interviewed 
utilized many skills in the commission of working and claiming fiddles 
which indicate a level of sophistication on a par with tax fraud. Mark is 
a well educated young man li; ing in London. Because of the high cost of 
living, he found himself unable to earn enough money, (on a regular basis), 
to rent adequate accommodation. However, supplementary benefit payments 
coupled with earnings enabled him to live decently. He managed to avoid 
detection by the D. H. S. S. by using the complexity of the benefit system and 
its overworked staff to his own advantage. His technique involved working 
full time in a variety of jobs: office work, though poorly paid, was 
acceptable so long as he could leave the office to sign on fortnightly. At 
the time of the interview (in 1986), he was working as a painter and 
decorator which, although physically demanding, offered better pay. 
He explained that although contact with Social Security offices is 
minimal, particularly since home visiting has all but ceased for new 
claims, in time 'the D. H. S. S. paperwork catches up with you'. If he received 
a letter requesting him to attend the local Social Security office for 
interview, he felt it wise to cease claiming, but took care to do so in an 
'above board' manner. He explained to the D. H. S. S. clerk, (falsely), that he 
had written to them 'over a week ago' to let them know he had found work, 
and went an to query 'Haven't you had my letter? ' Mark used a pleasant 
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approach to D. H. S. S. staff in which he sympathised, (genuinely) with their 
intolerable workload which, he said, must explain the 'mislaid' letter 
telling them of his changed circumstances. No action was ever taken 
against him, although if he felt that the suspicions of the D. H. S. S. or 
Inland Revenue were aroused, (official letters requesting details of former 
employment or past addresses, for instance), then the easiest solution was 
to 'disappear'. This meant changing his address on a fairly regular basis, 
but he found no problem in so doing. Mark's charm and intelligence clearly 
enabled him to work and claim benefit in a systematic manner without 
attracting the attentions of D. H. S. S. officials. By playing the system, 
realising its weaknesses, Mark has so far evaded detection and the 
attentions of the Inland Revenue too: he remains technically a 'ghost' as 
well as a working claimant. Marks appearance and demeanour did not fit 
the 'scrounger' stereotype, but his actions would certainly be represented 
by many commentators as evidence of the cunning and greed attributed to 
that stereotype. Significantly, his justifications for fiddling are 
consistent with those offered by all other claimants I spoke to who were 
'working on the side', and they derive from frustration, poverty and 
hardship rather than from greed (see section 2(b) below). 
Before analysing this form of fraud it is necessary to outline how 
supplementary benefit entitlement for a family, (consisting of husband, 
wife and dependent children), is calculated. As already mentioned, the 
family forms the key assessment unit upon which the D. H. S. S. bases its 
calculations of benefit payable (Chapter 2(b)). If a husband and wife 
separate, they become two assessment units, and each can then claim 
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benefit for him/herself and any dependant children living with him/her. 
Similarly, in the case of an unmarried parent, s/he can claim for his/her 
needs and those of the child. But under the Supplementary Benefits Act 
1976, a man is legally liable to maintain his wife and children, (including 
illegitimate children), and in the same way a wife is liable to maintain 
her husband and children (Lynes, 1985). For this reason the D. H. S. S. 
recover as much money as possible from the 'liable relative' in order to 
minimise the amount paid from public funds. As a result, when a separated 
wife claims benefit for the first time she may be 
'questioned in some detail about the circumstances of her 
separation. Such inquiries may be necessary to enable the D. H. S. S. 
to decide what action, if any, should be taken to induce the 
husband to fulfil his obligations. ' (Lynes, 1985: 212) 
Liable relative fraud may take two forms, both of which are enabled by the 
D. H. S. S. emphasis upon the ideal-type nuclear family as the key assessment 
unit for the purposes of supplementary benefit 
First, fictitious (or 'collusive') desertion. 
This may arise when 
'the wife denies knowledge of her husband's whereabouts although 
he is in fact living with her, or his temporary absence has been 
arranged to enable her to claim benefit. '(ibid) 
The couple therefore collude in falsely stating that desertion has taken 
place, so enabling the 'lone' parent to claim benefit in their own right 
thus (fraudulently) increasing the family income. 
As will be seen below, the justifications for this form of fraud are 
financial. It is frequently the case that collusive desertion occurs in 
times of financial difficulty for families. It offers the family involved 
263 
an extra source of income, supplementary benefit, to pay off accumulated 
debts and so provides a temporary escape from dire money problems. Once 
again, this form of fraud can be seen to arise from desparation rather 
than greed. 
Second, cohabitation. 
Cohabitation, more recently termed 'living together', cases can involve 
more complex issues which arise from the assumptions made by the D. H. S. S. 
concerning such relationships. A couple's reasons for living together are 
not necessarily economically motivated, yet the D. H. S. S. assumes that an 
economic relationship exists between couples whom they adjudge to be 
'living together as husband and wife'. Within the welfare state, as 
elsewhere in British society, the relationship between men and women is 
assumed to be that of breadwinner and dependant respectively (Smart and 
Smart, 1978; Wilson, 1977). The error of such assumptions is evidenced by 
one lone mother of three children I interviewed, Carol, who had lived with 
her (divorced and working) boyfriend: 
'It wasn't wrong. He didn't give me any money so my committments 
still stood and I needed my benefit. It was really me keeping him! ' 
(Carol). 
Clearly the breadwinner/dependant relationship did not exist in this case. 
Nevertheless, had the D. H. S. S. been aware of her domestic situation, a 
'husband and wife' relationship, (based on subjective assessments of shared 
expenses, stability of the relationship, 'public appearance' and sexual 
relations), would have been assumed (Esam et. al., 1985; Lynes, 1985). As a 
result Carol's benefit order book, together with her financial independence, 
would have been confiscated despite the fact that the man she lived with 
made no financial contribution to Carol or to her children. 
0 
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In the eyes of many feminists, the living together rule which creates 
this category of fraud is in itself tantamount to assuming payment by men 
for women's sexual and domestic services, a form of prostitution (Wilson, 
1983; Fairbairns, 1985). But such rules are perfectly understandable when 
located within the operation of a Welfare State based upon the principles 
of Beveridge. These principles need to be examined in order to place in 
political, economic and social policy context the treatment of women on 
supplementary benefit in general, and that of female benefit fraudsters in 
particular. 
The Beveridge Report published in 1942 provided the blueprint for the 
postwar Welfare State. Whilst recognising the importance of women's 
arduous and unpaid labour in the home it nonetheless rested upon pre-war 
assumptions concerning the family (Wilson, 1980). Distinctions were drawn 
between married and unmarried women: 
'The attitude of the housewife to gainful employment outside the 
home is not and should not be the same as that of the single woman. ' 
(Beveridge, 1942: 49) 
In putting a 'premium on. marriage' Beveridge saw married women's role as 
'ensuring the continuance of the British race and of British ideals in the 
world' (ibid: 52). Insurance classes reflected distinctions between married 
and single, men and women. In terms of benefits paid out, single men and 
women were treated equally, but benefits for married persons were gender- 
specific (Allatt, 1981). The postwar welfare consensus rested upon a belief 
in the contribution principle which, in turn, assumed not only female 
dependancy, but also male life-long employment. Sickness and unemployment 
were assumed to be transient, merely short breaks in the breadwinner's 
insurance contributions. By the late 1970's, economic stagnation and mass 
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unemployment had seriously weakened such principles (Mishra, 1984; Esam 
et. al., 1985). 
Demographic changes and alternative family strictures have also 
challenged the original Beveridge conception. With an ageing population, 
lifetime breadwinner contributions do not prove sufficient to finance 
retirement pensions for an increasing number of elderly people over longer 
periods of time. Additionally, the dramatic upturn in divorce in the early 
1970's created a new phenomenon, the single parent family, whose numbers 
doubled between 1961 and 1983. There are now over one million single 
parent families in Britain, the vast majority being headed by females, over 
half of whom rely on supplementary benefit (Annual Abstract of Statistics 
1985; Social Trends No. 16,1986). As Beveridge assumed the universality of 
the nuclear family (with wife at home, husband at work), his plans did not 
include provision for single parents (Esam et. al., 1985). 
There are two important conclusions to be drawn here: first that the 
Welfare State itself (as well as informal social norms), supports the 
existence of an ideal-type nuclear family that does not represent the way 
in which an increasing number of women live. The second issue relates to 
women and poverty: supplementary benefit, widely held to be the 'safety 
net' within the Social Security system is designed to ensure that 'nobody 
need fall below a minimum level of income which is intended to cover basic 
needs' (Lynes, 1985). Official definitions of poverty frequently use 
supplementary benefit level as an indicator of the 'poverty line' (Holman, 
1978). Therefore it can be concluded that increasing numbers of women are 
living on the poverty line simply as a result of their inability to fulfil 
their role in the economic marriage of breadwinner/dependant, assumed to 
be the norm since Beveridge (Smart and Smart, 1978; Wilson, 1977). 
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Women with children who claim supplementary benefit suffer a series 
of doutle binds in a social security system dominated by the assessment 
unit o: ' the nuclear family. Hilary Land (1985) has argued that the 
conditions under which men receive maintenance from the state reflect the 
goal of maintaining work incentives whereas the conditions under which 
mothers receive maintenance from the state are determined by the need to 
keep them performing unwaged 'caring' work for their families. But 
additional disincentives operate upon lone mothers which form an important 
background against which benefit fraud must be set. First, the 'obstacle 
course' presented to lone mothers first claiming supplementary benefit is 
daunting, stigmatising and degrading (see section (b) below for analysis 
of welfare rationing and stigma as justifications for fraud). Second, 
contrary to Land's argument, single mothers, for the first year of their 
claim, before the higher long-term rates of benefit become payable, are 
effectively subject to the same work incentive, (through low 'basic' scale 
rates of benefit), as are the unemployed. Third, it is significant that the 
only advantage which single parents enjoy is a higher disregard on their 
earnings than other groups of claimants. This rule, however. may be seen 
as confirming the inadequacy of the benefits paid to single parents and 
the necessity to supplement them with part-time work. 
Crucially, for women, inducements to work part-time serve to maintain 
the inferior and disposable status of females in a dual labour market. At 
the same time the necessity for additional income acts as a powerful 
motive and justification for fraud. If work is not readily available, then 
forms of fraud which involve cohabitation and liable relatives may offer 
an alternative form- of fiddle (Cook, 1987). It is hardly surprising, then, 
that single parent status is socially regarded as a transient phase for 
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women, because 'sooner or later it is likely, and even hoped, that a mother 
will solve her problems by marrying again' (Atkins and Hoggett, 1984: 98). 
In so doing she will solve society's problems too, in reducing welfare 
state expenditure and recreating a 'good family' (see Chapters 3 and 6). 
Women on welfare benefits can also be seen to suffer doubly as a 
result of their gender and working class situation (Harrison, 1983; 
Beltram, 1984). Initially they are often dependant on poorly paid men, 
thereafter upon the 'safety net' of welfare state provision. The operation 
of 'liable relative' cases serves in practice to force women, once more, 
into financial dependence upon men from whom they have separated. The 
position of women on supplementary benefit has been well summarised as 
follows: 
'The harsh earnings rules, low pay and 'liable relative' and 
cohabitation tests place obstructions in the way of women single 
parents who wish to work or enter any kind of friendship. They must 
either make a dramatic change - go to work full-time or set up joint 
home with a man - or stay as they are. Most women single parents and 
their children face the choice between poverty and dependence. ' 
(Esam, Good and Middleton, 1985: 65-6) 
Against this background of privation and dependency, this category of 
supplementary benefit fraud could be seen as an alternative path for some 
women who seek both financial independence (albeit through relatively 
meagre state benefits), and an emotional /sexual relationship with a man. 
For such women the financial gain from cohabitation which is assumed 
by the D. H. S. S. is frequently illusory. As Carol, quoted above, indicated, an 
emotional and sexual relationship does not necessarily involve a man 
giving money to a woman. In this particular case her boyfriend was 
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divorced and paid over a sizeable proportion of his wages in the form of 
maintenance to his ex-wife and children. The D. H. S. S. regulations 
concerning cohabitation, as argued above, assume rot only traditional 
breadwinner-dependant roles between men and women, but also a traditional 
'ideal' form of nuclear family which fails to come to terms with the 
realities of divorce and single parenthood. 
When they fail to adhere to social mores with regard to sexual 
relationships, poorer women living on supplementary benefit are subject to 
double regulation, first informally by neighbours, community and through 
the imagery and rhetoric of the media. Second, they are regulated formally 
through the rules of entitlement to benefit operated by the D. H. S. S. As a 
result it can be argued that poorer women whose lifestyle, family style 
and behaviour is seen as deviant are effectively criminalized when they 
violate the cohabitation rule. 
In analysing the various techniques by which benefit claimants may 
defraud the state, this category is less straightforward than other forms 
of fraud because, (as will be seen in section 2(b) below), the motivation 
of financial gain is not always present. Another important distinction 
involved in this category of fraud centres upon the claimant being 
regarded as a fraudster by virtue of his/her domestic and personal 
circumstances rather than by engaging in a purely financial transaction 
as, for instance, in the case of working while claiming. Although there are 
undoubtedly women who . 
da gain financially from cohabitation with 
(working) men, this is not necessarily the case. In addition, this category 
of fraud more than any other demonstrates the capacity of the welfare 
state to police the private arena of a claimants life and personal 
relationships under the veil of the prevention of fraud and abuse (see 
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Chapter 6 below). One may well ask, as Donnison does, 'How on earth did 
the State get into all this? ' (Donnison, 1982: 109). The answer lies in the 
household means test for the poor in which the traditional nuclear family 
pattern is first assumed, then, if not in evidence, actively promoted, 
through the stigma, deterrence and investigation methods used in the 
policing of female claimants. It is within this context that the 
commission of fraud by women on welfare must be located. 
This category of fraud encompasses a variety of activities, all of 
which are bound up with the claimants' response to lack of permanent 
accommodation. The term 'itinerant' implies vagrancy, yet supplementary 
benefit claimants so termed are rarely wilful vagrants. More often, as Lord 
Scarman noted, homelessness is accompanied by 'unemployment, marital 
breakdown, poverty, ill-health or the disabilities of old age' (Guardian, 
6.1.87. ). In recent years concern about this form of fraud has increased, 
probably due to the dramatic rise in numbers of claimants living 
temporarily in bed and breakfast accommodation effectively subsidised by 
the D. H. S. S.. However, as the Social Security Advisory Committee noted, 
'claimants have turned, for one reason or another and in increasing 
numbers to board and lodging accommodation not from choice, but 
because they have no alternative. ' (C. H. A. R., 1986: 145) 
Nonetheless government concern about fraud and abuse by claimants in such 
accommodation had, in September 1982, culminated in 'Operation Major'. The 
link between this ruthless pusuit of the homeless poor and the desire for 
maximum publicity for the D. H. S. S' anti-fraud campaign has been well 
documented (Franey, 1983; Smith, 1985). It may be argued that an emphasis 
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on the homeless 'scrounger' is another example of implicit distinctions 
being drawn between the allegedly undeserving poor (vagrants, workshy- 
unemployed and some single parent families), and the deserving poor, (the 
elderly, sick and handicapped for instance). The historical roots of suc2 
distinctions can be traced back to the Poor Law, yet remain influential in 
the representations of the poor in the 1980's (as argued in Ch&pter 3 
above). 
Not all commentators agree with amplified assessments of the extent 
of this form of fraud provided by media and right wing political voices. 
Former D. H. S. S. Under Secretary Geoffrey Beltram told the Public Accounts 
Committee in 1983 that 
'this kind of itinerant fraud is not in fact one of the most serious 
areas of fraud for us, simply because of the limited number of 
people involved nationally. ' (H. C. 102,1983: para 21) 
This is perhaps borne out in Table4: 1 (above) where itinerant fraud 
constituted only 6.7% of cases considered for prosecution in 1984/5. 
Techniques employed in this category of fraud are, broadly, of two 
types. First, a homeless claimant may visit more than one Social Security 
office in the same day, (possibly giving false names), and claim the daily 
N. F. A. (No Fixed Address) rate of benefit at each. Currently 14.20 is paid, 
for meals only, on a daily basis to those sleeping rough (C. H. A. R., 
1986: 38). In certain areas, London and Glasgow for instance, the 
opportunities for this form of fraud have been curtailed by the existence 
of Special Offices to which the homeless and those in lodging houses are 
sent. Procedures for dealing with claims are very different in these 
special offices which have no appointment system and are characterised by 
an emphasis on establishing the claimant's identity and 'Unemployment 
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Review'. These features, according to former D. H. S. S. Under Secretary Lynda 
Chalker, are geared towards 'greater control of the fraud and abuse which 
occurs in a proportion of these cases'. (C. H. A. R., 1986: 97). However, 
pragmatic factors, such as an average waiting time approaching five hours, 
also serve to restrict this type of fiddle (ibid). 
A second type of fraud involves a claimant with, 3ut a permanent home 
engaging in a collusive fiddle with a landlord of bed and breakfast 'hotel' 
or lodgings to whom s/he may have been referred by the D. H. S. S.. This type 
of fiddle was the object of Operation Major in Oxford where landlords of 
D. H. S. S. approved lodging houses falsely confirmed claimants' residence at 
their property (for a fee), and took a proportion of their benefit 
payments in order that homeless claimants could, falsely, receive in excess 
of the N. F. A. rate of benefit which pays for meals only (New Society, 
27.1.83: 141). The landlords, Cronin and Patel, who made vast sums from 
exploiting claimants and D. H. S. S. alike were, however, not prosecuted for 
their part in such frauds in Oxford - Cronin appeared as a prosecution 
witness instead. Despite the fact that a claimant may not gain as much 
from such frauds as a collusive landlord, this form of fiddle is regarded 
as an extremely serious one by the D. H. S. S. and courts alike, often 
attracting prosecution under the Theft Act which enables harsher 
punishments than under the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976 
(N. A. C. R. O. , 1986) . 
In identifying the techniques involved in what has been termed 
'itinerant fraud' it remains essential to locate the actions of these 
claimants in the context of their extremely vulnerable social and economic 
position. The homeless have for centuries constituted one of the most 
powerless and disadvantaged groups in our society. The responses to the 
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so-called 'hippy commune' in the summers of 1985 and 1986 indicates the 
hostility of Britain's control culture to groups who reject mainstream 
miterial values (Vincent-Jones, 1986). At the same time this particular 
group's status as benefit claimants was the subject of vociferous 
condemnation, both in parliament and in the tabloid press. Paradoxically, 
many of Britain's homeless poor do not reject mainstream material values 
and are, as Scarman noted, the victims of economic and domestic 
circumstances which have rendered them powerless. These economic and 
social factors underpin the justifications for benefit fraud offered by 
h3meless claimants (see analysis in section 2(b) below). 
4) Instrument of payment fraud. 
This category of fraud does not appear as a distinct classification in 
Table 4: 1 as it is subsumed under the heading of 'other static fraud'. 
'Instrument of payment fraud' is itself a composite term for a variety of 
fiddles associated with the theft, alteration or forgery of the claimant's 
'instrument of payment'. These are primarily the supplementary benefit 
order books and giros which are encashed through post offices. 
Techniques involved in these forms of fraud vary. A local example 
involving several such instrument of payment frauds recently came to light 
when ten (female) claimants were prosecuted. The local press detailed how 
the women had swapped orders in different order books, reported the books 
missing or stolen and subsequently received replacements from the D. H. S. S., 
which they also cashed. 'Crude alterations' were made to the books as, 
according to an investigator, 'they (the women] became too confident of 
getting away with the fraud' (Shropshire Star, 16.4.86). Clearly these 
frauds were relatively unsophisticated and demonstrated the fraudsters' 
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ignorance of D. H. S. S. procedures and anti-fraud safeguards. For instance, 
many alterations to giros are easily recognised. As one senior D. H. S. S. 
official told the Public Accounts Committee, 'we have defences built into 
the Giro cheques against alteration'. A fraudster's initial confidence that 
s/he has 'got away with it' may be misplaced because although Post Office 
counter staff may cash giros with convincing but false signiatures, all 
allegedly lost and stolen giros and orders are thoroughly traced back 
after encashment (H. C. 102,1983). A fraudster may therefore be initially 
unaware that the offence has been detected 
It is important to remember that D. H. S. S. staff themselves have to 
make judgements about the 'genuineness' of claimants who alledge that their 
giro has not arrived, has been lost or stolen. Suspicions are bound to be 
aroused if such assertions are made by the same claimant on more than one 
occasion. Therefore those who attempt instrument of payment fraud are more 
liable to get caught, (particularly if engaging in several frauds), unless 
their fiddles are highly organised. It is perhaps a measure of the 
desperation of these claimants that they even attempt relatively crass 
frauds of this kind. As will be argued below (section 2 (b)), these forms 
of fraud should be seen in the material context of poverty, despair and 
degradation in which they take place. 
Table 1 indicates that there are additional forms of benefit fraud 
which, although statistically not as important as those already discussed, 
need to be analysed in terms of the fraudsters' techniques. They all 
involve different means of 'knowingly making a false statement in order to 
obtain benefit', which is the essence of the illegal act involved in 
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benefit fraud (N. A. C. R. O., 1986). As discussed above, working 'on the side', 
cohabitation, fictitious desertion, itinerant and instrument of payment 
frauds all involve making false statements, whether on initially claiming 
benefit, on review or on cashing payments at a Fost office. But false 
statements relating to other aspects of a claim can also give rise to 
fraud. Such false statements refer to the lucerne and outgoings of the 
claimant, or the 'assessment unit'. For instance, concealment of income 
from occupational pensions, employers sick pay, grants, redundancy 
payments, Family Income Supplement and Child Benefit constitutes an 
offence for the same reasons as working on the side. The same applies to 
concealing capital resources. In addition, (currently) persons whose 
savings and capital exceed £3,000 are not eligible for supplementary 
benefit (Lynes, 1985). Clearly, failure to declare savings in excess of 
this amount has important consequences as one unemployed claimant, Brian, 
realised. 
In order to obtain supplementary benefit Brian engaged in what is 
termed 'deprivation of resources'. This involved temporarily 'giving' his 
capital, (around £4,000), to relatives for the duration of his 
unemployment. Although statements that he had no capital were technically 
false, had the D. H. S. S. been aware of his actions they would have 
assumed the capital to be his and so withdrawn his supplementary benefit. 
Another claimant, Heather, did not declare regular payments from her 
father. She was a lone mother and regarded her 'allowance' from him as an 
essential means of helping to make ends meet. Ironically, in Heather's case 
these payments would have been quite legitimate if earmarked for providing 
a 'leisure or amenity item' such as school fees, private medical treatment, 
cigarettes, sweets, holidays or home decorating (Lynes, 1985). 
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Less ambiguous in their commission and effects are fiddles such as 
those committed by Anne, who did not always inform the D. H. S. S. of the 
money she received from her ex-husband, (or 'liable relative' as he is 
technically known). Her statements in obtaining benefit were false and 
knowingly made, yet as will be seen below she justified her actions by 
reference to the cisruption to her benefit payments that would ensue if 
she dJ. declare this income. 
False statements can also refer to a claimants outgoings which are 
equally essential for an accurate assessment of supplementary benefit. 
For instance, falsely inflated figures of rent payable, (and possibly 
forged rent book), can lead to an over-claiming of benefit. Similarly, to 
claim for children or adults who are not in fact being maintained within 
the assessment unit is 'also fraudulent. 
Another technique which does not readily fit into earlier categories 
of fraud is that of multiple claiming. This form of fraud appears to be 
increasingly evident since the D. H. S. S. policy reducing the home-visiting of 
claimants and the subsequent introduction from 1982 of postal claims as 
the standard method of collecting information about claimants' 
circumstances (N. A. C. R. O., 1986). However, the effects of deepening economic 
recession, mass unemployment and a consequent upsurge in the numbers of 
supplementary benefit claimants in the 1980's should not be overlooked as 
inflential factors. The switch to postal claiming alone may be 
insufficient to explain the growth of fraud by multiple claims. This fraud 
involves a claimant, (or several claimants), applying for supplementary 
benefit from a series of false addresses and/or in a number of false 
names. The techniques involved were described in press coverage of the 
case of a Wolverhampton couple who were prosecuted in 1985: 
276 
'They had a network of 19 false names and 10 accommodation addresses 
in Wolverhampton, Kidderminster, Leicester and Coventry ... And 
they made regular trips to sign on at benefit offices and collect 
Giro cheques at the various addresses. ' (Express and Star, 15.2 85) 
In this case the figure of benefit defrauded was large - t50,000 according 
to press reports - and the techniques involved were complex, involving a 
high degree of organization. 
Finally, fraudsters may falsify details relating to their domestic 
circumstances in order to claim benefit. Geoffrey Beltram gives examples 
of this form of fraud which can be associated with multi-occupied 
accomodation in which claimants falsely 'pose as householders' (Beltram, 
1984: 99). There are links implied here with ethnic minorities, but it 
should be noted that Beltran, is sensitive both to the problems of such 
minorities and to those of the D. H. S. S. staff who serve them. According to 
Beltran, some staff did make racist comments, some, (at best), appeared to 
lack sympathetic understanding, but others found genuine difficulty in 
dealing with claimants from a different cultural back ground whose 
circumstances, (for instance in relation to cohabitation and multi- 
occupation), did not conform to the typical 'family' catered for in the 
D. H. S. S. regulations. At the same time, Beltran, argues that the minorities' 
advisers may be unaware of those in their community who da commit fraud 
(ibid). Certainly it is not logical to assume that claimants from ethnic 
minorities never commit fraud, but racism (to which D. H. S. S. staff, like 
other members of society are subject), can serve to amplify the alleged 
'problem' of benefit fraud amongst ethnic minorities. This in turn may 
influence the extent and character of the policing of welfare for such 
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groups and so further distort public perceptions an the issue of 
'scrounging' and race (see Chapter 5). 
Summary of supplementary benefit fraud techniques 
Individuals who defraud the D. H. S. S. utilise a variety of techniques in 
order to gain illegal financial advantage from the state. Some techniques 
are identical to those involved in defrauding the Inland Revenue: for 
instance, moonlighting, ghosting and the falsification of statements of 
income and outgoings are the precise techniques used by tax fraudsters. 
But, significantly, the same actions may be both justified and perceived in 
differing ways. For instance, a businessman falsifying accounts may see 
his actions as a logical response to repressive state agencies (the 
Revenue Departments) and at the same time a reassertion of the inherent 
values of a capitalist society - entrepreneurial spirit and the creation of 
personal wealth. A benefit fraudster is more likely to cite poverty and 
the inadequacy of supplementary benefit levels as the prime motive for 
his/her actions. Both tax and benefit frauds are motivated by economic 
imperatives, but the interpretation of these motives by regulatory agencies 
and in the public rhetoric is entirely different (see Chapters 3 and 6). 
The opportunity structure available to benefit fraudsters is 
relatively restricted in comparison to the opportunities available to the 
tax evader. For the benefit fraudster opportunities to fiddle centre upon 
low-paid casualised work, manipulation of information on personal 
circumstances, and 'risky' activities such as fiddling giros and order 
books and multiple claiming. Furthermore, the financial gain available is 
far less, being based on the low and finite limits of the supplementary 
benefit scale rates. By contrast most froms of tax fraud offers greater 
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gains for less risk, both in terms of getting caught and in terms of 
severity of punishment meted out (see Chapter 5(3) below), 
When describing tieir techniques of fraud, almost all the fraudsters I 
interviewed invoked vocabularies of poverty, need, stigma and despair in 
justifying their actions. It was, for most of them, impossible to separate 
the means of benefit fraud from the allegedly legitimate ends which they 
felt it served. By contrast, tax fraudsters' accounts of their techniques 
reflect a more 'sporting' view of fraud, whereby the complexities of the 
taxation system are utilized in order to outwit the taxman. No matter how 
cunning the benefit 'raud, claimants are not perceived as engaged in a 
battle of wits with the D. H. S. S., or as victims of a complex system of 
social security benefits. The reasons for differential responses to tax and 
benefit fraud are not located in qualitative differences in the commission 
of the criminal acts described in this part of the Chapter. Rather, they 
are located in the social, economic and ideological context in which these 
acts take place. 
This analysis has, for pragmatic reasons, distinguished the techniques 
of fraudsters from their motives. Yet the 'means by which tax and benefit 
fraudsters fiddle the state and ends which they argue are being served are 
often closely linked within the justificatory rationales. Both the 'means' 
and 'ends' of the fiddle become conflated in the material context of 
poverty and the bureaucracy of welfare provision. It is therefore necessary 
to examine the self-justifications put forward by benefit fraudsters in the 
light of both 
(a)the knowledge of the techniques of fraud (already discussed), and 
(b)the conditions of existence of the fraudsters themselves. 
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(b) JUSTIFICATIONS. 
In conversations with supplementary benefit claimants the harsh 
realities of life on the poverty line become apparent. All supplementary 
benefit fraudsters I interviewed referred to the inadequacy of the scale 
rates of benefit payments when they spoke of their reasons for fiddling. 
Clearly it is essential when examining their self-justifications to take 
account of the broader socio-economic context in which fraud takes place. 
The common themes which emerged when questioning claimants about 
reasons for fiddling all relate to the material conditions under which 
they live: they incorporate the effects of being a 'claimant' on the 
individual's self-image, the effects of strained interactions with D. H. S. S. 
staff and negative societal reaction to them as welfare 'scroungers' in 
addition to purely economic motives. The themes which emerged may be 
analysed under the following headings: 
1)! Eiddling for necessities': the inadequacy of supplementary benefit 
levels. 
2)The nexus of mistrust and degra : claimant/staff relations, the 
interactions of D. H. S. S. offices, claimants' perceptions of their treatment 
and their 'scrounger' status. 
3)Swin, gs and roundabouts: Fiddling as a response to the vagaries of the 
benefit system. 
4)*Eyryone does it': the belief that we are 'all' an the fiddle. 
280 
1)'Fiddling for necessities'. 
'It's simply lack of money. You don't have enough to live on. 
You fiddle for necessities and don't look for any luxuries. ' 
(Carol, lone mother of three). 
Carol described her life on supplementary benefit as 'hell'. SYe first 
claimed benefit at the age of nineteen when she had separated from her 
first husband and returned to her parents' home with her baby daughter. 
Years later, when her second marriage broke down, she had to claim once 
more, this time as a mother of three children with her own rented home. 
But she had great difficulty managing on what she regarded as inadequata 
supplementary benefit payments from the D. H. S. S.: 
'The kids never had any new things: it was always rummage and 
second-hand.... I couldn't shop weekly, I just shopped to replace 
essential things..... At Christmas I took old toys down from the 
loft, did them up and re-wrapped them... I couldn't cope with 
Christmas, birthdays and new clothes. ' (Carol) 
Her experience is one shared by many families dependant upon 
supplementary benefit. According to a study conducted by the C. P. A. G. in 
which such comments are typical: 
'The real problem is making ends meet.. . Having to live from day to 
day. You can never plan anything... A constant struggle... It's just 
not enough to live on. ' (C. P. A. G., 1980.13) 
More recent research has confirmed that many of those forced to live on 
supplementary benefit are not held in the 'safety net' above the poverty 
line, but rather are living in. conditions of poverty, this being especially 
so in the case of families with dependant children (Beltram, 1984; Cooper, 
1985; George and Wilding, 1984). This is certainly the case if poverty is 
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defined in the manner advocated by the Supplementary Benefits Commission 
(in 1978) under its last Chairman David Donnison. -Their definition is 
worth quoting in full because of its relevance to tha experiences of the 
families described above: 
'To keep out of poverty, people must have an income which enables 
them to participate in the life of the comin nity. They must be able 
for example, to keep themselves reasonably well fed, and well enough 
dressed to maintain their self-respect and to attend interviews for 
jobs with confidence. Their homes must be reasonably warm; their 
children should not be shamed by the quality of their clothing; the 
family must be able to visit relatives, and give them something on 
their birthdays and at Christmas time; they must be able to read 
newspapers, and retain their membership of trades unions and 
churches. And they must be able to live in a way which ensures, 
so far as possible, that public officials, doctors, teachers, 
landlords and others treat them with the courtesy due to every 
member of the community. ' (Donnison, 1982: 8) 
In terms of this definition, which sees poverty as a relative concept, 
related to the lives and expectations of others in the community, all of 
the supplementary benefit claimants I have interviewed are certainly 
living in poverty. 
The justification of poverty was invoked by Barry, a 26 year-old 
unemployed father of four who had only been able to obtain casual work 
since he left school at the age of 16. Barry and his wife spoke to me of 
not being able to afford new shoes for their three elder children, (all 
under seven years old). When, two years ago, the D. H. S. S. refused them a 
grant for nappies for their newly born baby, Barry took a week's casual 
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work on a local farm 'spud bashing' and continued to claim supplementary 
benefit. A neighbour 'grassed' on him and he was prosecuted by the D. H. S. S. 
(see Chapter 5(3)). Barry still feels that benefit fraud is justified so 
long as the cash defrauded is used 'to buy food, clothes and shoes for the 
kids' as, he argues, was the case for him. But he condemned 'fiddles for 
beer money'. He clearly felt that it was justifiable to fiddle for need but 
not for 'greed'. 
Normative considerations therefore seem to operate for many benefit 
claimants who delineate justifiable 'fiddling for necessities' in contrast 
to the unacceptable fiddling of those whom it is felt do not need the 
cash. Another example of such considerations was provided by a self- 
employed builder who explained that when he was out of work he had net a 
man who was 'on the social' but working on the side as a carpenter. This 
was felt to be reprehensible because the carpenter was suffering no 
financial hardship and, furthermore, 'he could have got a job if he'd 
wanted to - he was just greedy'. In another instance an add job man who 
was claiming benefit was 'shopped' by his own Aunty, not only because he 
had allegedly overcharged her, but also because his standard of living was 
still high despite his 'unemployment', and so even his family considered 
him to be 'greedy'! But for the vast majority of claimants, certainly for 
all of the individuals and families I interviewed, supplementary benefit 
proves insufficient income to provide the 'necessities' in terms of 
clothing, a good varied diet, warmth and household amenities. Under such 
circumstances fiddling for those necessities becomes a logical and 
pragmatic response. 
Other research involving analysis of the material conditions of 
supplementary benefit claimants, (and their own perceptions of those 
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conditions), arrives at similar conclusions regarding the material and 
psychological deprivation they suffer (Marsden, 1982; Campbell, 1984; 
Harrison, 1983). But, it is true to say that not all benefit claimants 
believe themselves to be living in the depths of poverty: 'one or two still 
had some residue of past affluence, others help from relatives, to ward off 
hardship' (Beltram, 1984(b): 140). 
Nevertheless, the effects of living at this level of income for any 
length of time are dire, and mass unemployment is pushing ever greater 
numbers of individuals and families into poverty. For instance, Manchester 
City Council(1986) calculated that unemployment, the main reason for the 
growth of poverty in the city, had more than doubled since 1978. The 
unemployment rate then stood at 10.6%, but by 1985 had reached 23.6%. Over 
a similar period the percentage of the citfts population dependant upon 
supplementary benefit had increased from 18% in 1979 to 31% in 1984 
(ibid). In this structural context of economic decline it becomes difficult 
to argue that poverty is the result of individual idleness, mismanagement 
and personal failing. Yet the consequences for individuals and families on 
supplementary benefit are inescapable. It is particularly significant that 
a former high ranking D. H. S. S. official should admit that, 
'It seemed clear that families with dependant children could not 
reasonably be expected to maintain an acceptable standard of life 
on incomes at, or close to, the ordinary basic S. B. level for any 
considerable length of time, unless they also had help from other 
sources... Indeed, without extra support they would generally 
continue to be hard pressed when, after a year on S. B., they 
qualified for the higher long term rate, a boon so far denied to 
the unemployed. ' (Beltram, 1984: 84) 
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Furthermore, it has been asserted that levels of supplementary benefit are 
in fact declining in relation to the average wage, and that the numbers of 
children in poverty has tripled since 1975 (Walker and Walker, eda., 1987) 
The majority of these new poor are the children of the unemployed 
(Piachaud, 1987). 
The justification for benefit fraud as fiddling for necessities 
therefore takes on added meaning when the realities of life on 
supplementary benefit are comtemplated. Such realities are not appreciated 
by the right wing critics and politicians who represent life on welfare 
benefits as cosseting and encouraging idleness (see Chapter 3). Yet two 
conservative M. P. s, (Matthew Parris and Piers Merchant), could not rise to 
the challenge of living comfortably on supplementary benefit for seven 
days, let alone the daunting prospect of 'dole' as a relatively permanent 
way of life. Three claimants recently prosecuted for supplementary fraud 
put the situation to me graphically in their comments upon the proceedings 
in a Magistrates' Court (see chapter 5(3)). One of them complained, 
'They don't live in the same world as us. They don't know what our 
life is like. ' 
Another agreed and added, 
'They're on another planet, mate. ' 
In their disadvantaged situation, (often with rent arrears, fuel debts and 
crippling 'club' payments), they responded by working 'on the side'. The 
response was seen as logical and the risks involved were accepted: 
'There are more getting caught, but you pay your money and take 
your choice, I suppose. ' 
Vocabularies of motive which stress poverty and necessity are not 
therefore merely 'excuses' for benefit fraud. The material conditions 
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(described here), indicate that poverty causes such fraud. But one 
problem arising from this observation is 'why is it that all supplementary 
benefit claimants do not engage in fraud? ' F ossible reasons derive from 
the diversity of people's individual responses to their material 
conditions, and the meanings which tley attach to them. For instance, 
Beltram noted that not all pensioners believed themselves to be poor - but 
some were cushioned from the worst effects of reliance on state benefits 
by savings or family support. In addition, some families' needs are greater 
than others: as noted above, those who suffer most from long periods on 
'safety net' levels of benefit are the long-term unemployed, particularly 
those who have children. Finally, as Box (1987) notes, responses to 
unemployment (and deprivation) depend on what this experience means to 
those suffering it, what is perceived as its likely duration, and what is 
beleived to have caused it (ibid: 158). Hence, not all inidividuals in the 
same circumstances will resort to lawbreaking. But that is not to say that 
the motives of those who do. are merely 'excuses'. On the basis of my 
interviews with benefit claimants (whether fiddling or not), most fraud is 
attributed to economic necessity which arises from harsh material 
conditions, which are worsening, particularly in the former industrial 
heartlands. 
Such conditions are well documented by Gofton and Gofton in their 
analysis of life in Consett, known locally as 'Giro City'. The authors 
detail how a culture of worklessness evolved, centred upon the D. H. S. S. 
economy (Gofton and Gofton, 1984). Empty shops, amusement arcades, and 
'cheap shops' (selling cut-price goods), co-exist with back street motor 
repairers, builders and painters. The unemployed find ways of 'making out' 
as the moonlighting 'dole-wallahs' who also serve to buttress the 
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employers of the formal economy by providing cheap and disposable labour. 
Although breaking the law, the authors argue 
'it's difficult to feel any moral indignation about it. 'What do you 
wat me to do? ' they say. 'In this world you've got to look after 
yourself'. ... They organise their lives around moves between full 
worklessness and 'fiddle jobs'. ' 
(Gofton and Gof ton, 1984: 282 
It could, nevertheless, be argued that care must be taken not to accept 
uncritically those rationales for fraud which cite economic imperatives, 
not least because this is also a justification frequently given by tax 
fraudsters for evasion. But in the light of evidence presented here, the 
privation suffered by supplementary benefit claimants is demonstrable - 
the same cannot be said of the alleged financial hardships of 'long- 
suffering' taxpayers. 
2)The nexus of mistrust and degradation. 
Justifications for benefit fraud may also be rooted in feelings of 
degradation and worthlessness created through the process of claiming and 
receiving supplementary benefit. Recent research has demonstrated the 
extent of such feelings amongst claimants (Cooper, 1985; Beltram, 1984; 
Foster, 1983). The existence of 'rationing' of welfare benefits is well 
documented (Foster, 1983; MacGregor, 1981; Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983). 
Rationing devices can include delays, lost files, failure to inform 
claimants of their full rights and the forbidding character of the benefit 
system itself. Whether by device or by mischance, such factors contribute 
to a framework within which claimants may feel 'guilty', even if they have 
committed no offence other than the sin of of being poor. 
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One claimant, (a lone mother being questioned about 'boyfriends' and 
how often they called), felt as if she was 'guilty until proven innocent'. 
When Carol initially claimed benefit on separating from her husband she 
had been angered and disgusted at her treatment by a visiting officer: 
'They wanted all the mucky details.... who I slept with, when and 
where and how many times. I'm surprised they didn't ask what 
position too... They didn't want to helg me. ' 
She felt she was being treated like a 'scrounger'. In these circumstances, 
she explained, her attitude toward committing fraud changed : 
'I thought "so what? They think I'm fiddling so I may as well bei"' 
Some time later when the opportunity to fiddle arose she took it, and her 
fiance unofficially moved into her home while she continued to claim 
benefit. However, she had enquired, on more than one occasion, about the 
cohabitation rule, but had been treated with great suspicion: 
'They told me that if I was even thinking about it to send my book 
in. I tried the C. A. B., but I had no information at all. ' 
In this case an official's mistrust, coupled with the claimant's belief that 
'they treat you like an imbecile', contributed to a situation in which the 
claimant felt that fraud was justifiable. 
It would be difficult to argue that the stigma suffered by claimants 
and the mistrust shown to them by D. H. S. S. staff is alone sufficient to 
explain why some claimants turn to fraud (see chapter 5(2) for discussion 
of D. H. S. S. policy and 'welfare rationing'). But, coupled with inadequate 
benefit levels, these factors may offer a contributory justification. 
Ironically, it is probably the concern to prevent fraud and abuse 
which leads D. H. S. S. staff effectively to label certain of their claimants 
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potential fraudsters and so possibly contribute towards a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. This has long been the case: 
'Officers seemed more anxious that they should not be taken in by 
a hard luck story than that they should fail to meet genuine need. ' 
(Sinf ield, 1970 : 233 ) 
More recently, Cooper (1985) noted the comments of the manager of an 
urban D. H. S. S. office who had been dealing with claimants since the days 
of the National Assistance Board (NAB): 
'I run a tight ship here, and I know how to do that because I've 
been in the business since the NAB days. In those days we did-n-. 
give anything out unless it was really needed and unless it was 
an honest, deserving claim. Now it's easy for claimants; too easy... 
I can tell you that it takes alot of pride out of the job, when 
you know that nine out of ten of your customers are fiddling 
you. What's more, welfare rights egg them on so you begin to feel 
you're anyone's mug. In this office we've a reputation for being a 
bit shrewd, a bit harder; that's deliberate. I tell all my staff 
to be on their watch and get all the information they can on 
people. There's just too much abuse. ' (Cooper, 1985: 13) 
These comments are interesting for a variety of reasons: first, the 
Manager appears to personalise the issue of fraud which he sees as making 
'mugs' of staff, taking away their 'pride'in the job and making 'fools' of 
them. This presents the staff-claimant relationship as adversarial. The 
effect of this personalisation is therefore to perceive interactions with 
claimants as a battle of wits, bearing in mind that the claimant is highly 
likely to be a cunning fraudster, (as nine out of ten are, according to 
this manager). Such comments appear to justify the belief of several 
28 
claimants I interviewed, that they were labelled 'scroungers' by the very 
fact that they wert: claiming supplementary benefit. Such beliefs are also 
supported when . advocates of 
'effort' refer to the receipt of social 
benefits as a 'mors: hazard' in itself (Parker, 1981) (see Chapter 3). 
Second, the D. H. S. S. office manager clearly makes distinctions between 
'deserving' and 'undeserving' (hence, suspicious), claims. Further 
observations noted by Cooper seem to indicate that staff are more likely 
to regard as 'deserving' those claimants who are from a middle class 
background (whether unemployed or not), the sick (unless suffering from 
'back trouble'), the disabled and the elderly. Therefore many single parent 
families and the unemployed may be unofficially categorised as potential 
'scroungers' by the staff who deal with their claims. But, it is important 
to recognise that these categorisations are not merely the product of 
D. H. S. S. staff prejudices: as Chapter 3 indicated, the legacy of the 1834 
Poor Law still informs images of the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor. As 
a result discourses about the morality and pathology of welfare recipients 
are 'naturalised' in the public rhetoric (Golding and Middleton, 1982). 
Although generalisations about staff/claimant relations would be 
difficult to make, (because, as Cooper indicates, there are sympathetic, 
caring and efficient staff too), it appears reasonable to assert that if 
claimants encounter staff who regard them as fiddlers, they may well lose 
self-esteem and become increasingly frustrated. Such frustration leads to 
loss of confidence in the supplementary benefit system which may provide 
a rationale for fiddling. For instance, many claimants I spoke to had been 
annoyed at what could be termed informal rationing or 'mucking about' 
(Foster, 1983). They referred to the refusal of Exceptional Needs Payments 
(E. A. P. s) seemingly unfairly or without explanation, delayed giros, lack of 
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explanation of entitlement and intrusive interviews. All contribute to a 
feeling of degradation, mistrust and mutual hostility between claimants 
and D. H. S. S. staff, which may make the commission of fraud more likely (see 
also discussion of benefit office conditions and adverse effects on take- 
up of benefits in Chapter 5(2) below). 
Third, the manager in question seems to regard it not only as a virtue 
to be 'hard' and intrusive towards the 'customer', but also as a necessity 
in view of the role of welfare rights agencies in 'egging them on' to 
claim. The payment of benefit is thus presented here not as a right but as 
a priviledge, conferred on the 'customers' by D. H. S. S. staff, once officals 
have been convinced of the honesty (and desert), of the claim. As 
knowledge confers power within this complex social security system, such 
knowledge is jealously guarded and thus the actvities of welfare rights 
advisers are resented. The rhetoric of the effort school of thought is 
evidently informing such attitudes towards welfare: for example, it is 
assumed that 'undeserving' claims can be deterred through the 'tests' 
informally administered by officials who make the claiming process as 
difficult as possible. Furthermore, the misgivings about claimants gaining 
all the benefits to which they are entitled could be seen to represent the 
fear that the principles of 'less eligibility' may be eroded and that the 
poor may thus 'enjoy their servitude' and dependancy (Boyson, 1978: 110). 
This 'hard' attitude is transmitted in staff-claimant interactions - 
claimants frequently used phrases like 'you'd think it was their own money' 
when describing to me the attitudes of benefit staff . In the light of 
Coopers observations this wpuld seem a common sentiment amongst 
claimants. This clearly signifies that feelings of mistrust and degradation 
are important elements in analysing the way in which many claimants 
291 
perceive the supplementary benefit system. Although D. H. S. S. staff are by 
no means uniformly hostile, Cooper's evidence suggests that the legacy of 
the harsh 'NAB days' dies hard. This legacy, like that of the Poor Law, 
gives rise to ideological contradictions which enable supplementary 
benefit claimants in the 1980's to be represented as idle, feckless and 
culpable (Boyson, 1976; Golding and Middleton, 1982). 
As a result, many claimants may feel they are stigmatised and 
degraded by the staff who administer welfare, and by 'society' in general, 
as evidenced in popular imagery of the'scrounger'. At the same time, the 
realities of mistrust and the scrounger mythology serve to shift official 
and popular discourses away from issues of poor take-up of benefits, poor 
service to claimants and, crucially, inadequate (and decreasing) levels of 
benefits. In this way the 'problem' of supplementary benefit fraud is being 
ideologically constructed, and alternative discourses suppressed. As 
Beltram (1985) notes, the D. H. S. S. 's policy and practice of policing 
supplementary benefit has important effects, for instance, 
'honest people who are deterred from claiming by publicity about 
scroungers, or fear of being asked distressing questions, or past 
experience of official incivility. ' (Beltram, 1985: 27) 
It is within this framework, I would argue, that fraud can be seen partly 
as a product of a staff-claimant nexus of distrust on the one side and, 
on the other, a feeling of degradation claimants feel as a result of being 
perceived as 'undeserving' scroungers. 
292 
3)Swings and roundabouts. 
The complex nature of tie supplementary benefit system itself may 
also contribute to the commission of fraud. Fraud may arise as much from 
omission as commission, and in many cases claimants fail to inform the 
D. H. S. S. of relevant ch; tnges in their circumstances for fear that a re- 
assessment of their entitlement would delay their benefit payments. This 
was the case for Anne who received maintenance payments from her husband 
very rarely indeed. On the few occasions that she did receive money from 
him, she did not always inform the D. H. S. S. because of the disruption this 
would cause: on informing the: i her entitlement would be reassessed and her 
benefit payments often delayed, leaving her temporarily without money. 
Anne justified not teling the D. H. S. S. about occasional maintenance 
payments in terms of 'swings and roundabouts': she felt that any advantage 
gained through this fiddle had previously been earned through the 
disadvantages she suffered while on irregular payments. 
A similar situation may arise in relation to part-time earnings. Brian 
was unemployed and had a part-time job, for one evening per week, and he 
declared any earnings when he signed on. As a result he was told to sign 
weekly as his earnings may vary. Although he explained that he earned 
identical amounts each week, he was required to produce verification 
weekly. His supplementary benefit was delayed and he often ran short of 
money. By the time his part-time job ended, his attitude towards the 
benefits system had changed; he indicated that in future he would probably 
not scrupulously declare any part-time earnings. 
The justification of 'swings and roundabouts' offered by claimants is 
an important contributory rationale, bearing in mind the primary cause of 
supplementary benefit fraud - poverty. It enables claimants to legitimise 
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their illegal gains from the welfare state in terms of the perceived 
failings of the operation of the welfare state itself. Effectively, such 
justifications shift the responsibility for fraud from the fraudster to the 
operation of the 'system', and certainly helps claimants who are on the 
fiddle to rationalise their actions. If they have suffered bureaucratic 
delay, if the whole benefit system was seen as collapsing under the strain 
of mass unemployment and staff cutbacks, if their levels of benefit are 
seen as inadequate, payments as at times unreliable and quality of service 
poor, then clearly fiddling will appear to be a legitimate response to a 
capricious system. 
The interplay of a variety of such justifications is well 
demonstrated by Harrison, who locates factors such as mutual mistrust and 
the vagaries of the benefit system within the context of deepening 
recession as Britain entered the 1980's: 
'The British social security system, never generous, became Scrooge- 
like, and acted as an incentive and a provocation to abuse. There 
was the widening gap between the basic rates of benefit and basic 
needs... and the even broader chasm between the rates and the level 
of expectations generated by the media. There was the often 
arbitrary denial of entitlement: if the system did not play fair 
with its dependants, it could hardly expect them to play fair in 
return. And there was the suspicion and scepticism about claims: 
if people were treated as potential scroungers even when they were 
honest, then they might as well be scroungers for real. ' 
(Harrison, 1983: 148) 
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4)'Emryone does it'. 
The belief that everyone is on the fiddle can also serve to reduce any 
anxiety that benefit fraudsters suffer when attempting to justify their 
actions. At the same time it makes fraud appear 'natural' and thus presents 
the fraudster's activities as less deviant. The belief that benefit fraud is 
widespread is a very popular one and was expressed by the majority of 
frausters I spoke to. For instance, in response to the question 'How many 
of your fellow claimants do you feel are fiddling? ', some of the answers 
were, 
'Many of them ... for their children, ' (Barry) 
'Everyone I know an Sup. Ben. is fiddling. ' (Carol) 
'Alot! '(Caroline) 
In response to a question on the apparently increasing number of D. H. S. S. 
prosecutions locally, one convicted fraudster commented wryly, 
'There's just more getting caught. ' 
It is widely acknowledged that it is impossible to estimate the scale 
of supplementary benefit fraud with any confidence (Harrison. 1983; 
DT. A. C. R. O., 1986; C. P. A. G., 1981: H. C. 102 1983/4). But it can reasonably be 
argued that it is not insignificant in scope, but hardly merits the 
political over-reaction which has occured since the 1970's (Harrison, 1983; 
Donnison, 1982; Levi, 1987). Unfortunately when claimants use the rationale 
that 'everyone' is fiddling, they unwittingly play into the hands of those 
right wing critics of the welfare state who seek to maintain the imagery 
of the idle, feckless scrounger (see Chapter 3). This form of justification 
therefore presents a paradox: if 'everyone' is on the fiddle then the harsh 
regulatory techniques sometimes employed by the D. H. S. S. in policing 
claimants surely gain acceptability. Furthermore, the 'scrounger' imagery 
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so prevalent in public representations of benefit fraud similarly gains 
credibility. Yet this imagery occludes the fact that the vast majority of 
claims are perfectly honest (Donnison, 1982). 
I would argue that this form of justification operates in the same way 
as it does for the tax evader who asserts that 'everyone is on the 
fiddle'. It serves to appease fraudsters consciences ay making it seem 
that their actions are the norm. However, when the tax fraudster invokes 
the vocabulary that 'everyone does it', their frauds are often successfully 
justified - the money which they defraud is perceived as their own hard- 
earned cash which they merely 'prefer to keep', and their fiddles attract 
public acquiescence. But when claimants allege that 'everyone' fiddles, they 
merely reinforce the imagery of claimants as 'scroungers' who are seen to 
take money from the state. Therefore differential societal responses to 
this rationale can be attributed to basic differences in the perceived 
relationships between taxpayer and the state, and supplementary benefit 
claimant and the state (see Chapters 3 and 6). 
immary of the justifications offered for sup plementary benefit fraud 
The justifications which supplementary benefits fraudsters offer for 
their actions need to be located in both material and ideological contexts. 
The material realities of life on 'safety net' levels of welfare provision 
enable claimants to assert that they fiddle for financial survival. As 
discussed above, there is much empirical evidence which supports these 
assertions (for instance, Walker and Walker, eds., 1987; C. P. A. G., 1987). At 
the same time, material preconditions and ideological factors combine to 
create conditions of mistrust and degradation which may encourage the 
commission of fraud. For instance, the strained interactions between 
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D. H. S. S. staff and claimants can be largely attributed to staff attitudes 
which are underpinned both by (historical) conceptions of the deserving 
and undeserving poor, and by contemporary 'scrounger' stereotypes. In turn, 
the scrounger mythology, when coupled with the material realities of 
social security bureaucracy, can give rise to the justification that 
fiddling supplementary benefit is a logical response first, because certain 
(undeserving) categories of claimants are perceived as scroungers anyway, 
and second, because the benefits system is inefficient and unfair. 
The contradictions between the social philosophies of individualism 
and collectivism are important in explaining the genesis of such 
justifications. For example, ideologies of individualism stress individual 
culpability for poverty and thus promote the notion of the feckless, idle 
and thus 'undeserving' poor. But the welfare state's provision for the 
'deserving' poor - the elderly, the sick and the handicapped - depends 
upon a collectivist approach, funded (ostensibly) by personal taxation. 
Hence the principles of individualism and collectivism are differentially 
invoked, historically (Chapter 2(a)), and according to claimant categories. 
Such contradictions enable alternative discourses about welfare and 
scrounging which are differentially invoked by fraudsters, departmental 
staff and in official and public rhetoric. For instance, official discourse 
centres on 'fraud and abuse' within the social security system, rather than 
the alternative issues of inadequate benefit levels and poor service- 
delivery to claimants. Thus for departmental staff the agenda for dealing 
with claimants is set in adversarial terms, dominated by the concern to 
prevent abuse. By contrast, the fraudsters' self-justifications emphasise 
the issues of poverty, inequality, powerlessness and degradation as the 
primary motives for fraud. 
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SUIXXARY 
The first part of this Chapter examined the principal techniques which 
individuals use to evade taxes. Such techniques were found to be 
influenced by the opportunity structures presented by certain occupations, 
and by the limitations which could be placed on these opportunities by 
changes in Inland Revenue procedures. Tax fraudsters were thus analysed as 
both proactive (seeking out new opportunity structures), and reactive 
(reacting to procedural changes made by the Revenue). But the commission 
of tax fraud is accompanied by a complex set of self-justifications which 
enable the fraudsters to rationalise their actions as rational, moral and 
non-criminal. 
Rationality is ensured if tax fraud is seen to be located in the 
context of a capitalist state, geared to the entrepeneurial wealth creation. 
The ideologies of individualism and the free market are therefore invoked 
in vocabularies which present fiddling taxes as the 'natural' product of 
wealth creating, crusading, clever and moral people. Morality is ensured 
either if one accepts that economic growth (even through the black 
economy), benefits p. 11 members of society, or if one accepts that the taxes 
evaded are the individual's own money which s/he merely prefers to keep. 
The notion that tax evasion is 'non-criminal' is constructed within the 
material and ideological context of an unequal society. Discourses which 
emphasise the functional aspects of differential reward (buttressed by 
incentives), create the ideological space within which the lawbreaking 
activities of the most 'valuable' citizens (the taxpayers) may be 
effectively de-criminalised (see Chapter 5 (1) and (3) below). 
The second part of this Chapter examined the techniques most commonly 
used to defraud supplementary benefit. To some extent these techniques 
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were related to particular claimant groups: for instance, liable relative 
fraud is almost exclusively committed by women as it is a form of fraud 
produced by the assumption that the patriarchal nuclear family is 
universal. Equally, itinerant fraud is primarily committed by claimants 
without a permanent home. But the principal form of supplementary benefit 
fraud is working while claiming: these frauds are thus largely deternined 
by occupational opportunity structures, (as much tax fraud is). However, 
from the analysis above, it is clear that such opportunities are relatively 
limited for benefit claimants, who are by definition unsuccessful in the 
formal economy. These limits, coupled with employers desires for a cheap, 
disposable workforce, keep claimants working in the most marginalised, 
casualised and non- unionised sectors of the economy. 
Benefit fraudsters implicitly invoke social justice ideologies when 
they justify their actions as a rational response to their economic 
deprivation and personal sense of degradation. In such discourses the 
state's function of 'accumulation' (invoked by tax fraudsters) is 
challenged, and an alternative goal of 'legitimation' through social justice 
is posed. But, as suggested in Chapters 2 and 3, such discourses fail to 
dominate official and public rhetoric because of the inherent tensions 
which have (historically) rendered official and public committment to the 
welfare state 'grudging', and yet have at the same time presented taxation 
as an intolerable inquisition. 
Therefore historical and contemporary struggles over the extent of 
state regulation (whether by personal taxation or welfare provision), 
inform the vocabularies of motive which fraudsters invoke to justify tax 
and benefit fraud, and also influence the extent to which such rationales 
attract official, judicial and popular assent. In conclusion, the main 
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justifications offered by tax and supplementary benefit fraudsters, and the 
economic and ideological conditions which underpin them, are summarised in 
Table 4: 2 below. 
SUPPLEXENTARY BENEFIT FRAUDSTERS 
Justifications Economic and ideological 
conditions enabling the 
justifications 
1) Fiddling for necessities. Poverty, inequality 
2) Nexus of mistrust and 'Social justice' ideology 
degradation. Democratic interventionist 
3) Swings and roundabouts. state. 
4) 'Everyone does it'. Focus on 'scrounger' 
stereotypes, stigma. 
TAX FRAUDSTERS 
Justifications Economic and ideological 
conditions enabling the 
justifications 
1) Tax as 'intolerable inquisition' 'Free market' ideology 
2) Taxation stifles incentives. Liberal minimalist state 
3) 'Everyone does it'. Focus on individualism, 
wealth creation, effort. 
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The Inland Revenue and D. H. S. S. are both government departments with 
an enforcement role. As will be argued below, both are concerned to enforce 
rules, (relating to the collection of revenue, or to the payment of 
benefits), which are ultimately laid down by parliament. In this Chapter the 
official aims of these enforcing departments will be outlined, together with 
the investigatory practices that are designed to meet those aims. Official 
discourses concerning both tax compliance and the policing of welfare 
benefits will be analysed in order to demonstrate contradictions between 
'official' policy goals and their effective practical outcomes. Practical 
outcomes will be assessed by analysing techniques of regulation used by 
Revenue and D. H. S. S. staff, the differing assumptions (concerning the 
taxpayer and claimant respectively) which underpin the nature and operation 
of such techniques, and the practical outcome of enforcement - settlements, 
penalties and prosecution. 
The 'gaps' between theory and practice in enforcement policies enable 
the paradox of differential response to those who defraud the D. H. S. S. and 
those who defraud the Revenue. This analysis of departmental policies, of 
investigation techniques and rationales, and of departmental and judicial 
responses to tax and benefit frauds will be organised under the following 
headings: 
(1) Tax Investigations: policy and techniques of regulation. 
(2) Supplementary Benefit Invests ions: policy and techniques of 
regulation. 
(3) Differential response: penalties and prQSEcttt i nns 
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(I)TAX INVESTIGATIOS, S,. 
(a)r Ucy. 
'You have important rights and entitlements as a taxpayer. You are 
entitled to expect that:... the staff of the Inland Rivenue and 
Customs and Excise will help you in every reasonable way to obtain 
your rights and to understand and meet your obligations under the 
tax laws. ' (Taxpayers' Charter, Board of Inland Revenue, 1986). 
The Taxpayers' Charter marked an attempt by the Revenue to establish 
its aims as an enforZing department and , crucially, to establish the rights 
of taxpayers to 'Information, courtesy and consideration... fairness, privacy 
and confidentiality... rights of independant appeal and review' whilst 
'minimising compliance costs' (ibid). 
The primary function of the Revenue according to officials I have 
interviewed is 'the care and management of the Taxes Acts', which involves 
collecting 'the tax which parliament says is due'. Recently this primary 
objective has been accompanied by attempts to make good the damage done to 
relations with taxpayers by a massive backlog of work which stood at 2.7 
million unworked papers at the end of 1985. This had arisen largely as a 
result of staffing cutbacks, involving the loss of almost 16,000 jobs in the 
last eight years (Board of Inland Revenue 128th Annual Report, 1986). The 
Charter signalled an attempt to restore public confidence and, although 
derided in some quarters, it does state the rights and duties of taxpayer 
and Revenue in a clear and open manner. (As will be discussed below, no 
similar document exists for supplementary benefit climants). In summary, 
the Revenue's main function is to administer the Taxes Acts efficiently and 
equitably, with the aim of securing the taxpayer's cornnliance to them. 
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The word 'compliance' is itself of significance: it reflects Revenue 
attitudes towards activities which the D. H. S. S. would simply term 'fraud and 
abuse'. (The language referring to taxation is altogether more obliging, 
equivocal and morally neutral than the language of welfare benefits). A 
crucial factor in obtaining the taxpayer's compliance is an unspoken 
agreement that financial reparation, not official punishment, is sought by 
the Revenue when an 'omission' from returns of income is discovered. In 
practice this involves the underclassification of many offences in order to 
t 'spare the taxpayers' feelings'(Cmnd 8822,1983; 423). As the Revenue told 
the Keith Committee in 1983, 'We do not allege an offence more serious than 
is necessary to secure a reasonable settlement by agreement. '(ibid. 422). 
Such settlements may involve the payment of interest on tax found to be due 
- up to six previous years may normally be investigated, though this time 
limit may be extended in cases of wilful default or fraud - and also added 
financial penalties where appropriate (see section (3) for discussion of 
penalties imposed by the Revenue). The tendency to underclassify offences 
is justified on the grounds that lesser offences require a 'lower burden of 
proof', yet a subjective element is also evident in the department's view 
that it is generally sufficient to establish wilful default and not to have 
to accuse the taxpayer of fraud. '(ibid. 422). 
But, as the Keith Committee noted, this policy of sparing the taxpayer's 
feelings may have objectionable consequences: 
'On the one hand... a taxpayer who vigorously protests innocent 
error and whose defence is rejected finds himself at once in a 
penalty category that in practice accommodates both the inadvertent 
and deliberate defaulter.. 'On the other hand, some offenders who 
have deliberately understated their income are likely to be treated 
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in practice as no more than negligent. (ibid. p. 423) 
Despite such problems in applying rules fairly, compliance and agreement 
form essential features of Revenue investigation policy. In practice the 
outcome of such a policy may be a structure of financial penalty which, in 
mitigation, stresses the degree of the taxpayer's 'compliance' rather than 
whether or not s/he intended to default or defraud the Inland Revenue. 
This anomaly reflects the essentially pragmatic nature of a policy which is 
directed first and foremost to the collection of tax rather than to equity 
or to retributive justice. Retribution is, however, frequently demanded when 
benefit claimants fail to comply with D. H. S. S. regulations (as will be seen 
in (3) below), despite the fact that they pay back monies owing to the 
public purse just as the tax fiddler does. Pragmatism therefore cannot be 
considered as the sole (or even the primary) explanation for the relatively 
lenient treatment of the tax fraudster when compared with the supplementary 
benefit fraudster. The practicalities of collecting unpaid tax therefore 
dominate the official rhetoric of investigation policy, though the urbane 
treatment of tax fraud is not simply a product of these practicalities: 
rather it is enabled by more complex contradictions emanating from 
differing relations between taxpayer and the state, and benefit claimant and 
the state. 
Beneath the official rhetoric of Revenue investigation policy lie the 
contradictory ideals of collectivism (realised by citizens willing 
contributions to the state in the form of taxes), and individualism 
(realised in the entrpeneurial spirit, wealth creation and private 
accumulation of property). On the one hand it can be argued that the 
Inland Revenue performs the function of collecting the state's revenue from 
complying citizens, and on the other hand (as is implicit in much of the 
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Revenue's regulatory practice), it can be argued that tax revenue is the 
citizen's to give, by agreement. The relatively lenient treatment of tax 
fraudsters therefore has a great deal to do with which perspective is 
adopted and, as a result, whose money is seen to be defrauded. 
The ideology of individualism and cultural emphasis upon individual 
material accumulation serves to present the tax fraudster as a victim of 
repressive taxation, someone who merely 'prefers to keep' a larger slice of 
their marginal earnings than the coercive taxman permits (Myddleton, 
1979: 47). According to critics of the Revenue, such as IvThr_Pearce, 
'Successive governments, obsessed with naive notions of social 
justice, have taxed to the point where the relation between effort 
and income has all but disappeared: where the industry of the people 
is obstructed in the maximum degree. ' (Pearce, 1977: 105) 
Former Secretary of the Inland Revenue Staff Federation Lord Houghton 
further argued that 'There are n. ethics in taxation. There is no moral law 
in taxation. '(Houghton, 1977: 60). Moral and civic duty is seen to play no 
part in influencing the individual to (willingly) pay personal taxes. 
Alternatively, the rhetoric of social justice and civic duty can be seen 
to be essential (and functional) elements of modern Welfare Capitalism: for 
instance Titmuss argued that 'the Gift Relationship' when applied to social 
policy promoted social solidarity, whereas market principles in social 
policy encouraged self-centredness (Titmuss, 1970). The 'civic duty' and 
'coercive' models of taxation form an important part of the debates (both 
historical and contemporary), concerning the relations between the 
individual and the state in an industrial society. It would be facile to 
simply locate the 'civic duty' view in the historical context of the 
'Butskellite consensus' and the 'coercive' view in the context of the New 
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Right (Mishra, 1984). As argued above (in Chapter 3) notions that appeared 
to have been superceded are often never simply replaced by others. Instead, 
thy often either inform or take on new meaning within subsequent 
discourses. So it has been with the contradictions deriving from liberal 
and democratic conceptions of the state. Evident throughout twentieth 
century British social policy, these contradictions are nowhere more evident 
than in the case of taxation and welfare policy. 
As far as taxation is concerned, the liberal view sees the Revenue's 
investigatory role as intrusive and stifling enterprise (Seldon ed., 1979). 
The democratic view sees taxation enabling collective provision for a 
social minimum for all citizens and therefore investigatory procedures are 
seen as essential in preserving the efficiency and integrity of the 
personal taxation system and, ultimately, social justice (I. R. S. F. /A. I. T., 
1982). When analysing the aims of the Inland Revenue as an enforcing 
department it is therfore necessary to consider both the official rhetoric 
articulating departmental policy and the hidden assumptions which inform 
and mould departmental practice. The Revenue's official aims are to ensure 
both compliance to the Taxes Acts and the rights of the individual 
taxpayer. Latent aims are to collect tax owed to the Revenue by the most 
agreeable means available: this involves seeking a bargain with taxpayers 
which will minimise the following : 
(1) Administrative hassle - hence underclass ification of offences, for 
instance. 
(2)Taxpayer's resistance - 'sparing the taxpayer's feelings'. 
(3)Taxpayers compliance casts - as specified in the Charter. 
I would argue that underpinning an ostensibly pragmatic approach to 
regulation of tax fraud is a coercive view of personal tax and, ultimately, 
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(and most effectively), the ideology of liberalism. When tax fiddles occur 
issues of crime, lack of civic duty or fiddling the state's revenue are not 
the operant: the 'individual's elemental right of property' dominates 
official and unofficial discourses (Denning, Daily Telegraphl?. 9.79). Given 
this emphasis on the individual's right to accumulate personal wealth, it 
is not surprising that the aim of seeking the taxpayer's compliance 
dominates Revenue investigation policy and practice. 
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(b)Regulation, 
Before analysing the regulatory techniques used by the Revenue, it is 
necessary first to outline the organizational structure in which 
investigations take place. 
Table 5: 1 below represents the organizational channels through which 
investigations proceed. Revenue investigation work is carried out through 
two major channels which reflect the type and scale of the fraud itself: 
(1) Frauds not regarded as 'serious' and dealt with by staff based in 
Local Offices and 
(2) 'Serious' frauds and those related to specific occupational 
groups/ industries - dealt with by staff working in specialist units under 
the Board's 'Technical Division 2'. 
(1)Local Office Investigations: The majority of Revenue investigations take 
place at Local Office level where Tax Inspectors are engaged in the routine 
examination of accounts, and in the vetting of other cases referred to them, 
for instance when suspicion has arisen as a result of other officer, 
examining tax returns. Since 1984 additional staff have been deployed in 
Local Offices on Compliance work: each office should now have at least one 
Compliance Officer (at the level of Tax Officer Higher Grade), and one 
Compliance Inspector. Although 850 extra officers were to be deployed 
between 1984 and 1988, by March 1986 only 180 of the authorised staff were 
in post, the delay being blamed on 'staff shortages' (Board of Inland 
Revenue, 1986: 35). 
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TABLE 5:! Simplified Diagram of Revenue Investigation outer. 
LOCAL OFFICE INVESTIGATIONS. SPECIALIST INVESTIGATIONS 
TECHNICAL DIVISION 2. 
---------------------- 
(a) INSPECTORS OF TAXES: 1. ENQUIRY BRANCH 
Routine investigation of returns, 2. B. 1.0. 
and accounts 3. SPECIAL OFFICES 
(b)COMPLIANCE OFFICERS: 
- 
NM 
9A 4. P. A. Y. E. AUDIT 
-- vV 
Specialist officers taking (5. SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 
Q ýU 
proactive role SECTION and 
av 
9 
6. INTERNATIONAL SECTION) y 
-1P 
oc 
---------------------------------------- 
(a) Emphasis on financial settlement. 
(b) Prosecute only in the 'most serious' cases. 
----------------------------------------- 
Local office investigations are primarily geared to obtaining financial 
settlement (as discussed above), but District Inspectors may refer cases of 
'serious fraud' to Enquiry Branch where prosecution can be considered - the 
criteria upon which such decisions are made will be discussed in (3) below. 
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(2)Specialist Investigations: there are six specialist units engaged in 
investigation work, although only four are relevant to this thesis, (which 
concentrates upon the fiddles of the individual taxpayer or small trader 
rather than upon larger scale international tax frauds or tax avoidance 
schemes). 
1. Enguiry Branch deals with cases of serious fraud in business 
accounts and cases where 'the honesty or competence of professional tax 
advisers is suspect'(ibid p36). According to the Keith Committee about 
three-fifths of referrals to Enquiry Branch come from Local Tax District 
Offices who suspect that a 'serious' fraud has been committed: guidelines 
indicated that an understatement of profits of £20,000 minimum was to be 
regarded as 'serious'(Cmnd 8822,1983: 9.11). 
2. The Board's Investigation Office(B. I. O. ) deals with a variety of 
suspected offences where trading accounts are nQt involved. Most B. I. O. 
officers are engaged in cases of suspected frauds connected with the 
construction industry (contractor and sub-contractor frauds), but also deal 
with false claims to allowances and expenses and offences connected with 
repayment claims. (They also investigate any suspected irregularities by 
Inland Revenue staff). Overall, 'they are regarded as the Board's police' in 
the sense that 'the offences they deal with are regarded as more in the 
nature of conventional crimes, and are thus more likely to be 
prosecuted. '(ibid. 9.10.3). The link here between what is regarded as 
'conventional crime' and the type of offences most likely to attract Revenue 
prosecution will be explored in section (3) below. 
3. Special Offices are concerned with problems of avoidance, evasion 
and non-compliance which are outside the field of other investigation units. 
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In addition they deal with complex cases which are beyond the resources of 
the local district offices. 
4. P, A. Y. E. Audit units regulate the operation of P. A. Y. E. by 
employers, (inspecting employer s' records and documents), and also check 
the operation of the special tax deduction scheme for the construction 
industry. 
[5. Special Investigation Section handles cases concerned with large 
tax avoidance schemes, including those where fraud is suspected. 
6. The International Section is concerned with legislation on 
international tax avoidance and investigates cases of abuse in relation to 
foreign companies]. 
An indication of the effectiveness of Revenue Investigation can be 
gained from analysis of the yield, in cash terms, of the various 
investigation units, (Table 5: 2 below) and also the cost-yield ratio of the 
investigation staff working within them (Table 5: 3 below). 
ALE 5: 2 INLAND REVEIUE: I MON YIELD (t milli ul. NVEST IG 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Tax Offices- 82.3 93.2 149 174.4 227.9 259.6 
Enquiry Branch- 18.9 22.8 35.4 40.9 41.9 51.4 
Special Offices- 20.5 28.8 50.1 52.9 52.6 100.1 
P. A. Y. E. Audit- 16.2 20.3 31.1 36.3 49.1 65.1 
Special Investigation Section--------------------------------- 72.5* 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
TOTAL 137.9 165.1 265.6 304.5 371.5 548.7 
ur : Board of Inland Revenue 128th Annual Report, 1986: 33. 
(snot included in investigation heading in previous years). 
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TABLE 5: 3 COST/ YIELD R. 
Year ending 31st March 1985: 
Tax Offices 1 6.8 
Enquiry Branch 1: 17.6 
Special Offices 1: 27 
PAYE Audit 1: 5.5 
(Source: Board of Inland Revenue 128th annual Report, 1986: 36) 
Table 5: 2 indicates that in the past five years the yield from Revenue 
investigation work has increased four-fold: it should be remembered that 
these figures represent actual yields of tax. (This contrasts . harply with 
D. H. S. S. figures of 'benefit savings' - see (2) below). Similarly the Revenue 
figures of cost-yield ratios given in Table 5: 3 are far more reliable than 
are the comparable D. H. S. S. statistics. They indicate, for instance, that an 
investigator based at a Special Office can yield up to 27 times his/her 
salary in tax recouped. Although lower ratios apply to Tax Office staff, 
local offices nonetheless carry out a greater number of Revenue 
investigations and so account for the vast majority of tax yield in cash 
terms. 
IE UJIQUES 
The organization of investigation units to some extent gives rise to a 
degree of specialisation in techniques used by investigators. However there 
are some approaches which are common to many areas of regulation . What 
follows will seek both to identify the major techniques commonly used in 
most Revenue investigations and to outline the particular techniques of 
specialist officers. In so doing the analysis will concentrate upon the 
regulation of the individual taxpayer, small trader or businessman: this 
will enable a meaningful comparison with the regulation of the 
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supplementary benefit claimant. The principle emphasis will therefore fall 
upon local office investigations, (both routine enquiries and compliance 
initiatives), as these most often affect the individual taxpayer. The 
analysis will fall under the following headings: 
Routine Investigations and Compliance work: 
(a) Making connections - utilising information already to hand. 
(b) Targetting - occupations and locations. 
Specialist Investigations 
(i)Routine Investigations and Compliance work.. 
(a)Making Connections is a phrase which will be used to describe the 
investigatory work which centres upon the use of information routinely 
supplied to the Revenue from a variety of sources. For instance, all firms 
are required to inform the Revenue of fees, expenses and commission paid 
out to individuals or traders. Financial institutions such as Banks and 
Building Societies also furnish the Revenue with information, providing 
details of interest payments made to a sample of their investors. The task 
of the routine investigator is simply to trace the tax records of the 
individul who has been paid fees/commission/expenses, or who has received 
investment income and to check that they have fully declared the monies 
received. 
According to one senior Revenue official interviewed, although much 
information is already to hand within local offices, resources are 
insufficient to follow up more than a small selection of cases for 
investigation. Recent compliance initiatives are an attempt to utilise such 
available information, but these efforts only scratch the surface in terms 
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of the numbers of investigations which could be undertaken, given increased 
staffing. 
Examination of business returns, undertaken by Inspectors of Taxes, may 
also reveal potential avenues for investigation. For instance, in 
examining the accounts of medical practices locum fees are recorded: these 
may then be traced back to check if the recipient has declared them. The 
payment of 'ash cash', (discussed in chapter 4 (1) above) was revealed by 
examining returns of fees paid out by crematoria. Inspectors of Taxes 
examine in depth a small selection of trader 
s accounts (only 2.8% of 
eligible accounts in 1984/5): in addition to discovering irregularities in a 
high proportion of the trader s' accounts challenged, (91% in 1984/5), in- 
depth examination of accounts may also pave the way for a routine 
investigation of other individuals who may or may not be known to the 
Revenue. For instance, an Inspector may follow up details given in such 
accounts of payments made to other traders or sub-contractors in order to 
check that these third parties have made full declarations of income on 
their own tax returns. 
Employers also have to complete end of year Returns(P14) giving details 
of pay, tax and National Insurance in respect of their employees. In 
addition a supplementary Return (P38) must be completed for employees who 
are paid over £100 in the tax year but who are not liable to pay P. A. Y. E. 
tax '(Inland Revenue leaflet P7,1983). This return in effect provides a list 
of staff who are employed on a casual basis and/or at wages less than the 
taxable minimum. If individuals are not earning taxable levels of income 
in respect of one particular source of employment. they may effectively 
undertake several part-time or casual jobs and still remain 'invisible' to 
the Revenue, with the exception of their appearance on returns P38. 
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Therefore such 'ghosts' can in theory be traced through end of year 
employer's returns, although the chances of this are severely limited 
because of lack of staff to regularly and thoroughly examine this 
information, readily supplied to local Tax offices. An infamous example of 
the employment of 'ghost' casual staff was revealed in the case of Fleet 
Street, where names such as 'Mickey Mouse' appeared on official employer 
returns (see Chapter 4 (la) above). The institutionalised nature and sheer 
audacity of this particular fiddle are perhaps indicative of the Revenue's 
inability to cope with routine examination of information already to hand: 
clearly the Fleet Street printers who used the names of Disney characters 
felt confident that they were not likely to be discovered ! 
Making connections may also involve tracing the local agents of large 
firms who, (in cases ranging from double glazing to football pools), pay on 
a commission basis and similarly provide lists of employees. Forms S16 
(returns of commission) can therefore provide another source of 
information, from within the Tax Office itself, which investigators may 
follow up. Once again the investigatory techniques involved in the tracing 
of agents resembles a paper chase - from information given in the firm's 
end of year returns to the tax records of the income-recipient. But the 
Inland Revenue is currently speeding-up the tracing process, partly through 
the computerisation of the records of P. A. Y. E. taxpayers, and in the 
development of a scheme of National Tracing using computers. In years to 
come the 'paper chase' may involve no 'paper' at all, and may well facilitate 
quick and efficient tracing of individuals recieving remuneration from 
whatever geographical or occupational source. In the meantime, the 
connections which are made are dependant upon the experience and expertise 
of tax Inspectors and (lesser grade) compliance officers in local offices in 
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utilizing available information to best effect, given constraints of 
resources and manpower. 
Another area of potential investigation based upon using information 
supplied to the Revenue is that of expenses paid to directors and highly 
paid employees. As explained in Chapter 4, firms supply details of expenses 
they pay out which may be checked against the declarations of the 
employees concerned. Since 1982 regulations governing the taxation of 
expenses and allowances, such as the company car which had previously been 
regarded by employees as a perk, have; been considerably tightened. Also the 
use of financial penalties for false expenses claims was extended. However, 
the Revenue still relies on the co-operation of employers to implement 
these regulations and tax officers I have spoken to believe that many 
abuses, involving employers connivance, remain. Abuses may involve illicit 
payments to employees for the types of expenses outlined in Chapter 4 (1a) 
above - firm's cars (and private mileage), provision of private health care, 
entertainment allowances, membership of leisure and sporting clubs, gift 
vouchers and credit facilities and so on. It is likely that fiddles 
involving 'incentives' through gift vouchers, expensive holidays and 
entertainment are particularly evident at Christmastime. But Revenue staff 
are no longer sure what form such fiddles now take because firms have been 
very successful in keeping 'one step ahead of the taxman' in seeking to 
motivate their most 'valuable' employees. Far more time and manpower would 
be necessary to examine expenses returns in depth in order to reveal the 
nature and extent of such abuses: in the current political and ideological 
climate, (in which competitiveness and profit maximization are so highly 
valued), it is difficult to see resources being directed towards regulating 
316 
the 'perks' of so-called successful businessmen (see Chapter 6 for 
implications for such 'perks' of the 1988 budget). 
The Revenue's current compliance initiatives which stress cost- 
effectiveness therefore tend to concentrate on easier targets which offer 
greater pay-off, in terms of tax recouped, for less investment, in terms of 
staff and time: thorough examination of employers returns of expenses paid 
involves is very time-consuming. As already discussed, returns of fees, 
commission and casual employees are becoming increasingly easy to trace, 
-. (with computerisation and National Tracing), and so may offer the Revenue a 
means of identifying tax evaders such as moonlighters and, to a lesser 
extent, ghosts. 
Ghosts are unknown to the Revenue and their detection often involves 
the targetting of the areas of trade in which, (according to experience), 
they are most likely to be found (see section (b) below). But a relatively 
easy technique which involves making connections entails the scrutiny of 
classified advertisements in the local press and the tracing the 
advertiser/trader to check if they are known to the Revenue. According to 
one senior Revenue official such advertisements are 'fair game', particularly 
for compliance officers who have a certain degree of operational freedom. 
This freedom has enabled a pro-active approach to investigation work 
previously not characteristic of the Inland Revenue. It is to this proactive 
approach, (involving in particular the targetting of likely areas of 
evasion), that discussion now turns. 
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(b)Targetting Occupations and Location.. 
In analysing the techniques individuals use to fiddle tax, a strong link 
emerged between certain occupational groups and the availability of both 
the opportunities and justificatory rhetorics facilitating tax evasion 
(Chapter 4 above). The building, catering and seasonal trades, for 
instance, offered specific opportunity structures. Although tax evasion is a 
covert activity, these areas of particular abuse are identified through the 
experience and vigilance of tax officials. As a result, there is sufficient 
knowledge of existing areas of fraud upon which to estimate what the most 
productive areas for future investigation are likely to be. When the 
Revenue first set-up Black Economy Units (or, in official terms, Schedule D 
Compliance Units) on an experimental basis in 1981, targetting was clearly 
evident: in addition to the focus on particular forms of evasion 
('moonlighters and ghosts') the experiment concentrated staff 'in areas of 
the country thought ripe for action... such as holiday resorts and big 
cities'(AssessmeIIt, November 1981). 
Compliance units are now a feature of Revenue investigatory work 
throughout the country, and the essential characteristics of the original 
experimental groups remain: the focus on moonlighting and ghosts utilizing 
methods which involve the targetting of particular trades or locations: 
'We'll do a purge... concentrating on a single area to take note 
of all the commercial activity going on. Or we might decide to look 
specifically at particular trades or occupations. ' 
(Compliance officer, quoted in Natwnr-k July 1985) 
Caterers and video shops were given as examples of possible targets. Other 
common targets are street markets, auctions and taxi ranks. Officers also 
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use their own initiative and experience of their locality in setting up 
investigations: 
'Bristol investigated sales of fishing permits at a local lake 
and were able to disprove protestations that fishing was rare in 
winter months by means of field (or bank? ) visits. '(ibid) 
A degree of operational freedom enables compliance officers to follow their 
own 'hunches', providing that they eventually prove fruitful. For instance, 
perusing local council's planning applications (largely for home 
extensions), in order to identify the architect's signature on plans and 
thereafter to follow-up any non-declarations of fees on the architect's own 
income tax returns. Another proactive technique involves attending auctions, 
(whether selling antiques, household goods or cars), and noting down the 
names of multiple purchasers suspected of being 'ghost' dealers. But 
whatever the target or the modus operandi of the investigation, the Revenue 
ensure that adequate evidence. is gathered before interviewing suspected 
fraudsters: 
'We get leads from a variety of sources. But we can't just go on 
hearsay. Unless the information is quite specific we need to back 
it up with our own enquiries. That could mean a visit for 
observation or a check with other sources. But it's only when we're 
pretty sure of our facts that we confront people. ' (ibid) 
'Leads' and 'information' are more likely to come from other Revenue staff 
in local offices who have come across irregularities in the course of their 
routine work than from anonymous tip-offs, which form an important 
source of D. H. S. S. investigations. 'Other sources' against which compliance 
officers'information is checked do not normally involve formal links with 
other Departments, except contact with the D. H. S. S. if the Revenue needs to 
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check individual's National Insurance numbers. (Informally, however there 
may be some utilisation of the D. V. L. C. computer in checking car 
registrations). Links with the police are not a regular feature of Revenue 
enquiries at local level: though, as will be seen, the same cannot be said 
of D. H. S. S. investigations! 
It may appear that there is an element of 'cloak and dagger' attached 
to some aspects of compliance work: for instance the use of surveillance 
and radio-links by some units. In addition the vocabulary associated with 
their activities envokes somewhat dramatic images: 'detectives... 
ghostbusters... leads... mission' (ibid). But this perhaps reflects the Inland 
Revenue's concern to project a more dynamic image of investigation work, 
and hence to deter fraud and encourage public compliance. At a more down 
to earth level, some compliance officers use such imagery in a jokier 
fashion, (for example one man-and-woman team being referred to as Dempsey 
and Makepiece, after the glossy T. V. detective series). But the proactive 
approach of compliance investigations is still a relatively new phenomenon 
in the Revenue. In contrast to the situation in the D. H. S. S., a specific 
vocabulary (used by the investigators or their 'suspects'), has yet to 
emerge: when one compliance officer was asked if any nickname or 
distinctive epithet was given to him and his fellow officers by the 
'punters', he paused and then replied 'They just call us "bastards"! '. 
According to a senior Revenue official, the staff who are most likely 
to be chosen for compliance work are younger Tax Officers Higher Grade 
T. 0's H. G. ) who are likely promotion candidates: they are therefore likely to 
be ambitious, hard-working and well motivated. The identification of 
moonlighting and ghosting as the principle area for their investigations is 
in itself a product of the perceived need (in view of Departmental cost 
320 
constraints), to utilise 'lower' level staff in order to gain most cost 
benefit from investigation work. Although the 'cream' of T. 0's H. G., these 
officers (who have a short intensive training), are not trained in the legal 
aspects of their work: I 
, 
was told that 50% of compliance cases are passed 
on to Inspectors of Taxes for consideration of financial penalties or 
questions of law (O. V. S., 1985). Clearly the primary rationale of the Revenue 
in relation to compliance units is to recoup the maximum tax due and so 
encourage 'compliance' in the most cost-effective manner. Personal 'targets' 
which officers are supposed to meet do play a part in maintaining this 
effectiveness: compliance units are under an obligation to pay for 
themselves. But this does not present any problems, simply because of the 
scale of tax evasion itself - there is always plenty of abuse which can 
relatively easily be discovered by the techniques outlined above. 
The work of certain specialist investigation units will only be 
mentioned briefly here because their role is too specialised to affect the 
many individuals, traders and small businessmen who form the focus of this 
research. The specialist units which are most directly relevant for the 
purposes of this thesis are the Board's Investigation Office(B. I. O. ) and 
Enquiry Branch: this analysis will therefore concentrate primarily on their 
investigatory techniques. 
The B. I. O. are regarded as the Board's police in the sense that the 
offences that they investigate come closest to what could be termed 'crimes' 
in the conventional sense. As mentioned above, their primary focus is the 
construction industry and frauds associated with sub-contractor 
certificates 714. Many of these frauds involve forgery, falsification, 
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selling and theft of these certificates, hence the link between B. I. O. 
techniques used to combat these forms of fraud and 'police' methods. 
Prosecutions brought as a result of B. I. O. investigations usually involve 
charges for theft, forgery, handling, deception or conspiracy (Network, 
January 1986). Techniques of investigation include elements of 'undercover' 
work: surveillance of suspects (using cameras and radios), long and 
irregular hours of work, and contact with other investigative agencies, such 
as Customs and Excise (ibid). Suspects are observed (often literally 'on 
site'), their activities monitored and visual and documentary evidence is 
collected. Although the cloak and dagger image may seem to fit such 
activities, it must be remembered that most sub-contractor investigations 
are focused on the seedy 'mean streets' of labourers' doss houses and 
hostels (ibid: 5). 
Cases may be referred to the B. I. O. by the P. A. Y. E. Audit section and 
local Tax District Offices, but most cases arise from within the unit itself 
(through examination of certificates and 714 vouchers forwarded to a 
Certificate Centre). Although this specialist unit only investigates around 
700 sub-contractor frauds per year, the sums of tax involved are huge: the 
tax known to have been evaded on cases dealt with in the year to 30th 
September 1985 was X35 million (ibid). 
Other areas of fraud dealt with by B. I. O. include false claims to 
allowances and expenses (set against tax liability) and deed of covenant 
frauds. In the case of the former, cases regarded with suspicion (because of 
amendments to invoices, for instance), are referred to the B. I. O. from local 
offices. Similarly, if local officers suspect a 'ring' of deeds of covenant, 
the B. I. O. may become involved. This relatively new form of fraud is likely 
to be concentrated an solicitors and accountants who claim tax relief on 
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'manufactured' covenants to each other's dependants (see Chapter 4 (1) 
above). Losses in tax can be considerable - hence the abolition of all 
but 
charitable covenants announced in the 1988 budget. 
The B. I. O., nonetheless, represent a unit set up to deal with a 
particular form of tax fraud, related to one key industry - construction. 
Administrative and legislative changes in the last decade have sought to 
counter tax evasion in the construction industry through the use of 714 
certificates (with photographs of the holder as an added safeguard), and a 
system of vouchers which the sub-contractor presents to the main 
contractor. Nonetheless, the entire 714 system is circumvented if main 
contractors themselves connive to employ 'subbies' who have no 714 
(and 
are not therefore bona fide sub-contractors). Main contractors may collude 
in this way in order to pay 'lump' subbies less than bona-fide contractors 
and so cut costs. One large contractor explained to me that this practice 
was commonplace and that 'you have to' fiddle in this way 'to keep in 
business'. Ultimately the only techniques which could be employed to counter 
such frauds would involve far greater manpower, surveillance and higher 
profile policing of the construction industry than the B. I. O. are capable of 
and than would be considered politically acceptable. 
Enquiry Branch specialises in the investigation of business accounts 
and also any irregularities concerning the work of professional tax 
advisers. The regulatory techniques involved are lower profile activities 
than those of many compliance and B. I. O. officers: essentially what is 
involved is the in-depth examination of trading accounts by highly 
qualified staff: 
'[Enquiry Branch] specialises in the investigation of fraud 
involving trading profits, work demanding a detailed knowledge 
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of book-keeping and accountancy as well as a full technical 
knowledge of income tax. ' (Cmnd. 8822.1983: 9.10.2. ) 
It is extremely difficult to identify specific techniques used in such a 
technical area of investigation. In brief, although the examination of 
business records is a complex process, Enquiry Branch officers seek to 
identify and pursue suspected irregularities in business accounts: initial 
enquiries may include looking through invoices for 'dummies' or alterations, 
looking for 'dummy men' in records of wages paid out, checking Directors' 
expenses accounts and checking the numerical sequence of invoices for 
missing numbers (Association of Inspectors of Taxes, 1982). Most referrals 
to Enquiry Branch come from District offices who have reason to believe one 
of the following: that profits in excess of 220,000 are understated, that 
forgery or collusion with intent to defraud the Revenue has taken place, or 
that false statements of 'full disclosure' have been made by a taxpayer who 
has been under investigation (Cmnd. 8822,1983: 9.11). Cases arising from 
'Informers' number only 14 to 15 per year on average(ibid). 
The difficulties involved in analysing Enquiry Branch techniques 
reflect the difficulties which the investigators themselves face in their 
task: as one witness to the Keith Committee put it, 
'the taxpayer builds a taxproof castle; if the Inspector could see 
inside it he would see the weaknesses in the castle's structure, but 
the taxpayer does all he can to make sure that the Inspector never 
sees inside it. ' (ibid: 7.3.5. ) 
If--accounts do reveal serious irregularities, Enquiry Branch officers 
interview the suspect 'by appointment in the presence of the taxpayer's 
advisers'(ibid: 9.13.3). The taxpayer and his advisers initial a verbatim 
copy of all questions and answers as the interview proceeds, and receive a 
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copy at the end. These interview techniques and respect accorded to 
the 
taxpayer's rights contrast sharply with the treatment of suspected 
supplementary benefit fraudsters at the D. H. S. S. interviews described below. 
Cost-effectiveness and pragmatism are the apparent rationales which 
underlie Revenue investigation policy, but the effective rationale is, 
rather, a desire to seek the compliance of the taxpayer. Therefore, in 
effect Revenue policy implicitly acknowledges the primacy of the coercive 
view of personal taxation and, ultimately, enables empathy for the tax 
evader. This is evident in the view expressed by a former Enquiry Branch 
officer who described the Revenue's financial settlement policy as 'The only 
sensible way to carry on' because 'after all, we have all sinned! ' (I. T. V. 
World in Action, 7.2.83. ) 
The analysis of enforcement policy and practice has shown that official 
discourses concerning cost-effectiveness and the pragmatism of tax 
collection are problematic. For example, cost-effectiveness does not result 
if (as under current policies), insufficient staff and resources are 
directed to anti-evasion work, and so vast amounts of tax remain unpaid. At 
the same time, anti-evasion initiatives in recent years have centred upon 
relatively 'easy' targets which demand the least time and money to 
investigate. Thus the richer pickings which are available through the 
investigation of highly paid taxpayers, directors and trading accounts are 
largely ignored in favour of the type of investigations which are quick 
(and cheap) to undertake, with fewer and low-level staff. In the longer 
term cost-effectiveness is not served by such policies. Furthermore, the 
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emphasis on cost-effectiveness may be open to serious criticism on the 
grounds that equity as well as efficiency should be a principle 
underpinning the work of any enforcing department. 
The dominance of 'pragmatism' in the justificatory rhetoric of policy 
makers is also more apparent than real: beneath this justification is the 
desire to 'spare the taxpayers feelings'. Although there are indeed practical 
difficulties in mounting successful Revenue prosecutions, such difficulties 
cannot alone explain a policy which advocates financial penalty in all but 
a very few of the 'most serious' of fraud cases, whilst almost thirty times 
as many individuals are likely to be prosecuted for supplementary benefit 
fraud. (see (3) below). The effective discourse shaping such policy 
therefore reflects the coercive view of tax - as an intolerable inquisition 
- rather than the citizenship view and thus buttresses the ideology of the 
free market rather than social justice. 
Nevertheless, the citizenship view is still invoked in order to maintain 
the integrity and legitimacy of the tax system: hence the Thatcher 
government, though committed to New Right free market economic policies 
was forced to invoke the citizenship view in launching compliance 
initiatives which were necessary for two reasons: first, to maintain the 
credibility of the Revenue as an equitable enforcing department. Second, to 
collect revenue which was essential to the state in a time of economic 
stringency. It is misleading, therefore, to see the state as immutable or 
monolithic: its policies are moulded by specific material conditions under 
which it may be possible to invoke contradictory discourses, It is in the 
context of such contradictions that differential responses to tax and 
benefit fraud must be located and explained. 
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jTUEXEXTA$yBENEFIT INVEST IGATIOHS. 
(a) Policy. 
The formal criteria which appear to govern D. H. S. S. policy are similar 
to those of the Inland Revenue - the safeguarding of public funds whilst 
assuring the rights of the individual. However, as N. A. C. R. O. has indicated, 
there are inherent tensions in the practical application of such principles: 
'... there is an unavoidable tension between the Department's first 
duty - prompt payment of benefit and relief of need with due 
consideration for people's dignity and welfare - azd the highly 
important but secondary function of combatting fraud and abuse. ' 
(N. A. C. R. O., 1986: 16) 
Whilst policy statements apparently emphasize the importance of efficient 
payment of benefits for the relief of need, effective D. H. S. S. practices 
involve rigorous testing by the D. H. S. S. to establish an individual's 'need', 
rather than the payment of benefits as of 'right'. The concept of rights may 
be subverted by policies which concentrate on prevention of abuse rather 
than on the efficient and courteous delivery of an individual's benefit 
entitlem. e=. 
The tension between the department's first duty and its secondary 
ftinction (identified by N. A. C. R. O. ) has been exacerbated in recent years by 
certain changes in policy. Prior to 1980 it had been recognised that 
'the first defence against fraud and abuse is a good standard of 
investigation and interviewing by officers dealing with ordinary 
claims on the counter and by home visits-prompt and humane 
attention to individual needs. ' 
(Supplementary Benefits Commission, 1979: 10.43) 
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Since then, though ministerial assurances have asserted that good standards 
of service to claimants are being maintained, Civil Service Trades Unions 
have voiced considerable disquiet over shifts in policy since 1980 which 
have focussed increasingly on the Department's enforcement role, rather than 
upon the primary role of ensuring that individuals receive the state 
benefits to which they are entitled under the law. For instance, reductions 
in the home-visiting of claimants, administrative changes in the handling 
of claims, staff cutbacks and new anti-fraud measures (see (b) below) have 
all been implemented since 1979 with the apparent justificatory rationale 
of 'efficiency', and all too have effected a deterioration in service to, and 
relations with, claimants. 
The policies discussed above are the product of certain material and 
political preconditions. Political priorities have, in particular since the 
election of the Thatcher government in 1979, been set in accordance with 
supply-side economics geared to monitoring and controlling public 
expenditure. Despite the fact that the civil service is not an industry, 
outside industrial and commercial advisers (such as Sir Derek Rayner), were 
brought in to create a more 'efficient' service. Although the profit motive 
was not applicable, the notion of 'financial management' was substituted: 
from 1982 local D. H. S. S. office managers were delegated responsibility for 
setting objectives and promoting incentives to ensure that their budgets 
were not exceeded (McKnight, 1985). But, as argued by McKnight (a senior 
official for the Society of Civil and Public Servants - S. C. P. S. ), the work 
of the D. H. S. S. cannot be measured simply in quantitative terms: 'The quality 
of work and the level of service to claimants must also be considered' 
(ibid: 32). Economies in purely cash terms may have detrimental effects, as 
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indicated to the Public Accounts Committee, who were told in December 1986 
of a series of 'prizes' paid to local office staff who introduced economies: 
'An office prize of X35 was given to the D. H. S. S. Hornchurch office 
for the idea of employing part-time cleaners rather than full-time 
staff, to save National Insurance contributions and meals allowances 
even though the public lavatories were not cleaned during the day. ' 
(Guardian, 2.12.86. ) 
Although only a seemingly minor example, cutbacks such as this may have 
more far-reaching effects on claimants and office staff who are caught up 
in a vicious circle of tension caused by high arrears of work and 
consequently increasing numbers of office callers: as one D. H. S. S. officer 
commented, 
'D. H. S. S. public waiting rooms have absorbed the anger, frustration 
and despair of claimants long enough for us to know that any peace 
in such places is at best fragile... Irregular incidents of people 
urinating, vomiting or even defecating in the waiting room can also 
add to the standard discomforts endured during the wait. ' 
(Mandla, 1987: 14) 
The 'wait' involved in many offices runs to several hours. In the south 
London (Oval) office, described by Mandla, claimants begin to queue outside 
the office at 8.00am and 'at 9.30am the first 150 are granted access and 
the remainder are turned away' despite the fact that the D. H. S. S. is 
officially meant to provide six hours of public service every day (ibid). 
Inevitably, anger and frustration spill over in the form of violence: 
attacks on D. H. S. S. staff are on the increase, largely as the result of the 
'squeeze' on claimants brought about by staffing cuts rather than because of 
any demonstrable change in the nature of the claimants themselves (Coetzee, 
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1983; Mandla, 1987). According to one D. H. S. S. official I interviewed the 
increasing number of assaults on staff is bound up with several recent 
policy changes: he argued that fewer home visits to claimants had led to 
more mistakes being made by staff who calculated benefits due. In turn, 
these mistakes, (and the consequent disruption to benefit payments while 
correction takes place), led to desperation on the part of claimants and to 
soured, hostile relations with D. H. S. S. staff. This argument is supported by 
the evidence of independant surveys on the quality of service provided to 
D. H. S. S. claimants(C. P. A. G., 1985; P. S. I., 1985), by statistics demonstrating 
increases in the error rates of the D. H. S. S. (Beltram, 1984) and by evidence 
provided by D. H. S. S. staff Trades Unions: for instance, a S. C. P. S. 
representative stated that an audit in the Swansea area had shown 'that 60% 
of payments made to people in urgent need were wrongly calculated because 
staff were under such pressure. '(Guardian, 12.11.86). Another S. C. P. S. 
representative graphically illustrated the consequences of staff cuts on 
claimants and staff alike in an inner London office: 
'People queue outside from. first thing in the morning.... Sometimes 
they wait up to eight hours, and then their papers might be missing. 
Management have created a state of siege following violent incidents 
and there has been a 50% staff turnover in the past year. ' 
(Rose Eagleson, quoted in Guardian, 12.11.86) 
Accounts such as this demonstrate the tension between the D. H. S. S's two 
functions in practical terms: the primary function of ensuring an 
individual's rights to benefit whilst according due respect does seem to 
have been rendered impossible in the face of policies aimed at cost-cutting. 
At the same time as staffing at local offices has been squeezed, additional 
staff have been made available for the Department's (secondary) function - 
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the prevention of fraud and abuse (see (b) below). Two examples serve to 
illustrate the severe problems. for local staff and claimants alike, which 
such contradictions can create: first, the collapse of the administration of 
social security payments in Birmingham during 1982-3. Second, the situation 
in Oxford D. H. S. S. offices in 1982. 
In Birmingham, economic collapse had put enormous stress upon local 
D. H. S. S. offices as 27,702 additional supplementary benefit claims were made 
in one twelve month period leading up to the crisis of September 1982 
(Coetzee, 1983). But this increase in workload had been accompanied by 
z 
reductions in staffing: in Handsworth, for instance, the number of claimants 
had increased (over 3 years) from 18,160 to 20,362 while staff had 
decreased from 244 to 199 during the same period (ibid: t7). By September 
1982 the Erdington office 'looked as if it had been struck by a tornado': 
storage space for casepapers ran out and files were stored in cardboard 
boxes or piled up on the floor, 1,500 pieces of post were outstanding and 
hundreds of callers (either by telephone or office call) were complaining of 
delayed benefit payments. Coetzee explained the sequence of events which 
finally led to a strike, closing the office for eight months: 
'Two of the three receptionists telephoned in sick. The third went 
to open the office up and found about 80 people lined up outside. 
She... burst into tears. Three other staff were drafted in from other 
parts of the office to run the public counter. In the domino effect 
this creates... three desks were left unattended. ' (ibid: 22) 
Inevitably empty desks meant yet more delay in dealing with outstanding 
claims, phone calls and post. This domino effect thus contributes to a 
worsening of relations between staff and claimant in which feelings of 
anger, mistrust and degradation (see Chapter 4 (2b) above) are rife. But 
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staff and claimants were, (and still are), both victims of a government 
policy which has stressed departmental economies at the expense, literally, 
of service to claimants. In the Birmingham example it is significant that 
the emergency centres which were set up to administer urgent payments 
during this dispute were staffed, in part, by officers of the Special Claims 
Control Unit. Political concern to counter fraud and abuse had overriden 
cost concerns, as this area of work was expanded at a time of acute cuts in 
overall staffing. At the same time the D. H. S. S. 's apparent policy aim (of 
ensuring prompt payment of benefits to those entitled to them by right), 
was subverted by the latent policy goal of cutting government expenditure, 
whether by a crude 'welfare rationing' in overworked offices or by 
effectively deterring /minimising claims to benefit through the Department's 
emphasis on anti-fraud work. 
A situation of stress and frustration similar to that described in 
Birmingham offices came to light in Oxford in the same year, as economic 
recession and hence increasing numbers of claims coincided with effective 
reductions in local office staff. The Oxford D. H. S. S. office was staffed in 
accordance with a notional 'live caseload' of 12,742 claimants. By August 
1982 the actual caseload had risen to 19,113 'Yet because of a shift to 
fraud and investigation work, the number of staff actually dealing with 
benefits [had been]... reduced' (Franey, 1983: 72), This imbalance became all 
the more evident as the anti-fraud swoop 'Operation Major' was mounted in 
September 1982 involving operational costs estimated at £180,546 , this 
figure not including the costs of the 175 prosecutions which resulted 
(ibid: 25. see also Chapter 3 for analysis of the media coverage of Operation 
Major). Local civil service trades union officials repeated the view of 
local fraud officers when they asserted 
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'Had the office been adequately staffed, both in their own section 
and in visiting and on interviewing time, then we would have coped 
with the problem without the need for any excercise or operation. ' 
(B. B. C. Grapevine, 1983: 7) 
Therefore in both Birmingham and Oxford the government's official 
policy of promoting efficiency, cash limits and cost-cutting, had been used 
to justify staff reductions in routine local office work. At the same time 
certain political, economic and ideological preconditions (see Chapter 3) 
promoted the effective contradiction of those policies through the increased 
expenditure on anti-fraud initiatives. As argued above, the New Right 
ideology which interprets taxpayers as victims of coercive state regulation 
views many recipients of state welfare benefits as being cossetted by a 
state which denies them incentives to effort and self- motivation. But, the 
effect of such ideas in practice has involved a far greater degree of 
intrusion by the state into the lives of citizens on welfare than 
previously: for example, through a series of complex work-tests for 
unemployed claimants, compulsory training schemes for young people (who 
lose entitlement to benefit if they refuse to take part in a scheme - see 
Chapter 6), and the randomised policing of lone mothers by S. C. C. units (see 
below). Such state control over the lives of the poor contrasts starkly 
with the state's efforts to de-regulate the lives of the rich - particularly 
of employers, whether large firms or small businessmen. Once again it may 
be argued that it is from the operation of politically-based contradictions 
such as these that differential response to tax and benefit fraud derives. 
Further contradictions between apparent (official) policy rationales and 
their effective results in practice are evident when analysing other 
administrative and procedural changes introduced with the apparent aim of 
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reducing costs and promoting departmental efficiency: for instance, 
reductions in home visiting and the consequent widening of the system of 
postal claiming. Official rationales were again belied by the practical 
consequences of these policies, geared ostensibly to 'cost-effectiveness': as 
argued by D. H. S. S. staff themselves, reductions in home visits may lead to 
more errors and more abuse by lessening direct contact with claimants. 
Similarly the postal claim form (known as 'the purple peril'), may lead to 
incorrect payments of benefit, either as a result of claimant's errors in 
completing the form itself, or from the increased opportunities for fiddling 
in a system where postal (not personal) contact is the norm. It can also be 
argued that the difficulties which postal claiming can present for some 
groups of claimants may serve either to deter them from claiming 
altogether, or may prevent them from obtaining the full benefits to which 
they are entitled: this may be a particularly pertinent argument in the case 
of elderly claimants and those from ethnic minorities (Beltran, 1984). 
This argument in turn raises the issue of possible 'welfare rationing' and 
involves an assessment of D. H. S. S. policy in relation to its' first function 
- ensuring that individuals receive the full benefits to which they are 
entitled under the law. 
In political circles the under-claiming of benefits can be regarded as 
tolerable, and even acceptable, for two sets of resons: first, because low 
take-up is seen to reflect a (laudable) reluctance on the part of citizens 
to rely upon state benefits. Second, because the social security system 
could not cope if all citizens d claim all the benefits to which they were 
entitled (Donnison, 1982). The Institute of Directors reflect these views: 
'Some think these low take-up rates a weakness of the present 
system; we think them a strength. First, a low take-up saves large 
334 
amounts of Government spending. Second, it is in substantial measure 
the result of self-selection amongst potential users of the welfare 
system.. . some people are reluctant 
to accept such payments.. . for 
reasons of self-respect. We see nothing wrong in this sentiment and 
many would consider it admirable. ' (in N. C. A. S. S. C., 1985: 2) 
Government's ambivalence to improving benefit take-up can thus be seen 
by some as a pragmatic response to burgeoning public expenditure on social 
security and the desire to promote an unwillingness to rely on state 
t welfare. This may ultimately lead to a situation in which 'entitlement' to 
benefit means little and governments effectively ration welfare benefit 
payments at their source: 
'[The government] never seems sure how many claimants it wants to 
get what they're entitled to. A recent example is the system of 
single payments for one-off expensive items like cookers and beds. 
They were going to a tiny minority of the clients eligible. Last 
year, welfare rights campaigns... led to a huge increase in claims. 
The government's response was to tighten up the regulations. ' 
(Laurance, 1987: 23) 
As mentioned above, no equivalent to the Taxpayers' Charter exists for 
supplementary benefit claimants. The regulations governing the payment of 
welfare benefits are extremely complex, yet the D. H. S. S. seems to believe 
that its responsibility is simply to get benefits and not to advise people 
to claim them: according to a leaked memorandum, the D. H. S. S. attempted to 
'postpone or change' a Channel 4 television campaign advertising welfare 
benefits (planned for February 1987), because it would involve too much 
extra work for D. H. S. S. offices (Guardian, 28.2.87). As Laurance notes, 
attempts to encourage claimants to obtain their full rights are met with 
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hostility: the work of the 'benefit shops' and advice centres who advised 
claimants to request exceptional needs payments was described by 
Conservative M. p. 's as 'total abuse' and furthermore 'the taxpayer is being 
ripped off by this gross abuse of the system. '(HaIsaLd21.7.86. Cols 22+24). 
Vitriolic attacks like this are rarely made upon accountants and tax 
advisers who seek to maximise financial benefits for their clients. Yet, as 
Laurance notes, 
'Helping people get what they are entitled to is not equivalent to 
advising the well-off on tax avoidance. It is not a matter of 
maximising income but of making survival possible. '(ibid) 
If information itself confers power. then the taxpayer has far more 
power than the supplementary benefit claimant. This inequality is 
accentuated where taxpayer and claimant are accused of fiddling, (as will 
be evident in examining the investigatory techniques used to regulate the 
latter). Moreover, lack of knowledge on the part of benefit claimants may be 
seen as essential in order to render an increasingly unworkable system 
workable. Lack of knowledge (or reluctance) to claim welfare benefits can 
also be seen as the result of the effectiveness of certain political 
ideologies: notions of the 'undeserving poor', the cossetting welfare state 
and the 'scrounger' mythology inevitably affect benefit take-up adversely 
(Golding and Middleton, 1983; C. P. A. G. 1986). 
In 1983 supplementary benefit unclaimed was estimated at t570 million 
I 
. a. (Hansard, 
30.10.86. Cols 232-4). The extent to which politicians 
actively foster such benefit losses to citizens (and gains for the 
treasury), is debateable. But what is more significant for the purposes of 
this thesis is the relative dominance of the issue of fraud and abuse on 
the public and political agenda, over the 'hidden' issue of the amounts of 
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unclaimed welfare benefits which far exceed all estimates of fraud losses. 
The material and ideological conditions enabling the effective displacement 
of the D. H. S. S. 's primary function of ensuring the individual's rights and 
welfare (N. A. C. R. O., 1986), have been outlined above in Chapter 3 (see also 
Chapter 6 below). The D. H. S. S. 's function can alternatively be seen in terms 
of 'protecting the public purse', both through the rigorous testing of means 
and policing of claimants and through cutting costs in the administration 
of the benefit system itself. These operative rationales underlying D. H. S. S. 
policy, (particularly since the abolition of the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission in 1980). are also revealed through an analysis of the 
organization and practice of supplementary benefit fraud investigations. 
(b) Regulation. 
The scale of the enforcement task facing the D. H. S. S. is far from clear. 
As mentioned above, estimates of the extent of supplementary benefit fraud 
show extreme disparities: for instance, such fraud was estimated at about 
£15 million p. a. according to a D. H. S. S. official in 1980, but was alleged to 
be in the region of £500 million p. a. according to an 'economic adviser' to 
the Public Accounts Committee in 1983 (Chapter 3 (a)). Estimates of fraud 
vary in accordance with certain political preconditions and the effective 
D. H. S. S. policy rationales which result: if ideological conditions favour the 
'scrounger' mythology and/or, the dominance of New Right critiques of the 
welfare state, then counter-fraud measures must be justified in terms of the 
ubiquity of fiddling amongst the idle poor. Under such circumstances 
estimates of the scale of benefit fraud increase dramatically, and so 
counter measures are justified. In this way anti-fraud drives can be seen 
as effective products of political 'campaigns' based on anti-collectivist 
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ideologies, rather than as reactions to any objective change in the amount 
of fiddling taking place. 
Regulation of supplementary benefit fraud is therefore organized and 
executed in accordance with political priorities. As seen above, the same is 
true of the regulation of tax fraud, although the practical consequences of 
those political priorities are very different. The regulation of benefit 
fraud is currently dominated by a liberal conception of the role of the 
state and by individualist (self-helping, 'on your bike') philosophy - the 
princ4ples of social justice, collectivism and the concepts of universal 
'rights' to benefit are not invoked. By contrast 'rights' figure strongly in 
the Taxpayers' Charter and in the practice of tax investigations. At the 
same time the philosophy of state de-regulation, individualism (self- 
helping, wealth-accumulating) and free-market serves to justify the actions 
of taxpayers who seek to maximise their income whether by avoidance or 
evasion of taxes. 
Against the background of these political and ideological rationales 
must be set the material realities of investigatory practice - first, in 
terms of departmental organization and second, in terms of regulatory 
techniques used. 
ORGANIZATION. 
Investigation of supplementary benefit fraud is organised at both 
Regional and local office level and involves three types of officer: 
1)Fraud Officers (F. O. 's) who are based at local offices 
2), pecial Investigators (S. I. 's) who have a greater degree of operational 
freedom, but still work in conjunction with local F. 0's 
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3)Special Claims Control Units (S. C. C. U. 's) who from 1980-86 operated from 
Regional Offices and selected local offices for anti-fraud drives. 
Table 5: 4 represents a simplified view of the main organizational 
channels through which investigations passed in the years 1980 to 1986. As 
will be seen below, in May 1986 changes were announced which affected the 
operation of S. C. C. 's, although the work of F. O, 's and S. I's remained 
virtually unchanged. 
INVESTIGATION AT LOCAL OFFICE 
Vets cases of suspected fraud 
Initial investigation. 
-SPECIAL 
. 
INVESTIGATOR 
Further vetting of cases, 
further investigation. 
panides to: 
(a) Seek repayment only 
(b)'Prosecute where appropriate' 
(c)'Non-prosecution interview' and 
possible withdrawl of claim 
` (d)No further action. 
REGIONALLY BASED 
S. C. C. U. S. 
I 
Random 'swoops' on 
local offices. 
I Selection of 'at risk' 
cases, non-prosecution 
interview. 
Refer back r+ local 
office for appro ra 
action: (a)Reduction in benefit 
(b)Cessation of claim 
(c)Prosecution if 
appropriate (unlikely 
as emphasis an benefit 
'savings') 
(d)No further action. 
wes: D. H. S. S. circular F. I. G. /21,1983; N. A. C. R. O., 1986, 
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The D. H. S. S. has 451 local offices, (grouped in seven regions), which 
deal with the payment of supplementary benefit. Most offices have one or 
more specialist F. O. 's among the staff: in 1984/5 they totalled 1512 
officers, and S, I. 's. numbered 564 in addition (N. A. C. R. O., 1986). 
1) Fraud Officers- are responsible for vetting cases of suspected fraud 
referred to them by other local office staff. Suspicions can arise in a 
number of ways: from a 'fraud awareness report' or 'signs of affluence' 
recorded by visiting officers, most frequently from anonymous tip-offs and 
letters from the public, or possibly from a 'hunch' on the part of visiting 
or fraud officers that a claimant is 'suspicious'. 
2) Special Investigators- are responsible for investigating cases 
(often referred to them by F. O. 's), where further evidence is needed in 
order to establish if there is a prima facie case of fraud. This may entail 
working outside normal office hours and travelling beyond the local office 
area. (To this extent S. I. 's have greater operational freeom than F. O. 's) 
3) Special Claims Control Units- S. C. C. U. 's were set up an an 
experimental basis in one region in the late 1970's and their anti-fraud 
activities were extended to cover the rest of Britain by 1981. By 1984/5 
there were around 112 officers working from Regional Offices organized in 
teams of six (ibid: 43). Teams selected certain offices within their region 
for anti-fraud drives, or 'swoops' according to local office staff. The 
techniques S. C. C. squads used in order to maximise 'savings' of benefit came 
under intense criticism (to be discussed in depth below), and when further 
increases in anti-fraud staff were announced in May 1986 'new' Regional 
Benefit Fraud Teams were set up to replace S. C. C.. But, significantly, the 
other innovation - 180 staff attatched to inner city offices where board 
and lodging claims are common - is unofficially referred to as 'Board and 
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Lodge S. C. C. ' despite the D. H. S. S. statement that S. C. C. techniques ceased in 
June 1986 (ibid: 44 and O. V. S., 1986). 
It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the D. H. S. S. 's anti-fraud 
efforts because of the lack of systematic, comprehensive and reliable annual 
statistics. As mentioned above, since the abolition of the Supplementary 
Benefit Commission in 1980 there has been no form of annual report 
published which enables an assessment of the performance of Departmental 
investigators or an accurate assessment of yields (in. -terms of actual 
benefits saved) from investigatory work. The statisics that have been 
analysed in the course of this research - from parliamentary, departmental 
and anonymous official sources - indicate more about political and 
departmental policy priorities than about specific yields in cash terms. As 
I have already pointed out, there is a correlation between the size of 
estimates of the scale of benefit fraud and the political and ideological 
preconditions under which departmental policy is formulated. Similarly there 
is a 'knock-on' effect caused by spiralling estimates of the scale of fraud, 
the political energy then directed towards detecting more fraud, and the 
consequent need to demonstrate the effectiveness of anti-fraud policies by 
ever-increasing claims of success through investigation 'yields' netted. 
The end result is an inevitable (and tautologous) justification of the 
political and policy stance which was taken in the first place! 
This circular rationale can be demonstrated in two ways; first, by 
seeking out and detecting more fraud, the D. H. S. S. are seen as 'saving' money 
otherwise paid out in benefits to the undeserving. Second, inflated figures 
of benefit savings can thereafter justify further fraud drives (and the 
negative attitudes towards benefit claimants which result) on the grounds 
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that there is far more fraud yet to be discovered. So the ideology of the 
undeserving 'scrounging' poor and the wasteful welfare state is both 
justified and regenerated through policies which concentrate on the issue of 
benefit fraud. 
Bearing in mind the problems involved in assessing the alleged yields 
from D. H. S. S. investigation work, confidential documents indicate the 
following differences between yields, (per manyear), obtained by F. O. 's, 
S. I. 's and S. C. C. respectively in the year 1983/4: 
F. O. =''99,000 S. I. - £103,000 S. C. C. - £128,000 
These figures are based upon 'multipliers' which involve an estimate of how 
long frauds would have been likely to have persisted, and therefore how 
much benefit has been 'saved' as a result of investigatory efforts. In these 
figures a 52 week multiplier had been used, despite the fact that many 
claimants may well have re-claimed benefit only a few weeks after the 
completion of a fraud investigation, and so to assume that a full years' 
benefit had been saved would have been misleading. The use of 52 week 
multipliers came under a great deal of criticism: an S. C. P. S. union official 
indicated the possible misuse of such figures- 
'Undoubtedly, far more people are being chased off the books for 
three or four weeks at a time-The government then multiplies the 
saving and is kidding itself that it is on target in its fraud 
. s. 
drive. ' (The Times, 4.8.80) 
But the dissemination of such figures may, more importantly, 'kid' the 
public by persuading them of the necessity for such drives and reinforcing 
the circle of justification discussed above. 
The D. H. S. S. eventually acknowledged the validity of some of the 
criticisms made of 52 week multipliers and in 1984/5 researched the 
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alternatives. The multipliers used therafter varied according to the type 
of investigator dealing with the case, and this in turn reflected different 
categories of fraudster dealt with by F. O. 's, S. I. 's and S. C. C. The 'yields' 
per man year show considerable variations when reduced multipliers are 
used: for the year 1983/4 quoted above, the figure yielded by 
F. O's would be reduced from 439,000 to £25,000, the figure for S. I. 's would 
be reduced from £103,000 to £64,000 and, most significantly, the figure 
for S. C. C. would be reduced from £128,000 to £54,000. Clearly the use of 
misleading figures of benefit savings in the early years of the Thatcher 
government may have given the impression that detected benefit fraud was a 
more costly problem than, in measurable terms, it was. In addition the 
impression was given that anti-fraud efforts were more effective than, in 
measurable terms, they were. In summary, the anti-fraud policy adopted from 
1979 was sustained and justified, in theory and in practice, by several 
misleading assumptions about the organization and efficiency of fraud 
investigations. 
In the case of detected tax evasion, the yields quoted in the Boards' 
Annual Report represent figures of tax actually calculated as unpaid and 
found to be recoverable from the taxpayer as the result of investigatory 
work. This is in stark comparison to the situation in relation to benefit 
fraud where the actual figures of overpayments (due to fraud), recoverable 
as a result of investigations, are not available. Instead the D. H. S. S. has, 
since 1979, concentrated on demonstrating 'benefit savings' in order to 
prove the alleged merits of a 'cost-effective' approach to the investigation 
of fraud. The political principles advocated by this New Right 
administration were therefore realised in practice through the operational 
policies of two key enforcing departments - the Inland Revenue and the 
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D. H. S. S.. These principles are discernable in an accentuation of the 
disparities in the political and practical responses towards tax and 
welfare fraud in recent years. It is to the practice of regulating the 
latter that this analysis now turns. 
There is considerable overlap in the techniques used by the three types 
of investigator referred to above: for instance, all use some form of 
targetting and respond to anonymous tip-offs. The analysis which follows 
will therefore initially deal with the techniques common to most 
investigators and thereafter will concentrate on how these techniques are 
both amplified and modified in the case of S. C. C. work and intensive fraud 
drives. The following headings will be used: 
(a)Targetting: occupations and claimant types. 
(b)A=nymous tip-offs. 
(c)Fraud drives and 'Knox er aquads'. 
(d)'; uhr-Snoopers': Special Claims Control Units. 
(a)Targetting: occupations and claimant types, 
The most common type of supplementary benefit fraud is failure to declare 
earnings and certain occupations have been identified as particularly likely 
to attract claimants who seek to fiddle by this means. Jobs involving part- 
time, casualised, seasonal and low-paid work are particularly open to 
claimants: their work status is vulnerable because work is itself covert, 
and they are more likely to settle for inferior pay and work conditions 
because wages are an (illegal) addition to benefits - they are in no 
position to bargain (see Chapter 4(2) above). 
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There is a commonsense knowledge amongst D. H. S. S. investigators of 
employers in their locality who are most prone to recruiting such a 
disadvantaged workforce: contract cleaning firms have been mentioned as 
possible employers of claimants, in view of the casualised, low-paid, part- 
time characteristics of the work. Similarly, in agricultural areas farms may 
well employ claimants for short-term seasonal work: for instance, fruit and 
vegetable picking or potato harvesting. In seaside areas the catering and 
holiday trades may provide similar casual work opportunities and throughout 
the country the construction industry, (discussed above in relatiön-. to tax 
evasion), offers opportunities for casual or temporary site labouring work. 
As a result of this knowledge investigators can target particular employers 
operating in their area, visit their premises and review lists of part-time 
and casual employees, later checking them against records of claimants 
names. If claimants are found to have received wages they are called to 
attend for interview by fraud officers and asked to give a signed statement 
of their circumstances, revealing all income. (The outcome of making 'false 
declaration', in terms of penalty and prosecution, will be dicussed in 
part(3) of this chapter). 
Investigation staff cannot guarantee the co-operation of employers in 
their enquiries, but information on employees is usually forthcoming. Co- 
operation is all the more probable if the employer has colluded with 
claimants' fiddles: a collusive employer (who has, for instance, suggested 
that claimants use false names to avoid detection - see Chapter 4(2) 
above), is hardly likely to refuse D. H. S. S. staff access and risk 'rocking 
the boat' still further. One claimant who did casual work on a farm told me 
that the farmer did not want to 'grass' on him, but felt he had no 
alternative because the D. H. S. S. 'were on to him anyway'. The techniques 
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involved in routinely targetting key employers, (inspecting their employee 
records and linking this information with claimant records at the local 
office), are therefore both simple and effective. 
A recent description of life in the Durham coalfields showed an 
alternative view of the 'targetting' of probable areas of abuse, from a 
critical perspective. The author (Chesshyre) described the way in which 
dozens of unemployed men were to be seen collecting seacoal along the 
despoiled Durham beaches. This coal could then be sold for t2 to £3 a bag, 
providing an important source of income for the families of the men who 
collected it. According to one such man the 'dolies' or 'Nashies' (the latter 
euphemism for the D. H. S. S. investigators being a throwback to the days of 
the National Assistance Board), lay in wait observing those who collected 
the coal. The author wryly concluded, 
'If the dolies can prove this seacoal is being sold.... they can stop 
benefits and haul the beachcombers into court. A triumph for the 
hard-working taxpayer over the shiftless, workshy scrounger.... If 
several hundred residents of Brighton spent 12 hours a day bent 
double in the surf - garnering what amounts to waste - in order to 
keep their families in decent rather than indecent poverty, the 
scandal would not be tolerated. ' (Chesshyre in The Ob erver, 6.9.87) 
Clearly it is a matter of political values whether the 'scandal' here is to 
be defined as the supplementary benefit fraud itself, or the material 
conditions which generate the necessity for it. 
Once certain gobs or locations have been targetted by investigators, 
then techniques of surveillance and identification may also come into play. 
In the Durham example, the individuals scavenging for coal would have to be 
identified and their movements traced in order to prove that a financial 
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gain had been made by selling the coal. Special Investigators have 
operational scope for following claimants by car and for working out of 
office hours, but mistakes can arise. For instance, a self-employed builder 
whom I interviewed was followed to work by D. H. S. S. investigators, to a site 
several miles from his home, having been wrongly identified as a 
supplementary benefit claimant. Similarly a D. H. S. S. official told me of a 
lengthy surveillance operation on casual forestry workers: after spending 
three days observing the movements of four workers, (from a car, at a 
distance, from dawn to dusk), the suspects eventually turned to confront the 
investigators. It was then discovered that the identities of the men had 
been mistaken and that they were not claiming benefit. 
Targetting can also be applied to certain categories of claimants, who 
are regarded as being more prone to fraud than the 'deserving' elderly, sick 
and handicapped. Historically, lone and deserted mothers have always been 
considered likely targets for investigation because, as explained in Chapter 
4(2), the supplementary benefit payment system assumes an ideal-type 
nuclear family as the principle 'assessment unit', and as a result lone 
mothers are regarded as 'between men' rather than as alternative heads of 
families. Consequently D. H. S. S. investigators, (and routine visiting officers 
in the past) were instructed to look for visible signs of a male presence 
(such as clothing, shoes etc. ) at the homes of lone mothers who were 
claiming benefit. If a man was thought to be living there (as 'husband'), 
then, according to the D. H. S. S. he should assume the role of head of the 
household and financially support the women and children within it. The 
effective rationales behind such administrative practice are the 
assumptions that: 
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(1)Lone mothers are potential fraudsters because of their lack of marital 
status and lack of economic dependance upon a male (Cook, 1987). 
(2)That the status of lone motherhood is transient until the woman finds 
another man to support herself and her children. 
(3)That a man's emotional and sexual relationship with a female 
supplementary benefit claimant should be accompanied by an economic 
relationship. 
It is significant that a mother who fails to take proceedings against a 
'liable relative', or whose liable relative has disappeared, may be 
considered as a possible case for a fraud investigation (O. W. S., 1985). 
Targetting in such instances is a reflection of broader idelogical 
principles concerning the perceived value of the ideal-type nuclear family, 
the dominance of the housewife-mother role as the ideal one for women, 
(providing, of course, that the welfare state is not subsidising such a 
role! ), and the evils of dependence on state benefits. 
The extent to which this form of targetting is gender-specific is 
revealed in the following description of the treatment of a 'cohabiting' 
male claimant, (a post-graduate student living in Oxford), by a visiting 
D. H. S. S. official: 
'The visiting officer found him living in a room which was almost 
entirely filled by a double bed. The garments and cosmetics 
scattered about made it clear that the room was shared- by a girl 
working as a secretary. he explained. But they were not living as 
husband and wife. They were only together for this term: after that 
-who knows? The D. H. S. S. did not cut off his benefit, deciding that 
this was not what most people meant by a husband and wife 
relationship. Not in Oxford anyway. "And besides", said the 
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visiting officer, "how do you argue with a man who's studying to 
be a doctor of philosophy? "' (Donnison, 1982: 108) 
Not only was the claimant in this case male, but he was also confident, 
articulate and middle class. The women who are most likely to find 
themselves suspected of cohabiting are, by contrast, poor and probably 
lacking in confidence: female claimants are therefore prone to suffer doubly 
as a result of their gender and marital status (or lack of it), and their 
working-class position. (A specific analysis of the treatment of women by 
S. C. C. investigators will follow 1Yi (d) below). 
The unemployed form another claimant cateory likely to be targetted for 
fraud investigation, especially when the individual has a 'marketable skill' 
or a history of self-employment (O. V. S., 1983). Once again, this is a 
consequence of investigators' commonsense knowledge of the opportunity 
structures available for fiddling by 'working on the side'. In local offices 
Unemployment Review Officers (U. R. O. 's) had, in the past, a twin role to 
perform in regulating the unemployed: ensuring that unemployed claimants 
were helped to actively seek work or training, and the prevention of fraud 
and abuse by these claimants. This may be regarded as a mixture of 
'counselling and policing', although most recently the former function has 
been largely displaced by the latter: growing numbers of unemployed 
claimants and shrinking employment and training opportunities have meant 
that only a tiny number of claimants go 'off the books' as the result of 
U. R. O. s' counselling role. The vast majority of U. R. O. 'successes' in these 
terms are claimants whose benefit is stopped because they fail to attend 
for interviews (N. A. C. R. O, 1986). U. R. O. 's may refer to fraud officers cases 
where working and claiming is suspected and thereafter F. O. 's assemble and 
review the facts of the case. 
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Informal targetting may arise from broader ideological notions about 
the deserving and undeserving poor. Historically the able-bodied unemployed 
have been regarded as least deserving of state support (Fraser, 1984). 
Again, the ideology of individualism espoused by New Right politics has 
contributed to negative stereotyping of the able-bodied poor who are, in the 
1980's more than ever, regarded as unmotivated, uncompetitive failures in a 
society imbued with entrepeneurial values. But this general ideological 
position interrelates with other more specific elements to form other 
additional targets - namely lone mothers, itinerants and certain ethnic 
minorities. The ideological principles which underpin the negative 'target' 
status of such claimants are realised in the attitudes of D. H. S. S. staff. 
Although staff attitudes to an extent mirror those of the wider society 
(Beltram, 1984), the perceptions of claimants held by benefit staff are 
crucial elements which construct the material reality of the stigmatisation 
of certain claimant groups through staff-claimant interactions. 
A recent P. S. I. study concluded that 'personal judgements [by benefit 
staff] could have an important bearing on staff-claimant relationships, and 
could significantly affect some benefit decisions'(Cooper, 1985: 67). Racial 
prejudice forms part of personal judgement which, according to Cooper, could 
influence 'decisions which were liable to variable treatment' (ibid: 68). 
Decisions on the investigation or referral of cases of suspected fraud 
would come under this heading of 'decisions liable to variable treatment', 
and therefore the possibility of racism influencing the targetting of cases 
for investigation cannot be ruled out. 
Negative attitudes towards lone mothers may similarly influence 
investigatory practice and the qualitative treatment of female claimants. 
This is demonstrated in the following responses of two interviewing 
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officers (Mike and Margaret) to a variety of supplementary benefit 
claimants: to an unmarried mother of West Indian origin, 'Mike was cold and 
brusque', yet appeared 'decent and pleasant' to a male invalid in his fifties 
(Cooper, 1985: 52-3). His comments following interviews* with a young 
Pakistani and with a deserted wife were less than objective and polite: 
'Bloody odd!... Ve get quite a few Pakis like that wandering in like 
lost sheep... ' 
'Magic isn't it! Old man walks out, we take over looking after the 
family. Sometimes I think we've got it all wrong. We ought to send her 
old man the bill. ' (Mike) 
Margaret's attitude to a lone mother was similarly negative and clearly 
influenced her decision making: 
'I can't understand why people like her think they've a right to 
rely on the taxpayer for everything ... I think people should have it 
brought home to them that they have got to stand up for themselves.. 
Lassies like that I haven't got alot of sympathy for. ' (Margaret) 
She also demonstrated a distrust of a young man with a chronic back 
condition: the office had 'information' that he was living with a woman 
(also receivng benefit) in the same street. This 'information' may well have 
been the result of an anonymous call or neighbourhood gossip, but he was 
nonetheless labelled as 
'One we have to watch very closely - always taking liberties... 
There's quite a few around who can't work because of "back trouble", 
if you know what I mean. ' (Margaret) 
The 1980 reforms of the Social Security system did mean a narrowing of 
the scope for personal judgements by benefit staff and a significant shift 
away from the excercise of staff discretion. Nevertheless, personal 
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judgements can still influence the quality and tone of the service to 
claimants. It can still also affect decisions concerning which types of 
claimants are 'taking liberties' and which should be viewed as potential 
fraudsters. 
Increasingly punitive attitudes towards certain claimant groups, 
(particularly the unemployed, itinerants, ethnic minorities and lone 
mothers), are to be expected within a political climate which extols the 
values of economic success and the morality of the 'normal' nuclear family 
(Levitas, 1986; David, 1986; Fitzgerald, 1983). In relation to the political 
celebration of 'family values', the consequences for those who deviate from 
these values (particularly if they are poor), are castigation, and blame for 
most of society's evils. According to Dr Rhodes Boyson, speaking at the 
1986 Conservative party conference, single parents had created 'probably 
the most evil product of our time', manifesting itself in wild youth, 
football hooliganism and inner city revolt. As already argued (in Chapter 
2(iii) above), single parent families are often represented as deviant by 
'choice' and not 'misfortune'. As such, moral indignation accompanies the 
imagery of dependance and 'scrounging'. In this way lone mothers are often 
regarded as 'undeserving' state 'subsidy' (Boyson quoted in Guards= 
10.10.86). 
Both formal departmental policy and informal social attitudes are 
influenced by ideologies valorising the family and advocating a 'go-getting 
society', based on individual competition and wealth. Lone mothers and other 
claimants who fail to aspire to these values are therefore particularly 
stigmatised. They may also find themselves targetted as potential 
fraudsters. 
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(b)Anonymous tip-offs. 
Anonymous allegations are acknowledged by the D. H. S. S. to form an 
important source of many supplementary benefit investigations (Time 
14.6.85). As a former S. B. C. Chairman noted, letters complaining about too 
many handouts, layabouts and scroungers 'rarely came on headed notepaper 
from leafy suburbs. Most of them are written by ordinary voters and 
taxpayers' (Donnison, 1982: 48). In one Midlands town the number of 
anonymous calls received by the local D. H. S. S. office was said to have risen 
from around, 80 calls in a month early in 1985 to 300 calls in November of 
the same year (O. V. S., 1986). Following up such allegations constitutes a 
significant part of D. H. S. S. routine investigatory work. 
Two claimants I interviewed were prosecuted for supplementary benefit 
fraud following investigations arising from anonymous tip-offs. The first 
was Caroline who was 20 years old when, in 1978, she worked part-time at a 
pub whilst claiming benefit. She sought this work more 'for the company' 
than for the money (her earnings were around t8 per week), and to alleviate 
the boredom of unemployment. After a few weeks the landlord 'made a pass' 
at her, which she rejected. Caroline soon stopped work at the pub. Shortly 
afterwards she was called for interview (which proceeded under caution) at 
the local office and realised that her employer had informed the D. H. S. S. 
(anonymously) about her earnings, which amounted to approximately £58. 
Caroline was subsequently prosecuted and received a custodial sentence 
(discussed in part 3 below). Clearly tip-offs such as this are both 
straightforward and fairly quick to investigate, and present easy pickings 
for the fraud staff involved. 
Barry was a 23 year-old father of four when he engaged in casual work 
on a local farm 'to buy the kids shoes', and new nappies and clothes for 
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his three month-old baby. The D. H. S. S. received an anonymous letter and 
wrote to the employer to confirm that Barry had worked there. Investigators 
subsequently visited Barry at his home where he admitted making a false 
representation, and was later prosecuted (see part 3 below). He believed 
that a workmate had probably 'grassed' on him, but seemed philosophical 
about it: he was aware of many other cases where even family and close 
friends had informed on claimants who were working and drawing benefit. 
But Barry accepted this as an inevitable risk involved in fiddling the 
D. H. S. S.. 
Caroline's view was less philosophical: she had been informed on by an 
initially collusive employer who, she felt, betrayed her unfairly because 
she had rejected his sexual advances. Many anonymous tip-offs are indeed 
motivated by anger, jealousy or the desire for revenge. Bill, (a self- 
employed builder) told me of a carpenter he had worked with who had 
fiddled 'the social' by working while claiming supplementary benefit. In 
addition to other jobs on the side, the carpenter had fitted a replacement 
window in the home of his aunt, who felt she had been overcharged by him 
(because no reduction in the price of the job was made for her being 
'family'). Feeling his actions were unjust she subsequently wrote an 
anonymous letter to the local D. H. S. S. office informing on her nephew. 
Following up anonymous allegations nay appear a distasteful 
investigatory technique, yet tip-offs remain a friutful source of 
information for investigators. The D. H. S. S. has encountered criticism for 
encouraging the practice of 'snitching' on friends and neighbours by 
offering payment for information leading to a successful investigation 
(Qdian, 23.9.85). The wife of an unemployed shipyard worker from 
Sunderland explained that her husband had been reported by a neighbour who 
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had seen him leave the house at the same time each morning and suspected 
him of working: benefit payments to the family were stopped as the result 
of the 'super snitcher' (I. T. V. World in Action, 23.9.85. and Gardian 
23.9.85). Allegations of cash payments to informers were not denied by 
D. H. S. S. representatives: 'And if you do get a successful snitch, you get 425 
out of the kitty, under the counter. ' 
The practice of payment for information leading to a successful 
investigation is also used by the Inland Revenue, although Enquiry Branch 
informers only average 14 or 15 per year, and local Tax District offices 
rarely receive anonymous tip-offs relating to tax evasion. Nonetheless, the 
Revenue do have discretion to pay rewards up to 450 to 'any person who 
informs them of any offence against any Act relating to inland 
revenue. '(Cmnd. 8822,1983: 199). Only seven rewards were paid in the five 
years to July 1982 (ibid). It can be argued that the far greater numbers 
of individuals informing on alleged benefit fraudsters are a reflection of 
factors other than simply the frequency of the offences committed: if this 
latter were the case then tax fraud 'snitchers' would be legion. The 
explanation for wide differences in the numbers of anonymous allegations 
received by the two departments are rather related to contradictory 
ideological principles underpinning public perceptions of tax and welfare. 
In Chapter 3(b) it was argued that there is a commonsense rationale 
that it is far more reprehensible to take money illegally from the state 
than illegally to fail to pay money due in taxes t the state: this view is 
rooted in the principles of liberalism which serve effectively to contradict 
apparent discourses centring on the collective provision of welfare and 3 
the 'rights' of benefit claimants. Given these effective contradictions, it 
is hardly surprising that very few individuals (are encouraged to) inform 
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on tax fraudsters, whereas those who inform on benefit fraudsters are 
promoted (in official discourse) as public spirited guardians of the public 
purse. Ingenuity and thrift legitimate and promote tax fiddles which are 
dismissed, with a wink and a nudge, because it is seen as'natural' to want 
to beat the taxman and maximise one's own financial gains. 
(c)Fraud drives and 'Knocker Squads'. 
The techniques collectively analysed here under the heading of 'fraud 
drives' encompass a variety of investigatory methods, (some aI? ezloy 
discussed), and utilise all levels of fraud staff, local and regional. The 
common themes which underlie fraud drives are 
1)The specific targett ng of a claimant group, location or occupation 
for intensive investigation. (Within this target area/group there may be an 
element of randomised investigation of some claimants on suspicion of fraud 
but without evidence that a fraud has taken place). 
2)A proactive approach in which investigators are seen to be taking the 
initiative in countering fraud (as opposed to the reactive approach of much 
routine fraud work evident in, for instance, fallowing up information and 
tip-offs received at the local office). 
3)Hlgh profile publicity of the results of the 'drive'. (Fraud drives are 
geared as much to the notion of 'deterrence' as to immediate cost- 
effectiveness). 
In 1981 a D. H. S. S. trades union representative cast doubt upon the 
motives and methods of fraud drives which were mounted against claimants 
adjuged to be in 'at risk groups': 
'This of course is totally objectionable in every way, as seeking 
to categorise claimants in this fashion can lead not to more success 
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in detecting fraud but even more alienation between claimants and 
the staff who serve them.... the slavish adherence to the political 
intent of fraud drives will increase the present gulf between 
claimant and staff and lead to even more friction in public caller 
areas... Do not co-operate with these fraud drives as they are 
politically dishonest, save hardly any money in real terms and do 
nothing to improve the relationship between claimant and staff. ' 
(O. W. S., 1981) 
Significantly, this official noted that there was very little difference 
between the 'modus operandi' of fraud drives and the methods used by 
S. C. C. U. 's (discussed below). For this reason the former were sometimes 
referred to as 'knocker squads' because of the possibility of random calls 
on claimants whose only 'crime' may have been their past work record (a 
marketable skill or history of self-employment), or their marital status 
(lone or deserted mothers). The specific methods of S. C. C. will be discussed 
below, but it is important to recognise the importance of the departmental 
emphasis on the 'fraud drive' approach, particularly in relation to broader 
political objectives. 
During the 1979 election campaign allegations had been made about 
widespread social security fraud and in February 1980 'Reg Prentice did his 
best to gain some political mileage out of the issue by launching a big 
campaign' (Donnison, 1982: 209). This campaign did not focus on the collusive 
employers who enable the commission of the majority of benefit frauds - 
working while drawing benefit. Rather, the characteristics of these fraud 
drives were determined by political factors: 
'.. the politically necessary job of showing that the government were 
'doing something' about fraud, without upsetting the ordinary voters 
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who, as customers, workers or employers, often participated in 
fraudulent transactions. ' (ibid: 210) 
In 1980 Patrick Jenkin had warned the Conservative party conference, 'Watch 
out! It's time the fiddling has to stop. ' (Presumably he was directing his 
remarks against social security claimants and not referring to the business 
practice of the conference audience). Combatting benefit fraud and abuse 
therefore became a means of rallying the faithful - whether the 'honest' 
taxpayer or the party faithful- and effectively a means of galvanising 
comfortable public opinion against welfare recipients through the 
'scrounger' stereotype. 
The amount of publicity generated by departmental fraud drives 
confirms the ideological function that they are designed to perform; for 
instance, recent drives against Heathrow Airport staff, (cab drivers, hotel 
and catering staff in particular) were publicised by the Department of 
Employment because Ministers had decided 'the campaign should be given a 
much higher profile' (Guardian 16.9.87. ) On the day of the announcement of 
the drive on these 'dole cheats', every national Television News broadcast 
carried the Heathrow story, which in the Midlands was followed up with 
publicity of a similar drive against workers at the National Exhibition 
Centre, Birmingham (I. T. V. Central News, 16.9.87). This belied the B. B. C. 
correspondents' assertion on the national bulletins that these fraud drives 
were being concentrated in the Thames Valley and areas of lowest 
unemployment in the South of England . 
The Heathrow and N. E. C. fraud drives were mounted by the Department of 
Employments' Regional Fraud teams against individuals who were claiming 
unemployment benefit and working, although some of those investigated would 
be in receipt of supplementary benefit in addition. Regional Fraud Teams, 
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formerly known as 'Rabbits' (Regional Benefit Investigation teams), utilise 
techniques broadly similar to those of S. C. C. 's. As a result they have 
attracted similar complaints: according to a dossier compiled by the 
C. P. S. A. their techniques of investigation have caused 'real distress to 
members of the staff and the public' in local offices and in claimants' 
homes (Guardian, 10.11.86. ). The complaints dossier includes allegations of 
investigators making uncorroborated accusations of fraud against an 
'educationally sub-normal' claimant, the covert use of tape recorders when 
interviewing claimants, and accusing a young man, recovering from a hernia 
operation, of working while claiming (ibid). 
In a fraud drive against motor-cycle dispatch riders in central London, 
techniques used by investigators involved comparing names on employer's 
wage records with the unemployment register, noting the registrations of 
riders and obtaining the names and addresses of the owners ( through the 
D. V. L. C. at Swansea), and cross-checking these details with the unemployment 
register (Guardian, 16.9.87). By contrast, the drive against workers involved 
in the construction and running of the N. E. C. involved 'seven months of 
surveillance' Q. T. V. Central News, 16.9.87). But the themes of targetting, 
proactive investigation and high profile publicity are common 
characteristics in both instances. 
The methods employed in fraud drives and manner in which they are 
represented in the public rhetoric derive from essentially political 
decisions to prioritise the issue of 'scrounging' at particular points in 
time. (lt is significant that the two fraud drives mentioned here were not 
publicised at the time of the June 1987 election, when unemployment and 
'caring government' were important issues). In order to understand the 
techniques and rationales of the departments engaged in these activities it 
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is necessary to locate departmental fraud policy in a wider economic and 
political framework (see Chapters 3 and 6). The relationship between 
departmental practice and political objectives is nowhere more evident than 
in the case of operation of S. C. C. U. 's from 1981 to 1986. 
(d)'Super Snoopers'- Special Claims Control Units. 
Following their introduction in 1980, S. C. C. U. 's immediately attracted 
strong criticism. This was principally directed against the 'bullying' 
tactics which they allegedly used in order to get claimants 'off the books' 
(Moore, 1981; Smith, 1985; N. A. C. R. O., 1986). But their investigatory 
techniques were merely a logical consequence of the departmental policies 
of a government committed to combatting social security fraud while at the 
same time seeking to significantly reduce public expenditure: the 
(confidential) fraud investigators' guide in use at that time emphasised a 
shift in departmental policy geared to meeting these objectives: 
'In the past, as many cases as possible were pursued to prosecution 
but, in future, while the deterrent effect of successful 
prosecutions will continue to be borne in mind, the cessation of a 
claim might be regarded in appropriate cases as the most cost- 
effective way of dealing with the matter. ' (Moore, 1981: 138) 
As will be seen below, techniques such as the 'non-prosecution interview' 
were used by investigators to achieve benefit savings through the 
'cessation of a claim'. 
Social Security minister Reg Prentice had asserted in February 1980 
that 'Efforts to control fraud and abuse have been inadequate for several 
years'(Hansard vol. 798 No. 118 col. 710) and, as mentioned above, a commitment 
to stop the 'fiddling' was made at the Conservative conference that year. 
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Having announced that up to X50 million could be saved as a result of new 
anti-fraud efforts, it is hardly surprising that the investigatory 
techniques of the new S. C. C. squads were geared to meeting those ministerial 
targets of expected 'benefit savings'. According to D. H. S. S. staff 'unofficial 
league tables were rife' as S. C. C. officers worked to meet their personal 
'targets' of benefit savings (O. W. S. 1981) . The methods they adopted to that 
end will now be examined. 
S. C. C. techniques include many of those employed by S. I. 's and already 
described above - targetting, surveillance and utilisation of information 
from other sources. The fraud investigators'guide (F. I. G. ) also encouraged 
the building of links with local police in the pursuit of social security 
fraud (The Times, 2.5.81). However, what distinguished the character and 
techniques of S. C. C. U. 's from other anti-fraud staff was their relative 
independence from local office control and their 'special squad ethos' 
(O. W. S., 1981). S. C. C. U. 's based at regional offices undertook 'swoops' on 
local offices where they selected certain cases from the 'live load' for 
investigation (according to criteria to be outlined below). But the very 
organization of these units set them apart from other departmental staff: 
'Considerable effort was put into a team approach by S. C. C., who tried 
to create the esprit de corps of an elite. ' (Smith, 1985: 118). 
This factor, coupled with grave misgivings about S. C. C. 'strong arm' methods, 
led civil service trades unions to advise their members- to refuse to co- 
operate with S. C. C. U. 's within local offices: 
'The charge [the unions]... brought specifically against S. C. C. teams 
was that the techniques they employed involved essentially random 
investigation of claimants, using questionable interrogation 
techniques and unacceptable pressure to produce dubious savings, 
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all in an atmosphere overcharged with the desire to meet targeted 
savings and root out fraud. ' (ibid) 
Certainly there is much evidence to support these C. P. S. A. and S. C. P. S. 
allegations - the N. A. C. R. O working party studying the enforcement of Social 
Security Law received similar complaints concerning S. C. C. from 
organizations such as the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux 
and the Association of Directors of Social Services (N. A. C. R. O., 1986: 46). 
The selection of cases for investigation by S. C. C. was based upon 
official guidelines which implicitly allowed for the random investigation 
of: (1) any unemployed claimant who was not ill and (2) lone mothers with 
dependant children (Smith, 1985; O. W. S., 1982). D. H. S. S. investigation staff 
translated these broad categories into typical operative reasons for S. C. C. 
case selection: these criteria included 
'No recent requests for exceptional needs payments (E. N. P. 's), 
claimants suspected of being "on the game", claimants living in 
luxury... and "smoothies". ' (O. W. S., 1982) 
There is, therefore, considerable room for personal and subjective 
judgements on the part of S. C. C. staff in requesting certain categories of 
claimant for investigation: 
'It seems that single women are particularly vulnerable to pressure, 
despite [circulars emphasising] the very sensitive nature of some 
M. C. cases.. . This situation is compounded by the predominance of 
male S. C. C. investigators... this also applies to general S. I. work. ' 
(O. W. S., 1982) 
Despite a re-write of instructions to S. C. C. investigators in June 1983 
which stressed the need to prevent distress (or duress) to claimants, the 
same vulnerable groups were targetted in a subsequent S. C. C. drive planned 
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for Scunthorpe in 1984. Here local officers were asked to take out the files 
of 7,000 of the 12,000 claimants in the town in preparation for the S. C. C. 
drive, and investigators were asked to 'look closely at single parents and 
the able-bodied unemployed' (Guardian, 24.1.84). Confidential evidence from 
D. H. S. S. officials indicated that S. C. C. investigation often proceeded on the 
basis of 'a hunch' or 'smelling a rat'. As already discussed, broader 
prejudices and stereotypes (particularly concerning lone mothers, ethnic 
minorities and the able-bodied unemployed) may influence the interactions 
between staff and claimant. Such negative attitudes were, moreover, actually 
fostered in the targetting of those groups for S. C. C. investigations. For 
instance, N. A. P. O. alleged that they had evidence of S. C. C. being directed to 
investigate claimants with surname Singh 'as this was a fertile area for 
investigation' (N. C. A. S. S. C., 1985: 10). Interestingly, other critics compared 
the loose criteria for the selection of claimants for S. C. C. investigation 
with the 'SUS' laws (S. C. P. S. /C. P. S. A., 1984). A conference on the Policing of 
Welfare Benefits suggested that 'S. C. C. is part of a rigid authoritarian, 
anti-woman, anti-minority elite within the welfare system' (C. P. S. A., 1984). 
In relation to the treatment of female claimants by S. C. C., the evidence 
of other D. H. S. S. officials was damning: 
'At least half the time and energy of S. C. C. is devoted to accepting 
the order books voluntarily surrendered by women with children who 
are persuaded that they are in fact living with men as members of a 
single household. ' (O. W. S., 1981) 
The methods used by S. C. C. teams to persuade claimants to relinquish their 
claim to benefit allegedly included intimidation and inducement: 
'Women interviewed in locked rooms by, sometimes, two S. C. C. team 
members. Late afternoon is a favourite time. with mothers 
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pre-occupied about their children at school, home or in waiting 
rooms... Evening home visits by two S. C. C. team members... Threats 
to women that their children will be taken into care by Social 
Services because they are unfit mothers. But, if they hand over their 
order books... Presentation of non-existent evidence (telephone 
directories in manilla folders), false stories of having watched and 
followed claimants for days and having obtained evidence of working or 
cohabitation. Threats to prosecute if order books not handed over 
or if claimants do not sign off... Inducements- Extra needs payments 
for working clothes used to be a favourite... now we find that single 
payments for children's clothing are used. ' (O. W. S., 1981) 
Revised instructions (circular F. I. G. /21 1983) to investigators marked a 
response by the then Social Security minister Rhodes Boyson to criticisms 
of S. C. C. techniques: the instructions warned against 'unacceptable 
techniques' such as harassment, falsely alleging that evidence of fraud is 
in hand, falsely alleging that a third party has cast doubt on the 
claimant's entitlement to benefit or 'trying to gain the claimant's 
confidence by claiming to be a single parent' (Qu, an 11.7.83; D. H. S. S. 
Circular F. I. G. /21,1983), But clearly the aims of S. C. C. U. 's, determined as 
they were by political and ideological principles, remained the same - 
(1)To take the initiative against fraud and abuse (F. I. G. 1983) 
(2)To avoid prosecution, as there was 'no additional cash return for a 
prosecution (Moore, 1981) 
(3)To favour the achievement of 'benefit savings' through the 'non- 
prosecution interview', and to be cost-effective in terms of manpower used 
and 'savings' achieved Mid), 
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The watchwords 'cost-effectiveness' and 'cash return' are in keeping 
with a political philosophy concerned with results in cash terms. The 
evidence presented here of the effective results when such priciples are put 
into practice indicates that claimants' rights may have suffered at the 
expense of (dubious) savings to the Treasury. But the ideological role 
served by such rigorous policing of certain sectors of the poor was the 
reinforcement of the 'scrounger' mythology and negative stereotyping of 
the 
'undeserving poor' (see Chapters 2 (a) and 3(a) above). 
However, the--official discourses which were replicated in much of the 
mass media were not universally accepted. Pressure groups (such as 
C. P. A. G., N. A. C. A. B. and N. C. C. L. ) and trades unions representing civil 
servants protested both at S. C. C. techniques and the political principles 
which underpinned them. In May 1986 Norman Fowler announced that S. C. C. U. 's 
were to be abolished. The announcement itself centred on the deployment of 
an additional 500 staff to anti-fraud work in the D. H. S. S.: 180 of the extra 
staff were to be placed in 
'selected offices, specifically to reinforce their efforts to 
combat benefit fraud by claimants resident in hotels and other bed 
and breakfast accommodation ... The other 320 extra staff will be 
added to the regionally based teams: these teams will be regrouped 
into 31 benefit fraud teams... They will help the local office in 
fully investigating allegations of fraud and bringing prosecutions 
where jystified. ' (Hansard. 15.5.86, Co1322) 
S. C. C. has therefore been abolished in theory. but it remains to be seen 
whether the abuses of claimants' rights by S. C. C. U. 's have been halted, or 
whether the 'special squad ethos' and tactics remain effective in practice. 
Certainly the political priority of 'cost-effectiveness' is still dominant, 
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and the abolition of S. C. C. may well be merely a reflection of this policy 
goal: it was in the area of demonstrable cost-effectiveness that S. C. C. 
conspicuously failed (N. A. C. R. O., 1986; Smith, 1985). 
Supplementry Benefit fraud investigations take place within a social 
context shaped by contradictory views of the modern welfare state and its 
benefit recipients (see Chapters 2(a) and 3(b)). On the one hand, the 
welfare state's main function can be seen to be the payment of benefits as 
of right and the relief of need, with due attention to the dignity of the 
individual claimant (N. A. C. R. O., 1986). On the other hand, the welfare state's 
main function can be seen in terms of protecting the public purse, 
discouraging 'avoidable' dependancy and paying benefits to those who 
demonstrate need. Patrick Jenkin argued, according to this view, that 
'The honest and the innocent have nothing to fear from the enquiries 
of our officials... Helping genuine claimants to get their benefits 
remains the main function of the Social Security organization. ' 
(Hansard, 6.5.81., vo14 No97) (My emphasis added) 
The pursuit of supplementary benefit fraud may serve to reinforce notions 
of the dishonest claimant, and ultimately reinforce nineteenth century 
distinctions between the deserving and undeserving poor. 
Since the mid-1970's economic recession has promoted the dominance of 
(monetarist) political policies stressing a curbing of public expenditure. 
It is in this context that the welfare state has become a crucial target 
for cost-cutting initiatives. Between 1979 and 1984 staffing in the D, H, S, S, 
was cut by 8,000 (McKnight, 1985), yet at the same time extra staff and 
resources were being directed against fraud and abuse. In this Chapter such 
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contradictions have been attributed to three main policy aims of the 
D. H. S. S.: 
(1)The aim of cutting D. I. S S. costs overall by using fraud staff to 
a)obtain 'savings' of benefit through their investigatory efforts 
b)save benefits being paid out by deterring individuals from claiming 
benefits to which they may be entitled, through publicising fraud drives. 
(Beltram, 1984; Smith, 1985) 
(2)The aim of promoting the ideal of a 'go-getting' entrepreneurial society: 
for there to be winners there must be losers, and those losers are labelled 
and stigmatised as such (see Chapter 6). Equally, in such a society, self- 
reliance should be stressed, hence an ambivalence to mounting official take- 
up campaigns (ref. Institute of Directors, quoted above) 
(3)The aim of undermining faith in the welfare state by exposing its 
wastefulness in paying benefits to the undeserving and the 'scroungers'. 
These policy goals, taken together, signal the end of the 'welfare state 
consensus' and instead pose alternative social market principles in the 
provision of relief the poor (Mishra, 1986; Loney, 1986). 
Underlying these policy aims are the vocabularies of the free market, 
effort and individualism. New Right political philosophy has therefore 
intensified earlier critiques of welfare: for example, the notions of the 
undeserving poor have been utilized to incorporate additional claimant 
groups who are re-constituted as 'avoidably' dependant. Single parent 
families are thus represented as 'undeserving' if they have 'chosen' not to 
be members of a patriarchal nuclear family. The New Right's version of 
morality encompasses other culpable poor groups - young people who 'do not 
want to work' or unemployed people who place an excessive burden on the 
state by having 'too many' children. As argued in Chapter 2, such moralising 
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attitudes to the poor have a long history. But, the crucial importance of 
such ideas is that they have been successfully incorporated into a political 
philosophy of the 1980's. In this way the New Right has not only tapped 
into a vast historical reservoir of ideas about the 'undeserving poor', but 
has also hi-jacked the vocabularies of 'freedom' and 'individualism': the 
former has been used to justify curbs on the freedom of the poor in the 
name of freedom from excessive taxation for the better-off, and the latter 
to justify the dismantling of collectivist social provision in the name of 
greater individual independance. For the time being, at least, social policy 
is dominated by the ideologies of the free market (rather than social 
justice) and individualism (rather than collectivism). But, as will be 
argued in Chapter 6, there are possibilities for change through challenging 
what is now regarded as the 'commonsense' of New Right ideology. One means 
of effecting such a challenge is through exposing the inconsistencies and 
contradictions of New Right discourse - these contradictions are realised 
in the differential social, political and judicial responses to tax and 
supplementary benefit fraud. 
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(3)DIFFERENTIAL RESPON8F_-_ PENALTIES AND PROSECUTION. 
The analysis of the investigation policy rationales of the Inland 
Revenue and D. H. S. S. in Chapter 4 argued that the responses of these 
enforcing departments to benefit claimants and taxpayers suspected of 
defrauding the public purse vary in key respects - both in policy and in 
practice. For instance, policy towards investigating benefit fraud is 
underpinned by notions of 'scroungers' and the 'undeserving poor' whereas 
policy towards the investigation of tax fraud is underpinned by a coercive 
view of personal taxaign, and by advocacy of the values of 
entrepeneurialism and the accumulation of personal wealth. The political 
and ideological contradictions which shape investigation policy are 
similarly evident in departmental practice: for example the differing 
material conditions in which interactions between departmental staff and 
claimant/taxpayer take place reflect wider ideological differences in the 
perceptions of claimant /taxpayer (and their respective relationships with 
the state). Hence there is no evidence of taxpayers waiting in queues, 
(hundreds long) at 9 a. m., or waiting for an interview, in appallingly 
squalid and overcrowded public waiting rooms, for several hours (Mandla, 
1987; Ward, 1985). 
The attitudes of departmental staff invariably reflect the ideological 
construction of their clients as 'winners or losers', 'givers' to the state 
or 'scroungers' taking from society. The tone of interactions between 
staff/claimant and staff/taxpayer and the quality of service and respect 
accorded to the taxpayer and the benefit claimant are clearly at variance. 
It will now be demonstrated that similar differences are also evident when 
analysing the departmental regulations governing penalties available for 
tax and benefit fraud, particularly when comparing the likelihood of 
1 
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prosecution for both types of offence. It will also be argued that 
differential responses are evident when such regulations are applied in 
practice: this is particularly apparent in the following analysis of 
prosecution guidelines and court proceedings involving tax and benefit 
fraudsters. What follows will therefore analyse 
(a) the POLICY and 
(b) the PRACTICE, of the Inland Revenue and the D. H. S. S. in the 
punishment of tax and benefit fraudsters. 
z .ý 
(a)PERALTY AND PROSRCUTIOJ POLICY - Tag 
'The first responsibility of the Revenue is to get money in and 
not to lock people up in prison and prosecute them. ' (O. V. S., 1985) 
According to this official, the Inland Revenue's primary task is the 
collection of the taxes which parliament says are due. This, the Revenue 
argues, may be- more effectively accomplished through seeking the 
compliance of the taxpayer and, in the case of default or fraud, through 
seeking financial penalties in all but the most serious cases. The senior 
official quoted above reflects this view which is apparently pragmatic in 
approach but effectively produces a 'non-prosecution' policy where most tax 
evasion is concerned. But there are several contradictions which render 
this policy open to question, on grounds of both equity and efficiency. 
Some of these doubts were raised in evidence to the Keith Committee: 
'There are millions of tax evaders in the U. K. and over 100,000 are 
detected each year, yet only a handful are prosecuted (and fewer 
still convicted). Could this handful legitimately complain that they 
are suffering from the arbitrary exercise of an administrative 
whim? ' (Deane, in Cmnd. 8822,1983: 457) 
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The criteria the Revenue use to decide whether to prosecute do not 
vindicate the notion of an administrative 'whim'. but do show a high 
degree of selectivity in the (few) cases proceeding to prosecution. The 
criteria for selection of cases for prosecution include the following: 
-'Heinous cases' 
-Cases where individuals have already enjoyed a negotiated settlement. 
-Cases where taxpayers have made incomplete disclosures (as, for 
instance, in the recent case of former jockey Lester Piggot) 
-'Status' prosecutions, for instance where accountants have been 
involved in fraud and public confidence in the tax system needs to be 
ensured. (ibid: 22.1.9) 
The common elements operating within these prosecution criteria are 
1) Prosecution where financial settlement and/or negotiation have not 
ensured the full compliance of the taxpayer. 
2) Cases involving a high degree of organisation (heinous cases). 
3) Cases where the Revenue's (and taxpayers) trust in professional 
advisers has been breached. 
The Revenue's policy is to 'prosecute in some examples of all classes 
of fraud... because it is the possibility of prosecution which prevents the 
spread of tax fraud to unacceptable limits. '(ibid: 378) This policy 
immediately poses three questions: 
First, what is considered to be the boundary beyond which tax fraud is 
said to reach an 'unacceptable limit'? 
Second, do such small numbers of Revenue prosecutions justify the claim 
implicit here, that they provide an effective 'deterrent' to the spread of 
unacceptable levels of fraud? 
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Third, is this selective (and subjective) approach to prosecutions 
equitable in practice if for instance, a large fraud in respect of trading 
profits is likely to result -in a cash settlement whereas if a payable 
order made out by the Revenue is stolen, the thief is likely to be 
prosecuted? 
The Centre for Policy Studies appeared to have similar questions in 
mind when they commented that the 'ease of presentation of the prosecution 
case has been a more important factor in the decision to prosecute than it 
should be', and furthermore that 'a bigger proportion of the more socially 
harmful kinds of offences tends to be the subject of negotiated settlement' 
(ibid: 22.1.3. ). A case of theft of a payable order is relatively easy to 
prove and is recognisable as 'real crime' - theft. However, to prove wilful 
default an the part of a businessman who understates trading profits is 
extremely difficult, and such frauds da not equate with what is publicly 
perceived as 'crime': after all, who is the victim? What is the boundary 
between tax fraud and shrewd business practice in commonsense terms? 
(Pearce, 1978; Chambliss, 1978). The prosecution policy of the Revenue is 
therefore not determined solely by pragmatism and the desire to collect 
tax effectively, though this does play a significant part in the decision 
n at to prosecute cases which are difficult to prove (see discussion of 
practice in 2 below). Prosecution policy is also underpinned by notions 
of what constitutes socially acceptable financial practice (within the 
logic of a capitalist economy), and by ideological stereotypes of 'crimes' 
and criminals. 
It is significant that of the 332 cases of criminal proceedings 
brought by the Revenue in 1984/5, the vast majority would fall into the 
descriptive category referred to above as 'real crime' and do not, for the 
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most part, relate to business fraud at all: 184 of the total of 332 
prosecutions mounted related to sub-contractor frauds and 86 to the theft 
of payable orders and girocheques. As the analysis of investigation 
techniques above indicated, such frauds are usually uncovered by the 
Revenue's 'police' (the B, I. O. ) and investigated by them or the police 
proper (see Appendix 2 for details of Revenue prosecutions since 1975/6 
and breakdown of convictions obtained by the police). 
Where the Revenue seeks financial settlement rather than prosecution, 
negotiatOnq. between taxpayer (and his/her advisers) aim to arrive at a 
mutually agreed figure of tax which has been underpaid. Where there is 
evidence of 'fraud, wilful default or neglect'-, bn the part of the taxpayer, 
additional financial penalties may be imposed on him/her, on top of the 
repayment of the agreed figure of tax owed, together with interest that 
would have accrued (to the Revenue) on that amount (Inland Revenue Leaflet 
73,1987). Normally six previous years may be investigated and so 
interest is calculated from the date that the tax should have been paid up 
to the date that it actually is paid. Penalties are calculated as a 
percentage of the tax unpaid: in strict law penalties could be over 100% 
of the amount of tax owed, or in cases of fraud 200'%, but in practice the 
Revenue does not seek penalties exceeding 100% (ibid). That figure is 
further reduced significantly according to the degree of the taxpayer's co- 
operation, the relative gravity of the offence and the fullness of any 
voluntary disclosure made. 
Once again the policy is geared to compliance and the apparent goal is 
the collection of tax, but the qualitative treatment of taxpayers accused 
of fraud, wilful default or neglect in relation to their tax affairs goes 
beyond the immediate requirements of obtaining tax: their treatment by 
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officials is far more respectful and mindful of individual rights than is 
evident in the case of benefit fraudsters. For instance, in seeking 
agreement on tax owed and in calculating any penalties due, the Revenue 
encourages discussion with taxpayers and their professional 
representatives, and all procedures for dealing with settlements are 
outlined in official leaflets. This contrasts starkly with the lack of 
respect, official knowledge and professional representation which 
characterises the treatment of many benefit claimants accused of omissions 
from their statements of circumstances (see (2) above and D. H. S. S. practice 
outlined below). Yet despite the relative leniency of financial penalties 
when compared with criminal prosecution, they are frequently represented 
(by both offenders and in the public rhetoric) as draconian and unjustly 
punitive. For instance, a recent article (in a series) on taxation opened 
with the following accusations in relation to the Revenue's system of 
financial penalties: 
'An increasing number of tax inspectors are becoming "trigger happy" 
about trying to invoke penalties against people whom they suspect 
of being defaulters; against peolpe who make innocent errors; and 
also against people who are merely late in dealing with their tax 
returns. ' (Horner, Guardian, 29.8.87) 
But Revenue leaflets clearly state the precise meaning of the guidelines in 
operation: 
'.. you may have done nothing more than make an innocent mistake. 
In that case, no penalty would arise. You may, however, have paid 
too little tax, or paid it late, as a result of fraud, wilful 
default or neglect. "Wilful default or neglect" can include sending 
in your tax return late. ' (Inland Revenue leaflet 73,1987) 
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The mythology surrounding the allegedly 'draconian' powers of the 
taxman derives essentially from the view of taxation as coercive, and the 
submission of income tax returns as an unwelcome intrusion into the 
taxpayer's private and business affairs - the intolerable inquisition 
school of thought. This view was articulated by one taxpayer I spoke to 
who had been charged financial penalties, following Revenue investigations 
into property holdings. He maintained that the Revenue routinely charged 
penalties at the rate of 200% This assertion is belied by evidence (see 
above) that the effective maximum penalty of 100% is further reduced'- 
according to the degree of mitigating circumstances already described - 
co-operation, gravity and disclosure. But nonetheless, such accounts of 
events do demonstrate the commonsense view that the Revenue's penalties 
are excessively punitive. In practice, the characteristics of coercion and 
intrusion are more applicable to supplementary benefit investigations (as 
described above), yet the regulation of the poor (who are financially 
supported by the state) is not regarded with the disapproval expressed 
when the state attempts to regulate the 'rich' (see Chapters 3 and 6 ). 
EERAL. TY AND PROSECUTION POLICY - Supplementary Ike nefit. 
During the period of intense 'scroungerphobia' in the late 1970's the 
D. H. S. S. mounted increasing numbers of prosecutions for supplementary 
benefit fraud: such prosecutions reached a peak in 1980/81 with criminal 
proceedings taken in 20,105 cases (D. H. S. S. [p. c. ], 1985). This policy of 
'prosecution where appropriate' was held to be a deterrent against fraud 
and abuse. In tune with emergent New Right ideology, calls for greater 
departmental cost-effectiveness led to a reappraisal of this policy 
following the Rayner team's enquiry in 1980. The official departmental 
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policy from 1980 favoured 'non-prosecution' interviews leading to benefit 
'savings', a policy which was spearheaded by S. C. C. U. 's and fraud drives. 
Critics of this policy pointed out that encouraging claimants to withdraw 
their claim to benefit may lead to situations where investigators may 
conduct a non-prosecution interview and achieve the cessation of a claim, 
where a formal prosecution would have failed - for instance through lack 
of evidence, delay in proceedings or improper methods of investigation: 
'A decline in the emphasis on prosecution could mean a decline in 
the adequacy of the evidence on which benefit is withdrawn.. 
In some circumstances benefit can be withdrawn on the basis of 
evidence which would not stand up in court. ' (Moore, 1981) 
Although such commentators would hardly advocate the use of criminal 
proceedings against benefit fraudsters, they were fearful that 'non- 
prosecution' was potentially a greater evil: it entailed the possibility of 
coercion of claimants in the proactive approach to anti-fraud work, 
together with a potential slackening of standards by investigators eager 
to achieve savings targets, and without the constraints of gaining the 
evidence necessary in court proceedings (Moore, 1981; C. P. S. A., 1932). 
Numbers of prosecutions for supplementary benefit fraud did show a 
substantial decrease as a result of this shift in policy, dropping from 
20,105 cases in 1980/81 to 9,360 cases in 1984/5 (see Appendix 3). 
Nonetheless, these figures still demonstrate the relative prevalence of the 
use of criminal proceedings against benefit fraudsters in comparison with 
the infrequency of criminal proceedings against those who defraud the 
Inland Revenue (see Appendix 2). It is noteworthy that justifications in 
terms of the deterrent value of prosecution are not applied equally in the 
case of tax and benefit fraud: the prosecution of a small selection of the 
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most serious cases of tax fraud is considered an adequate deterrent to the 
unacceptable spread of tax evasion, yet around thirty times that number of 
prosecutions seem to be required in order to deter the supplementary 
benefit fraudster. Clearly the differential prosecution of tax and benefit 
fraud is enabled by contradictory principles underlying taxation and the 
provision of state welfare (Chapter 3): the apparent rights of equal 
citizenship afforded to welfare recipients are dissipated by the 
requirement to prove the naj (and the personal worthiness) for state 
support, and by the political demands for departmental cost-effectiveness. 
Paradoxically, it would be far more cost-effective to devote resources to 
the investigation of tax fraud which is, according to best estimates, far 
more costly and more prevalent than benefit fraud (Chapters 1(2) and 5(1) 
above) . 
But differential responses to tax and benefit fraud also reflect the 
contradictory values of social justice and of the free market: the relative 
dominance of the latter enables leniency towards the economically 
successful, but a punitve approach to the economic 'failures' who are 
dependant upon the state. The policy of 'sparing the taxpayer's feelings' 
therefore represents not only a pragmatic approach to the collection of 
tax, but also an acknowledgement that tax evaders are not 'criminals' in 
merely failing to give the appropriate slice of their income to the state. 
By contrast the benefit fraudster is 'criminal' in the sense that s/he is 
stealing the taxpayer's money. The prosecution policies of the two 
enforcing departments are therefore explicable in terms of these 
ideological contradictions and cannot be explained in terms of cost- 
effectiveness and pragmatism alone. 
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The D. H. S. S. approach to financial reparation also reflects these 
ideological distinctions between recipients of state benefits and those 
who are perceived as financing those benefits - the taxpayers. In the case 
of tax fraud (or 'default'), financial penalties are the preferred form of 
punishment on the grounds of sparing the taxpayers feelings, pragmatism 
and the need for compliance. (In practice pragmatism means collecting 
taxes rather than punishing evaders and, as will be argued below, appeals 
to pragmatism offer a powerful justification for the relatively lenient 
departmental response to tax fraud). In the case of supplementary benefit 
claimants, all overpayments of benefit which do not arise from 
departmental error are recoverable, either through repayment in a lump sum 
or by instalments (if the claimant is no- longer in receipt of benefit), 
or by deduction from benefit payments if they are still in receipt (Lynes, 
1985). Although additional financial penalties cannot be levied by the 
D. H. S. S. (as they can by the Revenue). claimants may face criminal 
proceedings in which the imposition of fines and court costs have 
precisely that effect. 
It is often argued that the rationale behind the use of financial 
penalties for tax fraud is the offender's ability to pay coupled with the 
desirability of seeking the taxpayer's compliance (see (1) above). But 
regardless of their poverty (and thus, theoretically, their inability to 
pay), benefit claimants are indeed required to pay , both in terms of 
repayments to the D. H. S. S. and often in terms of financial penalties levied 
by the courts (see discussion of recovery practice and the 'ability to pay' 
below). The key difference in departmental policies regarding financial 
penalty lies in the context and manner of their imposition: for the tax 
fraudster financial penalties are civil matters dealt with by mutual 
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agreeement with officials of the Revenue. In the case of supplementary 
benefit fraud, financial penalties (where applicable) are imposed by courts 
and so involve the criminalization of the fraudster. As argued above, 
penalty policy also reflects ideological distinctions between the allegedly 
non-criminal nature of 'fiddling taxes' and the essentially criminal 
nature of stealing from the state (and taxpayers) through benefit fraud. 
The perceived relationship between the offender and the state is therefore 
crucial in explaining the differences in punishments and penalties imposed 
on tax and benefit fraudsters. 
(b)PRACTICE 
1. 
Departmental policy and practice in relation to the punishment of tax 
and benefit fraudsters is in part determined by legal considerations: the 
differences of prosecution and penalty described above reflect disparities 
in the legal definitions of offences relating to tax and to supplementary 
benefit. The form of law itself can be seen in turn as indicative of 
different societal responses to those who defraud the public purse by 
failing to pay taxes or by falsely claiming state benefits (Uglow, 1984). 
Disparities also emerge when examining the practice of departmental and 
judicial officials who administer the law and the punishments it 
prescribes. Differential practice in these respects will be analysed along 
the following lines: 
1) Legal i es - Intent ausj pf. 
2) Advice and renrese &M. 
3)ntanýipýý" 
4) The 'Ability- Pay' - the appropriateness of punishmontý 
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1) _LegaL 
I. qau s- nrsaf 
'Briefly, the offences available to the Inland Revenue are ones 
which require proof of wens rea in the form of dishonesty or 
intent to defraud ... The D. H. S. S. prosecutor has only to show 
knowledge of the falsity of the statement and does not have to show 
dishonesty in any wider sense. Are policies stressing the criminal 
aspect encouraged by the relatively easier task of prosecuting 
strict liability offences? ' (Uglow, 1984: 130) 
Evidence provided to the Keith Committee and to the N. A. C. R. O. working 
party on the enforcement of Social Security Law would indicate that, as 
Uglow suggests, policies stressing the criminal nature of social security 
offences and the 'non-criminal' nature of tax offences are generated and 
sustained by the availability of the substantive charges used against the 
different types of offender. For instance, according to the Keith Committe 
Report, 
'The Department commented "Prosecution is a very drastic step which 
of its nature ought to be reserved, as a general proposition, to the 
really serious cases". They frankly acknowledged, however, that 
significant practical considerations are also present which tended 
against a large number of prosecutions, namely "the burden of 
preparing cases to the standard required in court and of seeing 
them through the courts". ' ((mnd. 8822,1983: 379) 
By contrast, the task facing solicitors prosecuting on behalf of the 
D. H. S. S. under S. 21 of the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976 is far less 
daunting - they must prove only the following: that the claimant made a 
'representation' (statement), that it was false when made, that the 
claimant knew the purport of the representation and that it was false. 
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There is no requirement to prove deliberate dishonesty or intention to 
defraud the department (O. W. S., 1984; N. A. C. R. O., 1986) It can be argued that 
the law relating to social security cases therefore fails to observe the 
normal, principles of criminal liability in relation to deception offences: 
first, it is not necessary to prove that the 'obtaining' of benefit was 
raise by the deception. Hence 'the principle that causation is integral to 
criminal responsibility is ignored' (Uglow, 1984). Second, it is not 
necessary to prove the intention to defraud: 
'It is not an ingredient of the offence that a false representation 
was made with the intention of obtaining an increase in benefit. ' 
(O. W. S. 1984) 
If prosecutions are brought under the 1968 Theft Act S. 15 (obtaining 
property by deception), the prosecution must prove dishonesty and the 
wrongful obtaining of benefit, but these acts are only used in 'serious' 
cases (O. W. S., 1984; N. A. C. R. O., 1986). The vast majority of prosecutions for 
supplementary benefit fraud are therefore brought under departmental 
regulations which require no proof of intent to defraud. The availability 
of easily prosecutable offences makes a vigorous anti-fraud policy, 
involving the relatively frequent use of prosecution on the part of the 
D. H. S. S., more likely and more attractive (Uglow, 1984). 
The Inland Revenue adopts the principle that 'tax law is not something 
apart' and so it is usual to charge taxpayers with offences under the 
Theft Act 1968. Effectively, then, it is necessary to prove intention to 
defraud in Revenue prosecutions, which perhaps contributes to their 
effectively non-prosecution oriented approach (Cmnd. 8822: 378). As one tax 
official commented, 'Revenue prosecutions tend to be for things that are 
readily provable. How do you prove deliberate intent to defraud by under- 
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estimating profits? ' (O. V. S., 1985). In addition, many tax frauds involve a 
good deal of duplicity: they are by no means easily investigated, proved or 
understood. Evidence provided to the Keith Committee acknowledged the 
difficulties of mounting a successful Revenue prosecution, particularly in 
view of the technical complexities which both judge and jurors must 
understand: 
'.. The difficulties of presentation of fraud cases to juries mean 
that too many fraudsters are being acquitted, or never prosecuted 
in the first place. ' (Cmnd. 8822,1983: 165-6) 
The Roskill Committee, set up in 1983, went so far as to recommend the use 
of a 'Fraud Trials Tribunal' as a potential solution, advocating that they 
be used instead of juries in the most lengthy and complex cases of fraud 
(Zander, 1986). By contrast, in cases of supplementary benefit fraud the 
offence, of knowingly making a false statement for the purposes of 
obtaining benefit. is both easily provable and easily understood by 
Magistrates and Juries. This offence in itself is therefore perceived as 
less ambiguous than tax fraud and consequently more likely to be 
considered as straightforward 'crime'. 
The relative ease of presentation of supplementary benefit fraud cases 
may, however, lead to a certain complacency on the part of D. H. S. S. 
investigators and prosecutors. According to one prosecuting solicitor whom 
I interviewed the case against supplementary benefit claimants is often 
'full of holes'. He argued that in many instances he could 'get them off on 
technicalities'. This raises the important issues of the adequacy of the 
legal and procedural advice made available to claimants accused of fraud, 
and their access to legal representation. 
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his shoulders and with head bowed said 'It was one of those things I 
suppose'. This apparently flippant comment was clearly the result of 
nervousness, and demonstrated Bert's lack of knowledge concerning how to 
conduct his case. He was fined a total of £180 with costs of X35 
(deductions were already being made from his supplementary benefit 
payments to recover the benefit overpaid as a result of his working and 
claiming). Yet once out of the courtroom, he seemed confident and 
articulate: for instance, referring to the magistrates and solicitors 
around him he commented wryly, 
'This lot go on about scrounging, but who do they go to when they 
want an extension built? They come to us because we're cheap. How's 
that! ' (Bert) 
Although Bert would clearly not have gained added sympathy by expressing 
these views to the magistrate, our conversation in itself did illustrate 
the 'communication gap' that had existed in court. The duty solicitor 
scheme should, in theory, prevent this problem (N. A. C. R. O., 1987), yet a 
significant proportion of defendants (42.7'% in my sample) remain 
unrepresented. In addition, 93% of the sample pleaded guilty, despite the 
comments made by a prosecuting solicitor (noted above) suggesting that 
there may be weaknesses in the cases prepared by the D. H. S. S., 'weaknesse 
that could be revealed by expert counsel. 
The duty solicitor scheme should, then, enable defendants to obtain 
legal counsel, but the quality of the advice they may receive from these 
hard-pressed solicitors is questionable. For instance, one duty solicitor 
whom I observed evidently did not understand the regulations governing 
entitlement to supplementary benefit, particularly in relation to wife's 
earnings. As a result the defence he offered was both irrelevant and 
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counter-productive. It is hard to imagine tax lawyers making such errors 
in defending their (high paying) clients, and even harder to imagine an 
individual accused of tax fraud being unrepresented in court! 
Analysis of Revenue and D. H. S. S. investigatory techniques has 
indicated significant disparities in the conduct of interviews with fraud 
suspects (see 5(1) and (2) above). For instance, the 'Hansard' procedure 
and the practice of Revenue investigation specialists of supplying a 
record of proceedings to interviewees are evidence of a 'professional' 
approach to investigation (Cmnd. 8822,1983). They also, perhaps, reflect 
the Revenue's respect for the rights of taxpayers who have the financial 
and legal 'muscle' to insist upon those rights. By contrast, supplementary 
benefit claimants have less official knowledge of their rights and no 
means with which to purchase the best professional advice and 
representation. Agencies such as Citizens Advice Bureaux and local 
government financed Welfare Rights Centres offer invaluable assistance to 
claimants, in obtaining their benefit entitlement and in dealing with 
investigations (O, W. S., 1986). C. A. B. advisers I interviewed said that 
claimants felt that they 'had a better deal' from the D. H. S. S, when advisers 
were present at interviews. 
The possible consequences for claimants who do not receive advice 
(professional or voluntary) is evident in the experiences of Caroline and 
Barry, both of whom were unrepresented when facing supplementary benefit 
fraud charges in court. Caroline was not advised by the D. H. S. S. or the 
court to seek representation, and Barry was told by a D. H. S. S. official that 
there was 'no need to get a solicitor' because his case would probably not 
go to court, and if it did he would probably receive a conditional 
discharge. Barry was prosecuted, convicted, sentenced to a fine (plus 
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costs), and told by the magistrate that he would have received a custodial 
sentence but for his being a father of four small children. He felt that he 
had been misled by departmental officials and had been unaware of the 
gravity of the sentence which the offence (working while claiming) was 
likely to attract. Caroline received a custodial sentence (see discussion 
of sentencing in 3) below). 
It is conceivable that the first indication a claimant suspected of 
fraud has that something may be 'wrong' could be the cessation of their 
benefit payments and a request that they attend the local office for 
interview. At this stage claimants are invariably unrepresented and so may 
face the official accusation, (and presentation of 'evidence') of fraud 
without guidance on their legal rights or the possible implications of 
statements they may make. Prior to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
(1984) the D. H. S. S. did not advise claimants suspected of fraud to seek 
legal help: with the advent of P. A. C. E. there is now a requirement to 
inform all persons interviewed under caution 'that they may obtain legal 
advice if they wish to do so' (D. H. S. S. p. c., 1986). 
Research has indicated that most claimants who have engaged in 
fiddles do admit their offences when confronted by D. H. S. S. officials. But 
it is significant that several claimants, (who were interviewed by 
investigators and admitted their offences), were unaware of the possibliity 
of prosecution, believing that when they agreed to repay the amount of 
benefit overpaid to them, the matter would be resolved. In addition, many 
claimants are not fully aware of how their overpayments are determined, 
and feel that they are bound to accept 'official' figures, whether they 
understand them or not. As N. A. C. R. O. commented, 'it would be regarded as 
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intolerable that a demand for tax should be made without an explanation of 
how it is calculated' (N. A. C. R. O., 1986). 
The issue of claimants' access to representation and advice raises 
important questions concerning their ability to exercise the same rights 
as taxpayers when accused of fraud. Yet when knowledge of the 
benefit 
system is made more feely available to claimants, the assertion that such 
knowledge is tantamount to 'abuse' is frequently made: this was the case 
when welfare rights agencies promoted claimants' rights to exceptional 
needs payments (prior to the 1986 reform of these single payments - see 
section (2) above). The word abuse is, however, not used to describe 
the 
activities of advisers who help taxpayers gain their 'rights' in terms of 
minimising tax liability: phrases with positive connotations, such as 'tax 
planning', are used instead. These differences in vocabulary are indicative 
of more fundamental differences in attitudes towards claimant and 
taxpayer: those who are perceived as takers from the state are effectively 
denied the knowledge, the confidence and the opportunity to assert their 
full rights of citizenship. Those who are perceived as 'givers' are seen as 
engaging in a contract with the state in which the taxpayers' compliance 
is essential: compliance is, in great measure, won through ensuring the 
rights of individual taxpayers (Taxpayers' Charter, 1986). 
3) Sent *_º; 
'In 1984, the ratio of prosecutions brought by the Inland Revenue 
to that brought by the D. H. S. S. was 1: 30 ... The ratio of unsuspended 
prison sentences was about 1: 10 and of all prison sentences, 
including some suspended ones, it was 1: 14. The greater 
proportionate severity of sentencing of revenue law offenders 
3JUr( 
reflects the fact that prosecution is so very much more exceptional 
and more strictly reserved for very serious cases. ' 
(N. A. C. R. O. 1986: 70) 
In 1984,268 Social Security offenders were imprisoned compared to 32 tax 
law offenders, and this despite the Revenue's aim of seeking harsh 
deterrent punishments for its most severe fraudsters (ibid). But it should 
also be stressed that almost 9,000 benefit fraudsters also acquired 
criminal records in that year, compared with 136 tax fraudsters: even 
though significant numbers of tax defaulters are dealt with thräugh the 
imposition of compounded financial penalties, this does not involve the 
publicity and effective criminalization suffered by benefit fraudsters, who 
are 30 times more likely to undergo court proceedings (ibid). 
The analysis of the sentencing of tax and benefit fraud presented here 
will seek to identify the rationales behind certain disposals, and to 
analyse the discourses used in criminal proceedings. Because of the small 
number of Revenue prosecutions, and consequent lack of opportunity to 
observe proceedings, 'official' commentaries on selected court cases will 
form the empirical basis for this section. Observations of supplementary 
benefit fraud cases in a magistrates court (together with additional local 
press coverage) will form the basis of the analysis of sentencing 
rationales for benefit fraud cases. 
The Revenue's prosecution criteria (analysed in 1) above) are evident 
in the types of cases selected for proceedings, which involve for instance, 
failure to make full disclosures, particularly 'heinous' cases and those 
involving professional advisers. In case (A) Mr and Mrs. A. had 
substantially under-estimated farming profits and enjoyed a 'tax holiday' 
for almost a decade, after which they failed to make a full disclosure. The 
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tax thereby lost together with the interest on it amounted to 414,923. 
They were each sentenced to 6 months imprisonment on each of three 
charges, suspended for 2 years, to run concurrently. Additional fines 
totalling £1,000 were imposed, the judge saying that the courts had 'no 
sympathy' in such serious cases. Harsher sentences are often imposed upon 
professional advisers who engage in fraud, and the nature and scale of the 
frauds involved also appear to play a part in determining sentences. For 
instance, Mr B. was a chartered accountant who was found guilty of 
conspiring to defraud the Revenue of tax amounting to £500,000. He was 
sentenced to 9 months imprisonment and was referred to by the judge as a 
'gamekeeper turned poacher'. 
But even the sentencing of dishonest tax advisers may be influenced 
by 'mitigating circumstances': Mr C. was an accountant who pleaded guilty 
to three charges of falsifying accounts. In mitigation it was argued that 
'his professional career had been shattered-he had been a busy 
professional man, of high reputation in the local community, who 
had now lost everything through what were admitted as serious 
irregularities on his part. ' (A. I. T., 1982) 
He was sentenced to pay fines of £500 on each charge. Similarly Mr D. who 
was found guilty of Common Law cheat in relation to the submission of 
false accounts was not given a custodial sentence in view of his age 
'previous good character... the anxiety and general disgrace caused' and was 
sentenced to a £1,000 fine. The social disgrace suffered by the offenders 
in these cases was being presented as a form of punishment in itself, yet 
similar rationales are not used in mitigation where supplementary benefit 
fraudsters are concerned. The fact that the latter are almost by definition 
poor appears to effectively preclude the 'loss of status' plea in 
%4ý 
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mitigation. In addition, the degree of punishment which the sentence of a 
fine inflicts is relative to the wealth and income of the offender: despite 
financial penalties imposed by the Revenue and fines imposed by the 
courts, many tax fraudsters are well able to pay. The same cannot be said 
in relation to fines imposed on offenders who already live on the official 
'poverty line' (see the Ability to Pay discussed in 4) below). 
In the case of Mr E., a chartered accountant found guilty of defrauding 
the Revenue of £8,322 defence counsel emphasised Mr E. 's 'poor financial 
circumstances and the effect that the trial would have on the future 
income from the practice'. The judge took note of this and other mitigating 
factors and imposed a fine of £2,000 rather than a custodial sentence. 
Once again it appears that the status of the offender and the effects that 
court proceedings will have upon their future employment and earnings is 
taken into account when determining sentence. As will be seen below, being 
in regular employment may prove a similarly influential factor where 
benefit fraudsters are concerned, but for very different reasons: the view 
that the offender should no longer be financially dependant upon the state 
appears to be more influential than the notion that they have 'suffered 
enough' as a result of criminal proceedings, this notion being implicit in 
the sentencing of some tax offenders. 
A particularly serious case of tax fraud involved Mr F. a successful 
salesman who falsely claimed to have emigrated to the U. S. A. and therefore 
evaded U. K. tax. Two days before he completed a written declaration to the 
Revenue (statingthat he only visited the U. K. on business), he had agreed 
to purchase a t200,000 home in Chelsea (in his wife's name): his claim to 
non-residence was bogus. When arrested Mr F. was intending to go to the 
Bahamas 'on a one way air ticket': 'The Revenue estimated that tax and 
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interest lost could amount to over £300,000. Mr F. was sentenced to 18 
months imprisonment, 12 months were suspended, and fined £6,000. He was 
also ordered to pay costs of £9,000 and a criminal bankruptcy order was 
granted. However, arguments used by his defence counsel were that Mr F. 's 
current U. K. company employing 50 people would collapse without him, and 
that 'the atmosphere of corporate tax manipulation within a multinational 
group' contributed to the offences. Although an extremely serious offence, 
the bogus non-residence claim was being represented as the product of the 
pressures of the corporate business world. 
In prosecuting 'a selection of the most serious cases' the Revenue seek 
to deter future possible offences. But the selection chosen still appears 
to concentrate upon provable cases (see legal issues raised above) which 
often involve relatively small-scale individual frauds (as discussed above, 
large scale corporate tax fraud is beyond the scope of this thesis). But 
the status of the offender within the business community may be seen as 
another factor influencing sentencing, together with the desire of the 
Revenue to promote the compliance of individual taxpayers. For example, 
Mr G. was a secondhand car dealer in the Liverpool area who, following 
V. A. T. offences was also found to have substantially under-estimated his 
trading profits. But his fraud was lacking in sophistication compared, for 
instance, with Mr F. 's international fiddle: Mr G. had submitted accounts 
which, when analysed by investigators, 'indicated that-he and his wife and 
three children had lived on £273 during a period of 11 years', despite his 
admitting to owning homes in Liverpool and Alicante! He was sentenced to 
imprisonment for one year, a heavier sentence than Mr F. received at 
Knightsbridge court for a substantially larger fraud (A. I. T., 1981, and 
1983). 
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Vithout drawing too firm conclusions from a small sample of tax 
prosecutions, it is fair to say that the Revenue seeks custodial sentences 
for those most serious cases which are selected for prosecution (O. V. S., 
1987). Bearing this in mind, suspended prison sentences and fines are 
often imposed instead. I do not argue that it is desirable to imprison 
more tax fraudsters, but would rather argue that the differences in 
prosecution policy and judicial response to tax and to supplementary 
benefit fraud indicate gross social inequality. This is particularly 
evident in the case of Caroline. -" 
Caroline was the subject of a D. H. S. S. investigation in 1978 when, 
following an anonymous tip-off from he employer, she was interviewed under 
caution. She admitted working part-time in a pub earning a total of L58, 
although by the time of the court hearing she no longer worked there. 
Caroline was 20 years old and living with her boyfriend. Because the 
tenancy of the flat in which they lived was in her name, she was regarded 
as the claiming partner and so was the subject of the prosecution. 
Caroline was from a middle class background and had received a public 
school education, but she had 'been in trouble with the police' for minor 
offences. Her address, given in court, was in a 'bad' area, renowned for 
poverty and for crime. A social enquiry report was 'favourable' towards 
Caroline, but was largely ignored and she was given a custodial sentence, 
according to the magistrate, 'to teach you a lesson'. As already 
discussed, she was unrepresented in court and was completely unprepared 
for the possibility of imprisonment: the first 3 weeks of that sentence 
(she served 3 months in all) were served at Risley Remand Centre. It is 
almost inconceivable that an individual who defrauded the Inland Revenue 
to the tune of £58 should receive a custodial sentence, to teach them 'a 
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lesson'. It is also highly unlikely that such patronising comments would 
be passed by the judiciary in cases of tax fraud (see also the cases of 
Bert and Jim discussed below). It is a paradox that the Revenue now write- 
off up to £70 tax underpaid by P. A. Y. E. taxpayers as 'not worth collecting', 
yet supplementary benefit claimants who fiddle amounts less than £70 (for 
instance, by fiddling and altering giros) may still be prosecuted (O. V. S., 
1987; N. A. C. R. O., 1986). 
In the case of Caroline, issues relating to her class and gender may 
well have influenced the sentence passed. She felt that the magistrate 
regarded her as too independant for a 'young woman' of 20: she was living 
with a man and held the tenancy of a flat. Furthermore, she worked as a 
part-time barmaid, the job in itself envoking stereotyped sexualised 
images, which were particularly false in her case - she rejected her boss' 
advances and, ironically, it was this that led to her being investigated by 
the D. H. S. S.. Caroline also felt that she was regarded as doubly deviant 
because of her apparent rejection of her middle class family background. 
Bert reacted to the realities of supplementary benefit prosecution in 
a philosophical way, yet stressed 
'It's not as if we've beaten up old ladies and stolen their handbags, 
is it? We've not hurt anyone. ' 
But in sentencing one offender, a magistrate referred to benefit fraud as 
'one of the worst forms of stealing there is'. This discrepancy in these 
preceptions of the relative seriousness of benefit fraud perhaps confirmed 
an assertion made by another offender, Jim, who referred to the magistrate 
as being 'On another planet to us'. Another claimant similarly told me 
'They don't live in the same world as us. They don't know what our life is 
like'. If there is a relationship between perceptions of the seriousness 
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of certain offences and the degree of personal empathy with the likely 
offenders, then this may affect the prosecution and sentencing of tax and 
beneit fraud: 'If the wrongdoer is someone like themselves and the 
situation a familiar one, people tend to be less censorious' (Jowell and 
Witherspoon, 1985). The judges and magistrates who sentence tax and 
benefit fraud are far less likely to be familiar with the situation of 
supplementary benefit claimants. 
Jim was prosecuted for failing to declare his wife's earnings over a 
one year period, during which time they were attempting to pay off 
accumulated debts of over 11,000. Jim had admitted the offence and agreed 
that the benefit overpaid be deducted from his weekly supplementary 
benefit payments at the rate of £1.65 per week. In sentencing Jim the 
magistrate said , 
'this country's fed up to the teeth with people like you scrounging 
from fellow citizens. ' 
He was sentenced to fines totalling £210 and ordered to pay costs of £34. 
It is difficult to see the rationale behind a sentence which inflicts 
further financial penalties upon a family (with three school-aged children) 
who effectively live below the poverty line because of deductions made for 
a £996 overpayment, and whose offence was itself motivated by an attempt 
to clear debts of a further ä1,000. Under such circumstances Jim's 'joke' 
to his friends after the hearing was a sad indication of the family's 
plight: 'Ah well, I suppose it's the red light under the porch now. ' 
The proportion of indictable offences dealt with by fines is declining: 
in the 1970's 50% of such offences were dealt with by fines compared with 
40% in 1985 (N. A. C. R. O., 1987). This shift has been linked with rising 
unemployment, although research has indicated that magistrates' sentencing 
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patterns vary according to an area's history of unemployment and the 
existing unemployment rates (N. A. C. R. O., 1987). Nonetheless, courts were 
less likely to modify financial penalties for those on low incomes where 
supplementary benefit fraud was concerned (ibid: 48). This view is 
consistent with my own research in which 40% of offenders in the sample 
were sentenced to pay fines and 78% were ordered to pay costs (see 
Appendix 4). But over the six year period covered in this study there was 
a discernable increase in the use of conditional discharges and comparable 
reduction in the use of fines: during the period 1981-3,22% of offenders 
were sentenced to a conditional discharge and 44% to fines. In the year 
1986-7 the same proportion of offenders (37%) were sentenced to 
conditonal discharges and fines - this trend perhaps reflects a growing 
acknowledgement of the inappropriateness of fines in dealing with the 
crimes of the poor. 
As evident in the case of Caroline, magistrates can be both punitive 
and patronising in their attitudes towards benefit fraudsters: one 
magistrate used the same phrase on three occasions when sentencing 
supplementary benefit offenders: 'You are old enough to know better'. One 
offender reprimanded in this manner was 42 years old. Another was told 
when sentenced to 'pull himself together', and reference was made to his 
'deceiving society'. But one offender who was sentenced to a community 
service order was told that although he was 'in great danger of going to 
prison today, there is one plus in your favour - at least you're working'. 
The worst 'crime' is evidently to be financially dependant on the state. 
One issue raised when analysing the sentencing of tax and benefit 
fraudsters is the tendency of a 'ratchet effect' to be operative in the 
case of unemployed offenders: 
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'an offender who has had, say, fines and a probation order is more 
likely, other things being equal, to be considered for a higher 
tariff disposal next time, and being unemployed may -accelerate this 
process. ' (N. A. C. R. O., 1987: 25) 
As many tax defaulters are likely to be dealt with by the Revenue policy 
of financial settlement (and penalties as appropriate), they are not 
subject to the ratchet effect: tax fraud is usually dealt with by 'civil' 
proceedings within the department, supplementary benefit fraud, despite an 
avowed non-prosecution policy by the D. H. S. S., is more likely to reti lt in 
'criminal' proceedings. These in turn may have the cumulative effect of 
moving the offender's sentencing tariff upwards. This factor may 
accentuate the already unequal departmental and judicial response to those 
who defraud the Revenue and those who defraud the D. H. S. S. 
Itg6 
4)The Ability o Pay. 
There is a common assumption that the differential treatment of tax 
and benefit fraud derives from disparities in the offenders' relative 
'ability to pay', in terms of repayment of money lost to the public purse 
or in terms of added financial penalty. It is often asserted that this 
explains both the high rate of prosecution of poorer fraudsters by the 
D. H. S. S. and the comparably low rates of prosecution, (coupled with 
emphasis on financial settlement) by the Inland Revenue where richer 
ffhsters are concerned. However, this argument ignores the fact that the 
poorest menbers of society da pay for their fiddles, both in reparation to 
the D. H. S. S. through deductions from benefit, and in reparation to society 
through the courts, where in 1983 62% of benefit fraudsters were also 
ordered to pay fines (N. A. C. R. O., 1986 - but see discussion of sentencing 
above for recent changes). What follows will examine the contradictory 
rationales which underpin departmental and judicial assumptions concerning 
the individual taxpayer's or claimant's ability to 'pay' for their fiddles. 
The D. H. S. S. has the power to recover overpayments resulting from 
fraud in four ways: by deduction from future benefit (the most common 
method, accounting for two-thirds of all recoveries), by lump sum payment, 
by instalments or by compensation order. Until 1980 departmental practice 
followed the rule that any deductions from benefit made in respect of 
overpayments should not reduce the claimant's income to below the basic 
supplementary benefit level, regarded as the 'poverty line'. But current 
regulations enable up to £6.30 to be deducted from the weekly benefit of 
claimants accused of fraud and, as mentioned above, claimants are not 
always fully aware of how -their overpayments have been calculated 
(N. A. C. R. O., 1986: 65). It is difficult to see how benefit fraud is deterred 
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by the use of recovery methods which can reduce a claimant's income to 
£6.30 below the poverty line and, if criminal proceedings ensue, possibly 
involve a fine imposed by the courts in addition: under such circumstances 
fiddling benefits or other crimes, ironically, may become the only means 
of financial survival. 
Taxpayers are almost by definition better able to pay financial 
penalties than benefit claimants as the former do have a source of earned 
or investment income upon which they are liable to pay tax. 
For this 
reason, as we have seen already (in sections (1) and (3) above), the 
taxpayers' ability to repay tax lost and to pay additional compounded 
penalties where appropriate is used as a justification for 'sparing the 
taxpayer's feelings' and for the adoption of an essentially non-prosecution 
policy. Most tax officials I have spoken to have a sympathy for this 
approach on practical grounds, but nonetheless they object to the 'double 
standards' evident where benefit fraudsters are concerned. This not only 
applies to disparities in prosecution policy, but also to some of the 
justificatory rationales used in respect of those policies. 
Officials were particularly aware of the relatively extensive publicity 
which 'scrounging' attracts in comparison to tax evasion. But publicity is 
inextricably linked to the reporting of criminal proceedings in the courts, 
and if tax fraud cases do not reach the courts, then public awareness of 
the extent and costs of the problem will be minimal. In order to justify 
this 'softly softly' approach to publicising tax evasion it is sometimes 
argued that this is the most effective means of ensuring taxpayers' 
compliance with investigators: 
'The Inland Revenue argues that people will be prepared to co- 
operate more if they "settle out of court", as it were, with no 
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fuss. I think that is probably correct, but there is a need to 
weigh up the relative value of publicity as a deterrent, in 
relation to the lack of publicity being helpful in a handful of 
investigations. ' (O. V. S., 1985 - my emphasis added) 
This rationale for the relatively 'quiet' treatment of the tax fraudster is 
closely linked to the mitigation offered in court (see cases discussed in 
'sentencing' above), that social disgrace is in itself a punishment for tax 
evaders. The notion that a fraudster has 'suffered enough' merely through 
the public exposure of his/her crimes is one which is-. not applied to 
supplementary benefit fraudsters. Indeed, the media treatment of them 
suggests just the opposite! It seems that in order to 'pay' for one's 
crimes through personal suffering and disgrace, one has to have some 
social standing to lose: hence these discourses are not available to 
justify lenient treatment of benefit fraud. 
Although differences in the ability to pay offer a simple justification 
for the differential official and judicial responses to tax and benefit 
fraud, such justifications are themselves a_ product of particular sets of 
beliefs about the relative personal and economic worth of citizens who 
claim money from the state and citizens who pay money t9. the state. These 
beleifs are evident in discourses used in courts, by departmental officials 
(see sections (1) and (2) above) and in popular rhetoric (see Chapters 3 
and 6). 
In summary, the poor who defraud the D. H. S. S. am required to pay, to 
the department and to society, as a punishment for their crimes. Those who 
defraud the Revenue may well pay financial penalties, but these are more 
likely to be civil, in nature and in tone: they are less likely than benefit 
fraudsters to suffer criminalization and public villification. 
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This Chapter has described the departmental enforcement policies and 
investigation methods used by the D. H. S. S. and by the Inland Revenue, and 
has examined the outcomes of those investigations in terms of penalties 
and prosecution. Concomitantly, the relationship between policy and 
practice has been analysed, and is summarised in Tables 5: 5 and 5: 6 
below. 
OFFICIAL ENFORCEXEIT POLICY RATIONALES 
to protect the public purse. 
to ensure the compliance of the taxpayer to the Taxes Acts. 
to ensure the rights of the taxpayer. 
EFFECTIVE RATIONALES, IH PRACTICE 
to minimise administrative hassle - get the job (of collecting taxes) 
done. 
to operate as effectively as possible - given the practical 
constraints of manpower and resources. 
to spare the taxpayer's feelings - seek compliance through 
negotiation, effectively underclassify offences to minimise taxpayers' 
resistance, obtain financial settlement wherever possible, prosecute 
very rarely (only in the most serious cases). 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Pragmatism 
Compliance 
Tacit acknowledgement of the 'intrusive' view of personal tax 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Inland Revenue's enforcement policy has often been presented as a 
logical departmental response to the material realities of enforcement: 
hence the Revenue's effective, non-prosecution policy is represented as the 
result of the practical constraints encountered in achieving the 
department's primary goal - the protection of the Taxes Acts and the 
public purse. According to this view, the tax evader should be persuaded to 
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comply and pay his/her tax, and criminal sanctions should be reserved for 
only the most serious of offenders . This approach is justified as the 
most effective means of deterring potential fraud whilst at the same 
timemaintaining public confidence in our taxation system. It underpins 
enforcement policy, investigatory practice and judicial response. 
The rationale of protecting the public purse generates different 
departmental policy and practice when applied to the enforcement of social 
security law (N. A. C. R. O., 1986). 
TIME 5: 6 RATIONALES FOR SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT IN la 
OFFICIAL ENFORCEXENT POLICY RATIONALES 
to protect the public purse 
to ensure the efficient payment of benefit in accordance with the 
rights of the claimant 
to prevent fraud and abuse 
EFFECTIVE RATIONALES, IN PRACTICE 
cost-effectiveness - demonstrated by departmental cost-cutting, 
reductions in routine staff (but not fraud staff) and 'benefit savings' 
achieved as the result of anti-fraud work 
the effective policing of welfare - in practice accomplished through 
the routine stigma of the claiming process, work tests, and the 
surveillance and investigation of 'target' groups. 
efficiency - get the job done, given the practical difficulties 
(arising from 'cost-cutting') for routine D. H. S. S. staff and claimants. 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Detection and punishment of 'scroungers'. 
Means testing, to establish nseda (and desert). 
Tacit acknowledgement of the distinction between the 'deserving' and 
'undeserving' poor. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Cost-effectiveness coupled with the rigorous policing of the 
supplementary benefits system have been the principal goals of 
departmental policy since 1979, (although it must be remembered that 
'scroungerphobia' and high numbers of fraud prosecutions are not confined 
to the era of the Thatcher government alone - see Golding and Middleton, 
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1982). But contradictions between the apparent discourses surrounding 
official responses to benefit fraud, and the operative rationales which 
effectively determined policy and practice, reflected deep-seated 
ideological contradictions over the twin issues of taxation and welfare. 
As Chapter 3 suggested, the tension between the competing ideologies of 
individualism and of social justice has never been resolved: these tensions 
have given rise to differing perceptions of the relative importance of the 
state and the individual, and the claimant and taxpayer. It is within the 
material and ideological context of these contradictions that differential 
responses to tax and benefit fraud are generated. 
This Chapter has examined what happens to taxpayers and benefit 
claimants when their affairs are investigated by departmental officials. 
Interactions between tax officials and taxpayers were found to be 
characterised by respectful formality, and due attention to the taxpayer's 
rights as outlined in the Revenue's 'Charter'. By contrast, interactions 
between D. H. S. S. officials and claimants were characterised by mutual 
distrust and by stress (Mandla, 1987; P. S. I., 1985). Although there were 
some similarities in the investigatory techniques used by the two 
departments (for instance the common use of surveillance, targetting and 
in-depth interviews), there were significant differences in the practical 
operation of such techniques: for instance, surveillance by Board 
Investigation Officers is undertaken only with prior evidence of fraud, 
whereas surveillance by Special Claims Control Units could proceed on 
grounds of 'suspicion'. Similarly, compliance officers target certain 
occupational groups for investigation, but this does not involve the degree 
of coercion that was apparent in the targetting of vulnerable claimant 
groups by S. C. C. U. 's (O. W. S., 1982; N. A. C. R. O., 1986). Although no longer in 
402 
operation, S. C. C. have left a legacy of poorer relations between claimants 
and D. H. S. S. staff (and amongst D. H. S. S. staff themselves), and a proactive 
and intrusive approach to the policing of welfare recipients. 
Differences between official policy discourses and effective practice 
have also been analysed in relation to prosecution policy. For example, 
although the D. H. S. S. at present officially operates a policy designed to 
reduce numbers of prosecutions and seek 'benefit savings', effectively they 
continue to prosecute around 9,000 supplementary benefit claimants per 
annum: this contrasts with the official 'selective' approach to Revenue 
prosecutions which effectively resulted in only 332 prosecutions in 1984. 
Moreover, the justificatory rationale behind both policies - deterrence - 
is not applied equally to tax and benefit fraudsters, nor are the judicial 
punishments imposed on them based on similar premises: analysis of 
discourses used in court demonstrate crucial differences in the 
assumptions being made about claimant and taxpayer. In some cases it 
seemed that tax evaders were presumed to be victims - either of the ethos 
of the business and corporate world, or victims of the disgrace of their 
fellow citizens - as a result of Revenue prosecution. According to 
magistrates observed in this study, in cases of supplementary benefit 
fraud the victim is the taxpayer (who was seen to finance benefit 
payments), not the benefit fraudster. The tax fraudster is represented as 
at best folk-hero, at worst a victim of the taxman (Chapter 3(a)). 
At the heart of the contradictions in policy and in pratice which have 
been analysed here is the ideological representation of the taxpayer as a 
'giver' to the state and the supplementary benefit claimant as a 'taker' 
from the state (and thus, ultimately, from the compliant taxpayer). These 
representations are the product of the particular histories of tax and 
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welfare. These histories are characterised by a strong resistance to 
taxation, save in times of national crisis (for instance, during war or 
post-war reconstruction), and a parallel struggle over collective welfare 
provision, which was similarly and grudgingly accepted after the crises of 
two World Wars. Specific economic, social and political preconditons 
therefore underpin attitudes to tax and welfare at particular times. 
Contradictory political, social and judicial responses to tax and welfare 
rest upon combinations of beliefs about the nature of the relationship 
between the state and the individual, and the desirability of social 
justice or economic growth as the primary goal of modern mixed economies. 
These combinations of beliefs, the vocabularies they invoke and the 
policies which they generate are summarised in Table 5: 7 below. 
TABLE 5: 7 DIFFERENTIAL IDEOLOGICAL PRECO. ADITIOBS FOR EBFORCEKENT POLICY 
IA I VELF RE. 
ECONOMIC IDEOLOGIES 
Free Market 
Individualism 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 
Liberal minimalist state 
LEGAL IDEOLOGIES 
'hens real 
('Sporting' view of law, 
tax frauds as 'fiddling') 
ORGANIZATIONAL IDEOLOGIES 
Compliance 
Spare the taxpayers feelings 
Fraud deterred by exemplary 
prosecution of the few. 
Social Justice 
Collectivism 
Democratic interventionist state 
Strict liability 
('punish scroungers', 
benefit fraud as 'crime') 
Control 
Police the poor 
Fraud deterred by prosecuting 
some and policing many others. 
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DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE TO TAX AND SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT FRAUD 
- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The slogan that there is 'one law for the rich and another for the 
poor' often surfaces in critical social commentaries. This thesis has 
examined the, cliched slogan by analysing the legal, social, material and 
ideolgical responses to the economic crimes committed by individuals who 
approximate to the 'rich' and the 'poor' in contemporary Britain. In order 
to ensure meaningful comparisons between individual lawbreakers, the 
'relatively rich' taxpayers and the 'poor' supplementary benefit claimants 
were the chosen focus of study. This enabled the techniques and 
vocabularies of motive of individual tax and benefit fraudsters to be 
directly compared. Similarly, direct comparisons could be made between 
the departmental techniques used to regulate individual tax and benefit 
fraudsters, and the official rationales for Revenue and D. H. S. S. enforcement 
policies and practices. 
Chapter 1 examined the themes which emerged from a review of 
literature relating to taxation and welfare benefits. These themes were 
then utilized to inform the subsequent analyses, in later chapters, of: 
a) the historical, legal, administrative, and material preconditions 
for the commission of tax and supplementary benefit fraud (Chapter 2) 
b) how 'commonsense' knowledges about tax and benefit fraud are 
constructed (Chapter 3(a)) 
c) consistencies and contradictions in knowledges about tax and 
welfare. 
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d) contradictory discourses on personal taxation and welfare 
provision. 
e) the techniques and justifications used by tax and benefit 
fraudsters (Chapter 4), 
f) the deconstruction of 'official' discourses on D. H. S. S. and Inland 
Revenue enforcement policies, and examination of regulatory practices 
Chapter 5 (1) and 5(2)). 
g) Official and judicial discourses on the rationales underpinning, and 
means of effecting, the punishment of tax and suplementary benefit 
fraudsters (Chapter 5(3)). 
The utility of such an analysis will be demonstrated in the final 
section of this chapter (a brief analysis of the contrasting discourses 
justifying the 1988 Budget and the Social Security Act (1986), implemented 
in 1988). In the meantime, principal themes which emerged from the 
literature review (and thereafter informed these analyses), can be 
summarised as follows: - 
1) The 'deserving' and the 'undeserving' pes. 
The 1834 Poor Law left an important legacy which has influenced 
contemporary attitudes towards, and vocabularies used to describe, the 
poor. Implicit distinctions were made between those categories of poor who 
were seen to be 'deserving' of relief - the aged, the sick, children and 
the infirm - and those who were regarded as 'undeserving' - the unemployed 
or 'idle' paupers. These distinctions still inform popular rhetoric and, 
currently, social policy towards the unemployed and a new category of 
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claimants who could, it is argued, similarly 'avoid' poverty - lone 
mothers. 
The twin pillars of the 1834 Poor Law were the principles of less 
eligibility and the workhouse test. These principles remain operative in 
the 1980's, - although in differing forms. For instance, pressure for 
unemployed benefit claimants to attend Job Clubs, the Restart interviewing 
programme and increasin3ly stringent tests of an individual's 'availablity 
for work' all signify an intensification of the 'work test', which now 
operates -"Within the community, rather than within the walls of a 
workhouse, Such measures are, according to official pronouncements, 
designed to 'show people how to look for jobs more effectively' and to 
remotivate the unemployed. Yet an important latent function is to 'detect 
the "scroungers" and those not genuinely available for work' (Guardian, 
23.2.88 and-27-12,86). 
Less eligibilty still surfaces in arguments which invoke the notion of 
'incentives to work' (see below) and the 'anti-effort' (or unemployment) 
trap. Currently, discourses centring on the implementation of the 1986 
Social Security Act stress, amongst other issues, the officially stated 
goal of providing incentives for the unemployed to take low-paid jobs 
(B. B. C. Newsnight, 31.3.88). Such incentives will only be provided if the 
claimant's lot is rendered 'less eligible' than that of the lowest paid 
worker (Ruche and Kirchheimer, 1939). 
Taken together, the principles of less eligibility and the work(house) 
test still exert important influences upon popular perceptions of 
(a) those who are by virtue of their age, health or 'unavoidable' 
misfortune 'deserving' of state support, and 
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(b) those who are, because of their lack of effort (or their lack of 
adherence to the 'moral' nuclear family form), regarded as 'avoidably' poor 
and hence 'undeserving' of state support. 
2) Penality welfare and taxation 
An important theme which informs any analysis of welfare provision is 
the issue of penality: work tests and less eligible levels of welfare 
benefits (already described), inevitably result in the state functioning, 
through the claiming process and mechanisms of benefit payment, to instill 
discipline into welfare recipients. A generalised discipline may be seen 
to encompass the generation (through such processes) of sentiments of 
stigma and guilt, to which all claimants are exposed. But for the 
undeserving, an added 'obstacle course' is presented by informal welfare 
rationing, 'mucking about' and attempts to maintain the work discipline 
through specific 'tests' and deductions (from already-less-eligible levels 
of benefit), for 'voluntary unemployment' (Deacon and Bradshaw, 1983; 
Walker and Walker, eds., 1987). 
Because welfare recipients are 'takers', the state may lay down 
conditions upon which their benefit is to be received. The state thus has 
the power to punish those who cannot, or will not, meet those disciplinary 
criteria - benefits can be reduced or withdrawn, and in some 
circumstances individuals may be prosecuted for failure to financially 
maintain their families (Lynes, 1985). By contrast, taxpayers are 'givers' 
to the state and the discipline to which they are subjected is less 
rigorous and less direct - as a result, attempts to enforce the Taxes Acts 
frequently attract vociferous condemnation: for instance, a recent series 
of articles on Revenue investigation policy in The Times (February and 
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March 1988) were headlined 'Tax claw in the velvet glove', 'Shifting the 
Burden of proof' and 'Targets for the hit squad'. In response to the 
aggressive anti-Revenue tone of these articles Bill Hawkes, Assistant 
Secretary of the Inland Revenue Staff Federation, commented, 
'Every successful challenge or investigation which recovered tax, 
means that someone has lied to the Revenue - not just made a mistake. 
When the white middle classes lie it is seen as part of the game. 
If black working class people lie to the D. H. S. S. the morality of 
it is seen quite differently. ' (Assessment, March 1988) 
The vocabularies of the 'game' of tax evasion and the (lack of) 'morality' 
of benefit fraudsters are important themes in elucidating differential 
popular responses to tax and benefit fraud. But the complex problem of 
differential response cannot be 'read-off' as a product of structural 
inequalities of class and race alone: it can, rather, be seen as a product 
of the historical and ideological construction of taxation as an 
intolerable inquisition to which the 'giving' taxpayer is subjected, in 
order to finance those who 'take' welfare benefits from the state. Thus the 
differential powers of the state (legal and administrative), and the 
political will of the state to discipline and punish defaulting taxpayers 
and undeserving claimants are crucial in explaining differential response 
to tax and benefit fraud. 
3) The ncentives debate 
Arguments which suggest that 'high' levels of welfare benefits act as 
an incentive to idleness, and 'high' rates of taxation act as a 
disincentive to effort remain ideologically powerful, despite their dubious 
empirical foundations (Chapter 1(2)). This version of the incentives 
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argument enables tax fraudsters to be represented positively, often as 
enterprising individuals who are merely resisting 'excessive' personal 
taxation. Within this context tax evasion may be transformed from economic 
crime to a battle of wits to beat the taxman or as a 'part of the game' of 
capital accumulation, which is the taken-for-granted goal of the 'Growth' 
orientated society (Chapters 3 and 4(1)). 
At the same time, this view of incentives represents benefit claimants 
as welfare-drones or 'battery hens' who enjoy servitude and dependency 
(Boyson, 1971 and 1978). Their incentive to work is seen to be sapped. by 
their very idleness and the 'moral hazard' of claiming state benefits 
(Parker, 1982). Alternative discourses stress that the highest marginal 
rates of tax are not suffered by the enterprising middle classes, but by 
the low-paid, and go on to argue that the unemployed are not prevented 
from working by 'high' levels of state benefits but, rather, by mass 
unemployment and the chronic problem of low pay (Roll, 1983). Nonetheless, 
these critical versions of the incentives argument fail to gain dominance 
within a capitalist economic framework, dominated by New Right discourses, 
wherein low wages are seen to mean higher profitability, workers allegedly 
need to 'price themselves into jobs', and lower expenditure on benefits 
(potentially) enables lower taxes. 
The pre-eminence of the ideology of what may be termed the 'effort' 
school of thought is particularly assured whilst political power rests 
with advocates of New Right politics. Their comtemporary stress on the 
value of the 'enterprise culture' and parallel denunciation of the 'benefit 
culture' serves to polarise popular discourse on taxation and welfare. It 
is within this economic, historical and ideological context that 
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differential responses to tax and benefit fraudsters are reproduced and 
justified. 
4) The 'Robin Hoad' myth of a postwar redistribution of income and wealth 
The 'Robin Hood' myth reflects the widely held belief- that, since 1945, 
a fundamental redistribution of income and wealth has taken place. This 
belief is not supported by empirical evidence (Byrne, 1987), yet remains 
ideologically powerful. In propounding the 'Robin Hood' effect which has 
allegedly. -.. been achieved 
by progressive taxation, such mythologies 
effectively present the taxpayer as 'giver' to the poor and the poor as 
'takers' from the taxpayer and thus the state. This mythology serves two 
ideological purposes: first, it offers a justification for tax fraud in 
terms of resisting 'progressive' taxation, which, it is alleged, has gone 
too far because 'making the rich poorer does not make the poor richer, but 
it does make the state stronger' (Joseph, 1975). Second, the myth of 
redistribution effectively denies the principal motivation for benefit 
fraud - poverty - because the 'real' problem of poverty has been removed 
through the 'Robin Hood' activities of the state. 
5) Differential attribution of motives for tax and benefit fraud 
The myth of redistribution therefore raises the issue of differential 
popular acceptance of justificatory rationales offered for tax and benefit 
fraud. For example, it has been argued that tax fraudsters may 
successfully justify their actions in terms of excessive state regulation 
and 'penal' rates of personal tax (Chapter 4(lb)). Their 'need' to be 
economically successful remains unquestioned, the accumulation motive 
taken-for-granted. However, supplementary benefit fraudsters are unable to 
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successfully invoke their main motivation (poverty), because they are 
perceived as committing fraud through 'greed' not 'need'. The attribution of 
this motive derives from concepts of the undeserving poor, coupled with an 
invocation of 'Robin Hood' myths which present benefit claimants as prime 
recipients of the 'gift' of state support, enabled by the selfless 
redistribution of the taxpayer's money. 
Vocabularies of motive offered for tax fraud centre on resistance to 
pay over money legally due to the state, whereas the benefit fraudster 
attempts to justify taking money illegally from the state. The result is 
the same - loss to the public purse - and similar activities are engaged 
in by some tax and benefit fraudsters (for instance. working in the black 
economy, making false declarations to government departments). But 
differential attribution of motive essentially derives from the historical 
and ideological construction of the relationship between taxpayer and the 
state, and supplementary benefit claimant and the state: the vocabulary of 
'givers' and 'takers' thus helps to explain why tax fraudsters may gain 
popular acceptance (and even muted praise) in defrauding both the state 
and the honest taxpayer; yet it is benefit fraudsters who are attributed 
the motives of greed, selfishness and 'immoral' lack of public spirit. 
6) Freedom and social justice 
As argued above (see Chapter 3), the social philosphies of 
individualism and liberalism cannot fully be reconciled as they are based 
upon entirely different premises concerning the relative role of the state 
and the individual in modern industrial societies: a struggle between these 
philosophies characterises twentieth century social policy, particularly in 
relation to taxation and welfare. 
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From 'The People's Budget' of Lloyd George and Beveridge's 'Social 
Insurance' to the concept of Social Security in the 1960's, the apparent 
object of social policy was the achievement of some measure of social 
justice through the taxation and welfare benefits systems. Yet the 
economic prosperity upon which such policies were based was seen as being 
dependant upon adherence to free-market principles. These principles 
involve the pre-eminence of competition, entrepeneurial spirit, minimal 
state regulation in the market and personal wealth creation. The ideologies 
of social justice, and of the free market, though fundamentally at odds, 
uneasily co-exist and are differentially invoked at particular times 
according to specific material and political preconditions. Thus, for 
instance, in times of war the rhetoric of 'fair shares' was invoked to 
justify progressive taxation and a redistribution in favour of those who 
had been equal in war and in death. But the Butskellite 'consensus' upon 
which the postwar welfare state rested was, rather, a grudging compromise 
(Deakin, 1987). 
The ideology of the free market has always epitomised the 'Old Right', 
and was revitalised by the political ascendancy of the New Right in the 
mid 1970's: it is, therefore, important to remember that the ideological 
contradictions which allow space for the practice and justification of 
differential response have a long history. The contradictions which enable 
differential responses to tax and welfare fraud derive from a struggle 
between the competing ideologies of social justice and free market 
individualism. Such key ideas have never 'disappeared', but have lost 
dominance at particular times: in this way the generation of knowledges 
and ideas has been examined here as a process of incorporation and 
transformation of existing. discourses, rather than the creation of 'new' 
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ones. To this extent the 'New' Right is not new: as Taylor Gooby (1985) 
argues, this political philosophy weaves a variety of Old right arguments 
which, for example, derive from both the contradictions of the Butskellite 
era and the Victorian values of 'self-help' and 'morality'. 
By the mid 1970's, the material conditions created by economic 
recession particularly favoured two interlocking sets of beliefs which 
have firm roots in the histories of taxation and welfare: 
First, the notion of the social security 'scrounger' which echoed 
nineteenth century stereotypes of the undeserving 
poor, and which was 
similarly produced by a concern about the costs of 'poor relief' to the 
ratepayer/taxpayer. 
Second, a belief that allegedly 'progressive taxation' (raised in order to 
finance benefits to the poor), had gone too far in subsidising the (idle) 
poor at the expense of the hard-working taxpayer: it was argued that 
incentives, entrepeneurial spirit and thrift had all been stifled as a 
result (Seldon ed., 1979; Joseph, 1975). 
These two sets of ideas fused in the growing concern expressed, from 
left and right wing perspectives, about the form and objectives of the 
tax-financed modern welfare state (Xishra, 1984). Advocates of social 
justice focussed on the problems of inadequate levels of benefit, poor 
take-up of means tested benefits, issues concerning claimants' rights and 
inefficient service-delivery to the poor. By contrast, the advocates of 
free-market individualism focussed on the intrusive, stifling, inefficient 
and cossetting welfare state which allegedly fails to 'help the poor to 
help themselves', whilst at the same time burdens the not-so-poor 
(taxpayers), who are faced with the spiralling costs of an allegedly unfair 
and inefficient state bureaucracy. 
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Taxation and welfare provision are therefore inextricably linked, in 
free market and social justice ideologies, though the nature of that 'link' 
hinges upon differing views of the respective roles of the individual and 
the state. But it is within the context of this historical, ideological and 
political struggle that the paradox of differential response must be 
understood and explained, rather than in the simplistic terms of 'one law 
for the rich and another for the poor'. 
During the time when this summary of the central analytical themes of 
the thesis was being written in April 1988, an opportunity arose to 
demonstrate the utility of these themes by analysing contemporary 
discourses on taxation and welfare provision: this opportunity occurred 
because of a unique combination of 'reforms' of both tax and welfare 
announced in the 1988 budget (presented on March 15th), and the 1986 
Social Security Act (fully implemented in April 1988). The stated motives 
for both the budget and the social security reforms are srikingly similar: 
Promote incentives to effort 
(for the wealth creators) 
Radical reform, geared to 
simplification of the tax system 
(e. g. reduce the series of higher 
rate taxes to one rate - 40%) 
Promote incentives to work 
(for the unemployed, the young) 
Radical reform geared to 
simplification of the benefit 
system (e. g. same means-testing 
rules to apply to main benefits) 
Greater fairness, e. g. taxing wives Greater fairness e. g. 'more help' for 
separately, stopping 'tax breaks' families, targetting the 'needy' 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
The themes of reform, incentives, fairness and the added impetus 
(according to Mrs Thatcher), to 'push the balance back in favour of the 
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individual' characterise the rhetorics of both the budget and the social 
security reforms. But the manner in which these vocabularies are applied, 
in practice, to taxpayers and to benefit claimants are entirely 
contradictory. 
The 1988 budget promised to put the values of 'incentives and 
opportunity in place of old fashioned egalitarianism' (Financial Times', 
16.3.88). According to The Times, Britain had been brought closer to a 
'low tax, high incentive economy' (16.3.88). When the New Right version of 
incentives is applied to taxpayers, they are seen to respond directly to 
reduced taxation by working harder and seeking out opportunities. In a 
similar vein, it is argued that dramatic reductions in higher rates of tax 
were justified by the need to maintain incentives for 'scarce talent' to 
remain Jr% Britain. These interpretations of the incentives argument were 
questioned by critics (such as Victor Keegan) who argued that there was no 
proven link between low top rates of tax and high economic growth: 
'Anyone who tries to prove this first has to explain how countries 
varying from Japan (with a top rate of 78%) and Sweden (even higher) 
have achieved better prosperity than the U. K.... There has not been 
much evidence of an exodus of scarce talent from Japan or Sweden. ' 
(Guardian, 28.3.88) 
Nonetheless, popular press coverage centred on the 'high earners' who 
were allegedly being encouraged to greater effort in the budget, and the 
popularisation of this incentives argument proved bizarre, as, for 
instance, when The Sun announced that 
'Burton stores chief, Sir Ralph Halpern - famous for his sexploits - 
will get a banking great boost of 15,097 a week. ' (The Sun, 16.3.88) 
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But official discourse also clearly dominated popular vocabularies: Nigel 
Lawson's assertion that 'Everyone will benefit' was reproduced on March 
16th in the form of 'We're all in the money' (Daily Express), and 'Lotsa 
Lovely Lolly' (The Sun). Although the language of The Times was leis 
colourful, it was no less euphoric: 'Lawson's Tax Triumph'. 
This powerful invocation of incentives clearly left behind all those 
who were unable to respond to tax cuts, either because their wages were 
too low (hence they remained stuck in the poverty trap), or because they 
paid no tax (the unemployed, and pensioners). But those who disagreed with 
the 'official' justifications for tax cuts were likely to be branded 
'humbugs', and The Daily Mail' suggested that they should 'give the money 
back'. Crucial to an understanding of such popular sentiments is an 
ideological sleight of hand whereby the (largely working class) readership 
of The Sun absorbs official pronouncements which justify t2 billion tax 
cuts to the top 5% of wage-earners, whilst the lowest 30% received 
virtually nothing (Guardian, 17.3.88), on the grounds of incentives to 
effort. 
Arguments about fairness in the distribution of the 'lolly' were 
largely absent from official discourses on the budget. But, it was argued, 
'Fairness is a vague term at the best of times' and to talk of 
'distribution of wealth in a society is to borrow a word from 
statisticians: you might equally talk of the distribution of car-crashes or 
Cabbage Whites' (Spectator, 26.3.88), The 'rubbishing' of egalitarianism 
became an intrinsic part of attempts to restore free market individualism 
and promote tax incentives to wealth creation: 
'Nigel's Budget was the obituary for the doctrine of high taxation.. 
It was the epitaph for socialism. ' (Thatcher quoted in Hall, 1988) 
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As Stuart Hall (1988) pointed out, 'this budget was "about" the moral 
values and social principles on which the Thatcherite revolution is 
premised'. 
Thatcherism has long held that the pocr respond to the spur of their 
own poverty (Loney, 1986). Therefore, incentives are seen to operate 
entirely differently upon welfare recipients, who are presented as needing 
the 'incentive' of state work-tests and less eligible levels of benefit to 
persuade them to seek work. Incentives to effort are thus provided, for 
example, Thyy the abolition of Exceptional Needs Payments. The new Social 
Fund, according to Social Security Minister Nicholas Scott, 'will encourage 
claimants to take more responsibility for planning their own spending' 
(Guardian, 25.3.88). The frequent references to the negative effects of the 
'benefit culture' within official discourse on welfare are reminiscent of 
1834 imagery of the idle, indolent poor. 
However, the deserving poor are allegedly 'targetted' for additional 
help in the Social Security reforms and once more the distinction between 
the deserving and undeserving poor is evident in Social Services Secretary 
John Moore's assertion that 
[policy reforms will] ensure a greater coherence, greater fairness 
and greater focussing of help to those in need. ' (Guardian, 23.3.88) 
But representatives of 'Youth Aid' and . of 
'One Parent Families' argue that 
the young and lone parents (the new undeserving poor) will suffer 
disproportionately from these reforms. 
The contradictions between free market and social justice ideologies 
are crucial in explaining the contemporary struggles over the meanings and 
motives of the Social Security reforms, and the 1988 budget. These reforms 
will have effects on claimants and taxpayers: in theory the taxpayer, 
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having been released from the burden of penal rates of taxation, will no 
longer be forced by the 'intolerable inquisition' to avoid paying taxes, 
and, moreover, will be able to give more to charity to 
help the less 
fortunate. Whether tax evasion and avoidance (muted in the neutral term, 
used by Mr Lawson - 'tax breaks'), will be reduced as a result of 
these 
extensive tax cuts for the rich remains to be seen: it will be 
the ultimate 
test of the shaky doctrine of incentives and a litmus test 
for the 
justification for tax evasion as a response to excessive taxation (Chapter 
4). At the same time, the effective reduction in supplementary benefits 
(now 'Income Support') will test the justification that most fraud results 
from poverty: if this is true, then claimants will increasingly find 
themselves before either the courts or the loan sharks. Alternatively, (or 
maybe concomitantly), one result of the 1988 budget may be that if it can 
no longer be argued that the rich have valid excuse for tax evasion, then 
the New Right may indeed have gone a 'budget too far' and undermined the 
belief, (even of S= readers) that the rich are so hardworking and moral 
that they deserve even more 'lovely lolly'. For, as the analyses of this 
thesis have suggested, discourses already exist that would make it 
possible to have very different responses to tax and social security fraud 
than those that currently prevail, responses that may even reduce the 
gross inequalities of regulatory practices. Differential response to tax 
and social security fraud is not determined by immutable economic 
relations; rather it is the product of certain combinations of material and 
ideological conditions. The major claim of this thesis is that its analyses 
have indicated that knowledges about taxation and welfare are forever open 
to deconstruction and challenge. 
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APPENDIX I. BRT GRLBiIES IMRVIEKEE-2 
The names listed are fictitious, in order to preserve the anonymity of 
the interviewees. All the individuals listed below were approached 
informally through existing personal contacts and 'friends of friends', 
with the exception of Pert and Jim, whom I talked to following 
their 
appearance at Magistrates' Court. 
Bill is a 47 year-old self-employed builder and is married with one 
teenage child. He has worked in the building trade all his life and 
has 
been the subject of routine Inland Revenue investigations, frequently does 
jobs 'on the side', but has never been prosecuted for any offence. 
Fred is a 35 year-old British Gas employee who works 'on the side' 
installing cookers, gas fires and central heating. His wife works part-time 
and they have two young children. 
Gerry is a 40 year-old self-employed builders and plumbers' merchant. He 
is successful in business, and is married with three young children. 
Carol is a 32 year-old mother of three who is now married and working, 
but formerly claimed supplementary benefit as a lone mother for several 
years. 
Mark is a 33 year-old single graduate who works casually in a variety of 
occupations while claiming benefit. 
Brian is a 32 year-old divorced graduate who claimed supplementary benefit 
while unemployed for a year. He now has a full-time job. 
Heather is a 28 year-old (divorced) mother with two young children who 
has claimed supplementary benefit for the last five years. 
Anne is aa lone mother with one child. She claimed supplementary benefit 
following her divorce two years ago. 
Lo 
Barry is a 26 year-old married father of four young children who has only 
been able to find temporary and casual jobs since leaving school. He has 
occasionally 'worked an the side' and was prosecuted for working and 
claiming benefit in 1982. 
" Caroline is 29 years old, single and has been unemployed for several 
years. Caroline was prosecuted for working and claiming benefit in 1978 
and received a custodial sentence. (She is about to return to full-time 
education). 
Bert is a recently divorced father of four children. He is now living 
alone in bed and breakfast accommodation and claims supplementary benefit. 
He was prosecuted in 1987 for working while claiming benefit. 
Jim is long-term unemployed and married with three school-aged children. 
He is heavily in debt (for rent arrears, hire purchase and 'club' 
payments). He was prosecuted in 1987 for failing to declare his wife's 
part-time earnings and sentenced to a heavy fine. 
In addition to those specifically mentioned above, 8 other 
supplementary benefit claimants were interviewed in depth, together with 
several taxpayers. In addition, the following individuals and departmental 
officials were interviewed: two Magistrates, three solicitors, two 
accountants, a probation officer, three welfare rights advisers, four 
Inland Revenue officers and one senior Revenue official, three D. H. S. S. 
officers and one senior D. H. S. S. official, National Trades Union 
representatives from the C. P. S. A. and I. R. S. F., a journalist, a buliding 
contractor, a farmer and several small businessmen. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Source: Board of Inland Revenue, 129th Report (1987) 
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APPENDIX 3 SUPPLER ITARY BENEFIT PROSECUTIONS 
1980/81 20,105 (includes 4263 police prosecutions, 5 by the Post Office) 
1981/2 16,423 (" 4146 44 17 14) 
1982/3 13,589 (" 2884 12 
1983/4 9,101 (" 3346 " 2 
1984/5 9,360 (" 2878 2 
1985/6 9,885 ---- ------------------ ------------------- ------------- 
Source - D. H. S. S. p. c. (1985) 
APPENDIX 4 INFORMATION FROM A STUDY OF 206 SUpPLEAEIT RA Y BEHýFýLFRAUD- 
PROSECUTIONS IM ONE MIDLANDS MAGISTRATES' COURT (Oct. 1981 to Aug. 1987) 
1) Gender 
Males - 145 (70%) Females - 61 (30°%) 
2) Pleas 
Guilty - 191 (93%) Not Guilty - 15 (7%) 
3) Verdicts 
Guilty - 201 (97.6%) Not Guilty -5 (2.4%) 
4) Legal Representation 
Claimants represented - 118 (57%) Not represented- 88 (43%) 
5) Sentences passed 
Custodial sentence 17 (8.4%) 
Community Service Order 22 (10.9%) 
Probation Order 26 (12.9%) 
Fine 82 (40.8%) 
Conditional discharge 54 (27%) 
TOTAL 201 
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6) Social Enquiry Reports requested in 44 cases 
7) Compensation Orders made to the D. H. S. S. in 93 cases (46%) 
8) Costs awarded to the D. H. S. S. in 156 cases (78%) 
9) Prosecutions by t ype of offene and gender 
Offence No. of cases men Women 
Non-declaration 113 85 28 
of earnings 
Non-declaration 
of wife's earnings 26 26 - 
Giro/Order Book 45 30 15 
Frauds 
Non-declaration 1 - 1 
of capital 
Other circumstances 15 4 11 
not declared 
Cohabitation/ 6-6 
Fictitious desertion 
TOTAL 206 145 61 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
10) ntenc "mag 
Sentence Total Men Flomen 
Custodial 17 12 5 
C. S. O. 22 21 1 
Probation 26 12 14 
Fine 82 65 17 
Conditional 54 30 24 
discharge 
TOTAL 201 140 61 
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APPENDIX 5 REMIT STATUTES AND CASE 
E TE 
Finance Act 1971 
Finance Act 1982 
Ministry of Social Security Act 1966 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
Social Security Act 1975 
Social Security Act 1986 
Supplementary Benefits Act 176 
Taxes Management Act 1970 
Theft Act 1968 
CASES 
Duke of Westminster v Inland Revenue, 1948. 
The cases which are listed below are identified in Chapter 5 (2) by the 
following abbreviations: 
)Ir and Xrs A. Rv Mr and Mrs T. D. Jamison, North Antrim County Court, 
4th May 1984. 
Mr B. RvR. J. Lunn, Central Criminal Court, 4th to 13th October 1983. 
Xr C. RvP. R. Williams, East Radnor Magistrates Court 12th May 1982. 
Mr D. RvH. M. J. Gadd and J. Gadd and Sons Ltd, Bedford Crown Court 26th 
to 29th October 1981. 
Xr E. RvJ. Grant, Ayr High Court 24th November 1981. 
Xr F. RvR. D. C. Jones, Knightsbridge Crown Court 19th May 1983 
Xr G. RvV. Morrison, Liverpool Crown Court, 12th to 23rd January 1981. 
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Abel-Smith, B. and Townsend, P. (1965) The Poor and the Poorest. London, 
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A. I. T. (1982) Quarterly Record (unpublished - see introduction). 
Alcock, P. and Harris, P. (1982) Valfare Law and Order. London, Macmillan 
Alcock, P. and Shepherd, J. (1987) 'Take-up Campaigns: fighting poverty 
through the post' in Critical Social Policy No. 19 Summer 1987. 
Allat, P. (1981) 'Stereotyping: Familism and the law' in Fryer, B. 
et. al. eds. -(1981) Law State and Society. London, Croom Helm. 
Annual Abstract of Statistics (1985) London, H. M. S. O. 
Atkins, S.. and Hogget, B. (1984) Women and the Law. Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell. 
Atkinson, A. B. (1975)' The Economics of Inequality. alityy. Oxford University 
Press. 
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Butterworths. 
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University Press. 
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